Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. T, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit in primo capitulo Magister: Eorum tamen quaedam efflagitant specialem tractatum. Aut enim ista¹ efflagitant specialem tractatum, quia sunt difficilia, aut quia sunt appropriata. Si, quia sunt difficilia; sed alia etiam sunt difficilia, sicut simplicitas, veritas et immutabilitas. Si quia sunt appropriata; sed similiter sunt unitas et aequalitas.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista efflagitant specialem tractatum triplici ex causa: tum quia sunt difficilia; tum quia multa de ipsis in Scriptura sunt determinata; tum etiam quia dicunt respectum ad creaturam², et secundum has conditiones attenditur ratio causae in divina natura. Ideo, quia debebat facere transitum ad creaturas sive ad creationem, et ad hoc praeexigitur in causa posse, scire et velle, quae faciunt causam esse perfectam: ideo tractatum istum in medio collocavit inter tractatum de Trinitate et tractatum de rerum universitate. Sed quia huiusmodi plus se tenent cum Deo, et adeo se tenent³, quod sunt Deus; ideo tractatus iste in primo libro ponitur.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Amodo tractandum est de scientia et voluntate et potentia. Videtur enim male ordinare, quia potentia praecedit scientiam et voluntatem⁴: ergo male ordinat in proponendo et male in exsequendo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de istis: aut in sua generalitate, aut ut concurrunt ad unum effectum. Si in sua generalitate, sic cum scientia sit respectu bonorum et malorum faciendorum, prior est secundum rationem intelligendi quam potentia; et potentia, cum sit respectu faciendorum et non faciendorum, prior est voluntate, quae est respectu faciendorum bonorum tantum. Si autem loquamur de his, prout concurrunt ad unum effectum; sic potentia, in quantum potens, est prima, in quantum exsequens, est ultima: prius enim est posse, deinde scire, et post velle, et postremo est facere quod est ipsius potentiae⁵. Et quantum ad hunc actum Magister ponit hic ultimo loco potentiam; sed in exsecutione considerat ordinem secundum maiorem generalitatem et minorem.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod divina scientia diversa sortitur nomina, quae scilicet sunt scientia⁶, praescientia vel praevidentia, dispositio, praedestinatio, providentia. Quaeritur⁷, quomodo distinguuntur haec nomina; et videtur quod insufficienter enumeret, quia non solum est ponere in divinis praedestinationem, verum etiam reprobationem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod huiusmodi nomina distinguuntur sic: divina cognitio potest considerari in se, aut in comparatione ad creaturas. Si in se: aut prout dicit pure cognitionem per modum speculationis, aut prout dicit speculationem iunctam affectioni. Primo modo est scientia, secundo modo est sapientia. Vel sic: aut⁸ dicit cognitionem simplicem, aut per rationem nobilissimam. Primo modo scientia, secundo modo sapientia⁹. — Si autem consideretur in comparatione ad res, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut connotat eventum, et sic praescientia; aut effectum, et hoc dupliciter: aut in conservando sive gubernando, et sic providentia; aut in efficiendo, et hoc dupliciter: aut quantum ad bonum naturae et sic dispositio; aut quantum ad bonum superadditum, et sic praedestinatio, aut quantum ad eius privationem, et sic reprobatio. Sed quia privatio gratiae non est effectus, sed defectus, ideo reprobatio non hic numeratur, sed continetur sub praescientiae nomine, et ipsum sibi appropriat.

Unde divisio potest sic formari: cognitio Dei aut est in se, aut in comparatione: si in se, aut per rationem nobilissimam, et sic sapientia; aut per qualemcumque rationem, et sic est scientia. Si in comparatione: aut eventuum, et sic praescientia; aut eventuum et effectuum, et hoc vel in gubernando, et sic est providentia; vel in efficiendo, et sic, si respectu cuiuscumque naturae sit, est dispositio; si respectu rationalis, sic praedestinatio; aut eventuum et effectuum et defectuum, et sic reprobatio, quae est praescientia nominata.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod creator ita dicitur relative, ut tamen essentiam non significet. Videtur enim dicere falsum: nam creatio significat modum actionis, non relationis, ergo creator similiter; ergo non dicitur secundum relationem a parte modi, nec a parte rei; illud constat: ergo nullo modo. Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit, quod essentiam non significat, quia creatio significat aliquid: aut ergo creatum, aut increatum. Si creatum: ergo non dicitur de Deo; si increatum: ergo cum non significet personam, significat essentiam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod relative dici aliquid est dupliciter: aut quia significat relationem, sicut nomina, quae sunt in praedicamento relationis; aut quia habet respectum annexum: sic, cum omnis actio dicat respectum ad passum sive factum, et passum ad agentem, sic dicitur relative, et sic intelligit Magister de hoc nomine creator; et bene¹⁰. Aliud etiam quod dicit, quod non significat essentiam; dicit propter hoc, quod quamvis imponatur divinae essentiae — et ideo de sola essentia dicitur, secundum omnes — tamen de eo, a quo imponitur, fuit controversia. Quidam enim voluerunt dicere, quod nomina sex generum¹¹ non praedicant aliquid in Deo, sed compraedicant. Unde actio non videtur dicere aliquid in agente, sed ab agente. Et huic videtur consonare ratio, quia actio et passio videntur esse eadem. Et iterum huic videtur consonare verbum Boethii de Trinitate¹², quod «alia genera rerum nec de Creatore, nec de creaturis praedicantur» — Ista opinio fuit satis probabilis, et huius fuit Magister¹³; et ideo dicit, quod praescientia ratione scientiae importat essentiam, sed creator tantum relationem.

Verumtamen illud hodie communiter non tenetur. Dicimus enim, Deum esse suam actionem, ut puta creationem. Et quoniam essentia est divina actio, et hoc nomen creator imponitur ab actione; ideo non tantum impositum est essentiae, verum etiam ab essentia, sed illam significat in relatione. Nec Boethius intendit dicere, quod talia non praedicantur, sed non praedicantur absolute. — Si tamen velimus sustinere Magistrum secundum communem opinionem, dicemus, quod Magister non vult dicere, quod creatio non importet divinam essentiam, sed quod, quantum ex vi vocabuli, non dicit essentiam absolute, sed per modum relationis sive sub appellatione relativa. Sed praescientia duo dicit: et scientiam et praecessionem¹⁴. Ratione scientiae dicit essentiam absolutam, unde manet scientia, re ipsa non manente. Non sic est de creatione; non enim est creatio, nisi etiam sit creatura. Et secundum hoc verbum Magistri non habet calumniam¹⁵.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si nulla fuissent futura, esset tamen in Deo scientia eadem. Videtur enim male dicere, quia scientia nostra ponit res, et quando non ponit, non est scientia, sed opinio vel alia acceptio minus nobilis¹⁶: ergo cum de nobilitate scientiae sit ponere rem, videtur multo fortius, quod divina scientia ponat, quae est nobilissima.

Respondeo: Ad hoc breviter dicendum, quod est scientia, qua habeo cognitionem de re, et est scientia, qua scio rem esse¹⁷. Prima scientia nec in nobis, nec in Deo ponit existentiam rei in proprio genere, nec de praesenti, nec de futuro; quod patet, quia artifex habet cognitionem faciendi domum, quam nunquam faciet. Secunda vero scientia ponit rem tam in Deo quam in nobis; sed in nobis, quia dependet, in Deo, quia connotat¹⁸. Et quantum ad primum modum loquitur Magister, quod eadem scientia esset, sed non respectu eiusdem, et respectu tot, respectu quot modo est quantum ad secundum modum.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod omnia sunt Deo praesentia, non solum quae sunt, sed etiam quae praeterierunt. Quomodo intelligitur illud? Aut enim intelligitur de praesentia secundum veritatem, aut de praesentia secundum cognitionem. Primo modo falsum est: constans est, quod antichristus non est in Deo secundum veritatem praesens. Si secundum cognitionem, quia habet cognitionem praeteritorum et futurorum; sed sic habet una anima¹⁹: ergo similiter omnia sunt ei praesentia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non omnia dicuntur esse praesentia Deo secundum veritatem existentiae rerum, sed secundum cognitionem, quia actu cognoscit praesentia, praeterita et futura; et circa actum suae cognitionis semper est praesentialitas, ita quod nulla successio cognitionis Dei est in nunc, quod complectitur omnem successionem sine mutatione: et ideo omnia sunt ei praesentia ex hac duplici causa²⁰. Quamvis autem creatura habeat cognitionem de praeteritis, quia tamen cognitio eius transit in praeteritum et nova generatur cognitio ex rei existentia: ideo non dicitur, quod omnia sunt praesentia creaturae, sicut dicitur, quod omnia praesentia sunt Deo. Et ideo non ponitur memoria in Deo, quoniam memoria respicit praeteritum²¹, non tantum in re, sed ut etiam actus illius cognitionis transit in praeteritum; sed praescientia non dicit rationem sive actum scientiae ut futurum; et ideo in Deo convenienter ponitur.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says in the first chapter: Of these, however, certain ones demand a special treatment. For either these¹ demand a special treatment because they are difficult, or because they are appropriated. If because they are difficult; but other things also are difficult, such as simplicity, truth, and immutability. If because they are appropriated; but similarly so are unity and equality.

I respond: It must be said that these demand a special treatment from a threefold cause: both because they are difficult; both because many things concerning them are determined in Scripture; and also because they say a respect to the creature², and according to these conditions the account of cause in the divine nature is attended to. Therefore, because [the Master] had to make a transition to the creatures, that is, to creation, and for this there is required beforehand in the cause to-be-able, to-know, and to-will, which make a cause to be perfect: therefore he placed this treatment in the middle, between the treatment on the Trinity and the treatment on the universe of things. But because such things hold themselves more with God, and so hold themselves³ that they are God; therefore this treatment is placed in the first book.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Henceforth there must be treatment of knowledge and will and power. For he seems to order [them] ill, because power precedes knowledge and will⁴: therefore he orders ill in proposing and ill in carrying out.

I respond: It must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of these: either in their generality, or as they concur unto one effect. If in their generality, so since knowledge is with respect to goods and evils to be done, it is prior in the account of understanding than power; and power, since it is with respect to things to-be-done and not-to-be-done, is prior to will, which is with respect only to goods to-be-done. But if we speak of these as they concur unto one effect; then power, insofar as it is able, is first, insofar as it is executing, is last: for first is to-be-able, then to-know, and after that to-will, and lastly is to-do, which is of power itself⁵. And as regards this act the Master places power here in the last place; but in execution he considers the order according to greater and lesser generality.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the divine knowledge is allotted diverse names, namely knowledge⁶, foreknowledge or forevision, disposition, predestination, providence. It is asked⁷ how these names are distinguished; and it seems that he enumerates insufficiently, because in divine matters it is to be posited not only predestination but also reprobation.

I respond: It must be said that names of this kind are distinguished thus: divine knowing can be considered in itself, or in comparison to creatures. If in itself: either insofar as it says purely a knowing in the manner of speculation, or insofar as it says speculation joined to affection. In the first way it is knowledge, in the second way it is wisdom. Or thus: either⁸ it says simple knowing, or [knowing] through the most noble account. In the first way knowledge, in the second way wisdom⁹. — But if it be considered in comparison to things, this can be twofold: either it connotes the event, and so foreknowledge; or the effect, and this twofold: either in conserving or governing, and so providence; or in effecting, and this twofold: either as regards the good of nature and so disposition; or as regards the superadded good, and so predestination, or as regards its privation, and so reprobation. But because the privation of grace is not an effect but a defect, therefore reprobation is not numbered here, but is contained under the name of foreknowledge, and [the latter] appropriates it to itself.

Hence the division can be formed thus: the knowing of God either is in itself, or in comparison: if in itself, either through the most noble account, and so wisdom; or through whatever account, and so it is knowledge. If in comparison: either of events, and so foreknowledge; or of events and effects, and this either in governing, and so it is providence; or in effecting, and so, if it is with respect to any nature whatsoever, it is disposition; if with respect to the rational, so predestination; or of events and effects and defects, and so reprobation, which is named foreknowledge.

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that creator is so said relatively, that nevertheless it does not signify the essence. For he seems to say a falsehood: for creation signifies the mode of an action, not of a relation, therefore creator similarly; therefore it is not said according to relation on the side of the mode, nor on the side of the thing; that is established: therefore in no way [is it relative]. Likewise, he seems to say a falsehood when he says that it does not signify the essence, because creation signifies something: either therefore the created or the uncreated. If the created: therefore it is not said of God; if the uncreated: therefore since it does not signify a person, it signifies the essence.

I respond: It must be said that for something to be said relatively is twofold: either because it signifies a relation, like the nouns which are in the predicament of relation; or because it has a respect annexed: thus, since every action says a respect to the patient or thing-done, and the patient to the agent, so it is said relatively, and so the Master understands [it] of this name creator; and rightly so¹⁰. Now the other thing he says, that it does not signify the essence; he says on this account, that although it be imposed upon the divine essence — and therefore is said of the essence alone, according to all — yet concerning that from which it is imposed there was a controversy. For some wished to say that the names of the six [last] genera¹¹ do not predicate something in God, but co-predicate. Hence action does not seem to say something in the agent, but from the agent. And to this seems to consort the reasoning that action and passion seem to be the same. And again to this seems to consort the word of Boethius On the Trinity¹², that «the other genera of things are predicated neither of the Creator nor of creatures.» — That opinion was sufficiently probable, and of this opinion was the Master¹³; and therefore he says that foreknowledge by reason of knowledge imports the essence, but creator only relation.

Yet today this is not commonly held. For we say that God is his action, as for instance creation. And since the essence is divine action, and this name creator is imposed from action; therefore it is imposed not only upon the essence but also from the essence, but signifies it in relation. Nor does Boethius intend to say that such things are not predicated, but that they are not predicated absolutely. — If however we wish to sustain the Master according to the common opinion, we shall say that the Master does not wish to say that creation does not import the divine essence, but that, as much as from the force of the word, it does not say the essence absolutely, but in the manner of relation, that is, under a relative appellation. But foreknowledge says two things: both knowledge and a precession¹⁴. By reason of knowledge it says the absolute essence, whence the knowledge remains, the thing itself not remaining. It is not so concerning creation; for there is not creation unless there be also a creature. And according to this the word of the Master does not have any cavil¹⁵.

DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: If no things were going to be, there would yet be in God the same knowledge. For he seems to speak ill, because our knowledge posits the things, and when it does not posit, it is not knowledge but opinion or some other less-noble acceptation¹⁶: therefore since it pertains to the nobility of knowledge to posit the thing, it seems much more strongly that the divine knowledge, which is most noble, would posit.

I respond: To this it must be said briefly that there is a knowledge by which I have a cognition of a thing, and there is a knowledge by which I know that the thing is¹⁷. The first knowledge neither in us nor in God posits the existence of the thing in its proper genus, neither of the present nor of the future; which is plain, because the artisan has the cognition of building a house, which he will never build. But the second knowledge posits the thing both in God and in us; but in us, because it depends, in God, because it connotes¹⁸. And as regards the first mode the Master speaks, [namely] that the same knowledge would be, but not with respect to the same, and with respect to as many, with respect to as many as it is now, as regards the second mode.

DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that all things are present to God, not only those which are, but also those which have passed away. How is this to be understood? For either it is understood of presence according to truth, or of presence according to cognition. In the first way it is false: it is established that antichrist is not present to God according to truth. If according to cognition, [it follows] because [God] has cognition of past and future things; but thus has one soul¹⁹: therefore similarly all things are present to it.

I respond: It must be said that not all things are said to be present to God according to the truth of the existence of things, but according to cognition, because in act he knows the present, the past, and the future; and around the act of his cognition there is always presentiality, so that there is no succession of God's cognition in the now, which embraces every succession without change: and therefore all things are present to him from this twofold cause²⁰. But although the creature has cognition of past things, yet because its cognition passes into the past and a new cognition is generated from the existence of the thing: therefore it is not said that all things are present to the creature, as it is said that all present things are to God. And therefore memory is not posited in God, since memory looks to the past²¹, not only as regards the thing, but also insofar as the act itself of that cognition passes into the past; but foreknowledge does not say the account or act of knowledge as future; and therefore it is fittingly posited in God.

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