Pars 1, Cap. 7
Breviloquium · Pars I: De Trinitate Dei
Capitulum VII. De omnipotentia Dei.
De omnipotentia Dei secundum doctrinam sacram haec tenenda sunt; quod Deus est omnipotens, ita tamen, quod ei non attribuuntur actus culpabiles, utpote mentiri et male velle; nec actus poenales, ut metuere et dolere; nec actus corporales sive materiales, ut dormire et ambulare, nisi forte transsumtive; nec actus inconvenientes, ut posse facere maiorem se, vel alium Deum sibi aequalem, vel infinitum actu, et consimilia: « quia, ut dicit Anselmus6, quodlibet inconveniens, etiam minimum, apud Deum est impossibile ». Licet autem haec non possit, est tamen omnipotens vere, proprie et perfecte:
Intelligentia autem et ratio praedictorum haec est: quia primum principium est potens potentia, quae est potentia simpliciter; et ideo distributio addita ei1 distribuit pro his quae posse est posse simpliciter. Haec autem sunt, quae egrediuntur a potentia completa et ordinata. — Potentiam autem completam dico, quae non potest deficere nec potest succumbere nec potest indigere. Potentia autem in peccando deficit, in patiendo succumbit, in corporalibus actionibus indigentiam includit. Divina vero potentia, quia potentia summa et perfectissima, ideo nec est de nihilo nec est sub aliquo nec eget aliquo alio, ac per hoc nec culpabilia nec poenalia nec materialia potest; et hoc, quia omnipotens est potentia completa.
Potentiam autem ordinatam contingit tripliciter dici: vel2 secundum actum, vel secundum aptitudinem ex parte creaturae, vel secundum aptitudinem ex parte solius virtutis increatae. Quod possibile est potentiae primo modo dictae est non tantum possibile, sed etiam actuale; quod secundo modo et non primo, est possibile simpliciter, licet non actuale; quod autem tertio modo, non primo vel secundo, est possibile Deo, sed impossibile creaturae. Quod autem nullo praedictorum modorum est possibile, sicut illud quod directe repugnat ordini secundum rationes et causas primordiales3 et aeternas, simpliciter est impossibile: sicut quod Deus faciat aliquod actu infinitum, quod simul faciat aliquid esse et nullo modo esse, quod faciat id quod fuit, non fuisse, et cetera talia; quae posse est contra ordinem et complementum divinae potentiae. — Ex his patet, respectu quorum est divina potentia; patet etiam, quae debent dici simpliciter possibilia, et quae simpliciter impossibilia, et quod aliquorum impossibilitas simul stet cum vera omnipotentia.
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Chapter VII. On the omnipotence of God.
Concerning the omnipotence of God, according to sacred doctrine these things are to be held: that God is omnipotent, yet in such a way that there are not attributed to him culpable acts, such as to lie and to will evil; nor penal acts, such as to fear and to grieve; nor corporeal or material acts, such as to sleep and to walk, except perhaps by transferred speech; nor unfitting acts, such as to be able to make something greater than himself, or another God equal to himself, or something actually infinite, and the like: « because, as Anselm says6, anything unfitting, even the least, is impossible with God ». But although he cannot do these things, he is nevertheless omnipotent truly, properly, and perfectly:
Now the understanding and the reason for the aforesaid is this: because the first principle is powerful with a power which is power simply; and therefore the distributive sign added to it1 distributes over those things for which to be able is to be able simply. Now these are the things which issue from a power that is complete and ordered. — And I call that power complete which cannot fail, nor give way, nor be in need. But a power fails in sinning, gives way in suffering, and includes neediness in corporeal actions. But the divine power, because it is the highest and most perfect power, is therefore neither from nothing, nor under anything, nor does it need anything else; and through this it is capable neither of culpable nor of penal nor of material things; and this because the Omnipotent is a complete power.
But an ordered power happens to be spoken of in three ways: either2 according to act, or according to aptitude on the part of the creature, or according to aptitude on the part of the uncreated power alone. What is possible to power taken in the first way is not only possible, but also actual; what is possible in the second way and not the first is possible simply, though not actual; but what is possible in the third way, not in the first or the second, is possible to God, but impossible to the creature. But what is possible in none of the aforesaid ways — as that which directly conflicts with the order according to the primordial3 and eternal reasons and causes — is simply impossible: as that God should make something actually infinite, that he should at once make something to be and in no way to be, that he should make what has been not to have been, and other such things; and to be able for these is against the order and the completeness of the divine power. — From these things it is clear with respect to what the divine power is; it is also clear what things ought to be called simply possible and what simply impossible, and that the impossibility of certain things stands together with true omnipotence.
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- 6Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 20. et de Fide Trin. c. 5. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 52, nota 4. — Vide de his I. Sent. d. 42. (praecipue q. 2.) et d. 43. — Superius pro male velle A malum velle, et pro metuere B tristari. Inferius post hoc [F M V haec] R supplet facere.Book I of Why God Became Man, c. 20, and On the Faith of the Trinity c. 5. Cf. vol. I, p. 52, note 4. — See on these matters Book I of the Sentences, d. 42 (especially q. 2) and d. 43. — Above, for male velle A has malum velle, and for metuere B has tristari. Below, after hoc [F M V haec] R supplies facere.
- 1Scil. signum distributivum omne (cfr. I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. scholion.), quod intrat in nomen omnipotentia. — Inferius post Potentia autem [A D F H Q S Sed potentia] edd., 2 excepta, addunt incompleta.Namely the distributive sign all (cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 4, q. 1, scholion), which enters into the name omnipotence. — Below, after Potentia autem [A D F H Q S Sed potentia] the editions, except 2, add incompleta.
- 2E F H S scilicet vel.E F H S have scilicet vel.
- 3Cfr. II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. in corp., ubi dicitur, quod causae primordiales dicuntur primordiales « per privationem prioris... (et) in quantum respiciunt Deum ut principium primum ». — Plures codd. primordialissimas.Cf. Book II of the Sentences, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, in the body, where it is said that primordial causes are called primordial « through the privation of anything prior… (and) insofar as they regard God as the first principle ». — Very many codices have primordialissimas. ---