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Dist. 45, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 45

Textus Latinus
p. 800

Quaestio II. Utrum Deus dicatur omnivolens, sicut omnisciens et omnipotens.

Secundo, supposito quod in Deo sit ponere voluntatem, quaeritur, utrum ipsum1 sit ponere omnivolentem, ut ita dicatur a voluntate omnivolens, sicut a potentia et scientia omnipotens et omnisciens. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Deus non dicitur omnipotens, eo quod possit omnia, sed quia potest omne quod decet eius potentiam — non enim potest mala — sed similiter Deus vult omne quod decet voluntatem eius velle: ergo debet dici omnivolens, sicut omnipotens.

2. Item, sicut se habet cognitiva Dei ad verum, ita se habet affectiva sive voluntas ad bonum2; sed cognitiva sive intelligentia amplectitur omne verum — unde qui diceret, Deum aliquid verum ignorare, arctaret et derogaret eius intelligentiae — ergo pari ratione, cum intelligentia non sit latior nec perfectior quam voluntas, voluntas erit respectu omnis boni: ergo sicut dicitur omnisciens, quia scit omne verum, ita omnivolens, quia vult omne bonum.

3. Item, sicut dicitur Deus verum omnis veri, a quo scilicet omne verum habet veritatem, ita est bonum omnis boni, a quo omne bonum habet bonitatem3; sed Deus in videndo4 suam veritatem, quia est ratio omnium, omnia cognoscit: ergo similiter diligendo suam bonitatem omne bonum diligit. Sed omne quod diligit, vult: ergo vult omne bonum, sicut et cognoscit omne verum, et sic etc.

4. Item, bona voluntas est quae se extendit ad multa bona; ergo melior ad plura, et optima ad omnia, ergo infinita ad infinita: ergo sicut potentia et scientia se extendunt ad omnia et infinita, ita et voluntas: ergo qua ratione dicitur omnipotens et omnisciens, pari ratione debet dici omnivolens.

Contra:

1. In Psalmo5: Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit; ergo nihil vult, nisi quae facit; sed plura potest facere, et non potest nisi volens: ergo plura potest velle. Sed si Deus posset plura scire, non esset omnisciens: ergo etc.

2. Item, si aliquid sciret homo, quod non sciret Deus, non esset omnisciens Deus: cum ergo aliquid velit homo quod non velit Deus, ut puta facere furtum, ergo Deus non est omnivolens.

3. Item, si posse malum esset posse, Deus non esset omnipotens, quia non potest mala; cum ergo velle malum sit velle et Deus non velit mala, Deus non est omnivolens. Probatio minoris. Malum non est malum, nisi quia voluntarium, quia, secundum Augustinum6 « peccatum adeo est voluntarium » etc., ergo ratio voluntatis salvatur in malo, similiter et actus voluntatis in volendo malum; ergo etc.

4. Item, velle malum aut est velle, aut est nolle. Si velle, habeo propositum; si nolle; sed nolle malum est bonum; ergo velle malum7 est bonum; ergo si Deus vult omne bonum, Deus vult malum, quod est falsum. Restat ergo, quod velle malum est velle; et Deus non vult malum: ergo Deus non est omnivolens. — Sed istud argumentum est sophisticum, quia similiter posset obiici de potentia. — Et ideo quaeritur, unde est hoc, quod velle malum est velle, sed posse malum non est potentiae, sed impotentiae.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de comparatione potentiae, sapientiae et voluntatis ad sua obiecta secundum ambitum.

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Conclusio.

Conclusio. Simpliciter negatur, quod Deus dicatur omnivolens, sicut recte dicitur omnisciens et omnipotens.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur utrum Deus sit omnivolens, duplicem intellectum potest facere ista locutio ex eo, quod hoc quod est omne potest facere distributionem simpliciter vel ut nunc8. Si distributionem simpliciter quantum ad actum et habitum facit, tunc dicitur omnivolens, quia vult omne volibile; si ut nunc, dicitur omnivolens, quia vult omne volitum. In utroque sensu falsitatem habet9, et in utroque sensu habet veritatem in potentia et in scientia. Et ideo simpliciter conceditur, quod Deus sit omnisciens et omnipotens, et simpliciter negatur, quod sit omnivolens.

Intellectus huius et ratio patet. Si enim simpliciter accipiamus, Deus scit omne scibile et potest omne possibile, et10 non vult omne volibile; quia divina voluntas importat causam actualem, potentia vero abstrahit a ratione actualitatis et ponit rationem11 causae, scientia vero abstrahit a ratione utriusque. Quia igitur Deus non est causa actualis omnium quae potest facere vel velle, sicut non facit omne volibile, ita non vult. Quia vero potentia abstrahit a ratione actualitatis, ideo dicitur non solum respectu faciendorum in actu, sed etiam respectu possibilium fieri a Deo. Quia vero scientia abstrahit a ratione utriusque, hinc est, quod scientia non tantum est respectu faciendorum, sed etiam respectu possibilium, non tantum Deo, sed etiam aliis, utpote possibilium malorum. Haec igitur est ratio, quia actus scientiae, ut scire, est per modum habitus; similiter et12 potentiae per modum habitus, ut posse; voluntas per modum actus, ut velle. Ideo scientia est omnium scibilium, potentia omnium possibilium, quae sunt potentiae, sed non voluntas omnium volibilium. Et ideo non potest Deus plura scire vel posse, potest tamen plura velle.

Similiter, si accipiamus rem13 ut nunc respectu rei praevisae et respectu factae et volitae; scientia est respectu omnis rei, in qua salvatur ratio scientiae, et potentia respectu omnis rei, in qua salvatur ratio potentiae; sed voluntas non est respectu omnis rei, in qua ratio voluntatis salvatur. Scientia enim est respectu omnium futurorum et praesentium et praeteritorum, bonorum et malorum, quia ibi salvatur ratio scientiae et nobilitatis; quia scire malum scire est, et scire malum nobilitatis est14. Similiter potentia est respectu omnium bonorum, in quibus solum salvatur ratio potentiae. Nam posse malum non est posse. Unde posse malum non tantum derogat perfectioni potentiae, sed etiam ipsi potentiae, quia posse deficere non est posse; et ideo adhuc omnipotens15. Voluntas vero est respectu bonorum tantum, non respectu malorum. Et quamvis in volendo malum non salvetur dignitas voluntatis, salvatur tamen ratio volendi, quia velle malum velle est. Et hinc est, quod Deus non dicitur omnivolens, quia non vult malum, sed tamen omnipotens dicitur, quamvis non possit malum.

Si quaeratur16: quare ratio potentiae non salvatur respectu mali, sicut et ratio voluntatis? dicendum, quod potentia id ipsum quod dicit, dicit per modum habitus et positionis17, de potentia activa loquendo; unde, cum est respectu privationis, iam non est potentia, sed defectus potentiae; sed voluntas id ipsum quod dicit, dicit per modum cuiusdam indifferentiae et complacentiae. Quia ergo in malo salvatur ratio consensus et complacentiae, sicut et respectu boni; ideo velle malum velle est, sed posse malum non est posse.

Ad argumenta in contrarium:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus vult omne quod decet; dicendum, quod illa non est ratio quare dicatur omnipotens18, sed illa quae praeassignata est, scilicet quia potest omne quod posse potentiae est.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitiva amplectitur omne verum, et affectiva omne bonum; dicendum, quod aliter amplectitur haec, aliter illa. Cognitiva enim amplectitur actualiter19 cognoscendo omne quod est verum et quod potest esse20; sed affectiva, quia actus eius est in ratione actus, amplectitur

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et vult solum bonum, quod est vel erit. Rursus, amplectitur totum actum cognitionis, quia nihil est cognitum, quod non sit dilectum — sed bonum non amplectitur omnino actum voluntatis — nam velle oppositum boni est velle — et hinc est, quod Deus sciendo omne verum dicitur omnisciens, sed non sic volendo omne bonum omnivolens.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus cognoscendo se, qui est veritas ipsa, omne verum cognoscit: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, sed aliter: quia cognoscendo se21 est causa exemplaris, et causa exemplaris non tantum futurorum, sed etiam possibilium a Deo fieri. Sed diligendo se bonum est causa actualis, ut patebit22; et ideo non sequitur, quod velit nisi bona, quae erunt vel faciet, et propter hoc non potest dici omnivolens. Alia tamen est huius ratio, sicut patebit in littera23.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de voluntate, quod melior est quae se extendit ad plura; dicendum, quod voluntas est actus rationalis; unde non dicitur voluntas melior, quia simpliciter ad plura, sed quia ad plura rationabiliter. Et quoniam ratio recta dictat, creaturas fieri in numero definito, quia numerus infinitus rebus non competit24: ideo optima voluntas et perfectissima in aliquo numero vult res bonas esse, sed tamen finito; et ex hoc non sequitur, quod voluntas sit infinitorum vel omnium possibilium, nec etiam omnium. — Potest tamen dici, quod illud, si alicubi habet veritatem, ibi tantum habet, ubi voluntas aliquid recipit a volito; sed voluntas Dei nihil recipit, et ideo non est melior volendo tria bona quam unum, et mille quam tria; et ideo non valet illa ratio in proposito.

Ex his patet illud, quod consuevit quaeri: utrum voluntas et potentia et sapientia sint aequalia. Dicendum enim, quod est loqui de his quantum ad affectum sive actum, et quantum ad effectum, et quantum ad obiectum25. Si quantum ad actum; sic est ibi omnimoda aequalitas et circumincessio; ut patet, quia quidquid scit Deus et potest, vult scire et posse, et e converso. Si quantum ad effectum; sic adhuc sunt aequalia, quia nihil efficit Deus nisi per potentiam, sapientiam et voluntatem. Si quantum ad obiectum sive connotatum, sunt inaequalia: scientia enim hoc modo est in plus, et potentia in minus, et voluntas in minus. Nam scitum est bonum et malum; possibile est bonum tantum, sed futurum et non futurum; volitum vero est bonum et futurum tantum.

Scholion

I. Quaestio intelligenda est de voluntate efficaci, sive quatenus « importat causam actualem » (hic in corp.). Distinguitur enim a S. Doctore (hic dub. 2.) voluntas, ut dicit complacentiam, et ut dicit causam. De illa docet: « Prout dicit complacentiam, credo quod bene potest dici, quod (Deus) volendo se velit omnia, quia omnia placent ei, quae ab ipso et ad ipsum sunt ». Hoc amore complacentiae Deus amat etiam creaturas possibiles, ut explicite docetur III. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. ad 1. Omnino igitur erraverunt quidam, qui cum Mastrio ex hac nostra quaestione arguebant, S. Bonaventuram negare, Deum amare creaturas possibiles. Si autem sub omnia comprehendimus etiam malum, propositio illa intelligenda est ita, ut in complacentia boni implicetur displicentia oppositi (cfr. hic a. 3. q. 2.). — Aliter dicendum de voluntate efficaci, cum Deus volendo se non velit efficaciter omnia bona possibilia. Sic patere potest, in alio sensu Seraphicum et Alexandrum Hal. (S. p. I. q. 34. m. 2. ad ult.) negare propositionem Deus volendo se vult omnia; in alio vero sensu S. Thomam (S. c. Gent. l. c. 75. in fine) eandem affirmare; unde hi Doctores non sibi contradicunt. Ceterum communiter docetur, obiectum primarium, adaequatum et motivum divinae voluntatis esse ipsam divinam bonitatem, secundarium autem esse creaturas, quatenus participant de bonitate divina (cfr. hic dub. 3, et supra d. 1. dub. 12.). — In fine argumentorum ponuntur duae quaestiones incidentes: prima solvitur in fine corp., secunda post solutionem oppositorum.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 34. m. 3, q. 21. m. 1. a. 2. q. collat. — S. Thom., S. c. Gent. l. c. 76. 81; et quoad principia S. I. q. 19. a. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation
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Question II. Whether God is called all-willing, just as [he is called] all-knowing and all-powerful.

Secondly, granted that in God a will is to be posited, it is asked whether one is to posit [in him] an all-willing [one]1 — so that from will he should be called all-willing, just as from power and knowledge [he is called] all-powerful and all-knowing. And that he is so [called], is shown as follows:

1. Because God is not called all-powerful on the ground that he can do all things, but because he can do everything that befits his power — for he cannot do evils — but similarly God wills everything that befits his will to will: therefore he ought to be called all-willing, just as [he is called] all-powerful.

2. Likewise, as God's knowing power stands to the true, so his affective power or will stands to the good2; but the knowing power or understanding embraces every truth — whence whoever should say that God is ignorant of any truth would constrict and derogate from his understanding — therefore by parallel reasoning, since the understanding is no broader nor more perfect than the will, the will will be with respect to every good: therefore, just as he is called all-knowing because he knows every truth, so [he should be called] all-willing, because he wills every good.

3. Likewise, just as God is called the true of every true, namely from whom every truth has its truth, so he is the good of every good, from whom every good has its goodness3; but God, in seeing4 his own truth — since [that truth] is the formal account of all things — knows all things: therefore likewise in loving his own goodness he loves every good. But everything that he loves, he wills: therefore he wills every good, just as he knows every truth, and so forth.

4. Likewise, a good will is one that extends itself to many goods; therefore a better one extends to more, and the best to all, therefore an infinite [will extends] to infinite [things]: therefore as power and knowledge extend to all things and to infinite things, so also the will: therefore by the reason that he is called all-powerful and all-knowing, by the same reason he ought to be called all-willing.

On the contrary:

1. In the Psalm5: Whatsoever he willed, he made; therefore he wills nothing except what he makes; but he can make more, and he cannot [make anything] except by willing: therefore he can will more. But if God could know more, he would not be all-knowing: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, if a man should know something that God does not know, God would not be all-knowing: since therefore a man wills something that God does not will — for example, to commit a theft — therefore God is not all-willing.

3. Likewise, if to be-able-for-evil were a [genuine] ability, God would not be all-powerful, because he cannot do evils; since therefore to will evil is to will, and God does not will evils, God is not all-willing. Proof of the minor: evil is not evil except because [it is] voluntary, because, according to Augustine6, « sin is voluntary to such a degree » etc., therefore the formal character of will is preserved in [the case of] evil, and likewise the act of will in willing evil; therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, to will evil is either to will, or to nill [not-will]. If [it is] to will, I have my conclusion; if to nill — but to nill evil is good; therefore to will evil7 is good; therefore if God wills every good, God wills evil, which is false. It remains therefore that to will evil is [genuinely] to will; and God does not will evil: therefore God is not all-willing. — But this argument is sophistical, since the same could be raised about power. — And therefore it is asked, whence is it that to will evil is [genuinely] to will, but to be-able-for-evil is not [an act] of power but of impotence.

Alongside this, an inquiry is raised concerning the comparison of power, wisdom, and will with respect to their objects, as to their range.

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Conclusion.

Conclusion. It is simply denied that God is called all-willing, just as he is rightly called all-knowing and all-powerful.

I respond: It must be said that when it is asked whether God is all-willing, this expression can produce a twofold understanding from the fact that the word every can produce a distribution either simply or as-of-now8. If it produces a distribution simply, as to act and habit, then he is called all-willing because he wills every willable thing; if as-of-now, he is called all-willing because he wills every willed thing. In either sense it is false9, and in either sense it is true of power and of knowledge. And therefore it is simply conceded that God is all-knowing and all-powerful, and it is simply denied that he is all-willing.

The understanding of this and the reason are clear. For if we take [the term] simply, God knows every knowable and can do every possible, but10 he does not will every willable; because the divine will imports an actual cause, while power abstracts from the character of actuality and posits the character11 of cause, but knowledge abstracts from the character of both. Since therefore God is not the actual cause of all things which he can do or will, just as he does not do every willable, so he does not will [every willable]. But since power abstracts from the character of actuality, it is therefore said [to be] not only with respect to things to be done in act, but also with respect to things possible to be done by God. And since knowledge abstracts from the character of both, hence it is that knowledge is not only with respect to things-to-be-done, but also with respect to things-possible — not only by God, but also by others — such as possible evils. This therefore is the reason: that the act of knowledge, namely to know, is according to the mode of a habit; likewise also12 [the act] of power, according to the mode of habit, [namely] to be-able; the will [is] according to the mode of act, [namely] to will. Therefore knowledge is of all knowables, power of all possibles which are [the objects] of power, but the will is not of all willables. And therefore God cannot know or be-able to do more, but he can will more.

Likewise, if we take a thing13 as-of-now, with respect to a thing foreseen and with respect to a thing done and willed: knowledge is with respect to every thing in which the formal character of knowledge is preserved, and power is with respect to every thing in which the formal character of power is preserved; but the will is not with respect to every thing in which the formal character of will is preserved. For knowledge is with respect to all future things and present and past things, of both good things and evil, because there the formal character of knowledge and of nobility is preserved; because to know an evil is [genuinely] to know, and to know an evil belongs to nobility14. Similarly, power is with respect to all good things, in which alone is preserved the formal character of power. For to be-able for evil is not [genuine] ability. Hence to be-able for evil not only derogates from the perfection of power, but also from power itself, because to be-able-to-fail is not [genuinely] to-be-able; and therefore [God is] still all-powerful15. But will is with respect to good things only, not with respect to evils. And although in willing evil the dignity of will is not preserved, yet the formal character of willing is preserved, because to will evil is [genuinely] to will. And hence it is that God is not called all-willing, because he does not will evil, but yet he is called all-powerful, although he cannot do evil.

If it be asked16: why is the formal character of power not preserved with respect to evil, just as the formal character of will [is]? It must be said that power, the very thing it expresses, expresses according to the mode of habit and of position17 — speaking of active power; whence, when it is with respect to a privation, it is no longer power, but a defect of power; but the will, the very thing it expresses, expresses according to the mode of a certain indifference and complacency. Since therefore in evil the formal character of consent and complacency is preserved, just as also with respect to a good, therefore to will evil is [genuinely] to will, but to be-able for evil is not [genuinely] to-be-able.

Replies to the contrary arguments:

Ad 1. To that which is objected, that God wills everything that befits [him]; it must be said that that is not the reason why he is called all-powerful18, but rather the one that was assigned earlier, namely because he can do everything that belongs to the being-able of power.

Ad 2. To that which is objected, that the knowing power embraces every truth, and the affective every good; it must be said that the one embraces in one way, the other in another. For the knowing power embraces actually19 by knowing everything that is true and that can be20; but the affective [power], because its act is in the character of act, embraces

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and wills only the good that is or shall be. Furthermore, [the knowing power] embraces the whole act of knowing, because nothing is known that is not loved [as known] — but the good does not altogether embrace the act of will — for to will the opposite of a good is [genuinely] to will — and hence it is that God, in knowing every truth, is called all-knowing, but not in like manner [is he called] all-willing in willing every good.

Ad 3. To that which is objected, that God by knowing himself, who is truth itself, knows every truth: therefore etc.; it must be said that this is true, but in a different way: because in knowing himself21 he is the exemplary cause, and an exemplary cause not only of future things, but also of things possible to be done by God. But in loving himself as good, he is the actual cause, as will appear22; and therefore it does not follow that he wills [anything] except goods which shall be or which he shall make, and on this account he cannot be called all-willing. But there is yet another reason for this, as will appear in the [Master's] text23.

Ad 4. To that which is objected concerning the will, that better is that [will] which extends itself to more [things]; it must be said that the will is a rational act; whence a will is not called better because [it extends] simply to more [things], but because [it extends] to more rationally. And since right reason dictates that creatures should be made in a definite number, because an infinite number does not befit things24: therefore the best and most perfect will wills that things be good in some number, but a finite [one]; and from this it does not follow that the will is of infinite things or of all possibles, nor even of all [goods]. — Yet it can be said that that [proposition], if it has truth anywhere, has it only there, where the will receives something from the willed [object]; but the will of God receives nothing, and therefore he is not better by willing three goods than [by willing] one, or a thousand than three; and therefore that reasoning does not hold in the present matter.

From these things appears that which it has been customary to ask: whether will and power and wisdom are equal. For it must be said that one can speak of these as to affect or act, and as to effect, and as to object25. If as to act, there is an utterly all-around equality and circumincession; as is clear, because whatever God knows and is-able [to do], he wills to know and to be-able, and conversely. If as to effect, here too they are equal, because God effects nothing except by power, wisdom, and will. If as to object or connotatum, they are unequal: for in this manner knowledge is greater [in extent], and power lesser, and will lesser. For [the] known is good-and-evil; [the] possible is good only, but [is both] future and not-future; [the] willed, however, is good and future only.

Scholion

I. This question is to be understood concerning efficacious will, or insofar as [will] « imports an actual cause » (here in the body). For will is distinguished by the Holy Doctor (here, dub. 2) as it expresses complacency and as it expresses cause. Of the former he teaches: « So far as it expresses complacency, I believe it can well be said that [God], in willing himself, wills all things, because all things please him which are from him and toward him ». By this love of complacency God loves even possible creatures, as is explicitly taught at III Sent. d. 32, q. 1, ad 1. Wholly, therefore, did certain men err who, with Mastrius, argued from this our question that St. Bonaventure denied that God loves possible creatures. But if under all things we include also evil, that proposition is to be understood thus: in the complacency of the good, the displeasure of its opposite is implied (cf. here a. 3, q. 2). — Differently is it to be said of efficacious will, since God, in willing himself, does not will efficaciously all possible goods. Thus it can be made clear that in one sense the Seraphic and Alexander of Hales (Summa p. I, q. 34, m. 2, ad ult.) deny the proposition God in willing himself wills all things; in another sense, however, St. Thomas (Summa contra Gentiles l. c. 75 in fine) affirms the same; whence these Doctors do not contradict one another. Moreover, it is commonly taught that the primary, adequate, and motive object of the divine will is the divine goodness itself, and the secondary [object] is creatures, insofar as they participate in the divine goodness (cf. here dub. 3, and above d. 1, dub. 12). — At the end of the arguments two incidental questions are placed: the first is resolved at the end of the corpus; the second after the solution of the opposed [arguments].

II. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 34, m. 3, q. 21, m. 1, a. 2, q. collat. — St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, bk. I, c. 76, 81; and as to principles, Summa I, q. 19, a. 2, 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. ipsam, et dein et ita pro ut ita.
    The Vatican edition reads ipsam, and then et ita for ut ita.
  2. Vide verba Anselmi supra pag. 784, nota 10. dicta. — Mox post voluntatem cod. T cum uno alteroque cod. omittit sicut enim verum est obiectum intellectus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Hinc etiam Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. 28. (c. 10.) voluntatem sic definit: Est autem voluntas boni appetitio cum ratione; nemo enim vult, nisi quod bonum esse putaverit. — Proxime post pro intelligentia Vat. cum ed. 1 intellectiva. Dein Vat. cum cod. cc omittit arctaret et.
    See the words of Anselm cited above on p. 784, note 10. — Soon, after voluntatem, codex T with one or two other codices omits [the words] for just as the true is the object of the intellect, so the good is the object of the will. Hence too Aristotle, Rhetoric I c. 28 (c. 10), defines the will thus: Will is an appetite of the good together with reason; for no one wills except what he has supposed to be good. — Next, for intelligentia the Vatican edition with ed. 1 reads intellectiva. Then the Vatican edition with codex cc omits arctaret et.
  3. De prima huius proposit. parte cfr. August., I. Soliloq. c. 1. n. 2, et de Vera Relig. c. 36. n. 66; nec non Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 10. et 13; de secunda parte vide August., VIII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 4, ac Boeth. de Hebdomad. seu « Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint ». — Mox pro videndo, quod auctoritate codd. P Q (T in marg.) nec non ed. 1 posuimus, plurimi codd. dicendo. Vat. cum cod. cc cognoscendo.
    On the first part of this proposition cf. Augustine, Soliloquies I, c. 1, n. 2, and On True Religion c. 36, n. 66; also Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, c. 10 and 13; on the second part see Augustine, On the Trinity VIII, c. 3, n. 4, and Boethius, De hebdomadibus or « How substances, in that they are, are good ». — Soon, for videndo, which on the authority of codices P, Q (T in the margin) and also ed. 1 we have set down, very many codices [read] dicendo. The Vatican edition with codex cc has cognoscendo.
  4. Porro ed. 1 omittit particulam in ante videndo, quae lectio praeferenda esset, si non obstarent codd.
    Moreover, ed. 1 omits the particle in before videndo, which reading would be preferable, were the codices not in the way.
  5. Psalm. 113, 11.
    Psalm 113[4]:11 [Vulgate].
  6. Libr. de Vera Relig. c. 14. v. 27, et I. Retract. c. 13. n. 5: Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium.
    On True Religion c. 14, v. 27, and Retractations I, c. 13, n. 5: But now sin is to such a degree a voluntary evil that it would in no way be sin, if it were not voluntary.
  7. In cod. Z hic interiicitur: cum sit idem quod nolle per hypothesim. Post pauca pro Deus vult malum Vat. cum cod. cc Deus vult omne malum. — Nota, quod S. Doctor hoc argumentum paulo inferius vocat sophisticum, et iusto iure, quia prima consecutio: ergo velle malum est bonum, propositio est in se falsa, et dictiones velle malum et nolle malum non sunt idem. Esse sophisticum, probatur etiam ea ratione, quia, ut S. Doctor bene adiungit, similiter posset obiici de potentia; nam similiter probari posset, Deum vel non esse omnipotentem vel posse malum, quia posse malum aut est posse, aut non, ergo etc.
    In codex Z there is here inserted: since it is the same thing as to nill by hypothesis. Shortly after, for Deus vult malum the Vatican edition with codex cc has Deus vult omne malum. — Note that the Holy Doctor a little below calls this argument sophistical, and rightly so, because the first consequence: therefore to will evil is good, is a proposition false in itself, and the expressions to will evil and to nill evil are not the same. That it is sophistical is also proved by this reasoning: because, as the Holy Doctor well adds, the same could be raised about power; for it could likewise be proved that God is either not all-powerful or can do evil — because to be-able for evil either is to-be-able, or not, therefore etc.
  8. De distributivo signo omne vide supra pag. 99, Scholion I. n. 2. Distributio simpliciter per signum omne comprehendit tum quod actu est tale, tum quod habitu est tale sive quod tale esse potest; sed distributio ut nunc comprehendit tantum quod actu est tale. — Paulo ante pro intellectum ed. 1 intelligentiam.
    On the distributive sign omne (every) see above p. 99, Scholion I n. 2. Distribution simply by the sign every comprises both what is actually such, and what is such by habit or what can be such; but distribution as-of-now comprises only what is actually such. — A little earlier, for intellectum ed. 1 reads intelligentiam.
  9. Supple cum ed. 1 in voluntate. Vat. cum cod. cc prosequitur et quia in utroque... et in scientia, ideo simpliciter etc.
    Supply with ed. 1 the words in voluntate ['in [the case of] will']. The Vatican edition with codex cc continues and because in both… and in knowledge, therefore simply etc.
  10. Vat. et ed. 1 adiungunt habitualem, codd. non suffragantibus. Paulo ante pro et non vult Vat. sed non vult.
    The Vatican edition and ed. 1 add habitualem ['habitual'], with the codices not in support. A little earlier, for et non vult the Vatican edition reads sed non vult.
  11. Supple cum cod. M actus. Mox pro voluntas Vat. cum cod. cc voluntatis.
    Supply with codex M actus ['of act']. Soon, for voluntas the Vatican edition with codex cc has voluntatis.
  12. Pro rem sola Vat. omne, et subinde praescitae pro praevisae. Verba respectu omnis rei, quae mox post et potentia habentur, ex codd. M X (T in marg.) et ed. 1 revocavimus.
    For rem the Vatican edition alone has omne, and presently praescitae ['foreknown'] for praevisae ['foreseen']. The words respectu omnis rei ['with respect to every thing'], which are had shortly after et potentia, we have restored from codices M, X (T in the margin) and ed. 1.
  13. Cfr. supra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo ante pro et nobilitatis multi codd. minus congrue et nobilitas.
    Cf. above d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — A little earlier, for et nobilitatis many codices, less fittingly, [read] et nobilitas.
  14. Intellige: licet non possit facere mala. Cfr. supra d. 42. q. 2. — Vat. vocabulo omnipotens praemittit dicitur.
    Understand: although he cannot do evils. Cf. above d. 42, q. 2. — The Vatican edition prefixes dicitur to the word omnipotens [yielding adhuc dicitur omnipotens].
  15. Cod. R Si igitur quaeratur.
    Codex R [reads] Si igitur quaeratur.
  16. Id est, semper in se includit et respicit aliquid positivum sive ens et bonum. Mox pro respectu privationis cod. R causa privationis, et dein pro indifferentiae Vat. cum edd. 1, 3 adhaerentiae.
    That is, [power] always includes in itself and regards something positive — i.e., being and good. Soon, for respectu privationis codex R reads causa privationis, and then for indifferentiae the Vatican edition with editions 1 and 3 has adhaerentiae ['adherence'].
  17. Scilicet, quia potest omne quod decet eius potentiam, ut in obiectione dicitur.
    Namely, because he can [do] everything that befits his power, as is said in the objection.
  18. Sola Vat. habitualiter. Mox pro quia actus eius cod. R quia affectus eius. Utrumque vocabulum idem significare, manifestatur infra in fine quaest.
    The Vatican edition alone [reads] habitualiter ['habitually']. Soon, for quia actus eius codex R has quia affectus eius ['because its affect']. That both words signify the same thing is shown below at the end of the question.
  19. Vat. adiicit verum, codd. T X addunt cognitum sive verum. Paulo ante codd. P Q verbis sed aliter adiungunt et aliter. Paulo inferius Vat. voci futurorum praefigit est.
    The Vatican edition adds verum ['true']; codices T and X add cognitum sive verum ['known or true']. A little earlier, after the words sed aliter, codices P and Q add et aliter ['and otherwise']. A little below, the Vatican edition prefixes est to the word futurorum.
  20. Hic a. 2. q. 1, ubi exponitur, quomodo bonitas divina sit ratio causandi tum in ratione effectivi tum in ratione finis.
    Here at a. 2, q. 1, where it is set forth how the divine goodness is the formal account of causing both under the character of [the] effective [cause] and under the character of [the] end.
  21. Infra d. XLVI. c. 3. seqq., ubi assignatur haec ratio, quod Deus non potest velle malum; quam rationem S. Doctor etiam adduxit hic in corp. quaest. — Pro patebit Vat. patet.
    Below at d. XLVI, c. 3 and following, where this reason is assigned: that God cannot will evil; which reason the Holy Doctor has also adduced here in the corpus of the question. — For patebit the Vatican edition has patet.
  22. De quo vide supra d. 43. q. 3. — Paulo post pro sed tamen ed. 1 sed tantum.
    Concerning which see above d. 43, q. 3. — A little after, for sed tamen ed. 1 reads sed tantum.
  23. Vat. cum codd. aa bb omittit verba affectum sive, sed quantum ad actum simul praemittit codd. aa bb verbis novum membrum: substantiam vel quasi subiectum, et dein post quantum ad obiectum sic prosequuntur: Si primo modo, sic sunt omnino idem. Si quantum ad actum etc. Locutio circumincessio, quae mox sequitur, nihil aliud significat, quam quod ubi unus horum actuum est, ibi et alter erit.
    The Vatican edition with codices aa and bb omits the words affectum sive ['affect or'], but at quantum ad actum codices aa and bb prefix a new member with these words: substantiam vel quasi subiectum ['substance, or as it were the subject']; and then after quantum ad obiectum they continue thus: If [we speak] in the first mode, they are altogether the same. If as to act etc. The expression circumincession, which immediately follows, signifies nothing other than that wherever one of these acts is, there too the other will be.
  24. Pro sunt plures codd. tunc. — De quaestione hic incidenter soluta cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 4. et 5, et q. 34. m. 3, et Hug. de S. Vict. « libellus de Potestate et voluntate Dei, utra maior sit », in quo eadem distinctio occurrit quantum ad affectum, effectum et respectum (obiectum).
    For sunt several codices [read] tunc. — On the question here incidentally resolved, cf. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 20, m. 4 and 5, and q. 34, m. 3, and Hugh of St. Victor, the « little book on the Power and Will of God, which is greater », in which the same distinction occurs as to affect, effect and respect (object).
  25. Effectum hic significat causalitatem activam exercitam, obiectum vero materiam circa quam versatur actus. Cfr. notam praecedentem.
    [Cross-reference summary; the printed-page apparatus footer on p. 802 does not number a fresh entry past 6 — anchor 25 uses Quaracchi's parenthesized gloss embedded in the preceding footer note. See [?] note in Notes section below.] ---
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