Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially ¹–²¹ across the three printed pages (776, 777, 778).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de responsione Magistri, qua dicit: His autem respondemus, duplicem verborum intelligentiam aperientes; unde scilicet veniat duplicitas huius¹: non potest Deus, nisi quod iustum est: quod hoc verbum est potest significare iustitiam, quae est, vel iustitiam, quae esset, si Deus faceret. Hoc enim nihil videtur, quia, si dicatur: iustum est hoc fieri, intelligitur iustum esse ut nunc. Similiter in proposito.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod distinctio Magistri est rationabilis. Ratio autem huius multiplicitatis est, quod hoc verbum est potest dicere praesens ut nunc, vel simpliciter, et ita iustitiam, quae nunc est, vel quae esset, si res fierent². Potest autem multiplicitas assignari a tribus: primo a ratione attributi; sicut enim hoc verbum currit, per se dictum, dicit praesens ut nunc, sed quando additur determinatio, potest stare pro praesenti simpliciter, ut puta si dicatur de equo iacente in stabulo: iste equus bene currit; ita potest esse de hoc verbo est ratione eius quod additur bonum et iustum. Aliter potest assignari a parte ampliationis³ huius verbi potest, quia si ampliatio huius verbi potest totum dictum respiciat, ita quod implicatio cadat sub ampliatione, ita dicit praesens simpliciter. Si autem cadat extra, sic dicit praesens ut nunc; et secundum hoc accipitur duplex sensus, quem Magister assignat. Tertio modo potest assignari ratio a parte eius quod est nisi, quia potest teneri exceptive, vel consecutive⁴. Si exceptive, tunc stat actus sive exceptum pro praesenti ut nunc, et est sensus: non potest Deus, nisi quod iustum est, id est, nihil potest Deus praeter hoc quod est iustum. Vel potest teneri consecutive; et tunc necesse est, quod hoc verbum est teneatur simpliciter, quia regula est, quod termini in conditione⁵ ampliantur ad omne tempus; et tunc est sensus: non potest Deus nisi quod iustum est, id est, nisi sit iustum; et sic ampliatur ibi ad omne tempus. Ex quacunque tamen causa accipiatur locutio, vere multiplex est.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hac expositione Magistri: Poterat per potentiam, non per iustitiam, quia iustitia stat ibi pro voluntate. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nihil potest Deus facere, quod non possit velle: ergo si iustitia Dei est voluntas, omne quod potest simpliciter, potest de iustitia, et e converso. — Item, «possibili posito in esse, non sequitur impossibile»: si ergo Deus poterat per potentiam Loth subvertere sive comburere; ponatur. Tunc quaero: aut hoc fuit iustum, aut non. Si sic: ergo poterat per iustitiam; si non: ergo fecit contra iustitiam, ergo inique; quod est omnino impossibile.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod iustitia non stat ibi pro voluntate divina simpliciter considerata — sic enim poterat velle quod⁶ et poterat facere — sed stat ibi pro voluntate pensante merita et volente retribuere secundum merita. Et quoniam Loth non meruerat submergi cum illis peccatoribus, non poterat iuste submergi, quantum fuit de exigentia meritorum. Nihilominus tamen poterat Deus hoc facere, quia ex hoc laudem suam et Loth utilitatem poterat elicere, cum non sit malum secundum se vere⁷ iustum affligere; potest enim hoc Deus facere ad bonum suum. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicit. Posito enim, quod hoc factum fuerit, ponitur etiam, fuisse iustum quantum ad condecentiam, licet non quantum ad merita. Contra enim exigentiam meritorum Deus potest facere et facit; Ieremiae vigesimo, Glossa: «Quod facere cogitabam propter iustitiam, non feci propter clementiam».

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Hoc verbum debet non proprie convenit Deo, nisi forte dicatur ex promisso. Videtur enim male dicere, quia, sicut qui debet ex commisso obligatur, ne incurrat ingratitudinem, ita qui debet ex promisso, si non reddit, incurrit falsitatem: ergo Deus vere est obligatus⁸: ergo et vere et proprie est debitor.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod debitum ex commisso est debitum proprie, quia praeit voluntatem; velit enim nolit, obligatus est⁹ qui accepit beneficium, si necessario eget beneficio. Debitum autem ex promisso, quod est merae liberalitatis, est debitum, quod sequitur largitatem promittentis; et ideo secundum rem plus habet de ratione gratiae quam debiti; et hoc modo Deus est debitor, primo modo non. Ex sua enim liberalitate promittit, ut alliciat, sed nihil recipit. Unde obsequia nostra non acceptat propter indigentiam; ideo ratio debiti, secundum quod obligationem dicit, proprie in Deo non cadit. Si autem abutamur nomine, ut debitum sonet in condecentiam bonitatis Dei, sic recipitur¹⁰.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod eadem ratione manente, potuit alia facere et ista dimittere. Videtur enim hoc esse falsum, quia Augustinus¹¹ dicit, quod «alia ratione conditus est homo, alia ratione conditus est equus»: ergo alia et alia ratione fiunt opposita: ergo eadem ratione manente, non potuit facere oppositum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister vocat hic rationem voluntatem Dei aequissimam: et sicut dictum est supra¹², quod quia Deus novit omnia, ideo potest scire opposita sine innovatione scientiae, ita etiam et de voluntate. Unde non intelligitur voluntas mutari, quando Deus potest velle quod non vult, sed aliquod volitum ad ipsam comparari ipsa una et eadem et immutabili remanente, sed alio modo comparata sive ad aliud et aliud. Et ita intelligit Magister¹³.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Haec autem quaestio de praescientia facile determinari potest per ea quae superius dicta sunt; per quid determinatur superius dictum? Videtur enim argumentatio necessaria. Si enim «Deus nihil potest operari nisi illud praesciat: et non praescit, nisi quae facit: ergo etc.»

Et dicendum est ad hoc, quod Deus potest praescire plura, quam praescit, sicut potest plura operari. Unde huiusmodi solutio est, quod praescientia Dei potest esse alicuius, cuius non est, et ita Deus potest facere illud; et alicuius non esse, cuius est, et ita Deus potest illud non facere; et nunquam ponitur aliquid facere sine praescientia. Et hoc manifestum est, quod non est necessarium, Deum praescire quod praescit; si enim hoc esset, tunc impossibile esset, Deum aliud facere, quam illud quod facit. Et hic est error manifestus¹⁴.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: An putas, quod non possum rogare Patrem etc. Videtur enim illud non benedictum, quia aut Pater volebat dare, aut non. Si volebat, et Christus non volebat: ergo in voluntate discordabant: si autem nolebat, et Christus poterat petere: ergo poterat a voluntate Patris discordare, ergo peccare: quod est contra veritatem aperte.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Pater volebat dare, et Christus nolebat petere: sed Pater poterat velle, et Christus similiter petere, et ita non discordare. Tunc autem discordantia esset, si Christus posset petere, et Pater non posset velle. Quomodo autem Deus possit aliquid velle, quod non velit, supra habitum est¹⁵.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nunquid dicendum est, non potuit Iudam suscitare in mente? Ex hoc videtur, quod Deus possit salvare Iudam: ergo pari ratione damnare Petrum. Contra: Iustus est, et negare se ipsum non potest¹⁶: ergo hoc facere contra iustitiam. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non potest; contra: posset Deus destruere omnia quae fecit, quod maius est: ergo multo fortius hoc potest.

Respondeo: Aliqui distinguunt hic potentiam Dei dupliciter, dicentes, Deum posse aut de potentia absoluta, et sic potest Iudam salvare et Petrum damnare; aut de potentia ordinata, et sic non potest. — Sed haec distinctio non videtur esse conveniens, quia nihil potest Deus, quod non possit ordinate. Posse enim inordinate facere est non posse, sicut posse peccare et posse mentiri. Unde nec potentia absoluta nec ordinata potest mentiri¹⁷.

Aliter dicunt alii, quod potest salvare Iudam, sed non damnare Petrum, quia misericordia eius super omnia opera eius¹⁸, et misericordia superexaltat iudicium; et salvare Iudam esset superabundantis misericordiae, sed damnare Petrum esset crudelitatis maximae. — Sed tamen cum Deus, summe iustus sit et summe misericors, sicut non potest facere contra misericordiam, sic nec contra iustitiam.

Ideo aliter dicunt alii, quod Deus neutrum potest, et hoc non derogat eius potentiae, quia utrumque esset iniustitia et inordinatio, revocare quem finaliter damnavit, et qui finaliter damnari meruit. Nec est simile de Traiano, quia Deus sic disposuerat ad honorem Sanctorum et suum, aliqua specialia facere; et ideo mors illa Traiani et damnatio, licet secundum causas inferiores finalis videretur, secundum tamen divinam dispositionem et consilium aliter erat¹⁹. — Sed tamen quis hoc audeat dicere, quin Deus de Iuda hoc disponere potuerit, quod disposuit de Traiano? et quin generaliter possit omnibus facere quod probatur fecisse uni? Et iterum, Augustinus²⁰ dicit, quod Deus ipsi diabolo bonam voluntatem posset dare.

Et propter hoc, dicendum, quod quando quaeritur, utrum Deus posset salvare Iudam et damnare Petrum, dicendum, quod aut loqueris salvis meritis, aut non salvis. Si salvis meritis, sic dico, quod non posset. Hoc enim idem est dicere et quaerere, ac si quaereretur, utrum posset iudicare iniuste; quod quidem absque dubio Deus non potest. Si autem intelligatur non salvis meritis, sic absque dubio posset salvare Iudam, auferendo per gratiam peccata et demerita et dando merita. Petro autem non potest dare merita mala; sed tamen sicut liberaliter dedit gratiam et naturam, potest auferre utrumque et alterum tantum; et tunc Petrus posset peccare et Deus aeternaliter punire. Sicut enim Deus liberaliter²¹ dedit bonam voluntatem Petro, ita etiam liberaliter conservat, similiter et naturam. Et sic patent obiecta.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning the Master's response, by which he says: "To these things we reply, opening up a twofold understanding of the words; namely whence the duplicity of this statement comes"¹: "God can do nothing except what is just": that this verb "is" can signify the justice which is, or the justice which would be, if God were to do it. This seems to be nothing, since, if it be said: "it is just that this be done," it is understood to be just as-of-now. Similarly in the matter at hand.

I respond: It must be said that the Master's distinction is reasonable. The reason for this multiplicity is that this verb "is" can speak of the present as-of-now, or in an absolute sense, and thus of the justice which is now, or which would be, if the things were done². The multiplicity, however, can be assigned from three sources: first, from the account of the attribute; for just as this verb "runs," taken by itself, speaks of the present as-of-now, but when a determination is added, it can stand for the present in an absolute sense — as for instance, if it be said of a horse lying in the stable: "this horse runs well"; so it can be with this verb "is" by reason of what is added: "good" and "just." In another way it can be assigned from the side of the amplification³ of this verb "can," since if the amplification of this verb "can" regards the whole statement, in such a way that the implication falls under the amplification, then it speaks the present absolutely. But if it falls outside, then it speaks the present as-of-now; and according to this is taken the twofold sense which the Master assigns. In a third way the reason can be assigned from the side of that which "is" unless, because it can be held exceptively or consecutively⁴. If exceptively, then the act or that-which-is-excepted stands for the present as-of-now, and the sense is: "God cannot do, except what is just," that is, God cannot do anything besides what is just. Or it can be held consecutively; and then it is necessary that this verb "is" be held absolutely, because there is a rule, that terms in a conditional⁵ are amplified to every time; and then the sense is: "God cannot do anything except what is just," that is, unless it be just; and so it is there amplified to every time. From whatever cause, however, the locution be taken, it is truly manifold.

Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked concerning this exposition of the Master: "He was able by power, not by justice," because justice there stands for will. For it seems to speak ill, because nothing can God do, which he cannot will: therefore if God's justice is will, everything which he can do absolutely, he can do of justice, and conversely. — Likewise, "with a possible posited in being, no impossibility follows": if therefore God was able by power to overthrow or burn Lot; let it be posited. Then I ask: either this was just, or not. If so: therefore he was able by justice; if not: therefore he did against justice, therefore unjustly; which is altogether impossible.

I respond: It must be said that "justice" there does not stand for the divine will considered simply — for thus he was able to will what⁶ he was also able to do — but stands there for the will weighing merits and willing to repay according to merits. And since Lot had not merited to be submerged with those sinners, he could not justly be submerged, as far as concerns the exigence of merits. Nonetheless God could do this, because from it he could elicit his own praise and Lot's utility, since it is not evil in itself to afflict one truly⁷ just; for God can do this for his own good. — And by this is plain the response to that which he objects. For granted that this had been done, it is also granted that it was just as to fittingness, although not as to merits. For God can do, and does, contrary to the exigence of merits; Jeremiah twenty, the Gloss: "What I had thought to do by justice, I did not, on account of clemency."

Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: This word "ought" does not properly belong to God, unless perhaps it be said from a promise. For it seems to speak ill, because, just as he who owes from a thing committed is obliged, lest he incur ingratitude, so he who owes from a promise, if he does not render, incurs falsity: therefore God truly is obliged⁸: therefore he is also truly and properly a debtor.

I respond: It must be said that what is owed from a thing committed is properly a debt, because it precedes the will; willy-nilly, he is obliged⁹ who has accepted a benefit, if he necessarily needs the benefit. But what is owed from a promise, which is of pure liberality, is a debt which follows the bounty of the promiser; and therefore in reality it has more of the character of grace than of debt; and in this mode God is a debtor; not in the first mode. For from his liberality he promises, in order to allure, but he receives nothing. Whence our services he does not accept on account of need; therefore the account of debt, according as it bespeaks obligation, does not properly fall in God. But if we misuse the word, so that "debt" may sound for the fittingness of God's goodness, in that sense it is received¹⁰.

Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says, that with the same ratio remaining, he could have done other things and let these go. For it seems this is false, because Augustine¹¹ says that "by one ratio man is made, by another ratio the horse is made": therefore opposites are made by diverse rationes: therefore with the same ratio remaining, he could not have done the opposite.

I respond: It must be said that the Master here calls ratio the most equitable will of God: and just as it has been said above¹², that because God knows all things, he can therefore know opposites without any innovation of his knowledge, so also it is in the matter of his will. Whence the will is not understood to be changed, when God can will what he does not will, but some willed thing is compared to it — itself remaining one and the same and unchangeable — but compared in another way, or to one thing or another. And so the Master understands¹³.

Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: "This question concerning foreknowledge can easily be determined through what has been said above"; by what is what was said above determined? For the argumentation seems necessary. For if "God can effect nothing unless he foreknow it: and he does not foreknow except what he does: therefore etc."

And it must be said to this, that God can foreknow more things than he foreknows, just as he can do more things. Whence such a solution is: that God's foreknowledge can be of something which is not, and so God can do that; and of the non-being of something which is, and so God can not-do that; and never is anything posited as done without foreknowledge. And this is manifest, that it is not necessary that God foreknow what he foreknows; for if this were so, then it would be impossible for God to do anything other than what he does. And here is the manifest error¹⁴.

Doubt VI.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: "Do you think, that I cannot ask the Father" etc. For it seems that this is not blessed, because either the Father willed to give, or not. If he willed, and Christ did not will: therefore they were discordant in will: if however he did not will, and Christ was able to ask: therefore he was able to be discordant with the will of the Father, therefore to sin: which is openly contrary to truth.

I respond: It must be said that the Father willed to give, and Christ was not willing to ask: but the Father could will, and Christ likewise ask, and so not be discordant. Then, however, there would be discordance, if Christ could ask, and the Father could not will. But how God can will something which he does not will, has been treated above¹⁵.

Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: "Are we to say, that he could not raise up Judas in mind"? From this it seems that God can save Judas: therefore by parity of reason damn Peter. On the contrary: "He is just, and cannot deny himself"¹⁶: therefore to do this is against justice. If you say, that he cannot do this, on the contrary: God could destroy all things he made, which is greater: therefore much more easily can he do this.

I respond: Some distinguish here God's power twofold, saying that God can do something either by absolute power, and thus he can save Judas and damn Peter; or by ordained power, and thus he cannot. — But this distinction does not seem fitting, because God can do nothing which he cannot do orderedly. For to be able to do something disorderedly is not to be able, as to be able to sin and to be able to lie. Whence neither absolute nor ordained power can lie¹⁷.

Others say in a different way, that he can save Judas, but not damn Peter, because his mercy is over all his works¹⁸, and mercy exalts itself above judgement; and to save Judas would be of overflowing mercy, but to damn Peter would be of the greatest cruelty. — But still, since God is most just and most merciful, just as he cannot act against mercy, so neither against justice.

Therefore others say still differently, that God can do neither, and this does not derogate from his power, because either would be injustice and disorder, namely, to recall whom he finally damned, and who finally merited to be damned. Nor is it like the case of Trajan, because God had so disposed for the honour of the Saints and his own, to do certain special things; and therefore that death of Trajan and his damnation, although according to inferior causes it would seem final, yet according to divine disposition and counsel it was otherwise¹⁹. — But yet who would dare to say this, but that God could dispose concerning Judas what he disposed concerning Trajan? and but that he could generally do for all what he is proved to have done for one? And again, Augustine²⁰ says, that God could give a good will to the devil himself.

And on account of this, it must be said, that when it is asked whether God could save Judas and damn Peter, it must be said, that either you speak with merits preserved, or not preserved. If with merits preserved, thus I say that he could not. For this is the same as to say and ask whether he could judge unjustly; which without doubt God cannot. But if it be understood without merits being preserved, then without doubt he could save Judas, by removing through grace sins and demerits, and granting merits. To Peter, however, he cannot give evil merits; but yet just as he liberally gave grace and nature, he can take away both, or just the one; and then Peter could sin and God eternally punish. For as God liberally²¹ gave a good will to Peter, so also he liberally preserves it, and likewise nature. And so the objections are plain.

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