Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 45, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 45

Textus Latinus

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Articulus II. De voluntate Dei quantum ad causalitatem.

Quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de voluntate divina, scilicet quantum ad causalitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur in generali, utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. Secundo, utrum sit causa prima et immediata.

Quaestio I. Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum in generali.

Et quod sit causa, ostenditur sic.

1. Hilarius in libro de Synodis¹: « Omnibus enim creaturis substantiam voluntas attulit, sed Filio natura dedit ».

2. Item, Augustinus in libro contra Manichaeos²: « Respondendum est eis qui voluntatem Dei nosse desiderant, quod voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa ».

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia Deus est causa rerum; sed omnis rei, cuius est Deus causa, est per scientiam, potentiam et voluntatem: aut ergo est causa, quia potens, aut quia sciens, aut quia volens. Non quia potens, quia multa potest, quae non facit; similiter nec quia sciens: ergo quia volens, ideo facit. Sed « causa est, cuius esse sequitur aliud³ »: ergo etc.

4. Item, Deus est causa rerum creatarum: aut ergo per naturam, aut per voluntatem, aut per casum et fortunam⁴. Non per casum et fortunam, quia tales sunt causae secundum imperfectam rationem; non per naturam, quia sic simile ex simili producitur: restat ergo quod per voluntatem: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Si voluntas Dei est causa, aut ratione principalis significati, aut ratione connotati. Si⁵ ratione principalis significati: ergo cum idem sit sapientia, potentia, voluntas et essentia, eadem ratione debent dici causae. Si ratione connotati, quaero, quid sit illud. Non est dare nisi effectum; sed effectus consequitur rationem causae, non e converso: non ergo ratione connotati. Et iterum, si connotat effectum: ergo nullo modo potest dici: Deus vult se esse, cum circa se nihil omnino efficiat; quod est falsum.

2. Item, aut voluntas est causa per proprietatem, aut per appropriationem. Si per proprietatem, tunc ergo sapientia et potentia non sunt causae. Si per appropriationem, aut ergo quia in voluntate per prius est ratio causalitatis, aut quia immediatius. Non quia prius; nam potentia et scientia antecedunt voluntatem secundum rationem intelligendi. Nec quia immediatius, quia Hugo⁶ dicit, quod « Deus per voluntatem movet, per sapientiam disponit, et per potentiam exsequitur »: ergo immediatiorem comparationem habent ad opus scientia et potentia quam voluntas: ergo etc.

3. Item, aut est causa propter virtutem agendi, aut propter modum. Non propter virtutem⁷, quia voluntas non dicit virtutem, sed potentia dicit. Si propter modum agendi; contra: modus agendi per modum naturae nobilior est: ergo natura magis est causa. Probatio: illud agens est virtuosius, quod

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est sufficientius et nobiliorem effectum producit; sed natura sufficientior est in agendo et paucioribus indiget et nobiliorem effectum producit quam ars sive agens voluntarium: ergo etc. — Item, quod⁸ non quantum ad modum, videtur, quia agens, quod dat producto proprietates naturales consimiles, agit per modum naturae; sed Deus effectibus suis dat unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem; nec potest facere sine his, et istae sunt proprietates naturales divinae substantiae: ergo Deus agit per modum naturae, non voluntatis.

4. Item, omne agens voluntarie est agens praeconcipiendo; sed Deus non agit praeconcipiendo, sicut dicit Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus⁹: quia, sicut sol non praeconcipiendo illuminat, sic Deus non praeconcipiendo creat: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Ratio causalitatis attribuitur Deo sub ratione voluntatis, non sic sub aliis rationibus.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quamvis divina essentia sit unum quid simplicissimum, tamen « est pelagus substantiae infinitum¹⁰ ». Et ideo omnia quae in nobis reperiuntur per diversitatem, omnia, inquam, in Deo nobilius per omnimodam reperiuntur identitatem, nihilominus tamen secundum omnimodam perfectionem et veritatem. Unde sicut in nobis sapientia, potentia et voluntas est vere ens et causa rerum, quae a nobis sunt; sic et in Deo sunt, sed tamen unum sunt. Et quamvis unum sint¹¹, quia intellectus noster non potest infinitatem illius substantiae comprehendere nec per unum verbum exprimere, ideo multis modis intelligimus Deum et diversis nominibus exprimimus; et secundum quod per illos modos intelligimus, plura enuntiamus, ita quod Deo attribuimus aliquid secundum unum modum, quod non secundum alium, et vere quidem, quia omnia in Deo habent veram existentiam. Et ideo cum alio modo intelligamus Deum, cum dicimus Deum bonum, alio, cum dicimus Deum aeternum; concedimus, eum se diffundere, quia bonus est, non quia aeternus; haec enim est proprietas bonitatis, non durationis. Hinc est, quod cum intelligimus, vere voluntatem esse in Deo, et proprietas voluntatis sit producere ea quae exeunt per modum liberalitatis, quod dicimus, Deum, in quantum voluntas est, esse causam rerum.

Ratio autem, quare voluntati attribuitur causalitas, haec est, quia ratio causandi est bonitas et in ratione effectivi et in ratione finis. Nam « bonum dicitur diffusivum », « et bonum est propter quod omnia¹² ». Effectivum autem non fit efficiens in effectu nisi propter finem. Illud ergo quod dicit coniunctionem principii effectivi cum fine, est ratio causandi in effectu; sed voluntas est actus, secundum quem bonum reflectitur supra bonum sive bonitatem: ergo voluntas unit effectivum cum fine. Et hinc est, quod voluntas est ratio causare faciens in effectu; et ideo attribuimus Deo rationem causalitatis sub ratione voluntatis, non sic sub aliis rationibus.

Et hoc colligitur ex verbis Dionysii in quarto de Divinis Nominibus¹³, ubi dicit, quod « bonitatem ut continentiam et ut principium et ut finem omnia appetunt: ut principium, a quo sunt; ut continentiam, per quam salvantur; ut finem, in quem tendunt ». Unde « divinus amor est quidam cyclus

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aeternus, ex optimo, per optimum et in optimum ». Ex quo colligitur, quod dicit coniunctionem principii cum fine, et ideo causam actu, quando vult facere; ita quod actualitas in causando¹⁴ referatur ad voluntatem, non pro instanti, in quo habet voluntatem, sed in quo facere vult. Sicut ego volo cras audire missam, et voluntas¹⁵ faciet, me cras esse in actu respectu voliti; sic suo modo est in Deo.

Ad argumenta in contrarium:

1. Ad illud quod quaeritur: utrum conveniat voluntati ratio causalitatis propter connotatum, vel propter rem significatam; dico, quod nec propter rem significatam tantum nec propter connotatum, sed propter rem sic significatam, quia significatur divina essentia ut voluntas, cui modo significandi respondet veritas. Unde¹⁶ sicut, quando nos dicimus, quod lapis assimilatur Deo in quantum ens, animal in quantum vivens, et homo in quantum intelligens, revera essentia, intelligentia et vita idem sunt in Deo, tamen¹⁷ idem ipsum alio modo datur intelligi, non propter connotationem, sed propter eiusdem substantiae infinitatem, in qua omnes nobiles proprietates sunt unum. Non tamen possunt significari nisi per diversa.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum sit causa per proprietatem aut per appropriationem; dico, quod simpliciter loquendo propriissime est causa. Comparando vero voluntatem ad scientiam et potentiam, dicitur causa per appropriationem; et hoc, quia ipsa voluntas significat Deum ut causam actualem. Unde in voluntate primo invenitur ratio actualitatis, non causalitatis¹⁸. Potentia enim et scientia, etsi habeant rationem causae habitualis, non tamen actualis nisi per voluntatem. Unde voluntas facit de scientia dispositionem, sive facit scientiam esse disponentem, et potentiam exsequentem; ideo enim disponit, quia vult, et ideo facit, quia vult. Et sic patet illud.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare voluntas dicitur causa, utrum propter virtutem agentem¹⁹ vel propter modum agendi; dico, quod propter utrumque — Deo enim velle est posse — principalius tamen ratione modi agendi. Productio enim diversi in forma et natura ex sola liberalitate agentis spectat ad agentem per voluntatem. — Quod obiicitur, quod modus agentis naturalis est nobilior; verum est, ubi voluntas non est omnipotens; sed si ars posset facere omne quod vellet, non minus nobiliter²⁰ ageret quam natura. — Potest tamen dici, quod modus producendi naturalis competit personae respectu personae, non autem essentiae divinae respectu creaturarum, quia non possunt convenire in forma.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus producit simile secundum proprietates: dicendum, quod natura producit simile in proprietatibus specialibus si est agens particulare; vel si est agens universale, producit necessario, non ex sua liberalitate; Deus autem neutro modo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non est agens praeconcipiens; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de praecogitatione, quae praecedit voluntatem, sed non est verum de praeconceptione respectu operis. Et primo modo loquitur Dionysius; ipse vero opponit secundo modo.

Scholion

I. In praeclara huius quaestionis solutione primo in genere probatur, quod voluntas Dei sit causa rerum, et eliditur error pessimus, qui et antiquis et nostris temporibus late grassatur omnibusque pantheistis est communis, quod scil. Deus in operibus ad extra agat per necessitatem naturae. — Secundo afferuntur profundae rationes, quare potius voluntas, quam scientia et potentia, dicatur causa rerum, sive quare ista « immediatius se habeant ad res » (hic a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.), quae rationes inveniuntur in 3. fundam., in corp. et in solut. ad 2. Licet nonnulli ex schola S. Thomae putent, intellectum per imperium et iudicium practicum immediatius concurrere ad productionem rerum quam voluntatem; tamen sententia S. Bonaventurae communius tenetur. — Tertio optime explicatur illa distinctio inter attributa divina, quae ab aliis vocatur sive virtualis, sive fundamentalis, sive rationis ratiocinatae.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 35. m. 2. et 1. — Scot., de Rerum principio, q. 4. a. 2. — S. Thom., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. a. 2. 3; S. I. q. 19. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 36. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2.

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English Translation

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Article II. On the will of God according to its causality.

As to the second article, the matter is inquired concerning the divine will, namely as regards causality. And concerning this two [questions] are asked. First, it is asked in general, whether the will of God is the cause of things. Second, whether it is the first and immediate cause.

Question I. Whether the will of God is the cause of things in general.

That it is the cause is shown thus.

1. Hilary in the book On the Synods¹: « To all creatures the will gave substance, but to the Son nature gave [it] ».

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book Against the Manicheans²: « It must be answered to those who desire to know the will of God, that the will of God is itself the cause of all things that are ».

3. Likewise, it appears by reason: because God is the cause of things; but of every thing of which God is the cause, [it is so] through knowledge, power, and will: therefore either he is the cause because he is powerful, or because he is knowing, or because he is willing. Not because he is powerful, since he can do many things which he does not do; likewise not because he is knowing: therefore [it is] because he wills, that he therefore does. But « a cause is that whose being is followed by another³ »: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, God is the cause of created things: therefore [he causes] either by nature, or by will, or by chance and fortune⁴. Not by chance and fortune, because such causes are according to an imperfect manner [of causality]; not by nature, because in this way like is produced from like: it remains, therefore, that [he causes] by will: therefore, etc.

On the contrary:

1. If the will of God is a cause, [it is so] either by reason of the principal thing signified, or by reason of what is connoted. If⁵ by reason of the principal thing signified: then, since wisdom, power, will, and essence are the same, they ought by the same reason to be called causes. If by reason of what is connoted, I ask, what is that? Nothing is to be given except an effect; but an effect follows the formal character of a cause, not conversely: therefore [the will is] not [a cause] by reason of what is connoted. And again, if it connotes the effect: then in no way can it be said: God wills himself to be, since concerning himself he effects nothing at all — which is false.

2. Likewise, either the will is the cause by [its] property, or by appropriation. If by [its] property, then wisdom and power are not causes. If by appropriation, then either because in the will the formal character of causality is prior, or because [it is] more immediate. Not because [it is] prior; for power and knowledge precede the will according to the order of understanding. Nor because [it is] more immediate, since Hugh⁶ says that « God moves by will, disposes by wisdom, and carries out by power »: therefore knowledge and power have a more immediate comparison to the work than the will: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, either [the will] is the cause on account of the power of acting, or on account of the mode [of acting]. Not on account of the power⁷, because the will does not bespeak power, but power [as such] does. If on account of the mode of acting; on the contrary: the mode of acting by way of nature is more noble: therefore nature is more [properly] a cause. Proof: that agent is more virtuous which

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is more sufficient and produces a more noble effect; but nature is more sufficient in acting and needs fewer [aids] and produces a more noble effect than art or a voluntary agent: therefore, etc. — Likewise, that⁸ [the will is] not [a cause] as regards the mode [of acting] appears, because the agent which gives the product properties like to its own natural [properties] acts by way of nature; but God gives to his effects unity, truth, and goodness; nor can he make [them] without these, and these are the natural properties of the divine substance: therefore God acts by way of nature, not of will.

4. Likewise, every voluntary agent is an agent by pre-conceiving; but God does not act by pre-conceiving, as Dionysius says On the Divine Names⁹: since, just as the sun illuminates without pre-conceiving, so God creates without pre-conceiving: therefore, etc.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. The formal character of causality is attributed to God under the aspect of will, [and] not so under the other aspects.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, although the divine essence is a single, most simple [reality], nevertheless « it is an infinite sea of substance¹⁰ ». And therefore all the things which in us are found by diversity — all [of them], I say — are found in God more nobly through complete identity, yet nonetheless according to complete perfection and truth. Whence, just as in us wisdom, power, and will are truly being and the cause of the things that come from us; so also they are in God, but yet they are one. And although they are one¹¹, because our intellect cannot comprehend the infinity of that substance nor express [it] in a single word, therefore we understand God in many modes and express [him] in different names; and according as we understand him through those modes, we predicate several things [of him], so that we attribute to God something according to one mode which [we do] not [attribute] according to another, and indeed truly so, because all things in God have a true existence. And therefore, since we understand God in one way when we say God is good, in another when we say God is eternal; we grant that he diffuses himself because he is good, not because he is eternal — for this is a property of goodness, not of duration. Hence it is that, when we understand that the will truly is in God, and the property of the will is to produce those things which proceed by way of generosity, we say that God, insofar as he is will, is the cause of things.

Now the reason why causality is attributed to the will is this: that the formal character of causing is goodness, both in the character of the effective and in the character of the final. For « the good is said [to be] diffusive », and « the good is that on account of which all things [exist]¹² ». But the effective [principle] does not become efficient in an effect except on account of an end. Therefore that which bespeaks the conjunction of the effective principle with the end is the formal character of causing in an effect; but the will is the act according to which the good is reflected back upon the good or goodness: therefore the will unites the effective [principle] with the end. And hence it is that the will is the formal character which makes [something] cause in an effect; and therefore we attribute to God the formal character of causality under the aspect of will, [and] not so under the other aspects.

And this is gathered from the words of Dionysius in the fourth [chapter] On the Divine Names¹³, where he says that « all things seek goodness as containing, as principle, and as end: as principle, from which they are; as containing, by which they are preserved; as end, to which they

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tend ». Whence « the divine love is a certain eternal cycle, [going forth] from the best, through the best, and into the best ». From which it is gathered that [the will] bespeaks the conjunction of principle with end, and therefore [is] cause in act when it wills to act; in such a way that actuality in causing¹⁴ is referred to the will — not for the instant in which it has the will, but [for the instant] in which it wills to act. Just as I will tomorrow to hear Mass, and the will¹⁵ will bring it about that tomorrow I am in act with respect to the thing willed; thus in its own mode it is in God.

Replies to the contrary arguments:

1. To that which is asked: whether the formal character of causality belongs to the will on account of what is connoted, or on account of the thing signified; I say that [it belongs] neither on account of the thing signified only, nor on account of what is connoted, but on account of the thing thus signified, because the divine essence is signified as will, to which mode of signifying truth corresponds. Whence¹⁶, just as, when we say that a stone is likened to God insofar as it is a being, an animal insofar as living, and a man insofar as understanding, in reality essence, intelligence, and life are the same in God — yet¹⁷ the same [reality] is given to be understood in another mode, not on account of connotation, but on account of the infinity of the same substance, in which all the noble properties are one. They cannot, however, be signified except through diverse [names].

2. To that which is objected, whether [the will] is the cause by [its] property or by appropriation; I say that, speaking simply, [the will] most properly is the cause. But comparing the will to knowledge and power, it is called cause by appropriation; and this, because the will itself signifies God as actual cause. Whence in the will is found first the formal character of actuality, not of causality¹⁸. For power and knowledge, although they have the character of a habitual cause, nevertheless [do not have] that of an actual [cause] except through the will. Whence the will makes a disposition of knowledge — or makes knowledge to be disposing, and power to be carrying out; for [God] disposes because he wills, and acts because he wills. And thus that [point] is clear.

3. To that which is asked: why the will is called cause, whether on account of the agent power¹⁹ or on account of the mode of acting; I say that [it is so called] on account of both — for in God to will is to be able — but principally by reason of the mode of acting. For the production of [something] diverse in form and nature, from the sole generosity of the agent, pertains to the agent [acting] by will. — To the objection that the mode of a natural agent is more noble: it is true where the will is not omnipotent; but if art could do everything it willed, it would act no less nobly²⁰ than nature [acts]. — Yet it can be said that the natural mode of producing belongs to a person with respect to a person, but not to the divine essence with respect to creatures, since they cannot agree in form.

To that which is objected, that God produces what is like [himself] according to [its] properties: it must be said that nature produces what is like in special properties, if it is a particular agent; or, if it is a universal agent, it produces necessarily, not from its own generosity; but God [acts] in neither mode.

4. To that which is objected, that God is not an agent who pre-conceives; it must be said that this is true of prior-thinking (praecogitatio), which precedes the will, but it is not true of pre-conception with respect to the work. And Dionysius speaks in the first mode; he, however, sets [himself] against [it] in the second mode.

Scholion

I. In the splendid solution of this question, first it is proved in general that the will of God is the cause of things, and is dashed away that worst of errors which both in ancient and in our own times spreads widely and is common to all pantheists — namely, that God in his outward works acts by necessity of nature. — Second, profound reasons are brought forward as to why rather the will, than knowledge and power, is said [to be] the cause of things — or why these « bear themselves more immediately to the things » (here a. 3 q. 1 ad 1) — which reasons are found in the third fundamentum, in the body, and in the reply ad 2. Although some from the school of St. Thomas think that the intellect, through command and practical judgment, concurs more immediately in the production of things than the will [does]; nevertheless the opinion of St. Bonaventure is more commonly held. — Third, that distinction among the divine attributes is excellently explained, which is called by others either virtual, or fundamental, or [a distinction] of reasoned reason (rationis ratiocinatae).

II. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I q. 35 m. 2 and 1. — Scot., On the Principle of Things, q. 4 a. 2. — S. Thom., on this and the following q., here q. 1 a. 2. 3; Summa I q. 19 a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 4; Summa p. I tr. 20 q. 79 m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2 a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2 q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 2 princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Summa a. 36 q. 4. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q., here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

Num. 58. Textum originalem invenies supra pag. 127, Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.
Number 58. The original text you will find above at p. 127. See here the littera of the Master, c. 4.
Libr. I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 2. n. 4.
Book I On Genesis against the Manicheans, c. 2 n. 4.
Cfr. supra pag. 120, nota 7.
Cf. above, p. 120, note 7.
Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 49. (c. 5.), ubi tractatur de agentibus per naturam et voluntatem. Ipsum textum iam citavimus supra pag. 56, nota 6. Cfr. etiam II. Phys. text. 30. seqq., ubi agitur de casu et fortuna, quae sunt causae imperfectae sive per accidens et in hoc inter se differunt, quod fortuna proprie locum habet in causis liberis, casus vero in naturalibus. Cfr. etiam VII. Metaph. text. 22. seqq. (VI. c. 7.), et XII. Metaph. text. 13. seqq. (XI. c. 3.), ubi hae quatuor causae, quibus aliquid fit, una simul adducuntur.
Cf. Aristotle, Physics II text 49 (c. 5), where he treats of agents acting by nature and by will. We have already cited that text above at p. 56, note 6. Cf. also Physics II text 30 and following, where chance and fortune are discussed — which are imperfect causes, or per accidens causes, and in this they differ among themselves, that fortune has its proper place in free causes, but chance in natural ones. Cf. also Metaph. VII text 22 and following (VI c. 7), and Metaph. XII text 13 and following (XI c. 3), where these four causes, by which something comes to be, are adduced together at once.
Cod. T Sed si.
Codex T [reads] Sed si.
Libr. I. de Sacram. p. II. c. 6, ubi de tribus perfectis et omnia perficientibus agens ait: Et haec tria erant potentia, sapientia, voluntas; et ad omnem effectum concurrunt tria haec, nec aliquid absolvitur, nisi ista adfuerint. Voluntas movet, scientia disponit, potentia operatur. — Loco Hugonis Vat. cum cod. cc falso Augustinum citat auctorem, et paulo post pro comparationem substituit cooperationem.
Book I On the Sacraments p. II c. 6, where, treating of the three [things which are] perfect and which perfect all things, [Hugh] says: And these three were power, wisdom, will; and in every effect these three concur, nor is anything accomplished unless they are present. Will moves, knowledge disposes, power operates. — In place of Hugh, the Vatican edition with codex cc falsely cites Augustine as the author, and shortly afterward, for comparationem substitutes cooperationem.
Post virtutem Vat. repetit agendi, et paulo inferius post per modum naturae cod. bb legit melior est et nobilior: ergo.
After virtutem the Vatican edition repeats agendi, and a little below, after per modum naturae, codex bb reads melior est et nobilior: ergo ("[it] is better and more noble: therefore").
Quod sc. voluntas sit causa. — Codd. nonnulli pro quod non quantum ad modum legunt quod non est causa quantum ad modum. [?]
Quod — namely, that the will be cause. — Some codices, for quod non quantum ad modum, read quod non est causa quantum ad modum. [?]
Cap. 4. § 1. Verba Dionysii iuxta versionem Scoti Erigenae haec sunt: Etenim, sicut quidem qui secundum nos est sol non cogitans aut praeeligens, sed eo esse [eo ipso quod est] illuminat omnia quae participare lumen eius secundum propriam potentiam sunt rationem; sic et optimum [quod est] super solem, ut super obscuram imaginem, excellenter principale exemplum ipsi subsistentiae omnibus existentibus proportionaliter supermittit totius bonitatis radios. — De propos. maiori cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. seqq., et supra pag. 714, nota 3.
Chapter 4, § 1. The words of Dionysius according to the version of Scotus Eriugena are these: For just as the sun which is among us, not pondering or pre-choosing, but by the very fact that it is, illuminates all things which by their own power are [endowed with] reason to participate in its light; so also the Best [which is] above the sun, as above an obscure image, in an excellent way and as principal exemplar sends down upon subsistence itself, proportionately to all existing things, the rays of its whole goodness. — On the major proposition cf. Aristotle, Ethics III c. 1 and following, and above p. 714, note 3.
De hoc dicto Damasceni cfr. supra pag. 769, nota 7.
On this saying of [John] Damascene, cf. above p. 769, note 7.
De modo, quo Deus omnes creaturarum perfectiones eminenter contineat, vide Dionys. de Div. Nom. c. 5. § 3-10, et Anselm., Monolog. c. 13-18.
On the way in which God eminently contains all the perfections of creatures, see Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 5 §§ 3-10, and Anselm, Monologion cc. 13-18.
Vat. et cod. cc omittunt quamvis unum sint. Post unum sint codd. Q R inserunt tamen, quam particulam cod. Y inserit ante quamvis. Paulo superius post sicut in nobis codd. cum ed. 1 subiiciunt est.
The Vatican edition and codex cc omit quamvis unum sint ("although they are one"). After unum sint codices Q R insert tamen, which particle codex Y inserts before quamvis. A little above, after sicut in nobis, the codices with ed. 1 add est.
Cfr. supra d. 22. q. 2. seqq. — Paulo ante cod. Z verbis omnia in Deo adiungit sunt vera ei. Paulo inferius post concedimus Vat. cum cod. cc omittit eum, et deinde ed. 1 pro cum intelligimus exhibet cum intelligamus.
Cf. above d. 22 q. 2 and following. — A little before, codex Z, to the words omnia in Deo, adds sunt vera ei ("are true for him"). A little below, after concedimus, the Vatican edition with codex cc omits eum, and then ed. 1, for cum intelligimus, exhibits cum intelligamus.
Hi duo textus sunt Dionysii, quorum prior quoad sensum depromptus est ex libro de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 1. et ex libro de Div. Nom. c. 4. Alter textus contractus est ex his verbis, quae habentur in libr. de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 31: Principium et finis erit bonum. Propter enim bonum omnia et quaecumque contraria. Etenim et haec agimus, bonum desiderantes; nemo enim malum respiciens facit quae facit. Cfr. etiam Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 3. et XII. text. 54. seqq. (IV. c. 2. et XI. c. 10.), I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2. (c. 1.), et I. Moral. Eudem. c. 5. (c. 8.). — Paulo inferius pro ratio causandi multi codd. et ed. 1 ratio creandi, et post pauca similiter creare faciens pro causare faciens.
These two texts are of Dionysius, of which the first, as to its sense, is drawn from the book On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 1 and from the book On the Divine Names c. 4. The other text is contracted from these words, which are found in the book On the Divine Names c. 4 § 31: The beginning and the end will be the good. For on account of the good [are] all things and whatever is contrary [to them]. For indeed we also do these things, desiring the good; for no one acts looking to evil in what he does. Cf. also Aristotle, Metaph. V text 3 and XII text 54 and following (IV c. 2 and XI c. 10), Magna Moralia I c. 2 (c. 1), and Moralia Eudemia I c. 5 (c. 8). — A little below, for ratio causandi many codices and ed. 1 [read] ratio creandi, and shortly after, likewise, creare faciens for causare faciens.
Cap. 4. § 14: Et omnia ipsam [bonitatem] ut principium, ut continentiam, ut finem appetunt, et optimum est, ut eloquia aiunt, ex quo omnia subsistunt et sunt tanquam ex causa perfectissima adducta, et in quo omnia constituta sunt tanquam in omnipotenti consulto custodita et comprehensa, et in quod omnia convertuntur sicut in propriam singula summitatem, et illud concupiscunt omnia. Sequens textus habetur ibid. § 14: Divinus amor ostenditur differenter, sicut quidam aeternus cyclus (κύκλος), per optimum, ex optimo et in optimo et in optimum inenarrabili conversione circuiens et in eodem et per id ipsum et proveniens semper et manens et revolutus. — Pro cyclus aeternus ed. 1 circulus aeternus; aliae autem edd. et codd. omnes actus aeternus. Sed haec lectio videtur esse error librariorum.
Chapter 4, § 14: And all things seek it [goodness] as principle, as containing, as end; and the Best is, as the oracles say, that from which all things subsist and are, as drawn forth from a most perfect cause, and in which all things are established, as guarded and comprehended in an omnipotent counsel, and into which all things are converted as each into its proper summit, and which all things desire. The following text is found in the same place, § 14: The divine love is shown to be different, as a certain eternal cycle (κύκλος), through the best, from the best, into the best, and in the best, circling about in an unspeakable conversion and in the same and through that very thing, both proceeding always and remaining and being revolved. — For cyclus aeternus ed. 1 [reads] circulus aeternus; but the other editions and all the codices [read] actus aeternus. But this reading appears to be a scribal error.
Codd. K P Q cum ed. 1 et haec voluntas. Paulo superius pro in causando rursum plures codd. cum ed. 1 in creando.
Codices K P Q with ed. 1 [read] et haec voluntas. A little above, for in causando, again several codices with ed. 1 [read] in creando.
Unde vel superabundat, vel aliquid excidit, v. g. similiter est.
Unde is either superfluous, or something has fallen out, e.g. similiter est ("likewise it is").
Pro tamen Vat. cum cod. cc cum. Mox pro datur plures codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue dantur, codd. K Z dant.
For tamen the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] cum. Shortly afterward, for datur, several codices with ed. 1 incongruously [read] dantur, codices K Z [read] dant.
In Vat. desunt verba non causalitatis; quae bene respiciunt verbum primo. Paulo superius pro et hoc, quia cod. R sed per hoc quod. In fine solutionis Vat. omittit et ideo facit, quia vult.
In the Vatican edition the words non causalitatis are missing; they rightly correspond to the word primo. A little above, for et hoc, quia codex R [reads] sed per hoc quod. At the end of the solution the Vatican edition omits et ideo facit, quia vult.
Pro agentem Vat. agendi.
For agentem the Vatican edition [reads] agendi.  ---

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