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Dist. 45, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 45

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa prima et immediata.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum voluntas divina sit causa prima et immediata. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum tertio de Trinitate1: « Voluntas Dei est prima et summa causa omnium specierum et motionum ».

2. Item, omnis causa, cuius actus primus et proprius est rei productio, est causa prima et immediata; sed voluntas divina est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Probatio mediae. Super illud Psalmi2: Iustus Dominus in omnibus viis suis, Glossa: « Deo hoc est velle quod facere, quia ex eius voluntate res habent esse ».

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia omnis causa est prima et immediata, qua non est altera prior3; sed divina voluntas est causa, qua non est altera prior, cum sit idem quod Deus: ergo voluntas est causa prima et immediata.

4. Item, omnis causa est prima et immediata, quae est in totum effectum per actionem suam; sed omne quod fit, est a Deo, et nihil potest operari sine ipso, cum non possit in esse salvari4, et Deus toti cooperatur et in totum: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis qui rem cognoscit certissime et nobilissime, cognoscit per causam proximam et immediatam; sed cognoscens Deum et videns cognoscit in eo res certissime et nobilissime tanquam in causis prioribus, ut dicit Augustinus5: ergo in Deo est causa proxima et immediata; sed non nisi voluntas, ergo etc.

6. Item, quod Deo attribuitur, debet attribui ei in fine totius nobilitatis6: si ergo ratio causalitatis convenit ei, nobilissima causalitas debet ei attribui. Sed haec est ratio causae primae et immediatae: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Unius est una causa immediata7: ergo si Deus est causa omnium immediata, nihil habet aliam causam quam Deum; et si hoc, cessat omnis operatio, et ita potentia cessat, cessat et bonitas, et cetera sunt otiosa.

2. Item, si divina voluntas est omnium causa proxima et immediata; sed posita causa proxima et immediata, ponitur effectus8: ergo cum divina voluntas fuerit ab aeterno, cetera sunt aeterna.

3. Item, omne quod habet causam proximam et immediatam et necessariam, est demonstrabile9: ergo si divina voluntas est omnium causa prima et immediata, omnia sunt demonstrabilia.

4. Item, cognita causa proxima et immediata, non est ultra quaerere10: ergo scito, quod Deus velit aliquid, stulte laborat qui quaerit causam aliam. Sed de omni bono, quod fit, scimus Deum causam esse: ergo non est ulterior quaerenda. Pereunt ergo et vanae sunt scientiae doctrinales, immo omnes scientiae.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Voluntas est causa immediata rerum, cum sit causa prima, universalissima et actualissima.

Respondeo: Ad huius11 intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum in creaturis sit reperire causam universalem et particularem, causa universalis

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alio modo plus influit in effectum quam particularis, alio modo minus. Quantum enim ad intimitatem causa universalis, quia agens prior12 est, magis influit, sed quantum ad actualitatem et quantum ad ea quae sunt propria rei, minus influit. Et ratio huius est, quia causa universalis creatam habet omnimodam actualitatem nec perfectam potentiam; et ideo non potest pervenire ad formam specialem nisi per accidens, ut per formam agentis particularis, quae non est ab ipsa13.

Divina autem voluntas est causa prima et universalissima et actualissima; et ideo potest in totum effectum in totam rei substantiam etiam sine adminiculo alterius causae; nec aliqua causa potest aliquid vel modicum sine ipsa. Et ideo necesse est, quod ipsa sit causa immediata in omni actione et re. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

Ad obiecta in contrarium intelligendum, quod cum Deus sit omnium causa immediata, quorundam tamen est tota causa, sicut eorum quae creantur; quorundam autem est causa cum alia causa particulari, ut eorum quae sunt a natura et a voluntate particulari14. Et haec quidem causa concurrit non propter indigentiam divinae voluntatis, sed propter summam liberalitatem, quae non tantum dedit rebus esse, sed operationem et diffusionem, et propter ordinem et connexionem universi ad invicem. Nec una causa derogat alteri, sed totus effectus est a causa creata, et totus a voluntate increata.

Ad 1. Et sic patet responsio ad primum obiectum: obiicit enim de causa immediata respectu alterius causae creatae, quia duae causae creatae non sunt immediatae in eodem genere causae.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod posita causa immediata etc.; dicendum, quod causam poni est dupliciter, vel in esse, vel in operari. Et posita causa, non ponitur effectus15 in actu, nisi ponatur in operando; et sic non fuit ab aeterno, sed in tempore, in quo disposuit et voluit ab aeterno producere rem.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia essent demonstrabilia; dicendum, quod verum est, si causa illa sit propria et determinata ad tales effectus.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quod non debet quaeri alia causa; dicendum, quod si plene cognosceretur Dei voluntas et dispositio in se, nullus unquam desideraret scire aliam causam; ita plene cognosceret in causis primordialibus. Attamen quia divina voluntas non cognoscitur, nec ipsa excludit in agendo operationem causae creatae, non excludit etiam nec in cognoscendo16; et ideo bonum est et perutile exerceri in consideratione causarum creatarum, ut aliquo modo semiplene veniamus in cognitionem illius causae supremae, quae est finis omnis cognitionis.

Scholion

I. Deus vocatur causa prima, quia praecedit et perfectione et aeternitate omnes causas secundas; non autem vocatur prima in eo sensu, quod in concursu cum actione causae secundae Deus agat tempore prius. Haec conceduntur ab omnibus. Disputatur autem de quaestione, utrum in hoc concursu prima causa concipi debeat ut agens prius natura sive praemovendo. — Causa immediata vocatur a S. Doctore (supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.) ea, « inter quam et effectum non cadit alia substantia media causans ». Ab aliis duplex distinguitur immediatio, scil. suppositi et virtutis. Causa immediata secundum immediationem virtutis operatur propria virtute, non mota ab alia causa; quod non convenit causae instrumentali, quae operatur mediante virtute aliena. Immediatio autem suppositi intelligitur, quando inter ipsam causam et effectum non est medium aliud suppositum. Patet quod una immediatio potest esse sine alia. Nam in scribendo calamus est agens mediatum, quia aliena virtute movetur, sed ratione suppositi ipse immediate effectum attingit. E contrario scribens respectu effectus est causa immediata ratione virtutis, mediata autem ratione suppositi. Attamen saepe utraque immediatio coniungitur, ut aqua balnei in refrigerando habet immediationem et virtutis et suppositi.

II. Deum in actionibus ad extra, quarum est sola causa, ut in creatione, esse agens immediatum ratione suppositi et virtutis, manifestum est (cfr. respons. ante finem). Eandem duplicem immediationem S. Doctor (solut. ad 1.) videtur docere etiam quoad concursum cum actionibus causarum secundarum, ut bene notant Trigosus (S. q. 13. a. 1. dub. 3.) et Barth. de Barberiis (Curs. tom. I. disp. 6. q. 6.). Dicit enim Sanctus, quod idem effectus potest esse immediate ab increata causa et a creata, sed non a duabus causis creatis. Attamen immediatio solius virtutis etiam in duabus causis creatis respectu eiusdem effectus bene potest esse; non autem immediatio in utroque sensu.

III. Quoad Dei concursum generalem cum actionibus causarum secundarum duae fuerunt opiniones extremae et sibi oppositae. Prima opinio rebus creatis aufert omnem virtutem vere activam et causativam; quem errorem, iam a quibusdam antiquis philosophis praeformatum, aliqui posteriores sub nomine occasionalismi defendere voluerunt. Improbatur autem haec absurda opinio a S. Bonaventura, II. Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et alibi. — Ex opposito Durandus (II. Sent. d. 1. q. 5, d. 37. q. 1.) negat, Deum immediate in omni actione creaturae simul agere, cui opinioni et ante aetatem S. Bonaventurae et

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etiam postea aliqui adhaeserunt. De hac quaestione S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. dicit: « Circa istam quaestionem fuerunt diversae positiones adeo magnorum virorum et adeo rationabiles, ut ipse Magister ausus fuerit definire, quae earum magis contineat veritatem. Attamen, quia per multam discussionem dubia diriguntur ad manifestationem, nunc communiter tenetur, quod illa opinio verior sit, quae dicit, quod omnis actio, sive substrata peccato sive non, secundum id quod est actio, est a Deo. Nec immerito, quia illud oportet ponere, si pensetur eminentia divinae potentiae et indigentia potentiae creatae » etc.; quod ibi et a. 2. q. 1. 2, dub. 2, et II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 3. q. 1, d. 28. a. 2. q. 3, et alibi variis rationibus stabilitur. Consentiunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 3; S. Thom., S. I. q. 105. a. 3. 5, S. c. Gent. III. c. 66. 67. 70; Scot., II. Sent. d. 37. q. 2. (alios locos vide II. Scoti Sum., a P. Hier. de Montefortino, tom. II. p. I. q. 108. a. 3. 4. 5.); et alii communissime. De opinione, quam sequitur Durandus, dicit B. Albert. (II. Sent. d. 38. a. 7.): « Fere ab aliis et a multis modernorum reputatur haeretica ». Non defuerunt posterioribus saeculis, qui cum Suarez eandem opinionem ut erroneam vel haeresi proximam censuraverint. — Nihilominus circa modum divini concursus, praesertim utrum ille sit praevius, an simultaneus, inter scholas catholicas libere controvertitur, de quo alibi plura.

IV. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 33. m. 2. § 1. — S. Thom., locis hic et in q. praecedenti citatis. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. 5. p. I. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 2. a. 1. partic. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation
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Question II. Whether the will of God is the first and immediate cause.

Secondly, it is asked whether the divine will is the first and immediate cause. And that it is so, appears as follows:

1. Through Augustine in book III On the Trinity1: « The will of God is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. »

2. Likewise, every cause whose first and proper act is the production of a thing is a first and immediate cause; but the divine will is of this sort: therefore, etc. Proof of the middle [premise]: Upon that [verse] of the Psalm2: The Lord is just in all his ways, the Gloss [says]: « For God, to will is the same as to do, since from his will things have being. »

3. Likewise, by reason it appears [so], because every cause than which there is no other prior is a first and immediate cause3; but the divine will is a cause than which there is no other prior, since it is the same as God: therefore the will is a first and immediate cause.

4. Likewise, every cause is a first and immediate cause which [reaches] into the whole effect through its action; but everything that comes to be is from God, and nothing can act without him, since it cannot be preserved in being [without him]4, and God cooperates with the whole and unto the whole: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, everyone who knows a thing most certainly and most nobly knows it through its proximate and immediate cause; but he who knows and sees God knows things in him most certainly and most nobly, as in their prior causes, as Augustine says5: therefore in God there is the proximate and immediate cause; but [there is] nothing [in him] except his will, therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, what is attributed to God ought to be attributed to him at the highest pitch of nobility6: if therefore the character of causality befits him, the most noble causality ought to be attributed to him. But this [most noble causality] is the character of a first and immediate cause: therefore, etc.

On the contrary:

1. Of one thing there is [only] one immediate cause7: therefore if God is the immediate cause of all things, nothing has any cause other than God; and if this is so, every operation ceases, and so power ceases, goodness ceases, and the rest are idle.

2. Likewise, if the divine will is the proximate and immediate cause of all things; but when the proximate and immediate cause is posited, the effect is posited8: therefore, since the divine will has been from eternity, the rest are eternal.

3. Likewise, everything which has a proximate and immediate and necessary cause is demonstrable9: therefore if the divine will is the first and immediate cause of all things, all things are demonstrable.

4. Likewise, [once] the proximate and immediate cause is known, [there is] no further [reason] to inquire10: therefore, given that one knows God wills something, he labors foolishly who seeks another cause. But concerning every good thing that comes to be, we know God to be the cause: therefore no further [cause] is to be sought. Therefore the doctrinal sciences perish and are in vain — indeed, all the sciences.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. The will [of God] is the immediate cause of things, since it is the first, most universal, and most actual cause.

I respond: For the understanding of this11 [question] it must be noted that, since in creatures there is to be found a universal cause and a particular cause, the universal cause

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in one respect contributes more to the effect than the particular [cause], and in another respect less. For as to intimacy, the universal cause, because it is a prior agent12, contributes more; but as to actuality and as to those things which are proper to the thing, it contributes less. And the reason of this is that the universal created cause has only partial actuality, not perfect power; and therefore it cannot attain to the specific form except by accident, namely through the form of the particular agent, which is not from it13.

The divine will, however, is the first and most universal and most actual cause; and therefore it is able [to act] upon the whole effect, into the whole substance of the thing, even without the support of any other cause; nor can any [other] cause [do] anything, even slightly, without it. And therefore it is necessary that it itself be the immediate cause in every action and thing. — And the reasons [adduced] for this conclusion are to be granted.

To the objections on the contrary side, it must be understood that, since God is the immediate cause of all things, yet of some he is the entire cause — namely of those things which are created; of others, however, he is the cause together with another particular cause — namely of those things which are from nature and from a particular will14. And indeed this [particular] cause concurs not on account of any deficiency of the divine will, but on account of [God's] supreme generosity, which gave to things not only being, but also operation and diffusion, and on account of the order and connection of the universe with itself. Nor does one cause derogate from the other, but the whole effect is from the created cause, and the whole [effect] from the uncreated will.

Ad 1. And thus the reply to the first objection is plain: for it objects from the [notion of] immediate cause with respect to another created cause, [arguing] that two created causes are not immediate in the same genus of cause.

Ad 2. To that which is objected, that, when the immediate cause is posited, etc.: it must be said that "to be posited as a cause" is twofold — either in being, or in operating. And when the cause is posited, the effect15 is not posited in act unless [the cause] is posited as operating; and thus [the world] was not [in act] from eternity, but [came to be] in time, in which [God] disposed and willed from eternity to produce the thing.

Ad 3. To that which is objected, that all things would be demonstrable: it must be said that this is true if that cause is proper and determined to such [particular] effects.

Ad 4. To that which is asked, that another cause should not be sought: it must be said that, if God's will and disposition were known fully in itself, no one would ever desire to know any other cause; he would so fully know [things] in their primordial causes. Nevertheless, because the divine will is not [thus] known, nor does it exclude in acting the operation of the created cause, neither does it exclude [the same] in knowing16; and therefore it is good and most useful to be exercised in the consideration of created causes, that we may in some way half-fully come into the knowledge of that supreme cause, which is the end of all knowledge.

Scholion

I. God is called the first cause, because he precedes all second causes both in perfection and in eternity; he is not, however, called "first" in the sense that, in his concurrence with the action of a second cause, God acts prior in time. These [points] are conceded by all. But the question is disputed whether in this concurrence the first cause is to be conceived as an agent prior in nature — that is, by way of premotion. — An immediate cause is defined by the Holy Doctor (above d. 8 p. I a. 2 q. 1 ad 4) as that "between which and the effect no other intermediate substance falls as causing". By others a twofold immediacy is distinguished, namely of supposit and of power. An immediate cause according to immediacy of power operates by its own power, not as moved by another cause — which does not fit an instrumental cause, which operates by means of another's power. But immediacy of supposit is understood when between the cause itself and the effect there is no other intermediate supposit. It is plain that one [kind of] immediacy can exist without the other. For in writing, the pen is a mediate agent, because it is moved by another's power, but by reason of supposit it attains the effect immediately. On the contrary, the one writing, with respect to the effect, is an immediate cause by reason of power, but mediate by reason of supposit. Yet often both [kinds of] immediacy are joined, as the water of a bath in cooling has both an immediacy of power and of supposit.

II. That God in his outward actions, of which he is the sole cause — as in creation — is an immediate agent by reason both of supposit and of power, is manifest (cf. the response near its end). The same twofold immediacy the Holy Doctor (in the reply to objection 1) seems to teach also as to [his] concurrence with the actions of second causes, as Trigosus rightly notes (Summa q. 13 a. 1 dub. 3) and Bartholomew de Barberiis (Cursus tom. I disp. 6 q. 6). For the Saint says that the same effect can [come] immediately from an uncreated cause and from a created [cause], but not from two created causes. Yet an immediacy of power alone, even in two created causes with respect to the same effect, can well [come about]; but not an immediacy in both senses.

III. As regards God's general concurrence with the actions of second causes, there were two extreme and mutually opposed opinions. The first opinion takes away from created things every truly active and causative power — an error already prefigured by certain ancient philosophers, which some later [thinkers] wished to defend under the name of occasionalism. But this absurd opinion is refuted by St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 7 p. II a. 2 q. 1, and elsewhere. — On the opposite side, Durandus (II Sent. d. 1 q. 5, d. 37 q. 1) denies that God acts immediately at the same time in every action of a creature — an opinion to which both before St. Bonaventure's time and

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afterward some have adhered. On this question St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 37 a. 1 q. 1 says: « Concerning this question there were diverse positions of such great men and so reasonable, that the Master himself did not dare to define which of them more contained the truth. Nevertheless, because through much discussion doubts are brought to clarification, it is now commonly held that that opinion is truer which says that every action, whether underlain by sin or not, according to that which is action, is from God. Nor without reason, since this must be posited if one weighs the eminence of the divine power and the indigence of the created power » etc.; which is there [in the same place] and in a. 2 q. 1. 2, dub. 2, and II Sent. d. 1 p. 1 a. 3 q. 1, d. 28 a. 2 q. 3, and elsewhere established by various reasons. With this agree Alex. Hal., Summa p. II q. 94 m. 3 a. 6 § 3; S. Thom., Summa I q. 105 a. 3. 5, Summa contra Gentiles III c. 66. 67. 70; Scotus, II Sent. d. 37 q. 2 (for other places see Summa of Scotus, by P. Hier. de Montefortino, vol. II p. I q. 108 a. 3. 4. 5); and others most generally. Of the opinion which Durandus follows, B. Albert says (II Sent. d. 38 a. 7): « It is reckoned by others and by many moderns as nearly heretical. » There have not been lacking in later centuries those who, with Suarez, have censured the same opinion as erroneous or as next to heresy. — Nevertheless, as to the mode of the divine concurrence — especially whether it be prior or simultaneous — there is free dispute among the Catholic schools, of which [matter] more [is said] elsewhere.

IV. Alex. Hal., Summa p. I q. 33 m. 2 § 1. — S. Thom., in the places cited here and on the preceding question. — B. Albert, here a. 8. 5, Summa p. I tr. 20 q. 79 m. 2 a. 1 partic. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2 a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2 q. 2. — Durand., here q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 4. n. 3. In textu originali post omnium adiicitur corporalium.
    Chapter 4, n. 3. In the original text, after omnium the word corporalium is added.
  2. Psalm. 144, 17. Glossa, ex Cassiodoro desumta, habetur apud Lyranum, in qua pro Deo legitur Apud illum.
    Psalm 144, 17. The Gloss, taken from Cassiodorus, is found in Lyra, in which in place of Deo the reading is Apud illum.
  3. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. de primis et immediatis principiis demonstrationis agens ait: idem enim dico primum et principium. Est autem principium demonstrationis propositio immediata. Immediata autem est, qua non est alia prior. — In conclusione post voluntas codd. P Q inserunt eius.
    Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I c. 2, treating of the first and immediate principles of demonstration, says: for I say "first" and "principle" mean the same thing. Now a principle of demonstration is an immediate proposition. And an immediate [proposition] is one than which there is no other prior. — In the conclusion, after voluntas, codices P and Q insert eius.
  4. Intellige: per se sive sine Deo. Cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2, et d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — De hoc simultaneo concursu Dei cum creaturis quoad effectum cfr. August., V. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 40. seqq. Aristot., VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 18. (c. 14.): Quemadmodum in universo est Deus, et vicissim cuncta in illo [ed. Firmin-Didot: sic etiam in anima]: moventur enim omnia ab inexistente in nobis numine.
    Understand: of itself, or without God. Cf. above d. 8 p. I a. 2 q. 2, and d. 37 p. I a. 1 q. 1. — On this simultaneous concurrence of God with creatures as regards the effect, cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter V c. 20 n. 40 ff. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics VII c. 18 (c. 14): Just as God is in the universe, and in turn all things are in him [the Firmin-Didot edition reads: so also in the soul]: for all things are moved by the indwelling divinity within us.
  5. Libr. II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 8. n. 17. seqq., ibid. V. c. 14. n. 32. seqq., et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 29. — De propos. maiori cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2.
    Book II On Genesis according to the Letter c. 8 n. 17 ff., the same V c. 14 n. 32 ff., and XI On the City of God c. 29. — On the major premise cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I c. 2.
  6. Hic modus loquendi iam occurrit in Averroe, XII. Metaph. text. 39, ubi auctor Deo tribuit vitam in fine nobilitatis i. e. summopere.
    This manner of speaking already occurs in Averroes, Metaphysics XII text 39, where the author attributes life to God at the highest pitch of nobility — that is, supremely.
  7. Cfr. supra pag. 746, nota 6.
    Cf. above p. 746, note 6.
  8. Cfr. supra pag. 118, nota 2, et Avicenna, IV. Metaph. c. 1.
    Cf. above p. 118, note 2, and Avicenna, Metaphysics IV c. 1.
  9. Secundum Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. et 24. (c. 30.) demonstratio constare debet ex primis, veris, immediatis, prioribus, notioribus, necessariis propositionibus causisque conclusionis.
    According to Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I c. 2 and 24 (c. 30), a demonstration must be made up of first, true, immediate, prior, more-known, necessary propositions, and from the causes of the conclusion.
  10. Averroes verba Aristot., II. Phys. text. 38. (c. 3.): « Oportet autem semper causam uniuscuiusque summam quaerere », exponens ait: Oportet intendere principaliter de causis causam ultimam in quaestione, non ultimam in esse, et illa est causa propinqua; ultima enim in esse est causa remota, v. g. quando aliquis interrogat: quare aedificat aliquis homo? et dicetur, quia est aedificator, et cum dicitur: et quare est aedificator? dicetur, quia habet artem aedificandi; et hic cessat quaestio. Cfr. etiam Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 12. (VII. c. 1.). — Paulo inferius pro quod fit Vat. sic.
    Averroes, expounding Aristotle's words Physics II text 38 (c. 3): « But one must always seek the highest cause of each thing », says: One must principally aim, concerning causes, at the ultimate cause in the question — not the ultimate in being, and this is the proximate cause; for the ultimate in being is the remote cause. For example, when someone asks: why is this man building? and it is said, because he is a builder, and when it is asked: and why is he a builder? it will be said, because he has the art of building; and here the inquiry ceases. Cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII text 12 (VII c. 1). — A little below, for quod fit the Vatican [edition reads] sic.
  11. Cod. R addit quaestionis.
    Codex R adds quaestionis ("of [this] question").
  12. Vat. potior. — Cfr. supra pag. 471, nota 3.
    The Vatican [edition reads] potior ("more powerful"). — Cf. above p. 471, note 3.
  13. Scilicet causa universali creata. Cfr. supra d. 40. dub. 7. — Vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 ipso; perperam.
    Namely, [not] from the created universal cause. Cf. above d. 40 dub. 7. — The older codices, with edition 1, [read] ipso; wrongly.
  14. Vide supra d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Vat. cum cod. cc omittit et a voluntate, et aliquanto inferius post verba totus a voluntate interiicit infinita.
    See above d. 38 a. 1 q. 1, in the body [of the article]. — The Vatican [edition], with codex cc, omits et a voluntate, and somewhat further below, after the words totus a voluntate, inserts infinita.
  15. Vat. et cod. cc, post Et posita causa insertis vocibus in esse, omittunt effectus. In fine solutionis pro rem antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 tunc, cod. X tunc produxit.
    The Vatican [edition] and codex cc, after Et posita causa, with the words in esse inserted, omit effectus. At the end of the solution, for rem the older codices with edition 1 [read] tunc; codex X [reads] tunc produxit.
  16. Vat., omisso nec ante in cognoscendo, hic adiungit cognitionem rationis humanae. Paulo superius pro aliam causam non pauci codd. aliquam causam.
    The Vatican [edition], omitting nec before in cognoscendo, here adds cognitionem rationis humanae ("the knowledge of human reason"). A little above, for aliam causam not a few codices [read] aliquam causam.
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