Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 43

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio III. Utrum divina potentia possit in effectum actu infinitum.

Tertio quaeritur de infinitate divinae potentiae quantum ad opus, utrum videlicet divina potentia possit in effectum actu infinitum. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Potentia se habet proportionaliter ad opus, unde tanta potentia potest in tantum opus: ergo et maior in maius, et infinita actu in infinitum actu.

2. Item, omnis potentia, quae operatur ex se tota, si est infinita, producit infinitum, cum operetur ex tota sua virtute; sed divina potentia, cum sit simplicissima, se tota operatur; ergo videtur, quod producat effectum infinitum. Si tu dicas quod hoc non potest esse propter defectum et limitationem ipsius effectus; contra: frustra est potentia, quae non reducitur ad actum; unde et Philosophus¹ dicit, quod frustra est potentia activa, cui non respondet passiva: ergo aut potentia divina frustra est infinita, aut ei respondet effectus infinitus et potentia passiva infinita.

3. Item, omnis potentia potest se ipsam manifestare, ergo divina potentia, cum sit infinita, potest suam infinitatem manifestare; sed infinitas non manifestatur nisi in effectu infinito: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod manifestatur in productione Filii et Spiritus sancti; tunc obiicitur, quod Spiritus sanctus habet potentiam infinitam: ergo potest ipsam manifestare, sed non in productione personae infinitae: ergo in productione creaturae.

4. Item, omne possibile ponibile in esse; sed Deus potest producere infinita: ergo infinita produci est possibile, ergo ponibile. Sed «possibili posito in esse, nullum accidit inconveniens»²: ergo posito, quod Deus faciat infinita, nullum accidit inconveniens. Sed Deus potest omne illud quod non est inconveniens posse vel facere: ergo Deus potest facere, quod sint infinita actu.

5. Item, appelletur A omne creabile; tunc quaero: A aut est finitum, aut infinitum. Si finitum, et Deus non potest nisi A: ergo non potest nisi finita: ergo potentia eius est finita. Si infinitum, et Deus potest facere A: ergo potest facere aliqua actu infinita.

6. Item, «continuum est divisibile in infinitum»³; quaero, utrum Deus possit reducere potentiam continui ad actum. Si non potest; ergo potentia continui excedit potentiam Dei; quod est absurdum, quia tunc potentia divina esset finita. Si eam potest reducere ad actum omnino; sed hoc non est, nisi cum est actu divisum in partes infinitas: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Quod non possit in effectum intensione infinitum⁴ videtur, quia infinito simpliciter nihil est maius: ergo si producit effectum infinitum, tunc ergo illo nihil est maius: ergo Deus non est maior. Si ergo hoc est summae nobilitatis in Deo, quod nihil possit ei aequari, producere talem effectum est contra nobilitatem divinae potentiae: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne quod est actu infinitum, est summe simplex. Nam si est aliqua compositio, tunc est ibi coarctatio et limitatio. Si ergo Deus producit effectum infinitum, illud est simplicissimum; sed in simplicissimo idem est essentia, bonitas et potentia: ergo si effectus est infinitus in potentia et bonitate, ergo summum bonum, ergo non bonum propter aliud, ergo non bonum propter Deum, ergo nec a Deo, quia «universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus»⁵, et idem est finis, quod et primum

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principium. Ergo si est infinitus, non est a Deo: ergo non est effectus; et sic patet etc.

3. Item, si Deus potest in effectum actu infinitum; quaero a te, utrum possit in aliud. Si non: ergo in agendo amittit potentiam, et sua potentia agendo debilitatur. Si ergo potest in effectum alium consimilem illi, esto quod faciat; ponatur ergo. Isti duo effectus sunt consimiles in natura, ergo sunt in eodem genere: ergo si sunt in eodem genere⁶, tunc habent aliquod in plus, in quo conveniunt, et aliqua propria, per quae differunt; ergo exceduntur ab aliquo, et arctantur per aliquod. Sed omnia talia sunt finita: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod non possit facere infinita actu, ostenditur, quia non sunt plura infinitis: ergo si produceret infinita actu, non posset producere plura: ergo Deus est impotens. Sed nihil potest facere Deum impotentem: ergo etc.

5. Item, ubi est infinitas actualis secundum numerum, ibi deficit status et ordo et distinctio; sed divina sapientia non patitur, Deum aliquid facere sine modo et mensura: ergo etc.⁷

Conclusio.

Potentia divina potest facere infinitum in potentia, sed nullatenus infinitum in actu.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duplex est infinitum, scilicet in actu et in potentia⁸. Infinitum in potentia Deus potest facere et facit; infinitum in actu nec potest facere nec facit. Non potest, inquam, facere, quia nec convenit sibi, nec convenit creaturae.

Sibi non convenit: cum enim summe bonus sit, non potest aliquid facere nisi bonum, et ita non potest facere nisi rem ad se ordinatam. Quoniam igitur ordo praesupponit numerum, et numerus praesupponit mensuram, quia non ordinantur ad aliud nisi numerata, et non numerantur nisi limitata; ideo necesse fuit, Deum facere omnia in numero, pondere et mensura⁹, nec aliter facere potuit nec potest, nec infinitum nec infinita in actu.

Ratio est etiam, quia hoc nullo modo convenit creaturae. Infinitum enim in actu est actus purus¹⁰; alioquin, si aliquid haberet de limitatione et arctatione, esset finitum; sed quod est actus purus, est summum esse per essentiam, et nihil tale accipit esse ab alia essentia nec ex nihilo. Si igitur creatura, eo ipso quod creatura, aliunde est et ex nihilo, nullo modo potest esse actus purus, nullo modo potest esse infinita. — Et si non potest esse una infinita, nullo modo possunt esse infinitae secundum numerum, quia necesse est, illas plures ad aliquam unam creaturam reduci; sed infinita ad finitum reduci, est impossibile: patet ergo etc. Et quod ad aliquod finitum necessario reducantur, patet: quia necesse est ponere ordinationem in creaturis, non tantum ad Deum, sed etiam ad se invicem¹¹.

Summa ergo responsionis est, quia non decet Deum facere creaturam, quin ordinem habeat et mensuram; et ratio est ex parte creaturae, quia necesse est, omnem creaturam esse limitatam, eo quod ex nihilo, et eo ipso quod composita est.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod potentia tanta potest in tantum effectum sive opus; dicendum, quod est opus operans et opus operatum¹²: opus operans, ut creare, opus operatum, ut creatura. Dicendum ergo, quod opus operans est infinitum sicut ipse Creator, sed opus operatum necesse est esse finitum. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod opus proportionatur potentiae; si intelligatur de opere operante sive de actione generaliter, verum est; si autem intelligatur de opere operato, non habet veritatem, nisi cum causa et effectus se habent per univocationem¹³ et sunt unius generis; hoc autem non est hic.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus operatur ex tota potentia; dicendum, quod agens ex tota potentia quoddam agit per naturam, et hoc agit nisi tantum quantum potest, et tantum quantum ipsum est; ubi est productio similis. Quoddam agit per deliberationem et voluntatem, et tale non agit nisi secundum ordinem et quantum vult: unde ex eadem potentia facit magnum et parvum; et sic agit Deus. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod frustra est potentia, quae non reducitur ad actum; verum est de potentia, quae completur in actu; sed divina potentia non completur per actum, et ideo non est frustra, etiamsi non habeat potentiam passivam¹⁴

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correspondentem. Tamen illa propositio intelligitur non habere veritatem in potentia, quae potest¹⁵ infinita, si intelligatur quod omnino reducatur ad actum; reducitur tamen et reduci potest secundum partem; et ideo non est frustra.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divina potentia, cum sit infinita, debet suam infinitatem manifestare in infinito effectu; dicendum, quod Deus suam infinitatem manifestat in infinito secundum potentiam, sicut patet, quia, sicut supra¹⁶ monstratum est, interminabilis duratio manifestat virtutem infinitam. In infinito autem secundum actum non potest manifestari simpliciter, quia non decet, sed proportionaliter, quia ens in infinitum excedit non-ens; et tamen Deus ex nihilo facit ens, inter quae est distantia infinita¹⁷.

Unde cum divina potentia dicatur infinita tripliciter: durationis aeternitate¹⁸, virtutis immensitate et effectuum generalitate sive numerositate, prima manifestatur per infinitum duratione, quod est finitum actu, infinitum in potentia; secunda per creationem de nihilo, ubi est distantia infinita propter omnimodam improportionem; tertia manifestatur partim per positionem¹⁹, partim per privationem, quia tot fecit et adhuc potest in plura, et non tot fecit, quin adhuc possit in plura; tamen hoc manifestatur alia infinitate duplici manifesta. Et ita patet, quod non oportet, quod sit infinitum actu.

Potest tamen dici, sicut tactum est, quod virtus Patris manifestatur in productione Verbi, et per consequens tota virtus divina, cum virtus Filii et Spiritus sancti sit una, et aequales sint in virtute.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de possibili²⁰, quod potest poni; dicendum, quod est possibile a potentia infinita, et possibile secundum potentiam finitam. Possibile secundum potentiam finitam potest poni, quia omnino potest esse ad actum reducta²¹; sed possibile secundum potentiam infinitam non potest poni, quia semper est in reducendo, et nunquam in reductum esse.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod A appelletur omne creabile; esto²². Quod quaerit, utrum A sit finitum, vel infinitum; dico, quod infinitum, sed non est infinitum actu, sed potentia; et ideo non sequitur, quod si Deus possit A, quod possit in actu infinitum. Et si dicatur: ponatur, quod Deus faciat A; dicendum, quod non est ponibile, ratione praedicta.

6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum possit potentiam continui reducere ad actum; dicendum, quod sicut potentia in continuo passiva infinita est ad divisionem, sic in Deo activa infinita. Unde sicut continuum potest dividi in infinitum, tamen impossibile est, quod totaliter sit divisum, alioquin non esset infinitum; sic dividere in infinitum est possibile, ad actum reducere²³; sed sicut impossibile est divinam potentiam terminari, ita impossibile est, quod sit in termino divisionis. Unde Deus potest potentiam continui reducere ad actum, quia potest esse in reducendo²⁴ et semper in reducendo, ita quod nunquam plus se extendat potentia quam divina actio: sed tamen continuum nunquam potest esse in reductum esse, sicut nec Deus in reduxisse.

Concedendum ergo, quod impossibile est, esse aliquid actu infinitum nisi solum Deum et eius potentiam. Et hoc est quod dicit Hugo de sancto Victore²⁵: «Sicut aeternitatem Dei non aequat tempus, nec immensitatem locus; sic nec sapientiam sensus, nec bonitatem virtus, nec potentiam opus». Unde quando dicitur, quod Deus potest facere infinita, notatur infinitas circa potentiam²⁶, non circa opus. Unde aliqui distinxerunt hanc: continuum potest dividi in infinitum, quia illa determinatio²⁷ potest determinare hoc verbum potest, vel hoc verbum dividi. Tamen quocumque modo distinguatur, semper intelligendum est, infinitatem actualem esse proprium solius Dei.

Scholion

I. Apud omnes constat, non posse creari infinitum secundum essentiam. Quod autem infinitum in aliquo genere, sive secundum quantitatem vel continuam (magnitudinem) vel discretam (numerum), sive secundum intensionem, sive secundum durationem creari possit, Nominales ut probabile propugnare volebant, quibus quoad durationem etiam quidam ex schola S. Thomae et Scoti assentiebantur. Sed S. Bonaventura cum magis probatis Scholasticis multis rationibus contrariam sententiam invicte comprobat. — Responsio et solut. ad 2. 3. 4. plura attentione digna continet.

II. S. Thom., S. I. q. 7. a. 3; de Verit. q. 2. a. 10. B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., I. q. 1. n. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. 6. B. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q. 8. a. 38. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. in fine, et d. 11. q. 1. in fine; II. Sent. d. 1. q. 3.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether the divine power extends to an actually infinite effect.

Thirdly, inquiry is made concerning the infinity of the divine power with regard to its work — namely, whether the divine power extends to an actually infinite effect. And that it does is shown as follows.

1. Power stands proportionate to its work, so that so great a power extends to so great a work: therefore a greater power to a greater, and an actually infinite power to an actually infinite work.

2. Likewise, every power that operates from its whole self, if it is infinite, produces an infinite, since it operates from its whole virtue; but the divine power, being most simple, operates entirely from itself: therefore it seems that it produces an infinite effect. If you say that this cannot be because of the defect and limitation of the effect itself; on the contrary: a power is in vain that is not reduced to act; whence also the Philosopher¹ says that an active power to which no passive corresponds is in vain: therefore either the divine power is in vain infinite, or there corresponds to it an infinite effect and an infinite passive power.

3. Likewise, every power can manifest itself; therefore the divine power, since it is infinite, can manifest its own infinity; but infinity is not manifested except in an infinite effect: therefore etc. If you say that it is manifested in the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, then it is objected that the Holy Spirit has an infinite power: therefore it can manifest the same, but not in the production of an infinite person: therefore in the production of a creature.

4. Likewise, every possible is positable into being; but God can produce infinites: therefore that infinites be produced is possible, and therefore positable. But «when the possible is posited in being, nothing inconvenient follows»²: therefore, supposing that God should make infinites, nothing inconvenient follows. But God can do everything that it is not inconvenient to be able to do or to make: therefore God can make there be actually infinite things.

5. Likewise, let A be called every creatable thing; then I ask: A is either finite or infinite. If finite, and God can do nothing except A: therefore He can do nothing but finite things: therefore His power is finite. If infinite, and God can make A: therefore He can make some actually infinite things.

6. Likewise, «the continuum is divisible to infinity»³; I ask whether God can reduce the potency of the continuum to act. If He cannot, then the potency of the continuum exceeds God's power, which is absurd, since then the divine power would be finite. If He can reduce it to act altogether — but this is not the case unless it be actually divided into infinite parts: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. That He cannot effect a thing infinite in intensity⁴ is shown thus, since nothing is greater than the absolutely infinite: therefore if He produces an infinite effect, then nothing is greater than that effect: therefore God is not greater. If, then, it pertains to the highest nobility in God that nothing can be equated with Him, to produce such an effect is against the nobility of the divine power: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything that is actually infinite is supremely simple. For if there is any composition, then there is contraction and limitation in it. If, therefore, God produces an infinite effect, that effect is most simple; but in what is most simple, essence, goodness, and power are the same: therefore if the effect is infinite in power and goodness, then it is the highest good, therefore not good on account of another, therefore not good on account of God, therefore neither from God, since «the Lord has wrought all things for Himself»⁵, and the end is the same as the first

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principle. Therefore if it is infinite, it is not from God: therefore it is not an effect; and thus it is plain etc.

3. Likewise, if God can extend to an actually infinite effect, I ask you whether He can extend to another. If not, then in acting He loses power, and His power is weakened by acting. If, therefore, He can extend to another effect like that one, suppose that He should make it; let it be supposed, then. These two effects are similar in nature, therefore they are in the same genus: therefore if they are in the same genus⁶, then they have something further in which they agree, and certain things proper to each in which they differ; therefore they are exceeded by something, and contracted by something. But all such things are finite: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that He cannot make actually infinite things is shown thus, since there is nothing more than the infinite: therefore if He produced actually infinite things, He could not produce more: therefore God is impotent. But nothing can make God impotent: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, where there is actual infinity according to number, there fails standing and order and distinction; but the divine wisdom does not suffer that God should make anything without measure and mode: therefore etc.⁷

Conclusion.

The divine power can make an infinite in potency, but in no way an infinite in act.

I respond: It must be said that the infinite is twofold, namely in act and in potency⁸. An infinite in potency God can make and does make; an infinite in act He neither can make nor does make. He cannot, I say, make one, because it is fitting neither to Himself nor to the creature.

To Himself it is not fitting: for since He is supremely good, He cannot make anything except what is good, and so He cannot make anything except a thing ordered to Himself. Since, therefore, order presupposes number, and number presupposes measure — because things are not ordered to anything except as numbered, and they are not numbered unless limited — therefore it was necessary that God should make all things in number, weight, and measure⁹, nor could He nor can He make them otherwise, neither an infinite nor actually infinite things.

The reason is also that this is in no way fitting to a creature. For the actually infinite is pure act¹⁰; otherwise, if it had anything of limitation and contraction, it would be finite; but what is pure act is the highest being by essence, and nothing such receives being from another essence nor from nothing. If, therefore, a creature, by the very fact that it is a creature, is from elsewhere and from nothing, in no way can it be pure act, in no way can it be infinite. — And if one infinite thing cannot exist, in no way can infinites exist according to number, since it is necessary that those several be reduced to some one creature; but for infinites to be reduced to a finite is impossible: therefore it is plain etc. And that they are necessarily reduced to some finite is plain: since it is necessary to posit an ordering in creatures, not only toward God but also toward one another¹¹.

The sum, therefore, of the answer is, that it does not become God to make a creature without order and measure; and the reason is on the side of the creature, since it is necessary that every creature be limited, by virtue of being from nothing and by the very fact that it is composite.

To the arguments:

1. To that which is objected, that so great a power extends to so great an effect or work: it must be said that there is work-as-operating and work-as-operated¹²: work-as-operating, as creating; work-as-operated, as the creature. It must be said, then, that the work-as-operating is infinite, as the Creator Himself, but the work-as-operated must of necessity be finite. As to what is objected, that the work is proportioned to the power: if this be understood of the work-as-operating or of action in general, it is true; but if it be understood of the work-as-operated, it does not hold, except when cause and effect stand toward one another by univocation¹³ and are of one genus; but that is not the case here.

2. To that which is objected, that God operates from His whole power: it must be said that an agent acting from its whole power either acts by nature, and this acts only as much as it can and as much as it itself is — where the production is of like to like; or it acts by deliberation and will, and such an agent acts only according to order and as much as it wills: whence from the same power it makes a great thing and a small thing; and so God acts. — To that which is objected, that a power that is not reduced to act is in vain: this is true of a power which is completed in act; but the divine power is not completed by act, and therefore is not in vain, even if it has no corresponding passive¹⁴

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power. Yet that proposition is understood not to hold true of a power that extends to¹⁵ infinites, if it be understood that it should be wholly reduced to act; it is nevertheless reduced, and can be reduced, in part; and therefore it is not in vain.

3. To that which is objected, that the divine power, since it is infinite, ought to manifest its own infinity in an infinite effect: it must be said that God manifests His infinity in an infinite according to power, as is plain, since, as has been shown above¹⁶, an interminable duration manifests an infinite virtue. In an infinite according to act, however, it cannot be manifested simpliciter, because it is not becoming, but only proportionally, since being exceeds non-being to infinity; and yet God makes being out of nothing, between which there is infinite distance¹⁷.

Whence since the divine power is called infinite in three ways: by the eternity of its duration¹⁸, by the immensity of its virtue, and by the generality or numerosity of its effects — the first is manifested through what is infinite in duration, which is finite in act, infinite in potency; the second through creation from nothing, where there is infinite distance because of complete disproportion; the third is manifested partly by position¹⁹, partly by privation, since He has made so many and can still extend to more, and He has not made so many that He could not still extend to more; yet this is manifested by another infinity, by the twofold manifest infinity. And thus it is plain that it is not necessary that there be an actual infinite.

It can nevertheless be said, as has been touched on, that the virtue of the Father is manifested in the production of the Word, and consequently the whole divine virtue, since the virtue of the Son and the Holy Spirit is one, and they are equal in virtue.

4. To that which is objected concerning the possible²⁰, that it can be posited: it must be said that there is what is possible from an infinite power, and what is possible according to a finite power. That which is possible according to a finite power can be posited, since it can altogether be reduced to act²¹; but that which is possible according to an infinite power cannot be posited, since it is always in being reduced and never in having-been-reduced.

5. To that which is objected, that A be called every creatable thing: granted²². As to what it asks, whether A is finite or infinite, I say that it is infinite, but not actually infinite — only potentially; and therefore it does not follow that if God extends to A, He extends to the actually infinite. And if it be said: let it be supposed that God should make A — it must be said that it is not positable, for the reason already given.

6. To that which is asked, whether He can reduce the potency of the continuum to act: it must be said that just as in the continuum the passive potency is infinite with respect to division, so in God the active is infinite. Whence just as the continuum can be divided to infinity, yet it is impossible that it be totally divided, otherwise it would not be infinite; so to divide to infinity is possible, but to reduce to act²³ [is not]; but as it is impossible that the divine power be terminated, so it is impossible that it be at the term of division. Whence God can reduce the potency of the continuum to act, since He can be in reducing²⁴ and always in reducing, such that the power never extends itself more than the divine action: but yet the continuum can never be in having-been-reduced, just as neither can God be in having-reduced.

It must be granted, therefore, that it is impossible that anything be actually infinite save only God and His power. And this is what Hugh of St. Victor says²⁵: «As time does not equal the eternity of God, nor place His immensity, so neither does sense equal His wisdom, nor virtue His goodness, nor work His power». Whence when it is said that God can make infinites, infinity is noted with respect to the power²⁶, not with respect to the work. Whence some have distinguished thus: the continuum can be divided to infinity, since that determination²⁷ can determine either the verb can, or the verb be-divided. Yet in whatever way it be distinguished, it must always be understood that actual infinity is proper to God alone.

Scholion

I. It stands agreed among all that what is infinite according to essence cannot be created. But whether what is infinite in some genus — whether according to quantity, either continuous (magnitude) or discrete (number), or according to intensity, or according to duration — can be created, the Nominalists wished to defend as probable; to whom, as regards duration, even certain from the school of St. Thomas and Scotus assented. But St. Bonaventure, with the more approved Scholastics, by many reasons invincibly proves the contrary sentence. — The response and solutions to objections 2, 3, 4 contain much worthy of attention.

II. St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 7, a. 3; de Veritate q. 2, a. 10. B. Albert, on this and the following question, here art. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, I, q. 1, n. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1, n. 6, B. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following question, q. 8, art. 38, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 2. — Biel, here, q. in fine, and d. 11, q. 1 in fine; II Sent. d. 1, q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus

Propositiones istae: frustra est potentia, quae non reducitur ad actum, et: frustra est potentia activa, cui non respondet passiva, fundantur in definitionibus, quas Aristot. praebet tum de frustra, tum de potentia activa et passiva. Frustra et vanum Philosophus, libr. II. Phys. text. 62. (c. 6.) docet esse id quod ordinatum est ad aliquem finem, quem non consequitur. Et 1. de Caelo et Mundo, text. 32. (c. 1.), ubi tractat de corporibus in movendo se invicem impedientibus, quae frustra esse docet, adiungit: «frustra enim calceamentum hoc dicimus, cuius non est calceatio», sive ut in ed. Firmin-Didot legitur: «frustra enim calceum eum dicimus esse, cuius usus non est». Quod autem ad potentiam activam et potentiam passivam attinet, sic eas definit V. Metaph. text. 17. (IV. c. 12.), et IX. text. 2. (VIII. c. 1.), ut in definitione unius inclusa sit definitio alterius. Cfr. supra pag. 757, nota 6.
These propositions — a power that is not reduced to act is in vain, and an active power to which no passive corresponds is in vain — are grounded in the definitions which Aristotle gives both of "in-vain" and of active and passive power. The Philosopher teaches in Phys. II, text 62 (c. 6) that "in vain" and "vain" denote that which is ordered to some end which it does not attain. And in de Caelo et Mundo I, text 32 (c. 1), where he treats of bodies mutually impeding each other in motion, which he calls to be in vain, he adds: «for we call a shoe in vain when there is no putting-on of it», or as the Firmin-Didot edition reads: «we call that shoe in vain whose use there is none». As regards active power and passive power, he so defines them in Metaph. V, text 17 (IV c. 12) and IX, text 2 (VIII c. 1) that the definition of one is included in the definition of the other. Cf. above p. 757, note 6.
Cfr. supra pag. 674, nota 5. Pro sed possibili posito Vat. perperam sed ponibili posito. Quoad primam huius argumenti propositionem lectorem revocamus ad illud Aristot., Rhetor. ad Alexandrum, c. 1: Possibilia sunt omnia, quaecumque fieri possunt.
Cf. above p. 674, note 5. For sed possibili posito the Vatican edition wrongly reads sed ponibili posito. As to the first proposition of this argument, we refer the reader to that of Aristotle, Rhetoric to Alexander, c. 1: «Possible are all things, whatsoever can come to be».
Aristot., III. Phys. text. 1. et 69. (c. 1. et 7.), VI. text. 10. (c. 2.), et 1. de Caelo et Mundo, text. 2. Idem docet August., II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 8, et XI. de Trin. c. 10, n. 17.
Aristotle, Physics III, text 1 and 69 (c. 1 and 7), VI, text 10 (c. 2), and de Caelo et Mundo I, text 2. Augustine teaches the same, de Genesi ad litteram II, c. 4, n. 8, and de Trinitate XI, c. 10, n. 17.
Intellige effectum infinitae perfectionis; unde intensione infinitum pertinet ad infinitum secundum essentiam. — De propositione immediate subsequenti: idem est principium et finis etc. cfr. Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 37. (XI. c. 7.), — Pro quod et primum principium cod. V quod est primum et principium.
Understand an effect of infinite perfection; whence infinite in intensity pertains to the infinite according to essence. — On the proposition immediately following, the same is principle and end etc., cf. Aristotle, Metaph. XII, text 37 (XI c. 7). — For quod et primum principium codex V reads quod est primum et principium.
Prov. 16, 4.
Proverbs 16:4.
Vat. praetermittit propositionem ergo si sunt in eodem genere (homoeoteleuton), et dein pro in plus (cfr. supra pag. 348, nota 8.) substituit superius. Aliquanto superius pro Si ergo potest ed. 1 Si vero potest, et mox post consimilem illi cod. V subiicit effectui.
The Vatican edition omits the proposition therefore if they are in the same genus (by homoeoteleuton), and then for in plus (cf. above p. 348, note 8) substitutes superius. Somewhat earlier, for Si ergo potest the first edition reads Si vero potest, and just after consimilem illi codex V appends effectui.
Codd. VXY et ed. 1 esset.
Codices VXY and the first edition read esset.
Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 41. (c. 5.).
Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, text 41 (c. 5).
Sap. 11, 21: Sed omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti. — Cfr. etiam supra d. 19. p. II. q. 4, et d. 20. a. 2. q. 1.
Wisdom 11:21: «But thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight». — Cf. also above d. 19, p. II, q. 4, and d. 20, a. 2, q. 1.
Aristot., III. Phys. text. 56. (c. 6.).
Aristotle, Physics III, text 56 (c. 6). (On actus purus and the contracted-vs-pure-act distinction.)
Cod. T nec.
Codex T reads nec. (Variant in the passage on ordering creatures ad se invicem.)
Locutio opus operans et opus operatum significat hic ipsam agentis actionem et effectum actionis.
The expression work-as-operating and work-as-operated signifies here the very action of the agent and the effect of the action.
Sive sunt univoca. Etenim causa univoca est illa quae producit effectum sibi in specie similem; cui opponitur causa aequivoca. — Paulo superius Vat. verbis si intelligatur de opere operante praemittit respondeo, et in fine solutionis pro unius generis cum cod. cc ponit eiusdem generis.
Or such as are univocal. For a univocal cause is one which produces an effect like itself in species; to which an equivocal cause is opposed. — A little earlier the Vatican edition, before the words si intelligatur de opere operante, prefixes respondeo, and at the end of the solution, in place of unius generis, with codex cc reads eiusdem generis.
Cfr. Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 82. (XI. c. 10.). — Paulo superius Vat. cum cod. cc omittit necessario, et paulo inferius loco responsionis exhibet rationis.
Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. XII, text 82 (XI c. 10). — A little earlier the Vatican edition with codex cc omits necessario, and a little below, instead of responsionis presents rationis.
Ed. 1 addit et perficitur. Subinde pro in actu Vat. cum cod. cc per actum.
The first edition adds et perficitur. Then, for in actu the Vatican edition with codex cc reads per actum.
Cod. A hic interiicit in, codd. LO esse, Vat. cum cod. cc habere.
Codex A here interpolates in, codices LO esse, the Vatican edition with codex cc habere.
Hic q. 1.
Here, q. 1.
Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 1.
Cf. above q. 1, ad 1.
Pro aeternitate non pauci codd. interminabilitate. Paulo ante Vat. cum cod. cc voci tripliciter praefigit hoc est.
For aeternitate not a few codices read interminabilitate. A little earlier, the Vatican edition with codex cc prefixes to the word tripliciter the phrase hoc est.
Pro positionem Vat. cum cod. cc potentiam. Mox pro quia tot fecit codd. GKSTVXYZ etc. quia tot facit, et similiter pro et non tot fecit cod. W et non tot facit. Paulo post pro tamen hoc cod. V tamen haec. In fine propositionis loco manifestata, ut in Vat. legitur, auctoritate codd. A H T cc ee posuimus manifesta.
For positionem the Vatican edition with codex cc reads potentiam. Next, for quia tot fecit codices GKSTVXYZ etc. read quia tot facit, and similarly for et non tot fecit codex W reads et non tot facit. A little later, for tamen hoc codex V reads tamen haec. At the end of the proposition, in place of manifestata, as the Vatican edition reads, on the authority of codices A, H, T, cc, ee we have placed manifesta.
In argumento 3. ad opposit.
In the third argument ad oppositum.
Vat. reductum. Lectio nostra, pro qua multi militant codd., confirmatur et explicatur lectione cod. V: quia omnino potest illa potentia esse ad actum reducta.
The Vatican edition reads reductum. Our reading, in favor of which many codices fight, is confirmed and explained by the reading of codex V: quia omnino potest illa potentia esse ad actum reducta.
Pro esto Vat. et, et paulo ante quod ponitur pro quod obiicitur.
For esto the Vatican edition reads et, and a little earlier quod ponitur in place of quod obiicitur.
Sensus est: Sicut continuum potest dividi in infinitum potentia, sic actio dividendi, si exerceretur, semper foret in dividendo. — Vat., paucis faventibus codd., sic: dividere in infinitum est possibile, ad actum reducere impossibile. Et sicut impossibile est etc., lectio non falsa. — Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 59. seq. et 69. (c. 6. seq.).
The sense is: As the continuum can be divided to infinity in potency, so the action of dividing, if it were exercised, would always be in dividing. — The Vatican edition, with few codices supporting, reads thus: to divide to infinity is possible, but to reduce to act is impossible. And as it is impossible etc. — a reading not false. — Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, text 59 seq. and 69 (c. 6 seq.).
Accipias in reducendo in sensu passivo et referas ad potentiam continui, ut sensus sit: quia potentia continui potest esse in reduci. — Verba et semper in reducendo desiderantur in cod. T.
Take in reducendo in a passive sense and refer it to the potency of the continuum, so that the sense is: that the potency of the continuum can be in being-reduced. — The words et semper in reducendo are wanting in codex T.
Libr. I. de Sacram. p. II. c. 22, ubi in textu originali post sapientiam adiicitur eius. Paulo ante pro esse aliquid, quam lectionem ex cod. X restituimus, Vat. incongrue quod sit aliquid.
De Sacramentis, book I, p. II, c. 22, where in the original text after sapientiam is added eius. A little earlier, for esse aliquid — the reading which we have restored from codex X — the Vatican edition incongruously reads quod sit aliquid.
Id est: in infinitum. — Paulo inferius post potest cod. V hic bene addit et sic concedebant, ac dein post dividi aeque bene subiicit et sic negabant.
That is: to infinity. — A little below, after potest, codex V here rightly adds et sic concedebant, and then after dividi equally rightly subjoins et sic negabant.

← Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 2 Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 4→