Bonaventure

I. Haec quaestio differt a praecedenti, in qua agitur de ordine effectuum praedestinationis ad invicem, et de causa meritoria, quae inter eosdem esse possit. Hic agitur de ipso divino proposito sive de praeordinatione in eligendo vel reprobando, non quidem de voluntate vel actu ipsius in se, cum sit essentia divina, sed «quantum ad ordinationem voliti ad eius voluntatem», sive aliis verbis, quatenus volitio divina terminatur ad effectum vel praedestinationis, vel reprobationis. Quod ne in hoc quidem sensu causa meritoria illius praeordinationis concedi possit, cum sententia tunc communi hic et in praecedenti quaestione explicite docetur. Sed quaeritur, utrum saltem ratio motiva aliqua «congruitatis et decentiae» assignanda sit. Praecipue autem discutitur haec difficultas non circa rationem praedestinationis in generali, sed in speciali et comparative. Quare Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) quaestionem sic proponit: «Utrum in Deo sit aliqua ratio, quaecumque sit illa, quia praedestinavit aliquos et aliquos non». — Iuvat praenotare quae sequuntur.

1. Haec res gravibus difficultatibus obstructa est. Ex una parte salvari debet Dei iustitia, aequitas et bonitas, nec non seria voluntas antecedens salvandi omnes homines; ex altera parte cavendum est, ne derogetur gratuitati donorum Dei, scil. gratiae, perseverantiae finalis et praedestinationis, nec non independentiae divinae voluntatis. Sicut enim intellectus divinus in suo actu non dependet ab aliqua ratione cognoscendi, quae sit extra Deum, licet terminetur ad res extra Deum existentes, cum cognitio Dei non sit a rebus, sed ad res; simili modo volitio voluntatis divinae, licet terminetur ad obiecta volita extra

Deum, non potest excitari aliqua ratione motiva nec ab aliqua dependere, quae sit alia ab ipso, ut bene docetur infra d. 45. dub. 3.

2. Iam inter antiquos Scholasticos multum disputatum est, utrum et quomodo praescientia meritorum accipi possit ut ratio praedestinationis. Plures opiniones recitat Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 1. — Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 28. m. 3. a. 1.) recte dicit: «Ex parte praedestinationis nec principale significatum est ex meritis, nec etiam primum connotatum, quod est infusio gratiae, sed collatio gloriae ex meritis est». Sed ibid. a. 3. dicit (ad 2.): «Collationis gratiae et gloriae potest esse ratio praescientiae meritorum». Ad quae verba Dionys. Carth. hanc notam adiicit: «Responsio ista tanti doctoris admirationem et timorem ingerit mihi»; et probare nititur, ea esse contra intentionem S. Augustini et Patrum. Sed, si fallimur, sane exponi potest haec sententia Alexandri, ita ut non iis contradicat, quae in praecedenti articulo iam dixerat. Loquitur enim praecise de iustificatione, et verba praescientia meritorum intelligenda sunt de mera dispositione supernaturali ad infusionem gratiae habitualis, per gratias actuales acquisita. Sic intellecta sententia Alexandri idem dicit quod B. Albert. (loco infra n. II. relato) docet de praeparatione ad gratiam.

Henricus Gand. (Quodlib. 8. a. 19.) docet, quod praedestinatio, quatenus est a Deo agente, nullam rationem habeat nisi bonitatem et voluntatem Dei; sed quatenus est in subiecto recipiente, aliquam habeat rationem, scil. bonum usum liberi arbitrii praevisum. Hunc enim bonum usum sic distinguit, ut sit quidem effectus (non ratio) praedestinationis, quatenus est ex gratia, sed simul sit ratio motiva eiusdem (non autem meritoria), quatenus est ex libero arbitrio. Quae doctrina Scoto (hic q. unica, n. 8.) aliisque plurimis displicuit.

Nam Scotus cum S. Thoma rationem praedestinationis, ut est praedestinatio Dei, in ipsam divinam voluntatem tanquam in causam adaequatam referendam esse docet. Tamen Scotus (ibid. n. 13.) sapienter addit: «De istis opinionibus omnibus, quia Apostolus videtur, disputans de ista materia ad Romanos, in fine quasi totum inscrutabile relinquere: altitudo (inquiens) divitiarum..., ideo ne scrutando de profundo, secundum dictum Magistri, eatur in profundum, eligatur quae magis placet, dum tamen salvetur libertas divina sine aliqua iniustitia, et alia quae salvanda sunt circa Deum, ut liberaliter eligentem» etc. Antiqua igitur schola Scoti (Lyranus, Nicolaus de Nyse, Petrus ab Aquila, Alphonsus de Castro, Lychetus) et etiam posteriores plurimi (Mastrius, Rada, Macedo, Hauzeur, Schmising, Herincx, doctissimus Corbinianus Luydl etc.) negant, praevisa merita esse rationem efficacis praedestinationis. Totam fere scholam S. Thomae, et celeberrimos theologos Bellarminum, Toletum, Suarez, Ruiz, Molinam eandem sententiam profiteri, sed non eodem modo explicare, notissimum est. In favorem autem alterius sententiae scripserunt inter Scotistas Faber, Poncius et Frassenius.

3. Observandum est, quod in celebri controversia, quae a tribus saeculis in scholis catholicis agitatur, utrum scil. praedestinatio ad gloriam sit ex praevisis meritis, non est idem status quaestionis, secundum quem S. Bonav. et coaevi alii communiter rem tractabant, cum eo, secundum quem in nostris scholis disputatur. Illi quaerebant, utrum praedestinatio in genere, id est praeordinatio secundum omnes suos effectus collective sumtos habeat in Deo rationem aliquam motivam, sive in generali, sive in speciali i. e. comparative ad unum hominem prae altero; immo principaliter considerabant primos effectus praedestinationis, scil. vocationem et iustificationem, et praedestinationem in speciali. Sed nunc agitur praecise de ultimo effectu praedestinationis sive de praedestinatione ad gloriam, non quidem in ordine exsecutionis, sed intentionis. Ab omnibus enim conceditur, in ordine exsecutionis ultimum effectum de facto reddi adultis propter praecedentia merita; unde consecutio gloriae nec non decretum divinum, dandi in tempore «coronam iustitiae», praesupponunt in Deo praevisionem bonorum operum. In ordine autem intentionis est primum id quod est ultimum in exsecutione; unde intentio dandi gloriam concipitur ut antecedens voluntati dandi media. Itaque circa hanc intentionem, qua efficaciter et absolute eliguntur aliqui ad gloriam, duae exortae sunt sententiae, ex adverso sibi oppositae. Plurimae autem aliae cum quadam restrictione vel diversa expositione unam vel alteram partem sequuntur. Prima igitur sententia distinguit conditionalam intentionem dandi gloriam, et absolutam. Voluntate conditionata et antecedenti Deus omnes homines gratuito ad gloriam praedestinat sub conditione, quod gratiis dandis bene usuri sint. Voluntate vero absoluta et efficaci non omnes, sed electos nonnullos prae aliis ad gloriam absolute praeordinat. Haec discretio iuxta illam sententiam praesupponit praescientiam meritorum ut absolute futurorum, ita ut praedestinati secundum rationem prius eligantur ad gratiam et ad merita, et post vel etiam, ut multi volunt, propter praevisa merita voluntate consequenti et absoluta eligantur ad gloriam. Unde discretio salvandorum et reproborum etiam in ordine intentionis fit a Deo secundum praevisionem meritorum et ex motivo iustitiae. Ita cum Lessio, Vasquez, Becano, Wirceburgensibus plurimi posteriores. — Contraria etiam sententia distinguit inter ordinem intentionis et exsecutionis, sive inter primam electionem ad gloriam et ipsius gloriae consecutionem; sed aliter loquitur de ordine electionis et de motivo eiusdem. Ut huius sententiae defensores volunt, intentio non tantum conditionata, sed etiam absoluta, qua aliqui voluntate consequenti ordinantur ad gloriam, praecedit ratione praevisionem meritorum, ita ut haec volitio divina non habeat motivum nisi gratuitam divinam misericordiam; ordinatio autem ad gratiam et ad merita (quae sunt media ad finem, scil. gloriam) praesupponit electionem ad gloriam, cuius sunt effectus. Unde motivum intendendi gloriam est gratuitum, sed motivum dandi eam in exsecutione est ex iustitia; sive aliis verbis: Deus non propter merita, sed gratis vult primo ordinare ad gloriam, tamen vult dare eam propter merita. Haec sententia considerat bona opera sub ratione doni divini, quia Deus eorum est causa prima et principalis, et per consequens, quatenus ipsa sunt effectus praedestinationis; et inde infert: ergo non sunt causa seu ratio eiusdem praedestinationis. Prima autem sententia eadem bona opera considerat sub respectu meriti, quatenus procedunt etiam a libero arbitrio ut eius effectus.

Non est nostrum iudicare de veritate harum sententiarum, quas tantum proposuimus, ut facilius constet, S. Bonaventuram hic rem non tractare sub istis distinctionibus, cum non loquatur nec de ordine intentionis et exsecutionis (ut iam Scotus locutus est), nec praecise de electione ad gloriam, nec de ordine prioritatis et posterioritatis, qui inter decreta divina secundum nostrum modum intelligendi esse supponitur.

Hinc non est mirum, S. Bonaventuram et plerosque antiquos Scholasticos a diversis ad utramque partem trahi, et eadem S. Bonaventurae verba (in dd. 40. 41, et infra d. 46. a. 1. q. 1.) diversimode intelligi, scil. vel de ordine intentionis, vel de ordine exsecutionis. Nam Trigosus (Sum. theol. q. 18. a. 6. dub. 1.) diffuse disputat ad probandum, S. Bonaventuram docere praedestinationem ad gloriam ante praevisa merita, cui consentiunt Hauzeur (Coll. L. col. 516.) aliique. Isti propositiones, quae loquuntur de praevisione meritorum, intelligunt non de ordine intentionis, sed exsecutionis. Sed econtra Barth. a Barberiis et Frassenius (de Deo, tract. 2. disp. 3. a. 2. sect. 2. q. 3.) cum plurimis aliis S. Bonaventuram omnino patronum alterius sententiae faciunt.

Manifestum autem est, S. Doctorem loqui secundum statum quaestionis sua aetate communem atque summa moderatione et sapientia suam sententiam proponere. Dum loquitur de ratione motiva respectu praedestinationis in generali (hic in corp.) non commemorat praevisionem meritorum, sed ostensionem misericordiae et iustitiae. Dum autem loquitur de praedestinatione in speciali et comparative (in corp. et ad 6.) non intendit probare nisi: a) supponendam esse aliquam rationem motivam quantum ad ordinationem voliti ad voluntatem divinam, cum ipsa congruenter operetur; b) hanc non esse causam meritoriam, sed tantum rationem congruentiae; c) eandem non esse nobis certam nec determinatam, «quia multae possunt esse rationes congruentiae»; d) possibile esse, quod praeter alias etiam praevisio bonorum sit ratio motiva, (quae autem sint haec bona, se ignorare confitetur S. Doctor); e) temeritatem quandam sapere assertionem, merita in Iacob esse rationem congruitatis suae electionis (hic dub. 1.); f) praeter conclusionem principalem (quod divina voluntas «habet rationem congruitatis ratione voliti») vult, alia non esse inquirenda, et concedit, argumenta ab ipso in fundam. allata ex parte posse habere calumniam (ad 7.). Vide etiam infra d. 46. q. 1, d. 47. q. 1.

II. Hinc patet, Doctorem Seraphicum cautissime sententiam sua aetate communem proponere, nec a S. Thoma etiam in modo loquendi discedere nisi in hoc, quod respectu praedestinationis in speciali ipse asserat, esse quidem rationem congruitatis, quae tamen propter nostram ignorantiam determinate non possit assignari. Attamen S. Thom. (S. I. q. 23. a. 5. ad 3.), quem in hoc sequitur Scotus, explicite dicit: «Quare hos elegit in gloriam et illos reprobavit, non habet rationem nisi divinam voluntatem». Si haec verba intelliguntur in eo sensu, quem insinuat alia eiusdem formula (ibid. in corp.): «Non est assignare (scil. a nobis) causam divinae voluntatis a parte actus volendi»; tunc uterque S. Doctor idem aliis verbis dicit. Fortasse autem modus loquendi apud Angelicum procedit ex illo principio (S. 1. q. 19. a. 5.), quod velle finem tunc non possit esse causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, quando aliquis «uno actu velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem», ut est in Deo. — Ceterum S. Thom. non negat, quod «voluntas Dei nun-

quam est irrationabilis» (S. Anselm., l. Cur Deus homo, c. 8.), sed ipse (hic q. 1. a. 3.) dicit: «Praedestinatio causam non habet, sed habet rationem ex parte effectus, secundum quam imponens et iusta dicitur». Quaeritur igitur tantum de acceptatione rationis motivae, quae non sit ipsa voluntas. Argumenta pro utraque parte exhibet Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2., licet ipse potius sequatur S. Thomam in modo loquendi. — Alexandrum Hal. convenire cum Seraphico, at non ita caute et moderate loqui, iam observavimus. — B. Albert. in Summa p. I. tr. 16. q. 65. saepius eodem fere modo loquendi utitur, quo S. Bonav. Dicit quidem (ibi q. incid. 5. ad 1.): «Electio divina causa meriti est, et est causa respectus ad futura merita»; sed etiam: «Occultissima merita pro certo sunt in praescientia Dei merita, sed haec non possunt esse causa electionis aeternae, sed possunt esse ratio, propter quam electio sit rationabilis»; et ibid. ad 2: «Voluntatis enim divinae opus est electio, et nullam aliam habet causam, licet praescientia meritorum rationem ostendat rationabilem». Insuper de ipsa praescientia loquitur tanquam unum connotatum principale significatum praedestinationis dicens: «Causam habere non potest nisi voluntatem Dei; tamen quia praescientia meritorum secundum rationem intelligentiae informat voluntatem praeparantem gratiam... non video, quid prohibeat, quin praescientia meritorum ratio sit» (ibid. q. 63. q. 1. incid.). Quae verba respondent potius modo, quo loquitur Alexander, quam quo utitur S. Bonaventura.

Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 1. in fine) concludit: «Quamvis autem positio Thomae sit probabilis, attamen (si salva auctoritate Scripturae dici potest) rationabiliorem puto positionem Bonaventurae, quantum ad hoc, quod dicit, praedestinationem habere rationem in particulari seu singulari, sicut in communi, ita quod non sola Dei voluntas seu voluntas est ratio, cur isto praedestinatur magis quam ille, sed certa atque legitima ratio, ob quam voluntas sic agit, praesertim cum voluntas Dei essentialiter sit ipsa infinita sapientia ac iustitia, propter quod nec irrationalis nec iniusta consistere potest»; quod ibi pluribus rationibus probat.

III. Verba in solut. ad 6: «Propter quorum (bonorum) tamen praevisionem nec scio determinare» etc. respicere videntur locum S. Augustini (83 Qq. q. 68. n. 4. apud Magistrum, hic c. 2.), de cuius sensu et tum temporis et magis a tribus saeculis plurimum disputatum est. Dicit igitur S. Augustinus quod voluntas Dei, qua cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat, «venit de occultissimis meritis». Magister putat, S. Augustinum hoc saltem in suo simili retractasse, quod etiam S. Thomas (de Verit. q. 6. a. 2. ad 10.) refert, sed addit: «Vel si debent sustineri, referendum est ad effectum reprobationis vel praedestinationis, quod habet aliquam causam meritoriam vel dispositivam». Matth. ab Aquasparta, qui in quinta anecdota quaestione disputata: utrum praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam, omnino sequitur S. Bonaventuram, eundem textum explicat «non de electione aeterna, sed de vocatis ad poenitentiam».

IV. Praeter iam citatos auctores: B. Albert., hic n. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2, q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2.³¹

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I. This question differs from the preceding, in which is treated the order of the effects of predestination to one another, and the meritorious cause that can be among them. Here is treated the divine proposal itself, that is, the pre-ordaining in choosing or reprobating — not indeed the will or its act in itself, since this is the divine essence, but «as regards the ordering of the willed to his will», or in other words, in so far as the divine volition terminates at the effect either of predestination or of reprobation. That not even in this sense can a meritorious cause of that pre-ordaining be conceded — which is the then-common opinion — is explicitly taught here and in the preceding question. But it is asked whether at least some motive ground «of fittingness and seemliness» is to be assigned. The difficulty is chiefly discussed, however, not concerning the ground of predestination in general, but [concerning it] in particular and comparatively. Whence Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 2) so proposes the question: «Whether in God there is any ground — whatever it may be — why he has predestined some and not others». — It helps to note in advance what follows.

1. This matter is beset with grave difficulties. On the one hand, the justice, equity and goodness of God must be safeguarded, as also the serious antecedent will of saving all men; on the other, care must be taken not to derogate from the gratuitous character of God's gifts, namely of grace, of final perseverance and of predestination, nor from the independence of the divine will. For just as the divine intellect in its act does not depend on any ground of knowing that is outside God — although it does terminate at things existing outside God, since the cognition of God is not from things, but [is directed] to things — in like manner the volition of the divine will, although it terminates at willed objects outside

God, cannot be moved by any motive ground nor depend on any [ground] which is other than [God] himself, as is well taught below at d. 45, dub. 3.

2. Already among the ancient Scholastics there was much dispute as to whether and how foreknowledge of merits could be taken as a ground of predestination. Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 1, recites many opinions. — Alexander of Hales (S. p. I, q. 28, m. 3, a. 1) rightly says: «On the side of predestination, neither the principal signified is from merits, nor even the first connoted [object], which is the infusion of grace; but the conferring of glory is from merits». But ibid. a. 3, he says (ad 2): «Of the conferring of grace and of glory the ground can be the foreknowledge of merits». To which words Dionysius the Carthusian appends this note: «This response of so great a doctor inspires admiration and fear in me»; and he tries to prove that they are against the intention of St. Augustine and the Fathers. But, if we are not mistaken, this opinion of Alexander can certainly be so explained that it does not contradict what he had already said in the preceding article. For he speaks precisely of justification, and the words foreknowledge of merits are to be understood of the mere supernatural disposition for the infusion of habitual grace, acquired through actual graces. Thus understood, Alexander's opinion says the same as what B. Albert (in the place referred to below, n. II) teaches concerning preparation for grace.

Henry of Ghent (Quodlib. 8, a. 19) teaches that predestination, in so far as it is from God [as] agent, has no ground except God's goodness and will; but in so far as it is in the receiving subject, it has some ground — namely the foreseen good use of free choice. For he so distinguishes this good use that it is indeed an effect (not a ground) of predestination, in so far as it is from grace; but at the same time is the motive ground of [predestination] (though not meritorious) in so far as it is from free choice. This doctrine displeased Scotus (here q. unica, n. 8) and very many others.

For Scotus, with St. Thomas, teaches that the ground of predestination, in so far as it is the predestination of God, must be referred to the divine will itself as to an adequate cause. Yet Scotus (ibid. n. 13) wisely adds: «Concerning all these opinions, since the Apostle seems, in disputing on this matter in [the letter] to the Romans, almost to leave the whole inscrutable at the end: «O the depth (he says) of the riches…», therefore, that we may not search the deep, according to the Master's saying, let us go into the deep; let what most pleases be chosen, provided that the divine freedom be preserved without any injustice, and the other things which must be safeguarded concerning God, [namely God] as freely choosing». The ancient Scotist school, then (Lyranus, Nicholas of Nyse, Peter of Aquila, Alphonsus of Castro, Lychetus), and likewise very many later [Scotists] (Mastrius, Rada, Macedo, Hauzeur, Schmising, Herincx, the most learned Corbinianus Luydl, etc.), deny that foreseen merits are a ground of efficacious predestination. It is well known that nearly the whole school of St. Thomas, and most celebrated theologians — Bellarmine, Toletus, Suarez, Ruiz, Molina — profess the same opinion, though they do not explain it in the same way. In favor of the other opinion, however, among Scotists, Faber, Poncius and Frassenius wrote.

3. It should be observed that in the famous controversy which has been agitated in Catholic schools for three centuries — namely whether predestination to glory is from foreseen merits — the state of the question is not the same in the sense in which St. Bonaventure and his contemporaries commonly treated the matter, as in the sense in which it is now disputed in our schools. They asked whether predestination in general — that is, pre-ordaining as regards all its effects collectively taken — has in God some motive ground, whether in general or in particular, i.e. comparatively, [comparing] one man with another; indeed they principally considered the first effects of predestination, namely calling and justification, and predestination in particular. But now [the question] is treated precisely about the last effect of predestination, that is, of predestination to glory — not indeed in the order of execution, but of intention. For it is conceded by all that in the order of execution the last effect is in fact rendered to adults on account of preceding merits; whence the obtaining of glory, no less than the divine decree of granting in time the «crown of justice», presuppose in God the foresight of good works. But in the order of intention, the first [thing] is that which is last in execution; whence the intention of giving glory is conceived as antecedent to the will of giving the means [to it]. Therefore concerning this intention — by which some are efficaciously and absolutely chosen for glory — two opinions have arisen, opposed to each other. Very many other [opinions], however, with some restriction or different exposition, follow one or the other side. The first opinion, therefore, distinguishes a conditional intention of giving glory and an absolute one. By the conditional and antecedent will God gratuitously predestines all men to glory under the condition that they will make good use of the graces to be given. By the absolute and efficacious will, however, [he does so] not for all, but absolutely pre-ordains some, the elect, to glory in preference to others. According to that opinion this discrimination presupposes foreknowledge of merits as absolutely future, in such a way that the predestined are by reason first chosen for grace and for merits, and then — or even, as many will, on account of foreseen merits — are chosen by a consequent and absolute will for glory. Hence the discrimination of those-to-be-saved and the reprobate is, even in the order of intention, made by God according to foreknowledge of merits and from the motive of justice. So, with Lessius, Vasquez, Becanus, the Wirceburgenses, very many later [theologians hold]. — The contrary opinion also distinguishes between the order of intention and execution, that is, between the first election to glory and the obtaining of glory itself; but it speaks differently about the order of election and the motive of it. As the defenders of this opinion will have it, the intention — not only conditional but also absolute, by which some are by a consequent will ordained to glory — precedes in reason the foresight of merits, in such a way that this divine volition has no motive except gratuitous divine mercy; but the ordering to grace and to merits (which are the means to the end, namely glory) presupposes the election to glory, of which they are the effects. Hence the motive of intending glory is gratuitous, but the motive of giving it in execution is from justice; or in other words: God wills not on account of merits, but gratuitously, to order [men] first to glory, yet wills to give it [to them] on account of merits. This opinion considers good works under the ratio of a divine gift, because God is their first and principal cause, and consequently, in so far as they are effects of predestination — and from this it infers: therefore they are not the cause or ground of that same predestination. The first opinion, however, considers the same good works under the respect of merit, in so far as they proceed also from free choice as its effects.

It is not for us to judge concerning the truth of these opinions, which we have only set out so that it may more easily be evident that St. Bonaventure does not here treat the matter under these distinctions, since he speaks neither about the order of intention and execution (as Scotus has already spoken), nor precisely about election to glory, nor about the order of priority and posteriority which, according to our mode of understanding, is supposed to obtain among the divine decrees.

Hence it is not surprising that St. Bonaventure and very many ancient Scholastics are drawn by various [authors] to either side, and that the same words of St. Bonaventure (in dd. 40, 41, and below d. 46, a. 1, q. 1) are understood in different ways, namely either of the order of intention or of the order of execution. For Trigosus (Summa theologica q. 18, a. 6, dub. 1) disputes diffusely to prove that St. Bonaventure teaches predestination to glory before foreseen merits, with whom agree Hauzeur (Coll. L, col. 516) and others. These understand the propositions which speak of foresight of merits not of the order of intention, but of execution. On the contrary, Barth. a Barberiis and Frassenius (De Deo, tract. 2, disp. 3, a. 2, sect. 2, q. 3), with very many others, make St. Bonaventure the patron entirely of the other opinion.

It is, however, manifest that the Holy Doctor is speaking according to the state of the question common in his age and proposes his opinion with the greatest moderation and wisdom. When he speaks of a motive ground with respect to predestination in general (here, in the body), he does not commemorate foresight of merits but the manifestation of mercy and justice. When, however, he speaks of predestination in particular and comparatively (in the body and ad 6), he does not intend to prove anything except: a) that some motive ground is to be supposed as regards the ordering of the willed to the divine will, since [the divine will] operates fittingly; b) that this is not a meritorious cause, but only a ground of fittingness; c) that it is not certain to us nor determinate, «because there can be many grounds of fittingness»; d) that it is possible that, besides others, the foresight of goods also be a motive ground (which these goods are, however, the Holy Doctor confesses himself ignorant of); e) that a kind of rashness is implied in the assertion that merits in Jacob were the ground of fittingness of his election (here, dub. 1); f) besides the principal conclusion (that the divine will «has a ground of fittingness by reason of the willed [object]»), he holds that no other things are to be inquired after, and concedes that the arguments brought forward by him in the fundamenta can in part be open to objection (ad 7). See also below d. 46, q. 1, d. 47, q. 1.

II. Hence it is plain that the Seraphic Doctor most cautiously proposes the opinion common in his age, and does not depart from St. Thomas even in mode of speaking except in this, that with respect to predestination in particular he himself asserts that there is indeed a ground of fittingness, which, however, on account of our ignorance, cannot determinately be assigned. Yet St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3) — whom Scotus follows in this — explicitly says: «Why he has chosen these for glory and reprobated those, has no ground except the divine will». If these words be understood in that sense which another formula of his (ibid. in the body) insinuates: «It cannot be assigned (namely by us) [as] a cause of the divine will on the side of the act of willing»; then both Holy Doctors say the same thing in different words. Perhaps, however, the manner of speaking in the Angelic Doctor proceeds from that principle (S. I, q. 19, a. 5), that the willing of the end cannot then be the cause of willing those things that are to the end, when someone «by one act wills the end and the things that are to the end», as is the case in God. — Moreover, St. Thomas does not deny that «God's will is never

irrational» (St. Anselm, book Cur Deus homo, c. 8), but he himself (here q. 1, a. 3) says: «Predestination does not have a cause, but has a ground on the side of the effect, according to which it is called imposing and just». It is asked, therefore, only concerning the acceptance of a motive ground which is not the will itself. Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2, exhibits arguments for both sides, though he himself rather follows St. Thomas in mode of speaking. — That Alexander of Hales agrees with the Seraphic [Doctor], though does not speak so cautiously and moderately, we have already observed. — B. Albert, in the Summa p. I, tr. 16, q. 65, frequently uses almost the same mode of speaking as St. Bonaventure. He says indeed (there q. incid. 5, ad 1): «Divine election is the cause of merit, and is the cause of [the] respect to future merits»; but also: «Most hidden merits are for certain among the merits in the foreknowledge of God, but these cannot be the cause of the eternal election, but can be a ground on account of which the election is rational»; and ibid. ad 2: «For the act of the divine will is election, and it has no other cause, although the foreknowledge of merits exhibits a rational ground». Moreover, concerning foreknowledge itself he speaks as one connoted principal signified of predestination, saying: «It cannot have a cause except the will of God; yet because the foreknowledge of merits, according to the ratio of understanding, informs the will that prepares grace... I do not see what prevents foreknowledge of merits from being a ground» (ibid. q. 63, q. 1, incid.). These words correspond rather to the manner in which Alexander speaks than to that which St. Bonaventure uses.

Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 1, at the end) concludes: «Although, however, Thomas's position is probable, nevertheless (if it can be said without prejudice to the authority of Scripture) I think the position of Bonaventure more rational, as regards what he says — that predestination has a ground in the particular or singular as in the common — so that not God's sole will, that is, [his] will, is the ground why this one is predestined rather than that, but [there is] a certain and legitimate ground by reason of which the will so acts; especially since the will of God essentially is itself infinite wisdom and justice, on account of which it cannot consist as irrational or unjust»; which he there proves with many arguments.

III. The words in the solution ad 6: «on account of the foresight of which (goods), however, I do not know how to determine», etc., seem to regard the passage of St. Augustine (83 Quaestiones q. 68, n. 4, in the Master, here c. 2), of whose meaning much has been disputed both then and especially in [the last] three centuries. St. Augustine therefore says that the will of God, by which he has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills, «comes from most hidden merits». The Master thinks that St. Augustine retracted this at least in his similar [passage], which St. Thomas (De Verit. q. 6, a. 2, ad 10) also reports, but he adds: «Or, if they must be sustained, [the words] are to be referred to the effect of reprobation or predestination, which has some meritorious or dispositive cause». Matthew of Aquasparta, who in the fifth posthumously published disputed question — Whether predestination has any cause — entirely follows St. Bonaventure, explains that same passage «not of the eternal election, but of those called to penitence».

IV. Besides the authors already cited: B. Albert, here n. 3, 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2.³¹

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