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Dist. 47, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 47

Textus Latinus

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Articulus Unicus. De efficacia voluntatis divinae.

Quaestio I. Utrum voluntas beneplaciti Dei possit impediri.

Et quod voluntas beneplaciti non possit impediri, ostenditur primo auctoritate.

1. Genesis ultimo¹: Numquid Dei possumus resistere voluntati? Quasi dicat: non.

2. Item, ad Romanos nono²: Voluntati eius quis resistit?

3. Item, super illud primae ad Timotheum secundo³: Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri, Glossa: « Rogandus est, ut velit, quod si vult, necesse est fieri ».

4. Item, super illud Psalmi⁴: Iustus Dominus in omnibus operibus suis, Glossa: « Apud Deum hoc est velle, quod facere »; sed non potest impediri ne velit, quia libere vult quod vult: ergo non potest impediri, ne fiat.

5. Item, omnis voluntas, quae potest impediri, potest superari; sed divina voluntas superari non potest, cum sit suprema: ergo divina voluntas non potest impediri.

6. Item, omnis causa, quae impeditur a prosecutione sui effectus, aut deficit, aut mutatur; sed divina voluntas nec deficit nec mutatur nec potest deficere nec mutari: ergo etc.

7. Item, nobilius agens est et nobilior causa, quae non potest impediri, quam quae potest; sed divina voluntas est summa et suprema causa omnium, ut supra⁵ monstratum est: ergo etc.

Ad oppositum:

1. Omnis causa, cuius effectus contingenter evenit, potest impediri — nam si non potest, tunc effectus evenit necessario — sed divina voluntas est huiusmodi, quia est multorum contingentium — alioquin aut nihil esset contingens, quod est contra arbitrii libertatem et consilium et casum, aut Deus non esset illius causa, quorum utrumque absurdum est — ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis causa, quae per aliam agentem expletur, si expletur⁶, potest per illam deficientem impediri, si illa possit deficere — haec propositio per se nota est — sed divina voluntas est huiusmodi — nam Deus vult multa fieri per causas creatas, quae non facit sine ipsis, sicut generare hominem, asinum, et similia; similiter de his quae sunt ab opere nostro; et haec possunt deficere — ergo divina voluntas potest impediri.

3. Item, omnis causa, cuius virtus se extendit ad contrarium voluntatis, potest aliud velle, quam velit⁷; sed divina essentia est huiusmodi — aliquid enim vult Deus, ut istum damnari, cuius oppositum

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potest; hoc certum est, alioquin non esset omnipotens — potest ergo facere oppositum eius quod vult. Sed omne possibile ponibile: ponatur ergo, quod Deus faciat oppositum eius quod voluit; si hoc, voluntas Dei est frustra et impedita: ergo etc.

4. Item, voluntas vult aliquid, quod Deus vult ipsam velle; aut ergo potest velle contrarium, aut non potest. Si potest: ergo divina voluntas potest impediri; si non potest: ergo necesse est libertatem eius arctari.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Dei voluntas consequens non potest nec superari nec cassari nec impediri; antecedens vero potest impediri, sed non superari nec cassari; tamen necessitas, qua voluntas consequens connotat eventum, est necessitas consequentiae, non consequentis.

Respondeo: Ad intelligentiam praedictorum notandum, quod secundum Ioannem Damascenum⁸ voluntas beneplaciti duplex est, scilicet antecedens et consequens: antecedens sive conditionalis, qua vult quantum in se est, omnium salutem, et absoluta, qua determinate vult aliquid, quod novit certitudinaliter evenire.

Intelligendum est ergo, quod nullam Dei voluntatem possibile est superari; nullam possibile est cassari; aliquam tamen, ut antecedentem, possibile est non impleri; aliquam, ut consequentem, necesse est impleri, et impossibile est impediri.

Nullam, inquam, est possibile superari. Nam si homo non faciat quod Deus vult, quantum in se est, sive voluntate antecedente, Deus facit de ipso, quod vult voluntate consequente; et ita semper impletur vel de homine vel ab homine, et sic numquam vincitur vel superatur.

Non etiam possibile est, voluntatem Dei cassari. Nam cassum dicitur aliquid, dum privatur effectu proprio, ad quem est: voluntas autem nulla privatur effectu, ad quem est proprie. Nam quod dicitur, quod Deus vult, omnes homines salvos fieri, quantum in se est, haec voluntas non connotat salutem, nec proprie est ad effectum salutis, sed connotat ordinationem naturae sive naturam ordinabilem ad salutem. Unde nihil plus est dicere: Deus vult istum salvum fieri, quantum in se est, quam⁹ Deo placuit dare isti naturam, per quam posset pervenire ad salutem, et quod Deus paratus esset iuvare, ita quod salus non deficit propter defectum a parte Dei. Unde non cassatur, quia habet proprium effectum. De voluntate autem absoluta planum est, quod non potest cassari, quia omnem effectum suum ponit nec unquam remanet inexpleta.

Cum itaque verum sit, voluntatem Dei nullo modo posse superari nec cassari, tamen voluntatem absolutam necesse est impleri, conditionalem vero minime.

Sed attendendum quod est necessitas consequentis et necessitas consequentiae, sicut supra¹⁰ dictum est de praescientia, quia ipsa non habet necessitatem consequentis, sed consequentiae, quia necessario infert, et sequitur: Deus praescit hoc, ergo hoc erit; sed tamen non necessario praescit, quia in actu praesciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens. — Sic in voluntate intelligendum, quod voluntas Dei absoluta connotat eventum rei; et ideo est ibi necessitas consequentiae, sed non consequentis, quia non mutat eventum rei, immo vult Deus, quod eveniat consequens contingens¹¹. Unde sicut praescientia, quia necessario infert effectum, non potest falli, sic nec voluntas absoluta, quia necessario infert, non potest impediri, immo eam necessarium est impleri. Voluntatem vero conditionatam¹² non necessarium est omnino impleri, nec necessitate consequentis nec necessitate consequentiae, quia non connotat eventum rei, sed connotat illud quod est ordinabile ad eventum, ut praedictum est¹³. Unde bene sequitur: vult istum salvari voluntate absoluta: ergo iste salvabitur; nunquam enim vellet, nisi pariter praesciret, eum esse salvandum. De voluntate vero conditionata, ut visum est¹³, non sequitur.

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Si ergo obiiciatur, quod voluntas Dei est necessaria in se, et necessario infert effectum, ergo omnimodam ponit circa ipsum necessitatem; dicendum, quod quamvis necesse sit, Deum velle et voluntatem eius esse in actu, tamen comparatio eius est ad futurum contingens, et ideo effectus evenit contingenter.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod potest impediri, cum sit causa contingens; dicendum, sicut tactum est¹⁴, quod quamvis comparatio divinae voluntatis sit ad futurum contingens, tamen comparatio divinae voluntatis ad volitum et eventus voliti se necessario concomitantur, sicut unum contingens aliud; et ideo non potest impediri. Tunc enim impeditur causa, quando, manente comparatione et ordinatione eius ad effectum, effectus non evenit. Quod ergo proponitur: omnis causa, cuius effectus est contingens, potest impediri; falsa est propositio et habet instantiam, si effectus necessario concomitetur et consequatur ad causam; et haec est instantia in proposito.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest impediri propter defectum causae cooperantis; dicendum, quod sicut divina voluntas sive divinum velle connotat effectum, ita connotat existentiam causae particularis. Cum enim dicitur: Deus vult istum salvari, non est sensus, quod velit in omnem eventum, sed quod vult istum salvari, et vult istum velle. Unde sicut divina voluntas connotat istum effectum evenire, et ideo necessario sequitur effectus ad ipsam, ita connotat causam creatam concurrere. Et ideo necessario sequitur, si Deus vult istum salvari, quod iste etiam velit; et ita nunquam deficit, sicut nec effectus, et ita nunquam impeditur.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus potest oppositum eius quod vult; dicendum, quod divina voluntas non arctat potentiam in possendo, unde plura potest quam velit; arctat tamen potentiam in agendo — nunquam enim potentia agit aliquid, nisi quod vult — et impossibile est, quod actio superexcedat voluntatem. Unde nihil potest facere, nisi quod potest velle¹⁵. — Quando ergo dicitur, quod potest contrarium suae voluntatis; potest intelligi dupliciter: aut voluntate movente ad contrarium, et sic notatur repugnantia voluntatis ad potentiam, et hoc est impossibile; aut voluntate non movente, et sic non notatur impedimentum nec repugnantia, sed voluntas libere potest, quae ita potest hoc, quod eius oppositum. Ita enim vult hoc, quod potest velle eius oppositum absque sui mutatione, sicut supra¹⁶ dictum est de praescientia. Et ratio huius est, quia uno et eodem vult quaecumque vult.

Ad 4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod voluntas Dei secundum convenientiam ad praescientiam vult illa quae vult. Unde sicut praescientia ambit totum velle et posse et agere, et non potest falli aliquid non subtrahendo contingentiae rei evenientis; sic etiam in proposito intelligendum.

Scholion

I. Hac quaestione confirmantur et explicantur ea quae dicta sunt supra d. 16. q. I. de voluntate antecedente et consequente, et d. 38. a. 2. q. 1, et d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. 2. de contingentia rerum, quae nec Dei praescientia nec praedestinatione tollitur. — Notanda est hic differentia inter superari, cassari, non impleri, uti bene a Seraphico explicatur; item in solutione ad 2. doctrina gravis momenti quod in voluntate consequente connotetur non tantum effectus salutis, sed etiam efficientia causae secundae (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 1. ad 3; S. I. q. 19. a. 6 ad 3; Richard. a Med., hic q. I. ad 3.). — Quoad solutionem ad 3. cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2, ubi similis difficultas quoad praescientiam divinam discutitur.

II. Auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 36. m. 2, et q. 40. m. 4. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, I. Sent. d. 46. q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 19. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, et d. 46. a. 1; S. p. 1. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. 2. — Richard. Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. unica. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1. 2.

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English Translation

Article Unique. On the efficacy of the divine will.

Question I. Whether the will of good-pleasure of God can be impeded.

That the will of good-pleasure cannot be impeded is shown, first, from authority.

1. Genesis, last chapter¹: Can we resist the will of God? As if to say: no.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, ninth chapter²: Who resists his will?

3. Likewise, on that text of first Timothy, chapter two³: Who wills all men to be saved, the Gloss: « He is to be entreated to will it, because if he wills, it must necessarily come to pass ».

4. Likewise, on that of the Psalm⁴: The Lord is just in all his works, the Gloss: « With God, to will is the same as to do »; but he cannot be impeded from willing, because he freely wills what he wills: therefore he cannot be impeded from bringing it about.

5. Likewise, every will that can be impeded can be overcome; but the divine will cannot be overcome, since it is supreme: therefore the divine will cannot be impeded.

6. Likewise, every cause that is impeded from the prosecution of its effect either fails or is changed; but the divine will neither fails nor changes, nor can it fail or change: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, that is the nobler agent and the nobler cause which cannot be impeded, rather than that which can; but the divine will is the highest and supreme cause of all things, as has been shown above⁵: therefore etc.

On the opposite side:

1. Every cause whose effect comes about contingently can be impeded — for if it cannot, then the effect comes about of necessity — but the divine will is of this sort, because it is the cause of many contingent things — otherwise, either nothing would be contingent, which is contrary to freedom of choice and counsel and chance, or God would not be the cause of it, both of which are absurd — therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every cause that is fulfilled through another acting agent, if it is so fulfilled⁶, can be impeded through that agent's failing, if it is able to fail — this proposition is known per se — but the divine will is of this kind — for God wills many things to be done through created causes, which he does not do without them, such as to beget a man, a donkey, and the like; likewise concerning those things which are from our own action; and these can fail — therefore the divine will can be impeded.

3. Likewise, every cause whose power extends to the contrary of [its] will can will something other than it wills⁷; but the divine essence is of this kind — for God wills something, such as that this man be damned, the opposite of which

he can [will]; this is certain, otherwise he would not be omnipotent — he is therefore able to do the opposite of what he wills. But every possibility is positable: let it then be posited that God does the opposite of what he willed; if this is so, the will of God is frustrated and impeded: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the will wills something, which God wills the will itself to will; either, then, it can will the contrary, or it cannot. If it can: therefore the divine will can be impeded; if it cannot: therefore his liberty must necessarily be constrained.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. The consequent will of God cannot be overcome nor frustrated nor impeded; the antecedent, however, can be impeded, but cannot be overcome nor frustrated; nevertheless the necessity, by which the consequent will connotes the outcome, is the necessity of consequence, not of the consequent.

Respondeo: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, according to John Damascene⁸, the will of good-pleasure is twofold, namely antecedent and consequent: the antecedent or conditional, by which he wills, so far as in him lies, the salvation of all, and the absolute, by which he wills determinately something which he knows will certainly come to pass.

It must therefore be understood that no will of God is it possible to overcome; none is it possible to frustrate; some, however, namely the antecedent, it is possible not to fulfill; some, namely the consequent, it is necessary to fulfill, and impossible to impede.

None, I say, is it possible to overcome. For if a man does not do what God wills, so far as in him lies, that is, by his antecedent will, God brings it about concerning him that he wills by the consequent will; and so it is always fulfilled either concerning the man or by the man, and thus is never conquered nor overcome.

Nor is it possible for the will of God to be frustrated. For something is called frustrated when it is deprived of its proper effect to which it is [directed]: but no will is deprived of the effect to which it is properly [directed]. For what is said — that God wills all men to be saved, so far as in him lies — this will does not connote salvation, nor is it properly directed to the effect of salvation, but it connotes the ordination of nature, or nature as ordinable to salvation. Whence it is no more to say: God wills this man to be saved, so far as in him lies, than⁹ it pleased God to give to this man a nature through which he could attain salvation, and that God was ready to help, in such a way that salvation does not fail through any defect on God's part. Whence it is not frustrated, because it has its proper effect. — Concerning the absolute will, however, it is plain that it cannot be frustrated, because it puts forth every one of its effects, nor does it ever remain unfulfilled.

Since therefore it is true that the will of God can in no way be overcome nor frustrated, yet the absolute will must necessarily be fulfilled, while the conditional [must] not at all.

But it must be noted that there is a necessity of the consequent and a necessity of consequence, as was said above¹⁰ concerning foreknowledge, because foreknowledge does not have the necessity of the consequent, but of consequence, because it necessarily infers, and it follows: God foreknows this, therefore this will be; but nevertheless he does not necessarily foreknow, because in the act of foreknowing a contingent effect is frequently noted. — So in the will it is to be understood, that the absolute will of God connotes the outcome of the thing; and therefore there is in it a necessity of consequence, but not of the consequent, because it does not change the outcome of the thing, but rather God wills that a contingent consequent come about¹¹. Whence, just as foreknowledge, because it necessarily infers the effect, cannot fail, so neither can the absolute will, because it necessarily infers, be impeded; on the contrary, it is necessary that it be fulfilled. The conditioned will¹², however, is not necessarily fulfilled in every respect, neither by the necessity of the consequent nor by the necessity of consequence, because it does not connote the outcome of the thing, but connotes that which is ordinable to the outcome, as was said before¹³. Whence it well follows: he wills this man to be saved with absolute will: therefore this man will be saved; for he would never will it unless he likewise foreknew that he was to be saved. Concerning the conditioned will, however, as has been seen¹³, it does not so follow.

If, therefore, it be objected that the will of God is necessary in itself, and necessarily infers its effect, therefore it sets every kind of necessity around it; it must be said, that although it is necessary that God will, and that his will be in act, nevertheless its relation is to a contingent future, and therefore the effect comes about contingently.

To the arguments:

To 1. To that which is objected, that it can be impeded because it is a contingent cause; it must be said, as has been touched upon¹⁴, that although the comparison of the divine will is to a contingent future, nevertheless the comparison of the divine will to the willed object and the outcome of the willed object necessarily accompany each other, as one contingent [does] another; and therefore it cannot be impeded. For a cause is impeded when, the relation and ordering of it to the effect remaining, the effect does not come about. Therefore what is proposed — that every cause whose effect is contingent can be impeded — the proposition is false and has an instance against it, namely when the effect necessarily accompanies and follows from the cause; and this is the instance in our case.

To 2. To that which is objected, that it can be impeded through the defect of the cooperating cause; it must be said, that just as the divine will or divine willing connotes the effect, so it connotes the existence of the particular cause. For when it is said: God wills this man to be saved, the sense is not, that he wills it in every event, but that he wills this man to be saved, and wills this man to will [it]. Whence, just as the divine will connotes this effect to come about, and therefore the effect necessarily follows from it, so it connotes the created cause to concur. And therefore it necessarily follows: if God wills this man to be saved, that he also wills [it]; and so it never fails, just as neither does the effect, and so it is never impeded.

To 3. To that which is objected, that God can [will] the opposite of what he wills; it must be said, that the divine will does not constrain the power in respect of being-able, whence it is able to do more than it wills; yet it does constrain the power in acting — for the power never does anything except what is willed — and it is impossible that the action exceed the will. Whence it can do nothing except what it can will¹⁵. — When therefore it is said, that he can [will] the contrary of his will; it can be understood in two ways: either by a will moving toward the contrary, and so a repugnance of the will to the power is signified, and this is impossible; or by a will not moving, and so neither impediment nor repugnance is signified, but the will is freely able, [a will] which thus is able to [will] this in such a way that [it can also will] its opposite. For it wills this in such a way that it can will its opposite without any change in itself, as was said above¹⁶ concerning foreknowledge. And the reason for this is that he wills by one and the same [act] whatever he wills.

To 4. To the last [argument] it must be said, that the will of God, in accordance with [its] correspondence to foreknowledge, wills those things which it wills. Whence, just as foreknowledge embraces the whole of willing and being-able and acting, and cannot fail without thereby withdrawing something from the contingency of the thing that comes about; so likewise it must be understood in our case.

Scholion

I. By this question are confirmed and explained those things said above in d. 16, q. 1, concerning the antecedent and consequent will, and in d. 38, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 40, a. 1, q. 1–2, concerning the contingency of things, which is not taken away by God's foreknowledge nor by predestination. — Notable here is the difference between being overcome, being frustrated, not being fulfilled, as the Seraphic [Doctor] explains well; likewise in the solution Ad 2, a doctrine of grave moment, namely that in the consequent will is connoted not only the effect of salvation, but also the efficiency of the secondary cause (cf. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; Summa I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 3; Richard de Mediavilla, here q. 1, ad 3). — As to the solution Ad 3, cf. above d. 38, a. 2, q. 2, where a similar difficulty concerning divine foreknowledge is discussed.

II. Authors: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. 1, q. 36, m. 2, and q. 40, m. 4. — Scotus, in both Scripta, I Sent., d. 46, q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 19, a. 6. — B. Albert, here a. 1, and d. 46, a. 1; Summa p. 1, tr. 20, q. 79, m. 2, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 1, 2. — Richard de Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 princ., q. unica. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I Sent., d. 46, q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following question, I Sent., d. 46, q. 1, 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 19.
Verse 19.
Vers. 19.
Verse 19.
Vers. 4. — Verba integra Glossae ordinariae hic citata haec sunt: Rogandus est, ut velit, quia necesse est fieri, si ipse voluerit.
Verse 4. — The complete words of the Ordinary Gloss here cited are: He is to be entreated to will, because it is necessary that it be done, if he himself wills it.
Psalm. cxliv, 17: Iustus Dominus in omnibus viis suis, et sanctus in omnibus operibus suis. — Pro Apud Deum in ed. Gloss. legitur Apud illum.
Psalm 144:17: The Lord is just in all his ways, and holy in all his works. — For With God the edition of the Gloss reads With him.
Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, et August., II. de Gen. contra Manichaeos, c. 29. n. 44, ait: Cuius enim voluntas superat omnia, nulla ex parte quidquam sentit invitus.
Cf. here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 1; and Augustine, II On Genesis against the Manichees, c. 29, n. 44, says: He whose will surpasses all things, suffers nothing against his will in any respect.
In Vat. desideratur si expletur.
In the Vatican edition si expletur is wanting.
Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3 (VIII. c. 2.) distinguit potentias, quae cum ratione sunt, ab irrationalibus et dein addit: Et quae quidem cum ratione omnes, eaedem contrariorum sunt; irrationales vero, una unius, ut calidum ipsius calefaciendi solius: medicandi vero potentia infirmitatis et sanitatis. — Vat. hanc propositionem sic depravavit: Omnis causa... ad contrarium, voluntate potest etc. Eadem Vat. cum cod. cc aliquanto inferius post si hoc interiicit ergo.
Aristotle, IX Metaphysics text 3 (VIII, c. 2), distinguishes rational from irrational potencies, then adds: And all those that go with reason are themselves potencies of contraries; but the irrational, one of one only, as the hot of heating only; the potency of medicine, however, [is] of sickness and health. — The Vatican edition has corrupted this proposition thus: Every cause... to the contrary, can by will etc. The same Vatican edition with cod. cc, somewhat further down after si hoc, inserts ergo.
Libr. II. de Fide orthodoxa c. 29. Ipsa Damasceni verba iam allata sunt pag. 728, nota 2. — Mox post scilicet antecedens et consequens vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 perperam non repetunt antecedens, quod contextu exigente adiecimus; Vat. etiam omittit hoc verbum antecedens simul cum praecedentibus et consequens, sed deinde post et absoluta ponit sive consequens, et ita Vat. lectio non est vituperanda. Cfr. supra d. 16. q. I. in corp.
Book II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 29. The very words of Damascene have already been cited at p. 728, note 2. — Just after scilicet antecedens et consequens, the older codices and ed. 1 wrongly do not repeat antecedens, which we have added since the context demands it; the Vatican edition also omits this word antecedens together with the preceding et consequens, but later after et absoluta it puts sive consequens, and so the Vatican reading is not to be censured. Cf. above d. 16, q. 1, in corp.
Post quam cod. H (T a secunda manu) subiicit hoc, cod. W scilicet, codd. AGIV ff subiiciunt id est. — De doctrina hic proposita cfr. supra d. 16. q. I, et August., de Spiritu et littera, c. 33. n. 37. seq.
After quam cod. H (T, by a second hand) adds hoc; cod. W scilicet; codd. AGIV ff add id est. — Concerning the doctrine here proposed, cf. above d. 16, q. 1, and Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 33, n. 37 ff.
Dist. 38. a. 2. q. I. — Paulo ante Vat. omittit necessitas consequentis et, ac paulo inferius post de praescientia particulam quia.
Distinction 38, a. 2, q. 1. — A little before, the Vatican edition omits necessitas consequentis et; and a little further down, after de praescientia, the particle quia.
Ed. 1 contingenter. Post pauca pro sic nec Vat. sic. Revera nec rectius omitteretur, sed exstat in omnibus codd.
Edition 1 reads contingenter. A little further on, for sic nec the Vatican edition has sic. In truth nec would more rightly be omitted, but it stands in all the codices.
Dist. 46. q. 1. — Vat. hanc propositionem sic incipit: Voluntatem autem antecedentem vel conditionatam non est necesse impleri etc., et dein pro connotat eventum exhibet connotat effectum.
Distinction 46, q. 1. — The Vatican edition begins this proposition thus: The antecedent or conditional will, however, is not necessarily fulfilled etc., and then for connotat eventum it gives connotat effectum.
Paulo ante, et supra d. 46. q. I. — Post pauca Vat. omittit verba in se.
A little before, and above d. 46, q. 1. — A little further on the Vatican edition omits the words in se.
Hic in corp. — Verba immediate sequentia quod, quamvis comparatio divinae voluntatis sit ad futurum contingens, tamen Vat. suppressit, eorum loco ponens voculam cum, et dein pro sicut unum contingens aliud substituit sicut unum est contingens, ita et aliud. In fine huius propos. pro evenit codd. V G P S T W cc ee ff et ed. 1 eveniet. — Verba quae in media hac propositione habentur: se necessario comitentur, respiciunt necessitatem consequentiae, non consequentis, cum qua stat contingentia effectus.
Here, in the corpus. — The words immediately following quod, quamvis comparatio divinae voluntatis sit ad futurum contingens, tamen the Vatican edition has suppressed, putting in their place the little word cum, and then for sicut unum contingens aliud it substitutes sicut unum est contingens, ita et aliud. At the end of this proposition, for evenit, the codices V G P S T W cc ee ff and ed. 1 have eveniet. — The words which appear in the middle of this proposition, se necessario comitentur, regard the necessity of consequence, not of the consequent, with which the contingency of the effect stands.
Id est praescindendo ab omni conditione. — Paulo superius pro existentiam causae Vat. sola efficientiam causae, codd. LO coexistentiam causae. Paulo inferius pro et vult cod. O id est vult, non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 tantummodo vult.
That is, by setting aside every condition. — A little higher up, for existentiam causae the Vatican edition alone has efficientiam causae; codices L and O [read] coexistentiam causae. A little further down, for et vult, cod. O [reads] id est vult; not a few codices with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 read tantummodo vult.
Cfr. supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 2. in fine. — Dist. 38. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro sed voluntas libere potest, quae Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. sed quod voluntas libere potest, quia.
Cf. above d. 43, a. 1, q. 2, at the end. — Distinction 38, a. 2, q. 2. — A little higher up, for sed voluntas libere potest, quae the Vatican edition with one or two codices [reads] sed quod voluntas libere potest, quia.

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