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Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus
p. 711

Quaestio II.

Utrum praedestinatio ponat certitudinem in eventu.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo, supposito quod praedestinatio non inferat necessitatem libero arbitrio, quod non possit aliter esse, quaeritur, utrum ponat certitudinem in eventu, scilicet, ut numquam aliter eveniat, nisi sicut Deus praedefinivit. Et quod sic ostenditur:

1. Primo auctoritate Ioannis decimo tertio1: Ego scio, quos elegerim; et secundae ad Timotheum secundo2: Novit Deus, qui sunt eius: ergo si divina cognitio est certa et infallibilis, et falleretur, si non salvarentur illi quos novit esse suos certitudinaliter, ergo verum est, quod sic evenit, sicut praedefinivit Deus, et sic etc.

2. Item, primae Ioannis secundo3: Ex nobis exierunt, sed ex nobis non erant. Ponit illud ergo pro signo: quod illud est signum, quod homo non fuit electus, quando non perseveravit in bono finaliter. Si ergo illud signum est rectum, certum est, quod omnes praedestinati et soli in gratia finaliter perseverant; et si hoc certum est, quod soli salvantur et omnes: ergo certitudo est in eventu.

3. Item, Augustinus in libro de Bono perseverantiae4: «Praedestinatio est praescientia beneficiorum Dei, per quae certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur». Si igitur liberantur certissime, patet quod certitudo salutis est respectu personarum, et sic etc.

4. Item, Augustinus in libro de Correctione et gratia5: «Certus est numerus electorum, qui non potest minui nec augeri»: ergo videtur, quod certitudo sit in quoto numero.

5. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia in domo Patris sunt multae mansiones, sicut dicitur Ioannis decimo quarto6: aut ergo praevidit Deus, qui debeant ibi habitare, aut non. Constat quod praevidit, qui debeant ibi esse: ergo si aliquis eorum desit, aliqua mansio vacua remanebit. Sed hoc est inconveniens et indecens in civitate superna: ergo certum est, quod quilibet praedestinatus locum suum habebit.

6. Item, numerus electorum a Deo praefinitus est optima et decentissima ratione et proportione — si enim omnia fecit ordinatissime, multo fortius supernam civitatem — sed optima proportio foedatur et perditur per augmentum et diminutionem: ergo si non potest esse, ut sit ibi defectus ordinis et proportionis congruentis, certitudinaliter tot salvabuntur, et non plures nec pauciores quam Deus praevidit.

Sed contra:

1. Quod non sit certitudo eventus quantum ad personas, videtur sic: Apocalypsis tertio7: Tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam tuam; Gregorius ibi: «Dum alius labitur, alius in locum eius subinducitur»: ergo si unus vindicat sibi locum alterius, non ita evenit, sicut Deus ordinavit, immo tota die fit transmutatio.

2. Item, super illud Iob trigesimo quarto8: Conteret multos, Gregorius ibidem: «Locum vitae, aliis cadentibus, alii sortiuntur».

3. Item, quod non sit certitudo quantum ad numerum, videtur Lucae quinto9: Rumpebatur rete; Glossa: «Non tot intrant de Iudaeis, quot sunt praedestinati»: ergo pauciores salvantur, quam sint praedestinati.

4. Item, Deuteronomii primo10: Addat Deus ad hunc numerum multa millia; Glossa: «Ad hunc numerum praedefinitum in Dei praescientia, qui novit, qui sunt eius»: ergo si Deus addit ad numerum praedefinitum, non est certitudo quantum ad numerum salvandorum.

5. Item, quod quantum ad neutrum sit certi p. 712tudo, videtur. Intelligamus ABC esse numerum praedestinatorum, DEF numerum praescitorum: tunc quaero: A ita bene11 potest damnari, sicut et D, et e converso D ita salvari, sicut A: ergo nulla est certitudo quantum ad personas. Rursus A potest damnari, et tunc solum remanent duo, et D salvari, et tunc erunt quatuor: ergo nulla est certitudo quantum ad numerum.

6. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur deducendo ad inconveniens. Si enim certum est, qui et quot salvabuntur, ita quod sic eveniet, et non aliter, quamvis possit aliter12: ergo nullus praedestinatus damnabitur aliquo casu vel eventu, et nullus praescitus salvabitur: ergo nullus debet curare, utrum faciat bene vel male, quia si praescitus est, quidquid faciat, in fine damnabitur; si praedestinatus, quidquid faciat, in fine salvabitur; stultus est ergo, qui non comedit et laetatur, et non habet bona in vita sua.

Conclusio.

Praedestinatio a parte rei evenientis non habet certitudinem in eventu, a parte Dei praecognoscentis et disponentis habet certitudinem et infallibilitatis et immutabilitatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est dicere certitudinem a parte rei evenientis, et a parte Dei praeordinantis. Si loquamur de certitudine a parte rei, cum haec dicatur contra contingentiam, sic dico, quod non est maior certitudo in numero electorum, quam sit in numero aliorum futurorum contingentium, quia pendet eventus nostrae salutis et damnationis ex arbitrii nostri libertate. Si autem loquamur de certitudine a parte Dei praecognoscentis, sic certus est eventus salutis certitudine infallibilitatis, quia divina praescientia non fallitur, et ideo semper evenit, ut praescivit. Certum etiam est certitudine immutabilitatis, quia divina dispositio et ordinatio non variatur, ut modo unum eligat et modo alium, sed qui semel electus est, semper fuit et erit, et non alius.

Ad argumenta: Rationes ad primam partem inductae procedunt de certitudine eventus, non quantum ad necessitatem, sed quantum ad infallibilitatem aeternae praecognitionis, et quantum ad invariabilitatem aeternae praeordinationis.

Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod alius alterius locum accipit et coronam; dicendum, quod locus aeternae mansionis et corona retributionis alicui debetur secundum reputationem iustitiae, alicui secundum praedefinitionem praescientiae. Et contingit, quod unus locus debetur alicui secundum praesentem iustitiam, eo quod, illo cadente, alius intrat, cui debetur secundum praedefinitionem aeternam. Quando vero alicui debetur locus secundum praedefinitionem aeternam, potest quidem cadere et locum perdere, et alius, qui non est praedestinatus, potest acquirere; sed tamen hoc nunquam eveniet. Quia ergo praescitus iustus frequenter locum aeternae mansionis perdit, quem alius paris meriti acquirit; et nemo scit, utrum sit praescitus, vel praedestinatus: ideo, quamvis sciat, se esse iustum, timere debet, ne amittat locum. Et ad hunc timorem hortatur beatus Ioannes in praedicta auctoritate Apocalypsis. Et hic timor bonus est omnibus, et praescitis et praedestinatis, quia humiliat et sollicitat. Econtra, certitudo de electione elevat in tumorem et deprimit in torporem; ideo secundum ordinatissimam dispensationem hoc factum est, ut nulli reveletur, an sit praedestinatus, nisi sit a Deo confirmatus in bono, ut non possit elevari per superbiam vel torpere per negligentiam. Patet ergo, quod illa auctoritas non significat mutationem fieri in praescientia, vel aliter evenire, quam Deus praescivit, sed quod qui actualiter iustus est potest locum, quo dignus est, perdere perdendo iustitiam, et quod qui peccator est potest locum sibi indebitum acquirere acquirendo iustitiam; et hoc tota die contingit. — Exemplum in veteri Testamento manifestum fuit de Saule et David in regno, cui scilicet Sauli recte potuit dici: Tene quod habes, id est humilitatem et iustitiam, ne alius accipiat coronam tuam, id est tibi debitam secundum statum praesentem, alii tamen debitam secundum dispositionem aeternam. Exemplum etiam est in coronis quadraginta Martyrum.

Ad 3, 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de diminutione p. 713et augmento, dicendum, quod totum referendum est illud ad statum praesentis iustitiae. Nam illa Glossa: «Non tot intrant» intelligitur tempore primitivae Ecclesiae, quia multi intrabunt in tempore finalis Ecclesiae. Similiter quod dicitur, quod Deus addat ad hunc numerum, intelligitur iustificando plures et vocando ad fidem.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod possunt esse plures et pauciores et alii, quam sint praesciti, ergo ibi non est certitudo; dicendum, quod non est certitudo necessitatis, est tamen certitudo infallibilitatis. Quamvis enim possint esse alii et plures, tamen nunquam erunt; et si essent, tunc ab aeterno praedestinati essent: ideo non potest ibi cadere aliqua mutatio.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si ita evenit, tunc frustra laborat praescitus et praedestinatus; dicendum, quod illud est argumentum stultorum, quod ducit eos in torporem et impietatis excusationem. Et ideo primo ostendendum est, eos stulte arguere, inferendo a simili, dicendo sic: Deus praeordinavit, utrum tu debeas cras vivere, an non; ad quid ergo comedis et bibis? Qui sic argueret et tali rationi consentiret, argueretur dementiae; similiter in proposito. — Secundo respondetur contra arguendo: tu dicis, quod Deus praedestinat, et ego dico, quod Deus tanquam iustus iudex iuste remunerat. «Nullum ergo bonum irremuneratum, nullum malum impunitum13»: ergo nullus laborat sine fructu, nullus torpescit sine damno. — Et propterea dicendum, quod praedicta argumentatio deficit: procedit enim, ac si Deus praedestinaret et praesciret in omnem eventum; sed non praedestinat hominem ad salutem nisi per merita, nec reprobat, ut perveniat in damnationem sine meritis. Et ideo non solum est nostra salus ex parte Dei, sed etiam ex parte nostra; et cum ipse velit, omnes salvos fieri14 et omnibus gratiam impertiri, solum ex nostra malitia vel negligentia venit defectus nostrae salutis.

Scholion

I. Additur haec quaestio, ne quis ex principiis antea stabilitis derogare possit certitudini divinae praedestinationis. Simul in solutione ad 3. resolvitur alia quaestio, utrum scil. numerus praedestinatorum augeri possit; et in solutione ad 6. valide et triplici argumentatione retunditur insipientia eorum, qui doctrina hac ad impietatis excusationem abutuntur.

II. Distinctionem certitudinis a parte rei evenientis, et a parte Dei praedestinantis etiam S. Thom. (S. I. q. 116. a. 3; de Verit. q. 6. a. 3. in fine corp. et alibi) adhibet. Haec in genere ab omnibus conceditur, licet de ratione certitudinis a parte Dei dissentiant. — Quod nemo, seclusa revelatione, certo scire potest, se esse praedestinatum, docetur a Concilio Trid. (Sess. 6. c. 12.), et a S. Doctore confirmatur infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 2. et alibi.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 28. m. 2. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3.

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English Translation
p. 711

Question II.

Whether predestination posits certainty in the outcome.

Secondly, granted that predestination does not impose necessity on free choice such that things cannot be otherwise, it is asked whether it posits certainty in the outcome — namely, that things never happen otherwise than as God has foredefined. And that it does is shown thus:

1. First, by the authority of John 131: I know whom I have chosen; and 2 Timothy 22: God knows who are his: therefore if the divine cognition is certain and infallible, and would be deceived if those whom he knows certainly to be his own were not saved, then it is true that things happen just as God foredefined, and thus etc.

2. Likewise, 1 John 23: They went out from us, but they were not of us. He posits this then for a sign: that this is the sign that a man was not elect, when he did not persevere finally in the good. If therefore that sign is correct, it is certain that all the predestined and they alone finally persevere in grace; and if this is certain, that they alone are saved and all of them: therefore there is certainty in the outcome.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the book On the Gift of Perseverance4: «Predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits by which whoever are delivered are most certainly delivered». If therefore they are delivered most certainly, it is plain that the certainty of salvation is with respect to persons, and so etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Correction and Grace5: «Certain is the number of the elect, which can neither be diminished nor increased»: therefore it appears that there is certainty in the determinate number.

5. Likewise, this seems also by reason, since in the Father's house there are many mansions, as is said in John 146: either, then, God foresaw who ought to dwell there, or not. It is plain that he foresaw who ought to be there: therefore if any of them be missing, some mansion will remain empty. But this is unfitting and unbecoming in the heavenly city: therefore it is certain that every predestined one will have his place.

6. Likewise, the number of the elect foredefined by God is by the most fitting reason and proportion — for if he made all things in the most ordered way, much more so the heavenly city — but the best proportion is marred and lost by addition and diminution: therefore if there cannot be any defect of fitting order and proportion there, with certainty just so many will be saved, and not more nor fewer than God foresaw.

On the contrary:

1. That there is no certainty of outcome with regard to persons appears thus: Apocalypse 37: Hold what thou hast, that no one take thy crown; Gregory thereon: «While one falls, another is brought in into his place»: therefore if one claims for himself another's place, things do not happen as God ordained, but rather there is exchange all day long.

2. Likewise, on that text of Job 348: He shall break in pieces many, Gregory in the same place: «The place of life, when some fall, others obtain by lot».

3. Likewise, that there is no certainty as to number, appears from Luke 59: The net was breaking; Gloss: «Not so many of the Jews enter as are predestined»: therefore fewer are saved than are predestined.

4. Likewise, Deuteronomy 110: May God add unto this number many thousands; Gloss: «Unto this number predefined in God's foreknowledge, who knows who are his»: therefore if God adds to the predefined number, there is no certainty as to the number of those to be saved.

5. Likewise, that there is no certainty as to either, p. 712appears thus. Let us understand ABC to be the number of the predestined, DEF the number of the foreknown: then I ask: A can just as well11 be damned as D, and conversely D be saved as A: therefore there is no certainty as to persons. Again, A can be damned, and then only two remain, and D be saved, and then there will be four: therefore there is no certainty as to number.

6. Likewise, this same is shown by reduction to absurdity. For if it is certain who and how many will be saved, in such a way that it will so happen and not otherwise, although it could be otherwise12: therefore no predestined one will be damned in any case or event, and no foreknown one will be saved: therefore no one need care whether he act well or ill, since if he is foreknown, whatever he does, in the end he will be damned; if predestined, whatever he does, in the end he will be saved; foolish therefore is he who does not eat and rejoice, and have his goods in his life.

Conclusion.

Predestination, on the side of the thing happening, does not have certainty in the outcome; on the side of God foreknowing and disposing, it has the certainty both of infallibility and of immutability.

I respond: It must be said that one must speak of certainty on the side of the thing happening, and on the side of God who pre-ordains. If we speak of certainty on the side of the thing, since this is said against contingency, I say thus, that there is no greater certainty in the number of the elect than there is in the number of other future contingents, since the outcome of our salvation and damnation depends on the freedom of our choice. But if we speak of certainty on the side of God foreknowing, then the outcome of salvation is certain with the certainty of infallibility, since the divine foreknowledge is not deceived, and therefore it always happens just as he foreknew. It is also certain with the certainty of immutability, since the divine disposition and ordination is not varied, so that he should now choose one and now another, but he who has once been chosen, always was and will be, and not another.

To the arguments: The reasons adduced for the first part proceed concerning certainty of outcome, not as to necessity, but as to the infallibility of the eternal foreknowledge, and as to the invariability of the eternal pre-ordination.

To 1, 2. To that which is objected, that one receives another's place and crown; it must be said that the place of the eternal mansion and the crown of retribution is owed to one according to the reckoning of justice, to another according to the predefinition of foreknowledge. And it happens that one place is owed to someone according to present justice, in that, when he has fallen, another enters, to whom it is owed according to the eternal predefinition. But when a place is owed to someone according to the eternal predefinition, he can indeed fall and lose the place, and another, who is not predestined, can acquire it; yet this never will happen. Since therefore the foreknown just man often loses the place of the eternal mansion, which another of equal merit acquires; and no one knows whether he is foreknown or predestined: therefore, although he know himself to be just, he ought to fear lest he lose the place. And to this fear blessed John exhorts in the aforesaid authority of the Apocalypse. And this fear is good for all, both the foreknown and the predestined, since it humbles and stirs to vigilance. On the contrary, certainty about election lifts up into swelling and presses down into torpor; therefore by a most ordered dispensation it has been so done, that to no one is it revealed whether he is predestined, unless he be confirmed by God in the good, so that he cannot be lifted up by pride or grow torpid through negligence. It is plain therefore that that authority does not signify a change being made in the foreknowledge, or things happening otherwise than God foreknew, but that he who is actually just can lose the place of which he is worthy by losing justice, and that he who is a sinner can acquire a place not owed to him by acquiring justice; and this happens all day long. — There is a manifest example in the Old Testament of Saul and David in the kingdom, namely, where to Saul it could rightly be said: Hold what thou hast, that is humility and justice, that no one take thy crown, that is, owed to thee according to the present state, yet owed to another according to the eternal disposition. There is also an example in the crowns of the forty Martyrs.

To 3, 4. To what is objected concerning diminution p. 713and increase, it must be said that all that is to be referred to the state of present justice. For that Gloss: «Not so many enter» is to be understood as of the time of the primitive Church, since many will enter in the time of the final Church. Likewise what is said, that God adds unto this number, is to be understood as justifying more and calling them to faith.

To 5. To what is objected, that there can be more and fewer and others than the foreknown, therefore there is no certainty there; it must be said that there is not certainty of necessity, but there is certainty of infallibility. For although there could be others and more, yet there never will be; and if there were, then they would have been predestined from eternity: therefore no change can fall there.

To 6. To what is objected, that if it so happens, then the foreknown and the predestined labour in vain; it must be said that this is the argument of fools, which leads them into torpor and into the excuse of impiety. And therefore first it must be shown that they argue foolishly, by inferring from the like, saying thus: God has pre-ordained whether you are to live tomorrow or not; to what end then do you eat and drink? He who would so argue and assent to such reasoning would be charged with madness; likewise in the matter at hand. — Secondly, the answer is given by counter-arguing: you say that God predestines, and I say that God as a just judge justly rewards. «No good then unrewarded, no evil unpunished13»: therefore no one labours without fruit, no one grows torpid without damage. — And on this account it must be said that the foregoing argumentation is defective: for it proceeds as if God predestined and foreknew with regard to every event; but he does not predestine man to salvation save through merits, nor does he reprobate so that one comes into damnation without demerits. And so our salvation is not only on the side of God, but also on our side; and since he wills all to be saved14 and to impart grace to all, only from our malice or negligence does the defect of our salvation come.

Scholion

I. This question is added, lest from the principles previously established anyone derogate from the certainty of divine predestination. At the same time, in the solution to 3 another question is resolved, namely whether the number of the predestined can be increased; and in the solution to 6, the foolishness of those who abuse this doctrine as an excuse for impiety is robustly refuted by a threefold argumentation.

II. The distinction of the certainty on the side of the thing happening, and on the side of God who predestines, is also employed by St. Thomas (Summa I. q. 116. a. 3; de Veritate q. 6. a. 3. at the end of the corpus, and elsewhere). This is in general conceded by all, although they disagree about the ground of the certainty on God's side. — That no one, apart from revelation, can know with certainty that he is predestined, is taught by the Council of Trent (Sess. 6. c. 12), and is confirmed by the holy Doctor below at d. 41. a. 1. q. 2. and elsewhere.

III. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I. q. 28. m. 2. a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 11. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 18. — Sequens textus est loc. cit. vers. 19, quem textum Vulg. sic exhibet: Cognovit Dominus, qui sunt eius. — Circa finem argumenti pro evenit Vat. cum aliquibus mss. eveniet.
    Verse 18. — The following text is at the cited place, verse 19, which the Vulgate gives thus: The Lord knew who are his. — Near the end of the argument, for evenit the Vatican edition with some manuscripts reads eveniet.
  2. Vers. 19, ubi Vulgata prodierant pro exierunt. — Vat. post pro signo interiicit scilicet.
    Verse 19, where the Vulgate has prodierant for exierunt. — The Vatican edition, after pro signo, inserts scilicet.
  3. Nunc, ut iam supra dictum est, de Dono persever. nuncupat., c. 14. n. 35; sicut de Correctione et gratia (ut legitur in arg. seq.) nunc de Correptione etc. cfr. supra 699, col. II. nota 3.
    Now, as has already been said above, called On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 14, n. 35; just as On Correction and Grace (as it is read in the following argument) is now called On Correption etc. Cf. above 699, col. II, note 3.
  4. Cap. 13. n. 39. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In fine argumenti pro quoto Vat. quodam. Adiectivum quotus idem significat quod determinatus, sicut et appellatio quota significat quoddam determinatum, «quod quisque principi aut domino in tributum vel censum praestare tenetur». Du Cange, Glossar. mediae et infimae latin.
    Chapter 13, n. 39. See here the Letter of the Master, c. 1. — At the end of the argument, for quoto the Vatican edition reads quodam. The adjective quotus signifies the same as determinatus (determined), just as the noun quota signifies something determined, «which everyone is bound to pay to a prince or lord as tribute or tax». Du Cange, Glossary of medieval and late Latin.
  5. Vers. 2. — Pro quam Vat. quot.
    Verse 2. — For quam the Vatican edition reads quot.
  6. Vers. 1, ubi Vulgata ut nemo pro ne alius. — Textus mox allatus et Gregorio adscriptus, quoad sententiam invenitur in eius libr. XXV. Moral. c. 8. n. 20, et c. 13. n. 31; sed verba ipsa, ut citata sunt, habentur in Glossa ordinaria ad praenotata verba Apocalyps., quare et Vat. pro Gregorius substituit Glossa.
    Verse 1, where the Vulgate has ut nemo for ne alius. — The text quoted just above and ascribed to Gregory is found, as to its sense, in his book XXV. of the Morals, c. 8, n. 20, and c. 13, n. 31; but the very words, as cited, are had in the Glossa ordinaria on the aforesaid words of the Apocalypse, on which account the Vatican edition substitutes Glossa for Gregorius.
  7. Vers. 24. — Verba Gregorii habentur XXV. Moral. c. 8. n. 19, ubi in textu originali illis pro aliis.
    Verse 24. — The words of Gregory are had in XXV. Morals c. 8, n. 19, where in the original text is illis for aliis.
  8. Vers. 6. — Glossae ordinariae integer textus hic est: Non tot intrant de Iudaeis, quot apud Deum ad vitam erant praeordinati.
    Verse 6. — The full text of the Glossa ordinaria here is: Not so many of the Jews enter as had been pre-ordained unto life with God.
  9. Vers. 11. — Glossa ordinaria integre sic: Ad hunc numerum, definitum apud Deum. Novit qui sunt eius, qui numerat multitudinem stellarum.
    Verse 11. — The Glossa ordinaria in full thus: Unto this number, defined with God. He knows who are his, who numbers the multitude of the stars.
  10. Cod. X post ita repetit bene.
    Codex X after ita repeats bene.
  11. Vat., omissis verbis quamvis possit aliter, post sequentem voculam ergo interiicit certum est, quod, quae accessio nec in ed. 1 habetur nec in codd. In omnibus ferme codd. inveniuntur verba a Vat. suppressa quamvis possit aliter, sed codd. perperam eis praefigunt ergo, excepto cod. T (in quo a secunda manu ergo expunctum est) nec non excepta ed. 1, quos duos duces nos sumus secuti. Cod. X, qui de cetero convenit cum ceteris codd., omittit ergo ante nullus praedestinatus. — Respiciuntur verba Sap. 2, 6. seqq.; Isai. 22, 13; Luc. 12, 19. — Pro non habet non sumit ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition, having omitted the words quamvis possit aliter, after the following little word ergo inserts certum est, quod, which addition is neither in ed. 1 nor in the codices. In nearly all the codices are found the words quamvis possit aliter suppressed by the Vatican, but the codices wrongly prefix ergo to them, except codex T (in which by a second hand ergo has been struck out) and except ed. 1, which two we have followed as guides. Codex X, which otherwise agrees with the rest of the codices, omits ergo before nullus praedestinatus. — Reference is made to the words of Wisdom 2, 6 ff.; Isaiah 22, 13; Luke 12, 19. — For non habet ed. 1 has non sumit.
  12. Cod. W praedestinantis. Mox post rei Vat. addit evenientis. Dein pro dicatur codd. P Q X (T in marg.) dividatur. — Vat. et cod. cc hic adiiciunt nostrae, et paulo inferius post ideo omittunt semper. — Ed. 1 praecognitionis; Vat. praedestinationis. — Vat. cum ed. 1 voci iustitiae praemittit praesentis. Codd. A I in hac propositione bis aliter pro alicui. Paulo inferius pro eo quod Vat. cum paucis codd. et quod. — Vat. et nonnulli codd. dispositionem. Mox pro a Deo plures mss. adeo. — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. debitum, quae lectio bene explicari potest. Paulo superius pro praescivit Vat. praescit, ed. 1 praesciverit. — Cfr. 1. Reg. c. 13. seq. — De exemplo quadraginta Martyrum cfr. Breviar. Roman. die 10 Martii.
    Codex W reads praedestinantis. Soon after rei the Vatican adds evenientis. Then for dicatur codices P Q X (T in margin) read dividatur. — The Vatican edition and codex cc here add nostrae, and a little later, after ideo, omit semper. — Ed. 1 reads praecognitionis; the Vatican praedestinationis. — The Vatican edition with ed. 1 prefixes praesentis to the word iustitiae. Codices A I in this proposition twice read aliter for alicui. A little later for eo quod the Vatican with a few codices reads et quod. — The Vatican edition and several codices read dispositionem. Soon for a Deo several manuscripts read adeo. — The Vatican edition with one or two codices reads debitum, which reading can well be explained. A little above, for praescivit the Vatican reads praescit, ed. 1 praesciverit. — Cf. 1 Kings c. 13 ff. — For the example of the forty Martyrs cf. Roman Breviary, March 10.
  13. Vat. omittit stultorum, et paulo inferius cum cod. cc pro praeordinavit substituit praedestinavit. Deinde post an non cod. X interserit si non. — Hoc axioma formatum videtur ex dictis Boeth., IV. de Consol. prosa 1. et 4, sub cuius nomine circumferebatur. Cfr. Auctoritates Aristotelis etc., quarum iam supra pag. 101, nota 6. mentionem fecimus. Aliquanto superius pro contra arguendo Vat. argumentando.
    The Vatican edition omits stultorum, and a little later with codex cc substitutes praedestinavit for praeordinavit. Then after an non codex X inserts si non. — This axiom appears to be formed from the sayings of Boethius, IV. de Consolatione prose 1 and 4, under whose name it was current. Cf. Auctoritates Aristotelis etc., of which we have already made mention above on page 101, note 6. Somewhat earlier, for contra arguendo the Vatican reads argumentando.
  14. Epist. I. Tim. 2, 4: Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri et ad agnitionem veritatis venire. — Iuvat hic afferre quod Augustinus, de Dono persever. c. 15. n. 38, enarrat de quodam monacho: «Fuit quidam in nostro monasterio, qui corripientibus fratribus, cur quaedam non facienda faceret, et facienda non faceret, respondebat: Qualiscumque nunc sim, talis ero, qualem me Deus futurum esse praescivit. Qui profecto et verum dicebat, et hoc vero non proficiebat in bonum, sed usque adeo profecit in malum, ut, deserta monasterii societate, fieret canis reversus ad suum vomitum».
    1 Timothy 2, 4: Who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. — It is helpful here to bring forward what Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 15, n. 38, narrates of a certain monk: «There was a certain man in our monastery, who, when the brethren chided him as to why he did certain things which were not to be done, and did not do those which were to be done, would reply: Whatever I now am, such I shall be, as God foreknew that I would be. Who indeed spoke truly, but he did not by this truth profit unto good, but advanced so far in evil that, having forsaken the fellowship of the monastery, he became a dog returned to his vomit».
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