Bonaventure

Articulus unicus.

Quaestio IV.

Utrum ratio divinae potentiae se extendat ad infinita.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially `<sup>1</sup>`–`<sup>13</sup>` across the two printed pages (774, 775).

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de infinitate divinae potentiae quantum ad rationem operandi, et quaeritur, utrum ratio operandi¹ se extendat in infinitum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia quidquid Deus potest, rationabiliter potest; sed potest infinita: ergo rationabiliter potest infinita. Et si hoc, ergo ratio operandi ipsius potentiae se extendit ad infinita.

2. Item, sicut se habet ratio sciendi ad scientiam, ita ratio producendi ad potentiam; sed quia divina scientia est infinita, ideo habet in se rationes infinitas cognoscendi²: ergo cum divina potentia sit infinita, similiter et rationes producendi habet infinitas.

3. Item, ratio operandi in Deo non est aliud quam bonitas et sapientia; sed sapientia et bonitas est infinita: ergo et ratio operandi³.

4. Item, ratio operandi in Deo non est aliud quam Deus sive divina essentia, quidquid dicatur⁴ illa ratio; sed divina essentia est infinita: ergo et ratio operandi.

Contra:

1. Potentia se extendit ad opera secundum exigentiam rationis — nihil enim omittit de his quae ratio exigit — si ergo ratio se extendit ad infinita, ergo videtur, quod divina potentia producat infinita, quod falsum est.

2. Item, ratio operandi est ipsa ars et dispositio; sed dispositio non est nisi finitorum: ergo ratio operandi non est nisi finitorum⁵.

3. Item, ratio operandi est ipsa divina iustitia, quia universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas⁶; sed iustitia non est nisi finitorum: ergo videtur, quod ratio operandi similiter.

4. Item, obiicitur de praescientia, quae similiter est ratio operandi et est in plus quam potentia, quia respectu malorum; et tamen non est respectu infinitorum. Si tu dicas, quod dispositio vel praescientia vel iustitia non complectitur plenam rationem, per quam potest operari divina potentia⁷; contra: si non totam complectitur, ergo divina potentia sine his potest rationabiliter operari: ergo possibile est, Deum operari praeter dispositionem, praeter iustitiam et praeter praescientiam. Sed nullus talis operatur sapienter nec recte: ergo etc. Restat igitur, quod totam complectitur rationem.

Conclusio.

Ratio operandi in Deo respectu actus, qui est posse, accipitur in habitu et se extendit ad infinita; respectu actus, qui est facere, accipitur in actu et est finita secundum divinam dispositionem.

Respondeo: Sicut dicit Magister in littera⁸, aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod ratio divinae potentiae est finita. Et ex hoc voluerunt divinam potentiam limitare, tum quia nihil potest facere nisi ex optima p. 775ratione, nec dimittere, tum quia nihil potest facere nisi praesciens, nihil nisi iuste; et ideo cum haec finitorum sint, ut puta eorum quae facit, dixerunt, divinam potentiam non posse alia, quam quae facit. — Sed haec positio est erronea, sicut ostendit Magister in littera, quia nobilitati divinae potentiae derogat eius immensitatem limitando; et dicitur fuisse Magistri Petri Baialardi⁹. Ratio autem huius stultae positionis fuit, quia nescierunt distinguere rationem potentiae nec actus eius. Actus enim potentiae duplex est: unus per modum habitus, scilicet posse, alius per modum actus, scilicet operari.

Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum ratio divinae potentiae sit infinita: dicendum, quod sicut duplex est actus, ita¹⁰ dupliciter potest accipi ratio. Respectu enim actus, qui est posse, accipitur ratio in habitu, scilicet divina scientia et divinae bonitatis condecentia: et haec ratio se extendit ad infinita, quemadmodum et ipsa potentia respectu actus, qui est posse. Respectu vero actus, qui est facere, accipitur ratio in actu, scilicet divina dispositio sive praescientia et meritorum exigentia. Nihil enim facit¹¹, nisi quod disponit; nihil etiam retribuit, nisi secundum quod merita exigunt, quando retribuit; nullam rem gubernat nec regit aliter, quam natura eius sive iustitia naturalis exigat.

Et secundum hanc distinctionem patet responsio ad primo quaesitum et ad rationes inductas; quaedam enim procedunt secundum unam viam, quaedam secundum aliam.

Ad 3. 4. Ad illud quod postea obiicitur de iustitia, dicendum, quod iustitia, secundum quod dicit condecentiam divinae bonitatis et potestatis, sic est generalis ratio, quae complectitur totum posse; sed in quantum connotat exigentiam a parte meritorum, sic non complectitur totum posse nec totum agere; in quantum vero connotat condecentiam bonitatis respectu cuiuslibet temporis¹² in actu, sic complectitur agere, sed posse non. Dispositio similiter et praescientia agere complectuntur, sed non posse; sed agere est respectu finitorum, sicut et illa sunt, sed posse est respectu infinitorum.

Quod ergo obiicitur tunc, quod Deus potest sine eis rationabiliter operari; dicendum, quod falsum est nec sequitur ex illo. Quamvis enim Deus possit plura, quam velit, tamen non potest operari sine voluntate; quoniam nihil potest facere, quin possit velle, sic et praescire et disponere. Necesse est enim, potentiam¹³ exsequentem illis adaequari, scilicet dispositioni et voluntati, sed non oportet de potentia ut potente: ideo non sequitur, quod possit facere sine illis.

Article unique.

Question IV.

Whether the ground of divine power extends to infinite things.

Fourthly and lastly there is asked concerning the infinity of divine power as regards the ground of operating (ratio operandi), and it is asked whether the ground of operating¹ extends to infinity. And that it does, [thus] appears:

1. Because whatever God can [do], he can do reasonably; but he can [do] infinite things: therefore he can reasonably [do] infinite things. And if this [is so], then the ground of operating of his very power extends to infinite things.

2. Likewise, just as the ground of knowing (ratio sciendi) stands to knowledge, so the ground of producing (ratio producendi) [stands] to power; but since the divine knowledge is infinite, it has in itself infinite grounds of knowing²: therefore since the divine power is infinite, likewise it has infinite grounds of producing.

3. Likewise, the ground of operating in God is nothing other than goodness and wisdom; but wisdom and goodness are infinite: therefore the ground of operating also³.

4. Likewise, the ground of operating in God is nothing other than God or the divine essence, whatever that ground be called⁴; but the divine essence is infinite: therefore the ground of operating also [is infinite].

On the contrary:

1. Power extends to works according to the demand of [its] ground — for it omits nothing of those things which [its] ground demands — therefore if its ground extends to infinite things, then it appears that the divine power produces infinite things, which is false.

2. Likewise, the ground of operating is the very art and disposition; but [a] disposition is only of finite things: therefore the ground of operating is only of finite things⁵.

3. Likewise, the ground of operating is the very divine justice, since all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth⁶; but justice is only of finite things: therefore it appears that the ground of operating [is so] likewise.

4. Likewise, an objection is raised from foreknowledge, which is likewise a ground of operating and is of more [things] than power, since [it extends] in respect to evils; and yet it is not in respect to infinite things. If you say that disposition or foreknowledge or justice does not embrace the full ground through which the divine power can operate⁷; on the contrary: if it does not embrace the whole [ground], then the divine power can operate reasonably without these: therefore it is possible that God operate apart from disposition, apart from justice, and apart from foreknowledge. But no such [agent] operates wisely or rightly: therefore etc. It remains, therefore, that [the ratio operandi] embraces the whole ground.

Conclusion.

The ground of operating in God, in respect to the act which is "to be able" (posse), is taken as a habit and extends to infinite things; in respect to the act which is "to make" (facere), it is taken in act and is finite according to the divine disposition.

I respond: As the Master says in the text⁸, some have wished to say that the ground of divine power is finite. And from this they wished to limit divine power, both because [God] cannot make [anything] except from the best p. 775ground, nor leave it aside, and because he cannot make [anything] except foreknowing, [and] nothing except justly; and therefore, since these [grounds] are of finite things, namely of those which he makes, they said that the divine power cannot [do] other things than those it makes. — But this position is erroneous, as the Master shows in the text, because by limiting it, it derogates from the immensity of the nobility of divine power; and it is said to have belonged to Master Peter Abelard⁹. The ground of this foolish position was that they did not know how to distinguish the ground of power from its act. For the act of power is twofold: one through the mode of a habit, namely to be able (posse), the other through the mode of [an] act, namely to operate (operari).

When therefore it is asked whether the ground of divine power is infinite: it must be said that, just as the act is twofold, so¹⁰ the ground can be taken in two ways. For with respect to the act which is to be able, the ground is taken as a habit, namely the divine knowledge and the becomingness of the divine goodness: and this ground extends to infinite things, just as does the power itself with respect to the act which is to be able. But with respect to the act which is to make, the ground is taken in act, namely the divine disposition or foreknowledge and the demand of merits. For he makes nothing¹¹ except what he disposes; nor does he repay anything, except according as merits demand, when he repays; he governs no thing nor rules [it] otherwise than its nature or natural justice demands.

And according to this distinction the response to what was first asked and to the arguments introduced is plain; for some proceed by one way, [and] some by another.

To 3 and 4. To that which is afterwards objected concerning justice, it must be said that justice, insofar as it expresses the becomingness of the divine goodness and power, is in this way a general ground which embraces the whole to-be-able (posse); but insofar as it connotes a demand on the part of merits, in this way it does not embrace the whole to-be-able nor the whole to-act; but insofar as it connotes the becomingness of goodness with respect to any time¹² [whatsoever] in act, in this way it embraces to-act, but to-be-able [it does] not. Likewise disposition and foreknowledge embrace to-act, but not to-be-able; but to-act is in respect to finite things, just as those [merits] are, but to-be-able is in respect to infinite things.

Therefore to what is then objected, that God can operate reasonably without these; it must be said that it is false, nor does it follow from that [premise]. For although God can [do] more things than he wills, nevertheless he cannot operate without willing; since he can do nothing without being able to will, [and] likewise to foreknow and to dispose. For it is necessary that the power¹³ in carrying [the work] out be made equal to those, namely to disposition and to will, but it is not required of the power as "able" [in itself]: therefore it does not follow that he could make [anything] without these.