Dist. 45, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 45
Articulus I. De voluntate divina quantum ad quidditatem.
Quaestio I. Utrum in Deo sit ponere voluntatem.
Quod autem in Deo non sit ponere voluntatem, ostenditur auctoritate et ratione.
1. Primo sic: Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio1: « Voluntas est rationalis motus sensui praesidens et appetitui »; sed in Deo non est motus nec sensus nec appetitus: ergo neque voluntas.
2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus2: « Voluntas est animi motus ad aliquid prosequendum, vel fugiendum »; sed in Deo non est ponere fugam nec prosecutionem: ergo nec voluntatem.
3. Item, ratione3: quia voluntas est potentia in nobis maxime vertibilis, unde aliae potentiae non possunt in malum, sed sola voluntas est, a qua est peccatum; sed in Deo nulla est omnino vertibilitas ad malum: ergo etc.
4. Item, voluntas, eo ipso quod voluntas est, est ad opposita, eo quod ad opposita, est contingens et variabilis; in Deo autem nulla cadit contingentia nec varietas: ergo etc. Probatio primae. Voluntas, eo ipso quod voluntas, est potestas rationalis; sed « potestates rationales sunt ad opposita », sicut dicit Philosophus4: ergo etc. Similiter, eo ipso quo est voluntas, est libera; et si hoc, non est determinata ad unum, quia tunc non haberet libertatem, sicut nec potentiae naturales: ergo est ad opposita, et ita variabilis.
Sed contra:
1. Ad Ephesios primo5 dicit Apostolus: Secundum consilium voluntatis suae. Et iterum ibidem: Secundum propositum voluntatis suae; et tota Scriptura est plena hoc nomine voluntatis, ut est in Deo: ergo etc.
2. Item, Philosophus in duodecimo6 concludit, quod « voluntas est actio ipsius Dei ».
3. Item, ratione videtur, quia voluntas est illud, penes quod residet inter creata summa potentia7: ergo si voluntas de se dicit potestatem, quia omnibus praesidet in regno animae, et nihil potest sibi imperare; sed Deus est potentissimus, et omne quod potentiae est, sibi attribuendum est: ergo etc.
4. Item, voluntas est, in qua consistit summa voluptas sive felicitas — beatus enim est qui habet « omne quod vult »8; unde nihil delectatur nisi habens voluntatem vel aliquid simile voluntati — sed Deus est felicissimus, in quo est omnis felicitas et iucunditas: ergo etc.
5. Item, voluntas est illud, penes quod residet iustitia et aequitas — iustitia enim non est aliud quam rectitudo voluntatis9; unde non habentia voluntatem non sunt capabilia iustitiae — sed Deus est iustissimus secundum omnem intellectum: ergo habet voluntatem.
6. Item, voluntas est vis, secundum quam attenditur summa liberalitas — omnis enim liberalitas
venit ex amore, sed constat, quod amor est actus voluntatis — in Deo autem est ponere summam liberalitatem: ergo et amorem et voluntatem.
Conclusio.
Conclusio. Voluntas est in Deo magis proprie et completiore modo quam in nobis, et sine ullis imperfectionibus.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in Deo est ponere voluntatem, sicut ostendunt quatuor rationes praedictae, propter quatuor conditiones, scilicet potestatis, voluptatis, aequitatis et liberalitatis, quae sunt circa voluntatem; et magis proprie in Deo et completiori modo quam in nobis.
Voluntas enim in nobis est per differentiam a substantia et actu et per distantiam a fine1011; in Deo autem per omnimodam indifferentiam horum, scilicet substantiae, virtutis, actus et finis. Et quia in nobis est per differentiam a substantia et ab actu, ideo aliis praesidens et secundum diversos actus variabilis. Propter12 differentiam enim a substantia, in qua possunt et aliae potentiae radicari, praesidet aliis potentiis, ut sensui et appetitui. Propter differentiam ab actu est variabilitas secundum alternationem affectionum. In Deo autem neutrum; ideo13 nec regit inferiores potentias, nec habet variari secundum affectiones varias. Et ideo quia in nobis est per distantiam a fine, inde est quod est indigens, et ideo in ea est fuga et appetitus, et cadit in ea etiam tristitia, cadit et malitia, quia potest a fine obliquari, cum non sit illi coniuncta. In Deo autem est omnino fini coniuncta, ideo nec fugam nec appetitum habet, nec tristitiam nec malitiam, sed omnimodam laetitiam et iustitiam.
Ad argumenta in contrarium:
Ad 1. 2. 3. Et sic patet responsio ad prima tria, quia quamvis istae conditiones: appetitus, fuga, malitia sive vertibilitas, conditiones sint voluntatis creatae, tamen omnino a voluntate divina semotae sunt.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est contingens et variabilis: dicendum, quod est contingentia vel in actu vel in effectu. Si loquamur de contingentia in effectu, non tantum est in effectu nostro, sed etiam in multis, quae a Deo sunt. Multa enim facit Deus, quae posset non facere, nullo repugnante. Si autem loquamur de contingentia in actu, quo voluntas aliquid modo desinit velle et incipit velle, modo vult aliquid, modo vult oppositum14; haec cadit in voluntate humana, quia inter voluntatem humanam et actum est differentia; unde nec semper est in uno actu, nec in actu uniformi. Divina autem voluntas propter identitatem sui cum actu omnino variari non potest, nec habet in se aliquam contingentiam; et ideo patent omnia quaesita.
I. De voluntate in sensu proprio tractatur in art. 1. et 2; de voluntate signi in art. 3; de libertate, quae competit voluntati divinae in operibus ad extra, non pauca dicuntur in tractatu de libero arbitrio II. Sent. d. 25. praesertim p. I. q. 1. 2; p. II. q. 1. 2. — Quomodo libertas Dei cum eius immutabilitate possit componi, est difficilima quaestio, in qua enodanda plurimum laborant theologi; cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. 2; d. 35. q. 2. ad. 3; d. 13. dub. 4; d. 39. dub. 5; d. 47. q. 1. 2. Docti in conclusionibus convenirent; aliqui tamen sunt qui prosecutionem et fugam aliquo modo ad Deum transferri posse putant.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 34. m. 1. 2. — Scot., Report. hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 19. a. 1; S. c. Gent. l. c. 72. 73. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2; S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 45. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.
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Article I. On the divine will according to its quiddity.
Question I. Whether the will is to be posited in God.
That, however, the will is not to be posited in God, is shown by authority and by reason.
1. First, thus: Augustine in the book On Free Will1: « The will is a rational motion presiding over sense and appetite »; but in God there is no motion, nor sense, nor appetite: therefore neither will.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On the Two Souls2: « The will is a motion of the soul toward pursuing something, or fleeing it »; but in God there is no flight nor pursuit to be posited: therefore neither will.
3. Likewise, by reason3: because the will is the power in us most subject to turning — whence the other powers cannot [be turned] toward evil, but the will alone is that from which sin comes; but in God there is no turning whatsoever toward evil: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, the will, by the very fact that it is will, is toward opposites; and because [it is] toward opposites, it is contingent and variable; but in God there falls no contingency nor variety: therefore, etc. Proof of the first [proposition]: The will, by the very fact that it is will, is a rational power; but « rational powers are toward opposites », as the Philosopher says4: therefore, etc. Likewise, by the very fact that it is will, it is free; and if so, it is not determined to one thing — because then it would not have freedom, as neither do the natural powers [have it]: therefore it is toward opposites, and so variable.
On the contrary:
1. To the Ephesians, chapter 15, the Apostle says: According to the counsel of his will. And again in the same place: According to the purpose of his will; and all of Scripture is full of this name will as [predicated] of God: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the twelfth [book]6 concludes that « the will is an action of God himself ».
3. Likewise, by reason it appears [thus], because the will is that in which, among created things, supreme power resides7: therefore if the will of itself bespeaks power — because it presides over all things in the kingdom of the soul, and nothing can command it; but God is most powerful, and whatever belongs to power must be attributed to him: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, the will is that in which the highest pleasure or happiness consists — for « blessed is he who has all that he wills »8; whence nothing takes delight unless it has a will or something similar to a will — but God is most happy, in whom is all happiness and gladness: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, the will is that in which justice and equity reside — for justice is nothing other than the rectitude of the will9; whence things not having a will are not capable of justice — but God is most just according to every understanding [of justice]: therefore he has a will.
6. Likewise, the will is the power by which supreme generosity is measured — for all generosity
comes from love, but it is plain that love is an act of the will — in God, moreover, supreme generosity is to be posited: therefore also love and will.
Conclusion.
Conclusion. The will is in God more properly and in a more complete mode than in us, and without any imperfections.
I respond: It must be said that the will is to be posited in God, as the four foregoing reasons show, on account of the four conditions — namely, of power, of pleasure, of equity, and of generosity — which pertain to the will; and [it is to be posited] more properly in God and in a more complete mode than in us.
For the will in us is [present] by [way of] difference from substance and act, and by distance from [its] end1011; but in God [it is] by [way of] complete non-difference of these — namely, of substance, of virtue, of act, and of end. And because in us it is [there] by difference from substance and from act, therefore [it is] presiding over the others and variable according to diverse acts. For on account of12 [its] difference from substance, in which the other powers too can be rooted, [the will] presides over the other powers, such as sense and appetite. On account of [its] difference from act, there is variability according to the alternation of affections. But in God there is neither; therefore13 it neither rules inferior powers, nor undergoes variation according to varying affections. And so, because in us it is [there] by distance from [its] end, thence it is that [the soul] is needy, and therefore in [the will] there is flight and appetite, and there also falls in it sadness, and there falls also malice, because it can be turned aside from the end, since it is not joined to it. In God, however, [the will] is altogether joined to the end; therefore it has neither flight nor appetite, nor sadness nor malice, but altogether gladness and justice.
Replies to the contrary arguments:
Ad 1, 2, 3. And thus the reply to the first three is plain, because although these conditions — appetite, flight, malice or turnability — are conditions of the created will, yet they are altogether removed from the divine will.
Ad 4. To that which is objected, that [the will] is contingent and variable: it must be said that contingency is either in act or in effect. If we speak of contingency in effect, [such contingency] is not only in our own effect, but also in many [things] which are from God. For God does many things which he could not do, with nothing opposing. But if we speak of contingency in act — by which the will at one moment ceases to will something and begins to will [it], at one moment wills something, at another wills the opposite14 — this [contingency] falls in the human will, because between the human will and [its] act there is a difference; whence it is not always in one act, nor in a uniform act. The divine will, however, on account of the identity of itself with [its] act, cannot vary at all, nor has it any contingency in itself; and therefore all the questions asked become clear.
I. Of the will in the proper sense, [the matter] is treated in articles 1 and 2; of the will of sign in article 3; of the freedom which belongs to the divine will in its outward works, not a little is said in the treatise on free will, Sent. II d. 25, especially p. I q. 1. 2; p. II q. 1. 2. — How the freedom of God can be reconciled with his immutability is a most difficult question, in the unraveling of which theologians labor greatly; cf. above d. 8 p. I a. 2 q. 1. 2; d. 35 q. 2 ad 3; d. 13 dub. 4; d. 39 dub. 5; d. 47 q. 1. 2. The learned agree in their conclusions; some, however, there are who think that pursuit and flight can in some way be transferred to God.
II. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I q. 34 m. 1. 2. — Scot., Report. here q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., here q. 1 a. 1; Summa I q. 19 a. 1; Summa contra Gent. l. [I] cc. 72. 73. — B. Albert, here a. 1. 2; Summa p. I tr. 20 q. 79 m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1 a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1 q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 45 q. 1. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q., here q. 1.
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- Definitio hic proposita formata videtur ex iis quae S. August., l. de Lib. Arb. c. 8-11. n. 18-21, et III. c. 1. n. 1-4. de actibus rationis et voluntatis ceteros animi motus regentibus etc. profert. In cod. T a secunda manu loco libri de Libero Arbitrio citatur liber de Gratia et libero arbitrio, in quo tamen (c. 5. n. 3.) tantum docetur, hominis esse resistere concupiscentiae. In eodem cod. T (in marg.) paulo ante verbo Primo praemittitur Auctoritate.The definition here proposed appears to be formed from those things which St. Augustine, in book I On Free Will c. 8-11 n. 18-21, and book III c. 1 n. 1-4, brings forward concerning the acts of reason and of will which govern the other motions of the soul, etc. In codex T, by a second hand, in place of the book On Free Will, the book On Grace and Free Will is cited — in which, however (c. 5 n. 3), only that it pertains to man to resist concupiscence is taught. In the same codex T (in the margin) a little before the word Primo is prefixed Auctoritate ("By authority").
- Cap. 10. n. 14: Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum.Chapter 10, n. 14: The will is a motion of the soul, with nothing compelling, toward either not losing or acquiring something.
- Vat. et nonnulli codd. subiiciunt videtur. — De ipso argumento cfr. Anselm., de Conceptu virg. c. 3. seq.The Vatican edition and some codices add videtur ("it appears"). — On the argument itself, cf. Anselm, On the Conception of the Virgin, c. 3 and following.
- Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. seq, et text. 10. (VIII. c. 1. et 5.). Voluntatem esse potentiam rationalem, docet Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 42. et 50. (c. 9. et 10.). — In textu cit. pro ad opposita Vat. cum cod. cc ad oppositum. Mox pro eo ipso quo codd. H R X bb ee eo ipso quod. In fine arg. pro et ita Vat. est igitur.Book IX Metaph., text 3 and following, and text 10 (VIII c. 1 and 5). That the will is a rational power Aristotle teaches in book III On the Soul, text 42 and 50 (c. 9 and 10). — In the cited text, for ad opposita the Vatican edition with codex cc reads ad oppositum. Shortly afterward, for eo ipso quo codices H R X bb ee read eo ipso quod. At the end of the argument, for et ita the Vatican [reads] est igitur.
- Vers. 11. — Textus sequens habetur ibid. v. 5.Verse 11. — The following text is found in the same place, v. 5.
- Id est: Metaphys. text. 39. (XI. c. 7): « Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονή » i. e. iuxta versionem Arabico-latinam: Voluptas [delectatio] enim est actio ipsius, scil. primi principii. S. Doctor hic pro voluptas substituit voluntas, quod non est falsum, quia voluptas non est sine voluntate. Cfr. etiam quae dicit in 4. argumento, et quae docet supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1. de delectatione et fruitione.That is: Metaphysics text 39 (XI c. 7): « Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονή » — i.e., according to the Arabic-Latin version: For pleasure [delight] is an action of [the principle] itself, namely of the first principle. The Holy Doctor here substitutes voluntas (will) for voluptas (pleasure), which is not false, since pleasure is not without will. Cf. also what he says in argument 4, and what he teaches above d. 1 a. 2 q. 1 on delight and enjoyment.
- Cfr. August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 12. — Quod attinet ad rationem, quae mox adducitur: quia omnibus praesidet etc., Anselmus in libr. de Conceptu virg. c. 1. ait: Deus nos et potestatem, quae in nobis est, subiecit voluntati, ut ad imperium eius non possimus non movere nos et facere quod vult, immo illa movet nos velut instrumenta sua... Dominae, quam Deus nobis dedit, nec possumus nec debemus non obedire etc. — Circa finem argumenti pro potentiae, quam vocem ex codd. F H K T et ed. 1 restituimus, Vat. possibile.Cf. Augustine, On Genesis to the Letter VIII c. 6 n. 12. — As regards the reasoning which is presently adduced: because it presides over all things, etc., Anselm in the book On the Conception of the Virgin c. 1 says: God has subjected to the will both us and the power which is in us, so that at its command we cannot but move ourselves and do what it wills — indeed, it moves us as its own instruments... To the mistress whom God has given us, we can neither nor ought we fail to obey, etc. — Near the end of the argument, for potentiae — a reading which we have restored from codices F H K T and edition 1 — the Vatican [edition] reads possibile.
- August., XIII. de Trin. c. 5. n. 8: Beatus igitur non est, nisi qui et habet omnia quae vult et nihil vult male. Cfr. de Beata Vita, n. 10. seqq. — De seq. propos. cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 8.Augustine, On the Trinity XIII c. 5 n. 8: Therefore he is not blessed except he who both has all that he wills and wills nothing evilly. Cf. On the Blessed Life, n. 10 and following. — On the following proposition, cf. above d. 1 dub. 8.
- Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 12. iustitiam sic definit: Iustitia igitur est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata.Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, c. 12, defines justice thus: Justice, therefore, is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake.
- Cfr. supra d. 10. p. I. q. 1. seq.Cf. above, d. 10, p. I, q. 1 and following.
- Sive differt a substantia animae et ab actu volendi et distat a fine. — De differentia voluntatis a substantia animae et ab actu volendi cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, et d. 8. p. II. q. 2; de distantia voluntatis a fine cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 1. et 2.Or: it differs from the substance of the soul and from the act of willing, and is distant from [its] end. — On the difference of the will from the substance of the soul and from the act of willing, cf. above d. 3 p. II a. 1 q. 3, and d. 8 p. II q. 2; on the distance of the will from [its] end, cf. above d. 1 a. 3 q. 1 and 2.
- Cod. V ante Propter repetit praesidem, novam propositionem sic incipiens: Praesidens: propter. Paulo inferius pro variabilitas secundum alternationem Vat. variabilis secundum alterationem.Codex V before Propter repeats praesidem, beginning a new sentence thus: Praesidens: propter. A little below, for variabilitas secundum alternationem the Vatican [edition reads] variabilis secundum alterationem.
- Vat. omittit ideo, pro quo cod. H iterum. Lectio a nobis recepta minus plana est, sed fere omnibus codd. confirmatur. Paulo inferius pro quia potest cod. M qua potest.The Vatican edition omits ideo, for which codex H [reads] iterum. The reading we have adopted is less smooth, but is confirmed by nearly all the codices. A little below, for quia potest codex M [reads] qua potest.
- Vat. cum cod. cc sic in actu, quod voluntas modo vult aliquid modo desinit aliquid velle, quam lectionem ex cod. T emendavimus, contextu hoc postulante. Alii codd. nostrae lectioni non nisi ex parte suffragantur; sic codd. H X etiam pro quod voluntas exhibent quo voluntas, et codd. K R cum ed. 1 omittunt aliquid ante velle. Non pauci codd. verbo velle falso praemittunt esse. Paulo inferius pro quia inter complures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 perperam quare inter, et in fine solutionis ed. 1 obiecta pro quaesita.The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] sic in actu, quod voluntas modo vult aliquid modo desinit aliquid velle ("thus in act, that the will at one moment wills something, at one moment ceases to will something") — which reading we have emended from codex T, the context requiring this. The other codices support our reading only in part; thus codices H X also, for quod voluntas, exhibit quo voluntas, and codices K R with ed. 1 omit aliquid before velle. Not a few codices falsely prefix esse to the verb velle. A little below, for quia inter several codices with editions 2 and 3 wrongly [read] quare inter, and at the end of the solution ed. 1 [reads] obiecta for quaesita.