Pars 1, Cap. 8
Breviloquium · Pars I: De Trinitate Dei
Capitulum VIII. De Dei sapientia, praedestinatione et praescientia.
De sapientia vero Dei haec tenenda sunt, scilicet quod ipsa divina sapientia limpidissime cognoscit omnia bona et mala, praeterita, praesentia et futura, actualia et possibilia, ac per hoc incomprehensibilia nobis et infinita; ita tamen, quod ipsa in se nullo modo diversificatur, licet diversa nomina sortiatur. — In quantum enim est cognoscitiva omnium possibilium, dicitur scientia sive cognitio; in quantum est cognoscitiva omnium, quae in universo fiunt, dicitur visio; in quantum est cognoscitiva omnium, quae bene fiunt, dicitur approbatio; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae futura sunt, dicitur praescientia sive praevisio; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae ab ipso Deo fienda sunt, dicitur dispositio: in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae praemianda sunt, dicitur praedestinatio; in quantum vero est cognoscitiva eorum quae damnanda sunt, dicitur reprobatio4.
Et quia ipsa non tantum est cognoscitiva, sed est etiam ratio cognoscendi; ideo, in quantum est ratio cognoscendi omnia cognita, dicitur lux; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi visa et approbata, dicitur speculum; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi praevisa et disposita, dicitur exemplar; in quantum vero est ratio cognoscendi praedestinata et reprobata, dicitur liber vitae. — Est igitur liber vitae respectu rerum, ut redeuntium; exemplar, ut exeuntium; speculum, ut euntium; lux vero respectu omnium5. — Ad exemplar autem spectat idea, verbum, ars et ratio: idea, secundum actum praevidendi; verbum, secundum actum proponendi; ars, secundum actum prosequendi; ratio, secundum actum perficiendi, quia superaddit intentionem finis. — Quia vero haec omnia unum sunt in Deo, ideo unum frequenter accipitur pro alio.
Et licet divina sapientia ratione diversitatis scitorum et connotatorum diversa sortiatur vocabula, non tamen diversificatur secundum rationem intrinsecam. Cognoscit enim contingentia infallibiliter, mutabilia immutabiliter, futura praesentialiter, temporalia aeternaliter, dependentia independenter, creata increate, alia a se in se et per se6. — Et cum infallibiliter contingentia cognoscat, simul stat libertas et vertibilitas voluntatis cum praedestinatione et praescientia.
Intelligentia autem et ratio praedictorum haec est: quoniam primum principium, hoc ipso quod primum et summum, cognitionem habet simul simplicissimam et perfectissimam: quia perfectissimam, ideo cognoscit omnia1 distinctissime sub omnibus conditionibus, quas res habent vel habere possunt; et propterea futura scit esse futura, et praesentia praesentia; et bona scit approbanda, et mala reprobanda: hinc est, quod diversa sortitur vocabula, secundum quod dictum est supra.
Sed quia simul stat perfectio sapientiae cum summa simplicitate, hinc est, quod omnia alia a se cognoscit in se et per se; ex quo sequitur secundum, quod creata cognoscit increate; ex quo sequitur tertium, quod dependentia cognoscit independenter; ex quo oritur quartum, quod temporalia cognoscit aeternaliter; ex quo quintum, quod futura cognoscit praesentialiter; ex quo sextum, quod mutabilia cognoscit immutabiliter; ex quo septimum, quod contingentia cognoscit infallibiliter.
Et ita contingentia, manentia contingentia, sunt divinae sapientiae prorsus infallibilia, tam in contingentibus, quae subiacent naturae, quam libertati voluntatis humanae. — Unde qui vult hoc verum2 intelligere, quomodo simul stet libertas voluntatis creatae cum infallibilitate praedestinationis aeternae, resolvendo ab hoc ultimo procedat per illos septem gradus usque ad primum, quod primum principium perfectissime cognoscit omnia per se ipsum, quod est verum certissimum; ex quo cetera praedicta ratiocinando infallibiliter concluduntur.
Sicut autem divinae cognitionis certitudo simul stat cum contingentia rerum cognitarum, quia simul est simplicissima et perfectissima divina sapientia; sic unitas simul stat cum multiformitate rationum et idearum ex eadem causa. Quia enim perfectissima est, ideo distinctissime3 cognoscit universa et singula et illa omnia distinctissime et perfectissime repraesentat; et ideo singulorum dicitur habere rationes et ideas tanquam rerum similitudines perfectissime expressivas. — Quia vero simplicissima est, ideo omnes similitudines illae sunt unum in ipsa. Unde sicut Deus una virtute omnia producit ex tempore secundum omnimodam rerum integritatem, sic una veritate4 omnia exprimit sempiternaliter. Et sicut una est in Deo altissimo, omnipotente operatio activa secundum rem, dicuntur tamen plures rerum productiones ratione pluralitatis productorum; sic una est veritas unius actus intelligentiae in Deo; dicuntur tamen plures similitudines, ideae et rationes ratione pluralitatis ideatorum vel existentium, vel futurorum, vel possibilium. Hae autem rationes vel ideae, licet sint una veritas et lux et essentia5, non tamen dicuntur esse una ratio vel idea. Ratio enim vel idea dicitur ut ad alterum secundum rationem intelligendi. Nominat enim similitudinem cogniti, quae realiter tenet se ex parte Dei, licet secundum rationem intelligendi dicere videatur aliquid ex parte ideati.
Si autem huius simile in creatura requiratur, dicendum, quod hoc est illius exemplaris proprium; quia, sicut dictum est, simul est simplex et infinitum et perfectissimum, quo praeintellecto, cetera consequenter innotescunt. Quia enim exemplar illud est simplicissimum et perfectissimum, ideo actus purus; quia vero infinitum et immensum, ideo extra omne genus6. Et hinc est, quod existens unum, potest esse similitudo expressiva multorum.
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Chapter VIII. On God's wisdom, predestination, and foreknowledge.
Concerning the wisdom of God these things are to be held: namely, that the divine wisdom itself most clearly knows all things good and evil, past, present, and future, actual and possible, and through this things incomprehensible to us and infinite; yet in such a way that it is in no way diversified in itself, although it obtains diverse names. — For insofar as it is knowing of all possible things, it is called knowledge or cognition; insofar as it is knowing of all things which come to be in the universe, it is called vision; insofar as it is knowing of all things which come to be well, it is called approval; insofar as it is knowing of those things which are future, it is called foreknowledge or foresight; insofar as it is knowing of those things which are to be done by God himself, it is called disposition; insofar as it is knowing of those things which are to be rewarded, it is called predestination; but insofar as it is knowing of those things which are to be damned, it is called reprobation4.
And because it is not only knowing, but is also the ground of knowing, therefore, insofar as it is the ground of knowing all things known, it is called light; insofar as it is the ground of knowing things seen and approved, it is called mirror; insofar as it is the ground of knowing things foreseen and disposed, it is called exemplar; but insofar as it is the ground of knowing things predestined and reprobated, it is called the book of life. — It is therefore the book of life with respect to things as returning; exemplar, as going forth; mirror, as going; but light with respect to all5. — Now to the exemplar pertain idea, word, art, and account: idea, according to the act of foreseeing; word, according to the act of proposing; art, according to the act of carrying through; account, according to the act of perfecting, because it adds the intention of the end. — But because all these are one in God, therefore one is frequently taken for another.
And although the divine wisdom obtains diverse words by reason of the diversity of the things known and connoted, it is nevertheless not diversified according to its intrinsic character. For it knows contingent things infallibly, mutable things immutably, future things presentially, temporal things eternally, dependent things independently, created things uncreatedly, things other than itself in itself and through itself6. — And since it knows contingent things infallibly, the freedom and changeableness of the will stands together with predestination and foreknowledge.
Now the understanding and the reason for the aforesaid is this: since the first principle, by this very fact that it is first and highest, has a cognition at once most simple and most perfect: because most perfect, therefore it knows all things1 most distinctly under all the conditions which things have or can have; and on that account it knows future things to be future, and present things present; and it knows good things as to be approved, and evil things as to be reprobated: hence it is that it obtains diverse words, according to what has been said above.
But because the perfection of wisdom stands together with the highest simplicity, hence it is that it knows all things other than itself in itself and through itself; from which follows the second, that it knows created things uncreatedly; from which follows the third, that it knows dependent things independently; from which arises the fourth, that it knows temporal things eternally; from which the fifth, that it knows future things presentially; from which the sixth, that it knows mutable things immutably; from which the seventh, that it knows contingent things infallibly.
And thus contingent things, remaining contingent, are altogether infallible to the divine wisdom, both in contingents which lie under nature and in those which lie under the freedom of the human will. — Hence he who wishes to understand this truth2 — how the freedom of the created will stands together with the infallibility of eternal predestination — should proceed by resolution from this last through those seven degrees up to the first, namely that the first principle most perfectly knows all things through itself, which is the most certain truth; from which the rest of the aforesaid are infallibly concluded by reasoning.
Now just as the certitude of the divine cognition stands together with the contingency of the things known, because the divine wisdom is at once most simple and most perfect; so unity stands together with the multiformity of the accounts and ideas from the same cause. For because it is most perfect, therefore it knows universals and singulars most distinctly3, and represents all those things most distinctly and most perfectly; and therefore it is said to have the accounts and ideas of individuals as likenesses expressing things most perfectly. — But because it is most simple, therefore all those likenesses are one in it. Hence, just as God produces all things in time by one power according to the entire integrity of things, so by one truth4 he expresses all things everlastingly. And just as in God most high and omnipotent the active operation is one according to the thing itself, yet several productions of things are spoken of by reason of the plurality of things produced; so the truth of the one act of understanding in God is one, yet several likenesses, ideas, and accounts are spoken of by reason of the plurality of things ideated, whether existing, or future, or possible. But these accounts or ideas, although they are one truth and light and essence5, are nevertheless not said to be one account or idea. For account or idea is so called as being toward another according to the character of understanding. For it names the likeness of the thing known, which really stands on the side of God, although according to the character of understanding it seems to say something on the side of the thing ideated.
But if a likeness of this be sought in the creature, it must be said that this is proper to that exemplar; because, as has been said, it is at once simple and infinite and most perfect, and when this is understood beforehand, the rest become known consequently. For because that exemplar is most simple and most perfect, therefore it is pure act; but because it is infinite and immense, therefore it is outside every genus6. And hence it is that, being one, it can be a likeness expressive of many.
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- 4Cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. dub. 3; d. 36. dub. 3. et d. 38-42. — Pro fienda A F facienda.Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 35, dub. 3; d. 36, dub. 3; and dd. 38–42. — For fienda A F have facienda.
- 5Vide IV. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 1-3. De seqq. vide I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 3. seq.; d. 35. q. 1. seqq.; d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. et supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 2. seqq. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1: Ratio respicit finem, idea formam, exemplar efficientem, sapientia cognitionem, sicut ars operationem. Unde in quantum efficiens, scit, qualiter debeat operari; secundum exemplar dicitur sapiens; in quantum vero potest operari, cum vult, dicitur artifex. — Superius post sed est etiam ratio cognoscendi cum plurimis codd. et 2 omisimus omnia. Pro cognita I M O U V substituunt condita. Pro euntium multi codd. entium.See Book IV of the Sentences, d. 43, a. 2, qq. 1–3. On what follows see Book I of the Sentences, d. 27, p. II, q. 3 f.; d. 35, q. 1 ff.; d. 36, a. 2, q. 1; and above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 2 ff. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1: Account regards the end, idea the form, exemplar the efficient cause, wisdom cognition, as art regards operation. Hence insofar as he is efficient, he knows how he ought to operate; according to the exemplar he is called wise; but insofar as he can operate when he wills, he is called artificer. — Above, after sed est etiam ratio cognoscendi, together with very many codices and edition 2, we have omitted omnia. For cognita I M O U V substitute condita. For euntium many codices have entium.
- 6Cfr. I. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1-3. De seq. propositione vide ibid. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1; et d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. — Inferius pro voluntatis A arbitrii, R libertatis, S libertatis vel rationis. Subinde I L V legunt Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est etc.Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 39, a. 2, qq. 1–3. On the following proposition see ibid., d. 38, a. 2, q. 1; and d. 40, a. 2, q. 1. — Below, for voluntatis A has arbitrii, R libertatis, S libertatis vel rationis. Thereupon I L V read Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est, etc.
- 1A addit simul et, B H L O Q S simul. Subinde pro possunt B F H S valent, M valeant, et post hinc est A B E H M S ac 2 addunt igitur.A adds simul et, B H L O Q S simul. Thereupon, for possunt B F H S have valent, M valeant; and after hinc est A B E H M S and edition 2 add igitur.
- 2A hoc ultimum. Inferius vocibus ex quo A B S praefigunt et.A has hoc ultimum. Below, A B S prefix et to the words ex quo.
- 3Edd., excepta 2, addunt et perfectissime.The editions, except 2, add et perfectissime.
- 4Fide plurimorum codd. et 2 substituimus veritate pro virtute, quod contextui repugnat. Cfr. supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 2 et 3; I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. Mox post altissimo ex E H L M S supplevimus omnipotente, quod substituit A pro altissimo. Subinde pro unius B C G H K M O P Q T unus.On the authority of very many codices and edition 2 we have substituted veritate for virtute, which conflicts with the context. Cf. above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, qq. 2 and 3; Book I of the Sentences, d. 35, q. 2. Shortly after altissimo we have supplied omnipotente from E H L M S, which A substitutes for altissimo. Thereupon, for unius B C G H K M O P Q T have unus.
- 5Edd., excepta 2, lux in essentia. Inferius pro dicitur, post quod B H addunt esse, A dicit respectum, et pro ideati M cogitati, B ideati connotati.The editions, except 2, have lux in essentia. Below, for dicitur — after which B H add esse — A has dicit respectum; and for ideati M has cogitati, B ideati connotati.
- 6Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4.Cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 4. ---