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Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 41

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II.

Utrum enuntiabilia, quae semel Deus cognoscit, semper cognoscat.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Footnote numbering in the printed Quaracchi text restarts on every page; this chunk re-numbers continuously 1–28 across the four printed pages (738–741), in the order they are anchored in the body.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum enuntiabilia sive complexa1 quae Deus semel cognoscit, semper cognoscat vel sciat. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Deus non cognoscit enuntiabile nisi ratione veritatis5; sed veritas enuntiabilis, quae semel fuit, semper fuit et est et erit: ergo enuntiabile, quod semel cognoscit, semper cognoscit. Probatio mediae: omnis veritas complexi fundatur supra rem incomplexam; sed eadem res primo est futura, postea praesens, deinde praeterita, et una et eadem:

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ergo una et eadem veritas est in ea secundum omnes hos modos. Sed necesse est, quod sit semper sub aliquo horum modorum: ergo etc.4

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur alia ratione: quia quaecumque scit Deus scit immutabiliter2 — alioquin, cum scire Dei sit suum esse, si mutaretur suum scire, et esse6, quod est impossibile — sed omne quod habet immutabilitatem, habet sempiternitatem, quia, si desinit, mutatur: ergo quod Deus semel cognoscit semper cognoscit.

3. Item, quod scriptum est in illo libro deleri non potest; sed Deus cognoscit non aspiciendo extra, sed legendo in libro suae praescientiae: ergo quod semel cognoscit semper cognoscit. Prima patet, quia super illud Exodi trigesimo secundo7: Dele me de libro tuo etc., Glossa: «Securus hoc dicit, quia non delebitur». Et idem dicit super Psalmum.

4. Item, quod desinit vel perditur aliquo desinente, de necessitate pendet ex illo; sed divina cognitio non pendet ex veritate creanda8: ergo quamvis enuntiabile desinat esse verum, tamen Deus non desinit illud scire; et si hoc: ergo quod semel scit, et semper.

Sed contra:

1. Sicut praescire se habet respectu futuri, ut futurum est, sic scire respectu veri — si enim actu scitur, actu est verum — sed, sicut dicit Magister9, Deus desinit praescire rem, cum res de futuro fit praesens: ergo similiter desinit scire, cum de vero fit falsum.

2. Item, sicut divina acceptio respicit bonitatem, ita visio veritatem; sed Deus desinit hominem acceptare, cum perdit bonitatem: ergo desinit rem cognoscere3 sive enuntiabile, cum perdit veritatem.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile, quia, si quodcumque enuntiabile scivit, modo scit, et scivit, Christum esse moriturum, ergo et modo scit; sed quidquid scitur est verum10: ergo Christum esse moriturum est verum, quod est contra fidem.

4. Item, si quidquid scivit, modo scit; sed aliquando scivit te non esse, cum non eras: ergo scit te non esse, et scit te esse, quia verum est: ergo scit simul duo contradictorie opposita, ergo duo contradictorie opposita sunt simul vera, quod falsum est et impossibile.

Conclusio.

In quantum scire dicit nudum intelligere, quaecumque Deus semel scit semper scit; in quantum vero scire connotat veritatem in obiecto, ratione connotati, quod est variabile, Deus non quaecumque semel scit semper scit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod scire dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, prout reflectitur in se11; et sic sensus est: iste scit hoc, id est, habet cognitionem de hoc; et hoc modo dicendum, quod scire nihil connotat a parte sciti actuale, nec veritatem nec praesentiam. Deus enim de omni enuntiatione habet perfectam cognitionem, utrum sit enuntiatio perfecta et congrua, utrum vera, et cetera similia. Alio modo scire dicitur, secundum quod est verbum prohaereticum12 et transit in actum extra, et sic connotat veritatem in obiecto; tunc ergo scire aliquod enuntiabile idem est quod scire, ipsum esse verum. Unde scio te sedere, hoc est dicere: non tantum habeo cognitionem de hoc, sed etiam cognosco, ipsum esse verum. — Primo modo scire importat nudum13 intelligere; secundo modo intelligere cum assensu.

Si ergo scire accipiatur primo modo, sic dico, quod quidquid est, et omne enuntiabile, et omne quod adhuc scivit, scit et habet cognitionem de illo, quia de omni eo quod est et quod potest esse, habet cognitionem. Nec sequitur: scit hoc, ergo est verum; immo est ibi consequens14. — Si autem accipiatur scire secundo modo, prout connotat veritatem

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circa enuntiabile, sic fuerunt qui dicerent, quod desinit aliquod enuntiabile scire; quia15 quod enuntiabile, quod est verum, potest esse falsum.

Alii dixerunt contrarium, quia posuerunt, quod enuntiabile, quod semel est verum, semper est verum, et ita semper scitur. Et ut melius pateat, videnda est eorum positio16 et ratio positionis. Fuerunt qui dixerunt, quod albus, alba, album, cum sint tres voces et tres habeant modos significandi, tamen, quia eandem significationem important, sunt unum nomen. Per hunc modum dixerunt, quod unitas enuntiabilis17 accipienda est non ex parte vocis vel modi significandi, sed rei significatae; sed res est, quae primo est futura, deinde praesens, tertio praeterita: ergo enuntiare, rem hanc primo esse futuram, deinde praesentem, tertio praeteritam, non faciet diversitatem enuntiabilium, sed vocum. — Rursus, cum idem tempus sit primo futurum, deinde praesens, tertio praeteritum, tempus scilicet quod est mensura rei, quod significatur per orationem; quamvis esse vel fuisse vel fore consignificent tria tempora, ratione consignificati18 non diversificant enuntiabile, sed variatur solum a parte temporis significati. Unde si dicam semel: Socrates currit hodie, et cras dicam: cucurrit; cum hoc verbum det intelligere aliud tempus, et ita aliam actionem; enuntiabile non est idem, quantumcumque mutata significatione19. Et quia, retenta eadem significatione, enuntiabile semper est verum, et non est idem, nisi cum eadem significatio retinetur, ideo dixerunt, quod illud quod semel est verum, semper est verum. Et ideo, cum Deus nihil obliviscatur, dicunt, quod omne enuntiabile, quod Deus scivit, scit. — Et respondent illi rationi: omne enuntiabile, quod scivit, scit; sed scivit te nasciturum20, vel te esse: ergo etc.; non debet inferri sic: ergo potest esse scit, te esse, sed sic: ergo scit, te fuisse. Aliter est ibi figura dictionis, quia procedit ab identitate in modo significandi ad identitatem rei. — Et hoc modo solvit Magister21. Et ista fuit opinio Nominalium, qui sunt dicti Nominales, quia fundabant positionem suam super nominis unitatem.

Sed ista fuit positio contra Philosophum, qui improbam dicit in Praedicamentis22, quod eadem oratio primo est vera, postea falsa. Fuit etiam contra communem positionem. Fuit etiam contra veritatem. Et ratio huius est, quia nec bonum fundamentum habet, nec bonam adaptationem.

Primo enim, si quaeratur, utrum albus, alba, no, i haie album sint tria nomina, respondendum est: aut loqueris grammatice aut logice. Si grammatice, cum grammaticus consideret impositionem nominis, et modum principalem significandi substantiam cum qualitate23, sic dicet, unum nomen esse. Si logice, cum logicus consideret nomen, in quantum est vox expressiva, unde definit nomen, verbum et orationem per vocem tanquam per genus; et multiplicato superiori, necesse est, multiplicari inferius: si sunt multae voces significativae, sunt de necessitate multa nomina. Et ideo patet, quod male accipiebant nominis unitatem, secundum quod congruit ad propositum.

Mala etiam fuit adaptatio, quia enuntiabile non significat rem, sed modum se habendi24; et cum per verbum praesentis, praeteriti et futuri significetur, res alio modo se habere: patet de necessitate, quod aliud enuntiabile est, te esse nasciturum, et te esse natum. — Rursus, deficiebant in ultimo2526, quia, sicut homo non significat istum ho-

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minem vel illum, sic verbum praesentis temporis non significat illud vel illud praesens, sed praesens in communi, sive copulat vel consignificat. Et inde est, quod, sicut homo non habet aliam significationem nec est aliud nomen nec aequivocum, si modo supponat pro Petro, modo pro Paulo; sic nec verbum praesentis temporis, sive pronuntietur hodie sive cras, non habet aliam significationem, et ideo non facit aliud enuntiabile. Et propterea27 patet, quod quocumque tempore proferatur, te esse nasciturum, quod idem est enuntiabile, quod prius fuit verum, modo falsum. Secundum igitur quod scire connotat veritatem circa enuntiabile, scitum illud, quod scivit, modo non scit, nulla facta mutatione in Dei scientia, sed solum in connotato. — Concedendum igitur, quod in secunda acceptione non omne quod scit, semper scit.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod veritas est una in praesenti, praeterito et futuro; dicendum, quod quamvis sit reducibilis ad unam rei veritatem, sicut accidens ad subiectum28, et modus essendi ad entitatem, tamen, cum modus essendi habeat suam veritatem, et tres sunt modi essendi, ideo tres sunt veritates.

2. 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de indelebilitate et immutabilitate et independentia, dicendum, quod iam solutum est, quia nulla fit transmutatio in Dei cognitione, nec desinit scire enuntiabile propter mutationem in se, sed in connotato.

Scholion

I. Hanc quaestionem posuit Magister hic c. 3. tum quoad praescire tum quoad scire, et de eadem re loquitur etiam infra d. XLIV. c. 2. Solutio Lombardi quoad praescientiam est recta, sed quoad secundum membrum est ex parte falsa. Nam S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. (S. p. I. q. 15. m. 7. ad obiect.), S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 5; S. I. q. 14. a. 15. ad 3.), Richardo a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 1.) ad hoc respondet cum distinctione. Concedit quidem, quod si scientia Dei referatur ad res, Deus sciat omnem rem, quam scivit; si autem refertur ad enuntiabilia, tunc docet, sententiam Magistri, quae est Nominalium, deficere et falso niti fundamento. Putabant enim Nominales, idem esse enuntiabile, quando eadem res vel actio tribus propositionibus diversi temporis enuntiatur, ut si de eodem cursu dicitur hodie: Petrus currit, et heri: currit, et cras: cucurrit, unde dixerunt «idem esse enuntiabile, Christum nasci et esse nasciturum et esse natum» (S. Thom., S. loc. cit.). E contrario, eadem propositione, dicta diversis temporibus, recte significari possunt diversae actiones, ut de tribus cursibus Petri, quos fecit heri et hodie et cras, in unoquoque die recte dicitur: Petrus currit. — Verum est, hanc quaestionem spectare potius ad dialecticam; tamen non inutilis est ad vitandos errores. Nam si vera esset sententia Nominalium, sequeretur, quod differentiae temporis nullius momenti essent in enuntianda veritate alicuius propositionis, et quod sicut non est successio ex parte Dei, qui omnes res sibi habet praesentes, ita etiam ipsae res et differentiae temporum non realiter sibi succederent. Nam si differentiae temporum ex parte rerum veritatem habent, etiam enuntiatio sive significatio huius differentiae veritatem debet habere, et hanc veritatem Deus scit. Non est ergo idem enuntiabile, Christum nasci vel cum esse natum vel esse nasciturum. Unde recte Richard. a Med. (loc. cit.) concludit: «Scientia simplicis intelligentiae, quidquid scivit Deus, modo scit tam quoad res quam quoad enuntiabilia. Si autem scire significat cognoscere verum, sic non omne enuntiabile, quod Deus scivit esse verum, scit modo esse verum». Cfr. etiam S. Bonav., supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2, d. 39. a. 1. q. 3.

II. Praeter citatos auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 7, et m. 4. a. 6. — S. Thom. praeter locos cit. Quodl. 4. a. 17. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 39. q. 1.

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English Translation
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Question II.

Whether the enuntiabilia which God once knows, he always knows.

Secondly it is asked, whether the enuntiabilia or complexa1 which God once knows, he always knows or has knowledge of. And that [he does] so, it seems:

1. Because God does not know an enuntiabile except by reason of [its] truth5; but the truth of an enuntiabile which once was, always was and is and will be: therefore the enuntiabile which he once knows, he always knows. The proof of the minor: every truth of a complex thing is founded upon a non-complex thing; but the same thing is first future,

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then present, then past, [and is] one and the same: therefore one and the same truth is in it according to all these modes. But it is necessary that it always be under some [one] of these modes: therefore etc.4

2. Likewise, this same point seems [evident] from another reason: because whatever God knows, he knows immutably2 — otherwise, since the knowing of God is his being, if his knowing were changed, [his] being [would be changed]6, which is impossible — but everything which has immutability has eternity, because, if it ceases, it is changed: therefore what God once knows, he always knows.

3. Likewise, what is written in that book cannot be deleted; but God knows not by looking outside, but by reading in the book of his foreknowledge: therefore what he once knows, he always knows. The major is plain, because upon that [verse] of Exodus 327: "Blot me out of thy book" etc., the Gloss [says]: «He says this securely, because it will not be blotted out». And the same [Gloss] says [the like] upon the Psalm.

4. Likewise, what ceases or is lost upon something [else] ceasing, depends of necessity upon that [other thing]; but divine cognition does not depend upon the truth to-be-created8: therefore although an enuntiabile should cease to be true, yet God does not cease to know it; and if this: therefore what he once knows, he also [knows] always.

On the contrary:

1. Just as praescire (foreknowing) stands with respect to a future thing, insofar as it is future, so scire (knowing) [stands] with respect to a true thing — for if it is known in act, it is true in act — but, as the Master9 says, God ceases to foreknow a thing when the thing of-the-future becomes present: therefore likewise he ceases to know [it], when from a true [thing] it becomes false.

2. Likewise, just as divine acceptation regards goodness, so vision [regards] truth; but God ceases to accept a man, when he loses [his] goodness: therefore he ceases to know3 the thing or enuntiabile, when it loses [its] truth.

3. Likewise, this same point is shown by [arguing to the] impossible, because, if whatever enuntiabile he knew, he now knows, and he knew Christ to-be-about-to-die, therefore he also now knows [it]; but whatever is known is true10: therefore Christ-to-be-about-to-die is true, which is against the faith.

4. Likewise, if whatever he knew, he now knows; but at some time he knew that you were not [yet], when you were not: therefore he knows you not-to-be, and [also] he knows you to-be, because [each] is true: therefore he knows at the same time two contradictorily opposed [things]; therefore two contradictorily opposed [things] are simultaneously true, which is false and impossible.

Conclusion.

Insofar as scire says bare understanding, whatever God once knows, he always knows; but insofar as scire connotes truth in an object, by reason of the connotatum (which is variable), God does not [in this sense] always know whatever he once knew.

I respond: It must be said that scire is said in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is reflected upon itself11; and in this sense [the meaning] is: this one knows this, that is, has cognition of this; and in this mode it must be said that scire connotes nothing in the actual side of the known-thing — neither truth nor presence. For God has perfect cognition of every enunciation [as to] whether it is a complete and congruous enunciation, whether it is true, and other like [questions]. In another way scire is said insofar as it is a prohaeretic12 word (i.e. one importing election or assent) and passes outward into act, and thus connotes truth in the object; then therefore to know some enuntiabile is the same as to know that it is itself true. Whence «I know you to sit» is to say: I not only have cognition of this, but I also know that it itself is true. — In the first mode scire imports bare13 understanding; in the second mode, understanding with assent.

If therefore scire is taken in the first mode, then I say that whatever is, and every enuntiabile, and everything which he heretofore knew, [this] he [still] knows and has cognition of, because of everything which is and which can be, he has cognition. Nor does it follow: he knows this, therefore it is true; on the contrary, there is here a consequent [fallacy]14. — If however scire is taken in the second mode, insofar as it connotes truth

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concerning an enuntiabile, thus there have been some who would say that he ceases to know some enuntiabile; because15 [some] enuntiabile which is true can be false.

Others said the contrary, since they laid down that an enuntiabile which is once true, is always true, and so is always known. And that it may be more clearly evident, their position16 and the reason of [their] position must be seen. There have been some who said that albus, alba, album ("white" [in masc., fem., neut.]), although they are three utterances and have three modes of signifying, nevertheless, because they convey the same signification, are one name. By this same mode they said that the unity of an enuntiabile17 is to be taken not from the side of the utterance or of the mode of signifying, but [from the side] of the thing signified; but it is the [same] thing which is first future, then present, third past: therefore to enunciate that this thing is first future, then present, third past, will not make a diversity of enuntiabilia, but [only] of utterances. — Again, since the same time is first future, then present, third past — time, namely, which is the measure of the thing, which is signified by the utterance —, although esse or fuisse or fore ("to-be, to-have-been, to-be-about-to-be") consignify three times, by reason of the consignified18 they do not diversify the enuntiabile, but [the enuntiabile] is varied only on the side of the time signified. Hence if I once say: Socrates is running today, and tomorrow I shall say: he ran; although this verb gives [us] to understand another time, and so another action, the enuntiabile is not [therefore] different, however much the signification has been changed19. And because, the same signification being retained, the enuntiabile is always true, and is not the same, except when the same signification is retained, therefore they said that what is once true, is always true. And therefore, since God forgets nothing, they say that every enuntiabile which God knew, he [still] knows. — And they reply to that reasoning [thus]: every enuntiabile which he knew, he knows; but he knew you-to-be-about-to-be-born20, or you-to-be: therefore etc.; it ought not to be inferred thus: therefore he can be [said to] know, you-to-be, but thus: therefore he knows, you-to-have-been. Otherwise there is in that [argument] a fallacy of speech (figura dictionis), because it proceeds from identity in the mode of signifying to identity of the thing. — And in this way the Master21 solves [it]. And this was the opinion of the Nominales, who were called Nominales, because they founded their position upon the unity of the name.

But this position was against the Philosopher, who plainly says in the Categories22 that the same sentence is first true, then false. It was also against the common position. It was also against the truth. And the reason for this is that it has neither a good foundation, nor a good adaptation.

For first, if one asks whether albus, alba, album are three names, the answer is: either you are speaking grammatically or logically. If grammatically, since the grammarian considers the imposition of the name and the principal mode of signifying substance with quality23, thus he will say [it] is one name. If logically, since the logician considers the name insofar as it is a signifying utterance — whence he defines name, verb, and sentence by utterance as by genus —; and when the superior [genus] is multiplied, the inferior [species] must of necessity be multiplied: if there are many signifying utterances, there are of necessity many names. And therefore it is plain that they wrongly took the unity of the name, according to what is congruent to the matter at issue.

The adaptation was also bad, because an enuntiabile does not signify a thing, but a mode of being24; and since by the verb of the present, past, and future is signified that the thing is in another mode of being: it is plain of necessity that te esse nasciturum ("you to-be-about-to-be-born") and te esse natum ("you to-have-been-born") are different enuntiabilia. — Again, they were deficient in the last point2526, because, just as homo ("man") does not signify this man

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or that one, so verbum praesentis temporis ("verb of the present tense") does not signify this or that present, but the present in general — whether it couples [the predicate to the subject] or consignifies. And hence it is that, just as homo does not have another signification, nor is it another name, nor equivocal, if it supposits now for Peter, now for Paul; so neither does verbum praesentis temporis, whether it is pronounced today or tomorrow, have another signification, and therefore [it] does not make a different enuntiabile. And therefore27 it is plain that, at whatever time it is pronounced, te esse nasciturum — which is the same enuntiabile which was previously true — is now false. Therefore according as scire connotes truth concerning an enuntiabile, that known [object] which he knew, he now does not know — with no change made in the divine knowledge, but only in the connotatum. — It must be granted therefore that in the second acceptation [of scire] not everything which he knows, he always knows.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that truth is one in present, past, and future; it must be said that, although it is reducible to one truth of the thing — as accident to subject28, and mode of being to entity — yet, since the mode of being has its own truth, and there are three modes of being, therefore there are three truths.

2. 3. 4. To that which is objected concerning indelibility and immutability and independence, it must be said that it has already been solved, because no transmutation comes about in God's cognition, nor does he cease to know the enuntiabile on account of a change in itself, but in the connotatum.

Scholion

I. The Master proposed this question here in c. 3, both with regard to praescire (foreknowing) and with regard to scire (knowing), and he speaks on the same matter also below in d. XLIV. c. 2. Lombard's solution as regards praescientia is correct, but as regards the second member it is in part false. For St. Bonaventure, with Alexander of Hales (S. p. I, q. 15, m. 7, ad obiect.), St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 5; S. I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 3), [and] Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 4, q. 1) responds to this with a distinction. He grants indeed that if the knowledge of God is referred to things, God knows every thing which he knew; but if it is referred to enuntiabilia, then he teaches that the opinion of the Master, which is that of the Nominales, fails and rests on a false foundation. For the Nominales supposed that the enuntiabile is the same, when the same thing or action is enunciated by three propositions of different time — as if of the same running it is said today: Peter is running, and yesterday: he runs, and tomorrow: he ran, whence they said «it is the same enuntiabile that Christ-is-being-born and is-to-be-born and has-been-born» (St. Thomas, S. loc. cit.). On the contrary, by the same proposition, said at different times, diverse actions can rightly be signified — as concerning three runnings of Peter which he performed yesterday and today and tomorrow, on each day it is rightly said: Peter is running. — It is true that this question pertains rather to dialectic; yet [it is] not useless for avoiding errors. For if the opinion of the Nominales were true, it would follow that the differences of time would be of no moment in enunciating the truth of any proposition; and that, just as there is no succession on the side of God, who holds all things present to himself, so also the things themselves and the differences of times would not really succeed one another. For if the differences of times have truth on the side of the things, the enunciation or signification of this difference too must have truth, and this truth God knows. Therefore it is not the same enuntiabile — Christ-being-born or [Christ] having-been-born or being-about-to-be-born. Whence Richard of Mediavilla (loc. cit.) rightly concludes: «The knowledge of simple intelligence — whatever God knew, he now knows, both as regards things and as regards enuntiabilia. If however scire signifies to know-the-true, in this way not every enuntiabile which God knew to-be-true, he now knows to-be-true». Cf. also St. Bonaventure, above, d. 38, a. 2, q. 2; d. 39, a. 1, q. 3.

II. Besides the authors already cited: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 7, and m. 4, a. 6. — St. Thomas besides the places already cited, Quodl. 4, a. 17. — B. Albert, here a. 6. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Durand., I Sent. d. 39, q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cod. K compositio.
    Codex K [reads] compositio ("composition").
  2. Cod. T (V in marg.) mutabilem. Proxime ante Vat. omittit sicut est. Aliquanto inferius pro modum simplicitatis ed. 1 modum simplicis.
    Codex T (V in the margin) [reads] mutabilem ("changeable"). Just before, the Vatican [edition] omits sicut est ("as it is"). Somewhat below, in place of modum simplicitatis ("the mode of simplicity"), edition 1 [reads] modum simplicis ("the mode of the simple").
  3. Vat. cum cod. cc praeterea; incongrue.
    The Vatican [edition] together with codex cc [reads] praeterea ("moreover"); incongruously.
  4. Codd. A T patet, quod sic intelligendum.
    Codices A T [read] patet, quod sic intelligendum ("it is plain, that it is to-be-so-understood").
  5. Codd. L O hic interiiciunt: signatae vel ratione enuntiabilis in se; si ratione enuntiabilis in se, cum ipsum sit aliqua res etc.; si ratione veritatis: sed cur. Paulo inferius pro falsa lectione Vaticanae super rem complexam substituimus auctoritate potiorum codd. et ed. 1 supra rem incomplexam. In fine argumenti pro horum cod. T istorum.
    Codices L O here interject: signatae vel ratione enuntiabilis in se; si ratione enuntiabilis in se, cum ipsum sit aliqua res etc.; si ratione veritatis: sed cur ("[truth] signed, either by reason of the enuntiabile in itself — if by reason of the enuntiabile in itself, since it is some thing etc.; if by reason of the truth: but why"). A little below, in place of the false reading of the Vatican super rem complexam ("upon a complex thing"), we substitute on the authority of the better codices and edition 1 supra rem incomplexam ("upon a non-complex thing"). At the end of the argument, in place of horum ("of these"), codex T [reads] istorum ("of those").
  6. Intellige: etiam suum esse mutaretur.
    Understand: his esse (being) too would be changed.
  7. Vers. 32. — Psalmus, qui mox memoratur, est Ps. 105, et versus, qui respicitur, v. 23. — Glossa, in qua verba inveniuntur: Securus hoc dicit etc., est Glossa interlinearis, et Glossa, quae «idem dicit super Psalmum», est Glossa ordinaria et sumta est ex August., Qq. in Exod. q. 117, et Enarrat. in Ps. 105. n. 21. — De propos. minori argumenti cfr. August., XX. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. — Pro Prima patet Vat. cum pluribus codd. perperam Praeterea patet.
    Verse 32. — The Psalm which is shortly remembered is Ps. 105, and the verse referred to is v. 23. — The Gloss, in which the words Securus hoc dicit etc. are found, is the Interlinear Gloss; and the Gloss which "says the same upon the Psalm" is the Ordinary Gloss and is taken from Augustine, Questions on Exodus q. 117, and Enarrations on Psalm 105, n. 21. — On the minor proposition of the argument cf. Augustine, City of God XX, c. 15. — In place of Prima patet ("the first is plain"), the Vatican with several codices wrongly [reads] Praeterea patet ("moreover it is plain").
  8. Ed. 1 creata.
    Edition 1 [reads] creata ("created").
  9. Hic cap. 3. Expositio huius dicti Magistri dabitur infra, dub. 4. — Magister loc. cit. distinguit inter praescientiam et scientiam Dei, et praescientiam affirmat posse desinere; scientiam autem non. At S. Bonav. etiam hoc posterius affirmat, scil. scientiam Dei posse desinere, hoc derivans de eodem principio, quo Magister nisus docuit, praescientiam Dei posse desinere.
    Here, c. 3. The exposition of this saying of the Master will be given below, dub. 4. — The Master at the cited place distinguishes between God's foreknowledge and his knowledge, and affirms that foreknowledge can cease, but not knowledge. But St. Bonaventure affirms this latter [point] also, namely that God's knowledge can cease — deriving this from the same principle by which the Master attempted to teach that God's foreknowledge can cease.
  10. Ed. 1 cogitare.
    Edition 1 [reads] cogitare ("to think").
  11. Cfr. supra pag. 690, nota 2. — Pro scitur Vat. scit.
    Cf. above p. 690, note 2. — In place of scitur ("is known"), the Vatican [reads] scit ("knows").
  12. Id est, prout sistit in se, sive, ut paulo inferius dicitur, prout importat nudum intelligere, meram scil. apprehensionem absque iudicio de veritate obiectiva cognitionis. Hoc modo Deus omnia cognoscit quae cognosci possunt, etiam omnia falsa et impossibilia. — Paulo inferius pro praescientiam non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 praescientiam.
    That is, insofar as it stands in itself, or — as is said a little below — insofar as it imports bare understanding, that is, a mere apprehension without judgment about the objective truth of the cognition. In this mode God knows all things which can be known, even all false and impossible things. — A little below, in place of praescientiam ("foreknowledge"), not a few codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 [read] praescientiam (Quaracchi prints the same word at both positions; the variant evidently lies in accentuation or in an underlying word-form not captured by spelling).
  13. Graece προαιρετικόν (a προαιρείσθαι, de quo supra pag. 714, nota 3.) i. e. electivum vel adhaesivum. Verbum igitur scire, acceptum ut verbum prohaereticum, significat cognitionem cum electione sive adhaesione (assensu) relate ad rem cognitam, quatenus scil. simul iudicatur, rem cognitam esse veram, et scire transit in actum extra connotando cogniti existentiam extra intellectum. Cfr. supra d. 33. dub. 5, et d. XXXVIII. lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Cod. M verbo prohaereticum adiungit: id est voluntarium, unde prohaeresis id est voluntas.
    In Greek προαιρετικόν (from προαιρείσθαι, on which see above p. 714, note 3), i.e. electivum vel adhaesivum ("of choice or of cleaving-to"). The verb scire, then, taken as a prohaeretic word, signifies cognition with election or cleaving-to (assent) relative to the thing known — namely insofar as it is at the same time judged that the thing known is true, and scire passes into act outside [the knower] by connoting the existence of the known outside the intellect. Cf. above d. 33, dub. 5; and d. XXXVIII, littera Magistri, c. 1. — Codex M adds to the word prohaereticum: id est voluntarium, unde prohaeresis id est voluntas ("that is, voluntary, whence prohaeresis is the will").
  14. Cum Vat. retinuimus nudum, quamquam codd. cum sex primis edd. exhibent divinum, quod sensum nimis arctare videtur.
    With the Vatican [edition] we have retained nudum ("bare"), although the codices with the first six editions exhibit divinum ("divine"), which seems to constrict the sense too much.
  15. Scilicet fallacia consequentis, in quantum enim scire in antecedente accipitur in primo sensu hic exposito, et in consequente in secundo. Cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.).
    Namely the fallacy of consequent, inasmuch as scire in the antecedent is taken in the first sense here expounded, and in the consequent in the second. Cf. Aristotle, I Sophistical Refutations c. 4 (c. 5).
  16. Omnes ferme codd. cum ed. 1 minus concinne suunt pro enum.
    Almost all the codices with edition 1, less elegantly, [read] suunt for enum [?] (an OCR-garbled variant — apparent intent is a variant on the local Latin reading).
  17. Cod. U enuntiationis.
    Codex U [reads] enuntiationis ("of enunciation").
  18. Scilicet temporis. — Pro consignificati Vat. tamen significati. Eadem Vat. paulo ante pro quod significatur substituit quae significatur, quam lectionem castigavimus ex multis codd. et ex sex primis edd.
    Namely, of time. — In place of consignificati ("of the consignified"), the Vatican however [reads] significati ("of the signified"). The same Vatican, a little before, in place of quod significatur ("what is signified") substitutes quae significatur ("which is signified") — which reading we have corrected from many codices and from the first six editions.
  19. Haec propositio interpretatur verba praecedentia: sed curatur unitas a parte temporis significati; nam posita v. g. quantumcumque diversa actione in diversis temporibus, compatibile diversificatur necesse est. Sola Vat. hanc propositionem refert ad illa verba: ratione consignificati non diversificant enuntiabile, quare et ipsam transformaverit hoc modo: Socrates currit hodie, et cras dicam cucurrit, cum hoc verbum non det intelligere aliud tempus (?) et ita nec aliam actionem enuntiabile non est mutatum quantumcumque mutata consignificatione. Codd. conveniunt cum nostra lectione, excepto quod nonnulli pro non est idem exhibent non est mutatum, repugnante contra Vat. Pro non est idem ed. 1 tamen est idem, et paulo superius pro cras dicam; currit eadem ed. cras dicam, cucurrit. Paulo inferius in segmenti propositione quo semper est verum Vat. semper est idem, et in fine alterius propositionis pro quod Deus scivit, scit cod. Z paulo perfectius quod Deus semel scivit, scit. — Locutio tempus significatum et tempus consignificantis sumta est ex Aristot., I. Periherm., ubi c. 2,
    This proposition interprets the preceding words: but the unity is preserved on the side of the time signified; for if, e.g., one posits however much different action in different times, the compatible [item] is necessarily diversified. The Vatican alone refers this proposition to those words ratione consignificati non diversificant enuntiabile ("by reason of the consignified they do not diversify the enuntiabile"), whence it has also transformed [the wording] thus: Socrates currit hodie, et cras dicam cucurrit, cum hoc verbum non det intelligere aliud tempus (?), et ita nec aliam actionem enuntiabile non est mutatum quantumcumque mutata consignificatione. The codices agree with our reading, except that some, in place of non est idem ("is not the same") exhibit non est mutatum ("is not changed") — against the Vatican. In place of non est idem edition 1 [reads] tamen est idem ("yet it is the same"); and a little earlier, in place of cras dicam; currit, the same edition [reads] cras dicam, cucurrit. A little below, in a fragmentary proposition, in place of quo semper est verum ("by which it is always true"), the Vatican [reads] semper est idem ("is always the same"); and at the end of another proposition, in place of quod Deus scivit, scit ("what God knew, he knows"), codex Z more perfectly [reads] quod Deus semel scivit, scit ("what God once knew, he knows"). — The expression tempus significatum et tempus consignificantis is taken from Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 2,
  20. de nomine dicitur: Nomen igitur est vox significativa etc., et c. 3, de verbo dicitur: Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus.
    where it is said of nomen (name): Nomen igitur est vox significativa etc. ("A name, then, is a signifying utterance," etc.), and c. 3, where it is said of verbum (verb): Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus ("A verb, however, is that which consignifies time").
  21. Sola Vat. hic et paulo inferius post te esse ac te fuisse bene repetit nasciturum; cod. L hic et paulo post verbo esse et dein verbo fuisse praefigit non.
    Only the Vatican here and a little below, after te esse and te fuisse, rightly repeats nasciturum; codex L here and a little after prefixes non to the verb esse and then to the verb fuisse.
  22. Hic c. 3. — De fallacia figurae dictionis cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 5. (c. 4.), quae fundatur «in similitudine dictionis in parte cum alia dictione non idem significante» (Petr. Hisp.) v. g. esse nasciturum, fuisse nasciturum. — Pro procedit cod. V et ed. 1 proceditur.
    Here, c. 3. — On the fallacy of speech (figura dictionis) cf. Aristotle, I Sophistical Refutations c. 5 (c. 4), which is founded «on the likeness of speech in part with another speech not signifying the same» (Peter of Spain), e.g. esse nasciturum, fuisse nasciturum. — In place of procedit, codex V and edition 1 [read] proceditur.
  23. Cap. de Substantia: Eadem enim oratio vera et falsa videtur esse, veluti si vera sit oratio, sedere quempiam, eo surgente, ipsa eadem falsa erit. — Infra multi codd. habet pro habent.
    Chapter On Substance: "For the same sentence seems to be true and [then] false — as, if it is a true sentence that someone is sitting, when he stands up, the very same [sentence] will be false." — Below, many codices [read] habet for habent.
  24. De grammaticali definitione nominis cfr. supra pag. 390, nota 6; de logica definitione nominis, verbi et orationis cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1. seqq.
    On the grammatical definition of nomen (name) cf. above p. 390, note 6; on the logical definition of nomen, verbum, and oratio (name, verb, sentence) cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 1 seqq.
  25. Scilicet connexum praedicati cum subiecto.
    Namely, the connection of predicate with subject.
  26. Scilicet quoad consignificationem temporis, de qua S. Doctor paulo superius locutus est in propositione, quae incipit: Rursus, cum idem tempus sit etc. Ratio, qua S. Doctor hic profert ad refutandum Nominales, fundatur in eo, quod conceptus nostri et propositiones ex eis formatae propter abstractionem, quae ipsis competit, non designant obiecta singularia; et quae his applicantur servant eandem significationem, ita ut [continuation on p. 741 footer:] aliqua propositio, in se spectata, sit eadem, quocumque tempore proferatur; sic v. g. haec propositio: Socrates currit, in se spectata eadem est, sive hodie sive cras pronuntietur. Sed aliter res se habet, si propositio non in se consideratur, sed relate ad rem, sive in quantum est vera. Tunc enim eadem propositio, quae primo fuit vera, falsa fieri potest, prout res ipsa mutatur. Falsum est igitur quod dicunt adversarii, retenta eadem significatione, enuntiabile semper esse verum etc. — Paulo inferius pro sive copulat, quam lectionem cum Vat. (copulet) et codd. A C L S T U W Y retinuimus, non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 sive non copulat.
    Namely, as regards the consignification of time, on which the holy Doctor spoke a little earlier in the proposition beginning Rursus, cum idem tempus sit etc. The reason which the holy Doctor here brings forward to refute the Nominales is founded on this: that our concepts and the propositions formed from them, on account of the abstraction which belongs to them, do not designate singular objects; and [those things] which are applied to them preserve the same signification, so that some proposition, considered in itself, is the same at whatever time it is uttered — thus e.g. this proposition Socrates currit ("Socrates is running"), considered in itself, is the same whether it is pronounced today or tomorrow. But the matter stands otherwise if the proposition is not considered in itself, but in relation to the thing, that is, insofar as it is true. For then the same proposition, which was at first true, can become false, as the thing itself changes. Therefore what the adversaries say is false: retenta eadem significatione, enuntiabile semper esse verum ("with the same signification retained, the enuntiabile is always true") etc. — A little below, in place of sive copulat — which reading we have retained with the Vatican (copulet) and codices A C L S T U W Y — not a few codices with edition 1 [read] sive non copulat.
  27. Vat. cum cod. cc praeterea. Paulo inferius pro scitum illud quod scivit, modo non scit, quam lectionem cum Vat. etiam exhibet cod. T, plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 scitum illud quidem scivit et modo non scit.
    The Vatican with codex cc [reads] praeterea ("moreover"). A little below, in place of scitum illud quod scivit, modo non scit ("that known [thing] which he knew, he now does not know") — which reading the Vatican together with codex T also exhibits — the majority of codices with edition 1 [read] scitum illud quidem scivit et modo non scit ("indeed he knew that known [thing] and now does not know [it]").
  28. Ed. 1 substantiam.
    Edition 1 [reads] substantiam ("substance").
← Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 1Dist. 41, Dubia→