Dist. 40, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 40
Articulus III.
De divina electione.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum1 articulum quaeritur de divina electione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.
Primo quaeritur, utrum electio sit in Deo aeternaliter, vel ex tempore.
Secundo quaeritur, quid sit electio secundum rem.
Quaestio I.
Utrum electio sit in Deo ab aeterno, an ex tempore.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Quod autem electio in Deo sit aeternaliter, ostenditur:
1. Primo auctoritate Apostoli ad Ephesios primo2: Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immaculati coram ipso.
2. Item, Ioannis decimo tertio3: Ego scio, quos elegerim; sed omnes elegerat temporaliter, qui erant eius discipuli: ergo est alia electio in Deo quam temporalis.
3. Item, quod electio sit in Deo, videtur per rationem, quia omnis agens discrete et ordinate, est agens per electionem4: sed Deus est huiusmodi: ergo in Deo est ponere electionem.
4. Item, quod ab aeterno videtur, quia omnis dilectio, quae est specialiter aliquorum, non tantum est dilectio, sed etiam electio5; sed praedestinatio Dei non est omnium hominum, sed solum salvandorum, et praedestinatio non est sine dilectione, ergo neque sine electione; sed illa ab aeterno: ergo et ista.
Sed contra:
1. Damascenus6: «Electio non cadit in Deum, quia divina natura non est possibilis ad ignorantiam».
2. Item, eligere est alterum alteri praeoptare; sed Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri7: ergo videtur, quod electio non sit in Deo.
3. Item, videtur quod solum sit in Deo temporaliter — electio enim non esset, si homo non perstitisset, ergo videtur, quod lapsus hominis faciat ad electionem — sed temporale non facit ad esse aeterni8: ergo electio non est aeterna, sed temporalis.
4. Item, electio est dissimiliter entium9; sed omnia in Deo aeternaliter sunt unum et similiter: ergo electio est rerum existentium in proprio genere. Sed in proprio genere non sunt nisi ex tempore: ergo nec electio.
5. Item, electio est praeoptatio; sed Deus nihil praeoptat alii quantum ad intensionem affectus10: ergo solum quantum ad excellentiam effectus. Sed effectum non est ponere nisi ex tempore: ergo etc.
6. Item, in plus est vocatio quam electio. Multi enim sunt vocati, pauci vero electi, Matthaei vigesimo secundo11; sed vocatio est temporalis: ergo videtur similiter quod electio.
Quaeritur ergo, cum vocatio sit temporalis, praedestinatio vero aeterna, unde hoc est, quod electio et temporalis est et aeterna.
Conclusio.
Electio, sed non deliberativa, ab aeterno est in Deo, cuius manifestatio est electio temporalis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod electio dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, prout dicit dilectionem cum discretione solum, alio modo, prout dicit dilectionem cum discretione praecedente et deliberatione et inquisitione. Et primo modo est in Deo, secundo modo in creatura, in qua cadere potest ignorantia; et hoc secundo modo loquitur Damascenus.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas Dei et dilectio est sine discretione; dicendum, quod est voluntas antecedens et consequens: antecedens, qua vult quantum in se est, consequens, qua vult cum praescientia nostrae salutis; et prima quidem est omnium, secunda vero non12. Secundum hunc modum est dilectio duplex: una, quae respicit voluntatem antecedentem, et hac diligit omnes; est et alia, quae respicit consequentem, et hac diligit omnes salvandos, et haec est electio.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod electio non esset, nisi homo peccasset; dicendum, quod est electio, qua eligitur et separatur bonus a malo, et est electio, qua separatur melior a minus bono. Haec secunda esset, si homo non peccasset; prima autem non esset, si homo non peccasset, non quia lapsus aliquid faciat ad rationem eligendi, sed praevisio lapsus; et quamvis lapsus hominis fuerit temporalis, praevisio tamen eius fuit aeterna.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod electio est dissimiliter entium; dicendum, quod sicut dilectio duplex est: quaedam, quae oritur ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, quaedam, quae est principium bonitatis; sic electio duplex est: quaedam quae causatur a diversitate et praeeminentia eligibilium, et haec consequitur eligibilia, ut electio humana; quaedam, quae est ratio diversitatis in eligendo, ut divina, et haec est dissimilium, non quae sunt, sed quae futura sunt. Et talis praecedit et est aeterna; nisi enim esset divina electio, omnes essemus reprobi et mali. Et sic patet illud.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod electio est praeoptatio; dicendum, quod praeoptatio ratione maioritatis effectus potest esse dupliciter: aut per modum approbationis13, aut per modum dispositionis et praeordinationis. Per modum approbationis ponit effectum in actu, per modum praeordinationis et dispositionis ponit in potentia tantum; et sicut dispositio est aeterna, ita et praeoptatio.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de vocatione, quod solum est temporalis; dicendum, quod vocatio dicit actum ut exteriorem, electio dicit actum ut interiorem, praedestinatio dicit actum ut anteriorem. Quoniam igitur actus ut exterior connotat effectum ut exteriorem, ideo vocatio solum est temporalis. Rursus quoniam actus ut anterior non habet rationem initiandi, ideo praedestinatio est solum aeterna. Sed quoniam actus interior per manifestationem fit exterior, hinc est, quod electio et dilectio14 est aeterna et temporalis.
Quod ergo obiicitur de vocatione, quod in plus est, ergo prior; dicendum, quod prior est secundum rationem intelligendi tanquam communior, sed non quantum ad ordinem durandi; non enim est superius essentiale, sed effectus15 consequens. Et sic patent omnia.
I. Quid sit electio et quomodo differat a proposito et a praedestinatione, explicatur in quaest. seq. ad 2. 3. et aliquatenus hic ad 6; sed diffusius a Richardo a Med., 1. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 1, et a S. Thom. (1. Sent. d. 41. q. 1. a. 2.), ubi dicitur: «Ipsa divina ordinatio, qua quidam aliis praeferuntur ad consequendam beatitudinem, electio dicitur»; et ibi ad 1: «Electio est, qua aliqui ex ordine suae sapientiae ordinantur ad finem beatitudinis; sed praedestinatio est, secundum quod praeparantur eis ea quae perducunt in finem»; et ad 2: «Electio praeexigit diversitatem naturae in divina cognitione et facit diversitatem gratiae, sicut dispositio diversitatem naturae facit». — Distinctionem inter aeternam et temporalem electionem approbat S. Thom., 1. Sent. d. 41. q. 1. a. 1, qui etiam 2. opposit. eadem distinctione voluntatis antecedentis et consequentis solvit (S. I. q. 23. a. 4. ad 3.). De voluntate antecedente et consequente plura vide infra d. 46. a. 1. q. 1. — Solutio ad 3. sumta est ex Alexandro Hal., S. p. I. q. 30. m. I. ad 2; et consentit B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 16. q. 66. q. incid. 4. Haec solutio favet iis, qui docent, quod in hypothesi supponente, Adam non peccasse, nulli fuissent nati reprobi; sed sententia communis cum S. Thoma (S. I. q. 100. a. 2.) contrarium tenet. — Ex verbis: «Non quia lapsus aliquid faciat ad rationem eligendi, sed praevisio lapsus», et ex solutione ad 4. videtur sequi, Seraphicum cum Angelico (de Verit. q. 6. a. 2. ad 9; S. I. q. 23. a. 5. ad 3.) supponere, secundum nostrum modum intelligendi efficacem electionem praedestinatorum a Deo factam esse post praevisum peccatum originale. Sed Scot. (III. Sent. d. 7. q. 3.) videtur sentire aliter et secundum suam sententiam, quod Christus incarnatus fuisset, etsi Adam non peccasset.
II. In solutione ad 2. docetur, quod electio discretiva ad voluntatem consequentem spectat, non ad antecedentem, de qua distinctione cfr. infra d. 46. q. 1. Valde autem notandum est, quod in solut. ad 4. dicitur de differentia inter dilectionem et electionem nostram, quae supponit bonitatem et praeeminentiam in dilectis et electis et inde causatur, et divinam dilectionem et electionem, quae econtra est causa bonitatis et diversitatis in dilectis et electis. Idem omnino docet S. Thom., S. I. q. 23. a. 4; et B. Albert. (S. p. I. tr. 16. q. 65. q. incid. 2.), qui dicit: «In electione aeterna, quae nullo merito potuit praeveniri, Deus nihil respicit in nobis, sed in se ipso suae bonitatis tantum communicationem». Et confirmatur Conc. Arausic. II. can. 12: «Tales nos amat Deus, quales futuri sumus ipsius dono, non quales sumus nostro merito» (cfr. infra d. 43. dub. 7.).
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 28. m. 1. a. 1, et q. 30. a. 1. — S. Thom., 1. Sent. d. 41. q. 1. a. 1; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 17; de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. 16. q. 63. — Petr. a Tar., 1. Sent. d. 41. q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., 1. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. 1. Sent. d. 41. princ. 1. q. 1. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. 1. Sent. d. 41. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., 1. Sent. d. 41. q. 2.
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Article III.
On divine election.
Consequently, as regards the second1 article, inquiry is made concerning divine election. And on this two questions are asked.
First, it is asked whether election is in God eternally, or from time.
Second, it is asked what election is according to the thing.
Question I.
Whether election is in God from eternity, or from time.
That election is in God eternally is shown:
1. First, by authority, [from] the Apostle to the Ephesians 12: "He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in his sight."
2. Likewise, John 133: "I know whom I have chosen"; but he had chosen all temporally who were his disciples: therefore there is in God another election than the temporal.
3. Likewise, that election is in God is shown by reason, since every agent [acting] discretely and orderedly is an agent through election4: but God is of this kind: therefore in God election is to be posited.
4. Likewise, that [election is] from eternity is shown thus, since every love that is specifically of certain ones is not only love but also election5; but the predestination of God is not of all men, but only of those to be saved, and predestination is not without love, therefore neither without election; but that [predestination] is from eternity: therefore so is this [election].
On the contrary:
1. Damascene6: "Election does not fall in God, since the divine nature is not possible-of-ignorance."
2. Likewise, to elect is to prefer one to another; but God wills all men to be saved7: therefore it seems that election is not in God.
3. Likewise, it seems that [election] is in God only temporally — for there would be no election if man had not fallen, therefore it seems that the fall of man contributes to election — but the temporal does not contribute to the being of the eternal8: therefore election is not eternal but temporal.
4. Likewise, election is of dissimilar beings9; but all things in God eternally are one and alike: therefore election is of things existing in their proper genus. But in their proper genus they are not except from time: therefore neither is election.
5. Likewise, election is preferential-choosing; but God prefers nothing to another by way of intensity of affection10: therefore [he prefers] only by way of excellence of effect. But effect is not to be posited except from time: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, calling is wider than election. For many are called, but few are chosen, Matthew 2211; but calling is temporal: therefore it seems likewise that [so is] election.
It is asked therefore, since calling is temporal, but predestination eternal, whence is it that election is both temporal and eternal.
Conclusion.
Election — but not deliberative — is in God from eternity, of which [election] the manifestation is temporal election.
I respond: It must be said that election is said in two ways: in one way, insofar as it expresses love with discretion alone; in another way, insofar as it expresses love with preceding discretion and deliberation and inquiry. And in the first way it is in God; in the second way in the creature, in whom ignorance can occur; and in this second way Damascene speaks.
To the arguments:
Ad 2. To that which is objected, that the will of God and [his] love is without discretion; it must be said that there is an antecedent will and a consequent: the antecedent, by which he wills [salvation] insofar as it is in itself; the consequent, by which he wills with foreknowledge of our salvation; and the first indeed [regards] all, but the second not12. According to this mode, love is twofold: one which regards the antecedent will, and by this he loves all; there is also another, which regards the consequent, and by this he loves all those to be saved, and this is election.
Ad 3. To that which is objected, that there would be no election if man had not sinned; it must be said that there is an election by which the good is chosen and separated from the bad, and there is an election by which the better is separated from the less good. This second [election] would have been even if man had not sinned; the first however would not have been if man had not sinned — not because the fall does anything to the ratio of choosing, but the foresight of the fall [does]; and although the fall of man was temporal, the foresight of it was nevertheless eternal.
Ad 4. To that which is objected, that election is of dissimilar beings; it must be said that just as love is twofold — one which arises from consideration of the divine goodness, and one which is the principle of goodness — so election is twofold: one which is caused by the diversity and pre-eminence of the things to be chosen, and this follows the things to be chosen, as human election; another which is the ratio of diversity in choosing, as the divine [election], and this is of dissimilar things — not of those which are, but of those which will be. And such [election] precedes and is eternal; for unless there were divine election, all of us would be reprobate and evil. And so that [argument] is plain.
Ad 5. To that which is objected, that election is preferential-choosing; it must be said that preferential-choosing, by reason of the greater [efficacy of its] effect, can be of two kinds: either by way of approbation13, or by way of disposition and pre-ordination. By way of approbation it places the effect in act; by way of pre-ordination and disposition it places [it] in potency only; and just as disposition is eternal, so also is preferential-choosing.
Ad 6. To that which is objected concerning calling, that it is only temporal; it must be said that calling expresses the act as exterior, election expresses the act as interior, predestination expresses the act as prior. Since therefore the act as exterior connotes the effect as exterior, hence calling is only temporal. Again, since the act as prior does not have the ratio of initiating, hence predestination is solely eternal. But since the interior act through manifestation becomes exterior, hence it is that election and love14 are both eternal and temporal.
As to what is therefore objected concerning calling, that it is wider, therefore prior; it must be said that it is prior according to the ratio of understanding, as more common, but not as regards the order of duration; for it is not an essential superior, but a consequent effect15. And so all [the arguments] are plain.
I. What election is, and how it differs from proposal and from predestination, is explained in the following question, ad 2, 3, and somewhat here ad 6; but more diffusely by Richard of Middleton, 1. Sent. d. 41, a. 1, q. 1, and by St. Thomas (1. Sent. d. 41, q. 1, a. 2), where it is said: "That divine ordination by which some are preferred to others for the attaining of beatitude is called election"; and there ad 1: "Election is that by which some, from the order of his wisdom, are ordered to the end of beatitude; but predestination is according as there are prepared for them those things which lead to the end"; and ad 2: "Election presupposes diversity of nature in divine cognition and makes diversity of grace, just as disposition makes diversity of nature". — The distinction between eternal and temporal election is approved by St. Thomas, 1. Sent. d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, who also in the second [argument] of the contrary side resolves [the matter] with the same distinction of antecedent and consequent will (S. I, q. 23, a. 4, ad 3). On the antecedent and consequent will see further below at d. 46, a. 1, q. 1. — The solution ad 3 is taken from Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 30, m. I, ad 2; and B. Albert agrees, S. p. I, tr. 16, q. 66, q. incid. 4. This solution favors those who teach that, on the hypothesis supposing that Adam had not sinned, none would have been born reprobate; but the common opinion with St. Thomas (S. I, q. 100, a. 2) holds the contrary. — From the words: "Not because the fall does anything to the ratio of choosing, but the foresight of the fall", and from the solution ad 4, it seems to follow that the Seraphic [Doctor], with the Angelic (de Verit. q. 6, a. 2, ad 9; S. I, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3), supposes — according to our mode of understanding — the efficacious election of the predestined made by God to be after the foreseen original sin. But Scotus (III Sent. d. 7, q. 3) seems to think otherwise and, according to his opinion, [holds] that Christ would have been incarnated even if Adam had not sinned.
II. In the solution ad 2 it is taught that discretive election pertains to the consequent will, not to the antecedent — concerning which distinction cf. below at d. 46, q. 1. But it must be very much noted that in the solution ad 4 it is said concerning the difference between our love and election — which presupposes goodness and pre-eminence in the things loved and chosen, and is caused thence — and divine love and election, which on the contrary is the cause of goodness and diversity in the things loved and chosen. The same is taught entirely by St. Thomas, S. I, q. 23, a. 4; and by B. Albert (S. p. I, tr. 16, q. 65, q. incid. 2), who says: "In eternal election, which could be preceded by no merit, God regards nothing in us, but only in himself the communication of his goodness". And it is confirmed by the Council of Orange II, can. 12: "God loves us such as we shall be by his gift, not such as we are by our own merit" (cf. below d. 43, dub. 7).
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 28, m. 1, a. 1, and q. 30, a. 1. — St. Thomas, 1. Sent. d. 41, q. 1, a. 1; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert, here a. 17; on this and the following question, S. p. I, tr. 16, q. 63. — Petr. a Tar., 1. Sent. d. 41, q. 1, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., 1. Sent. d. 41, a. 1, q. 1. — Aegid. R., on this and the following question, 1. Sent. d. 41, princ. 1, q. 1, 2. — Durand., on this and the following question, 1. Sent. d. 41, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., 1. Sent. d. 41, q. 2.
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- Cum art. I. divisus sit in duos (pag. 701, col. II.), nos inscripsimus, ut aliae edd., hic art. III.Since article I is divided into two (p. 701, col. II), we have inscribed [it], like the other editions, here as art. III.
- Vers. 4, ubi Vulgata: Elegit nos in ipso; et infra pro coram ipso (Ambros. in hunc locum coram eo) Vulg. in conspectu eius.Verse 4, where the Vulgate [reads]: Elegit nos in ipso ("He chose us in him"); and below in place of coram ipso ("before him") (Ambrose at this passage [reads] coram eo) the Vulgate [reads] in conspectu eius ("in his sight").
- Vers. 18. — Pro Item Vat. sola substituit Contra, et dein post ergo interiicit non; perperam, quia, hac lectione recepta, argumentatio Doctoris disturbatur et ad irritum redigitur.Verse 18. — In place of Item the Vatican [edition] alone substitutes Contra, and then after ergo inserts non; wrongly, for, this reading being accepted, the Doctor's argumentation is disturbed and brought to nothing.
- Cfr. supra pag. 600, nota 2. Cfr. etiam Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2, et I. Magnor. Moralium, c. 16. (c. 17.), ubi agitur de prohaeresi (περὶ προαιρέσεως), quod verbum Graecum (προαίρεσις) in antiquis versionibus Latinis modo redditur voce electio (sic loc. cit. Ethic.), modo voce propositum (sic loc. cit. Magn. Moral.); in ed. recentiore Paris. (Firmin-Didot) verbum προαίρεσις constanter vertitur consilium.Cf. above p. 600, note 2. Cf. also Aristotle, III Ethics c. 2, and I Magna Moralia, c. 16 (c. 17), where the matter treated is prohaeresis (περὶ προαιρέσεως), which Greek word (προαίρεσις) in old Latin versions is rendered now by the word electio ("election") (so loc. cit. Ethics), now by the word propositum ("proposal") (so loc. cit. Magn. Moral.); in the more recent Paris edition (Firmin-Didot) the word προαίρεσις is constantly rendered consilium ("counsel").
- De quo vide supra d. 10. dub. 1.On which see above d. 10, dub. 1.
- Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22: In Deo volendi quidem actum dicimus, non autem electionem proprie (κυρίως) sumtam. Deus quippe non deliberat, quia ignorantis est consilium inire. — Quoad maiorem huius argumenti commemoramus verba Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2: «Nam electio cum ratione et cogitatione est, quod et nomen ipsum (προαίρεσις) significare videtur, quasi e quibusdam propositis unum aliquod legatur i. e. capiatur». Cfr. etiam Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22.Book II, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22: "In God we say there is indeed an act of willing, but not election properly (κυρίως) taken. For God does not deliberate, since to enter on counsel is [a feature] of one who is ignorant." — As to the major of this argument, we recall the words of Aristotle, III Ethics c. 2: "For election is with reason and thought, which the very name (προαίρεσις) seems to signify, as it were, that out of certain proposed [things] some one is selected, i.e. taken". Cf. also Damascene, II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22.
- Epist. I. Tim. 2, 4: Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri etc. — Quoad maiorem huius argumenti commemoramus verba Aristot. ut supra. — Quod et August. innuit de Divers. Qq. ad Simplic. I. q. 2. n. 4: Quomodo est enim iusta aut qualiscumque omnino electio, ubi nulla distantia est? Et ibid. n. 6: Nemo enim eligitur nisi iam distans ab illo qui reiicitur.I Timothy 2:4: "Who wills all men to be saved etc." — As to the major of this argument we recall Aristotle's words as above. — Which Augustine also intimates On Diverse Questions to Simplicianus I, q. 2, n. 4: "For how is there a just election, or any election at all, where there is no distinction?" And ibid., n. 6: "For no one is chosen unless [he is] already distant from him who is rejected."
- Vat. cum paucis mss. aeternum.The Vatican [edition] with a few manuscripts [reads] aeternum ("eternal" [acc.]).
- Sive, ut aliis verbis utamur: sed Deus quantum ad affectus aequaliter se habet erga omnes homines.Or, to use other words: but God, as regards affection, is related equally to all men.
- Vers. 14.Verse 14 [Matthew 22:14: multi enim sunt vocati, pauci vero electi].
- Ed. 1 interiicit est solum. Plura de hac distinctione voluntatis invenies infra d. 46.Edition 1 inserts est solum ("is only"). More on this distinction of [the] will you will find below at d. 46.
- Cfr. August., de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 17. n. 34. seqq.Cf. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, c. 17, n. 34 ff.
- Pro verbis per modum approbationis Vat. absque auctoritate codd. hic et paulo inferius exhibet per modum appropriationis simulque primo loco his verbis addit sive operationis vel applicationis i. e. quae effectum ponit in actu.In place of the words per modum approbationis ("by way of approbation") the Vatican [edition], without manuscript authority, here and a little later exhibits per modum appropriationis ("by way of appropriation"), and at the same time in the first place adds to these words sive operationis vel applicationis ("or of operation or of application") — that is, that which places the effect in act.
- In Vat. et cod. cc desiderantur verba et dilectio.In the Vatican [edition] and codex cc the words et dilectio ("and love") are missing.
- Pro effectus, quod clare legitur in codd. H R I aa et in ed. 1, Vat. effectu. Multi codd. sunt dubiae lectionis nec discerni potest, utrum effectum exhibeant, an effectu. — Huc referri potest quod August., de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 17. n. 34, de electis eorumque vocatione profert. Facta enim c. 16. n. 32. distinctione inter vocatos, qui, etsi vocati, noluerunt venire, et illos, qui etiam praedestinati et electi sunt, loc. cit. ait: Electi sunt itaque ante mundi constitutionem ea praedestinatione, in qua Deus sua futura facta praescivit; electi sunt autem de mundo ea vocatione, qua Deus id quod praedestinavit, implevit.In place of effectus, which is clearly read in codices H R I aa and in edition 1, the Vatican [reads] effectu. Many codices are of doubtful reading, nor can it be discerned whether they exhibit effectum or effectu. — Here may be referred what Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, c. 17, n. 34, brings forward concerning the elect and their calling. For having made, c. 16, n. 32, the distinction between those called, who, although called, were unwilling to come, and those who are also predestined and elect, loc. cit. he says: "The elect are therefore [chosen] before the foundation of the world by that predestination in which God foreknew his own future deeds; but they are elected out of the world by that calling by which God fulfilled what he had predestined."