Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 13
Quaestio II. Utrum in Christo sit gratia finita, vel immensa.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum in Christo sit gratia finita, vel immensa. Et quod in Christo fuerit gratia sine mensura, videtur sic:
1. Ioannis tertiop278-1: Non ad mensuram dat Deus spiritum; et Augustinus dicit, quod illi homini datus est Spiritus non ad mensuram; sed quod caret mensura est immensum et infinitum: ergo etc.
2. Item, Magister in litterap278-2: «Sane dici po- p. 279 test, ipsum tantam gratiae accepisse plenitudinem, ut ei conferre Deus plenius non potuerit»; sed omni finito potest Deus aliquid maius facere: ergo videtur, quod ille acceperit gratiam infinitam.
3. Item, tanta est gratia, quantum est meritum procedens ex ipsa; sed meritum Christi fuit infinitum, quia nullatenus potest exhauriri, et suffecisset infinitis millibus hominum, sicut dicit Anselmusp279-1: ergo gratia, per quam meruit, videtur habere immensitatem.
4. Item, finitum non excedit aliud finitum in infinitum in eodem genere: si ergo gratia Christi est finita, ergo proportionaliter excedit gratias aliorum hominum: ergo si alii homines possentp279-2 continue proficere, videtur, quod Christo possent adaequari per gratiam et ipsum excedere. Quodsi nullus unquam ad perfectionem eius potest attingere, quantumcumque proficiat; videtur, quod eius gratia sit immensa.
5. Item, tanta est gratia disponens, quantum est, illud ad quod disponit secundum rectam habitudinem et proportionem; sed gratia illius hominis disposuit ipsum ad hoc, quod esset Deusp279-3; gratiae aliorum hominum disponunt ad hoc, quod fruantur Deo: si ergo esse Deum est bonum infinitum, et maius in infinitum esse Deum quam habere Deum; videtur, quod gratia illius hominis sit infinita in se et quod omnes gratias in infinitum excedat.
6. Item, anima Christi aut potest ampliorem gratiam desiderare, aut non. Si potest desiderare ampliorem gratiam: ergo videtur, quod non sit perfecta, cum ei possit fieri additiop279-4. Si non potest: cum ergo omni finito possit aliquid maius desiderari, videtur, quod eius gratia sit immensa.
Sed contra: 1. Omne creatum habet certum pondus, numerum et mensuram, secundum illud quod dicitur Sapientiae undecimop279-5; sed gratia illius hominis, scilicet Christi, est creata: ergo etc.
2. Item, quamvis gratia non semper respondeat naturalibus per aequalitatem, respondet tamen secundum debitam proportionem, ubi non est defectus a parte suscipientisp279-6; sed naturalia Christi non sunt infinita nec excedunt in infinitum naturalia cuiuslibet hominis: ergo nec gratuita.
3. Item, infinitas in creatura tollit bonum et perfectionem, quia quod est infinitum caret fine et terminop279-7, ergo bonitate et complemento; sed gratia Christi haec duo praecipue habuit: ergo videtur, quod conditio finitatis ei praecipue competat.
4. Item, infinito nihil maius estp279-8: ergo si gratia Christi, secundum quod homo, esset infinita; ergo gratia increata non esset maior illa: ergo Creator et creatura aequarentur in nobilitate et excellentia; quodsi hoc est impossibile, restat etc.
Conclusio.
Gratia Christi, secundum quod homo, in se considerata est finita; tamen in comparatione ad gratias aliorum hominum excedit in infinitum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquid mensura carere sive immensum esse dupliciter est: vel absolute in se, vel in comparatione. Si igitur loquamur de gratia Christo collata, secundum quod est singularis persona, in se; sic, cum dicat donum creatum, necessario finitum est et mensuratum. Finitas enim et mensuratio circa creaturam potius dicit complementum quam imperfectionemp279-9. — Si autem loquamur de ipsa in comparatione ad gratias aliorum hominum; sic improportionabiliter excedit ratione unionis ad personam Verbi, ad quam unionem gratia illa disposuit animam Christi. Gratia enim illa propter coniunctionem summam cum Verbo aeterno habet excedere in infinitum, id est incommensurabiliter, gratias aliorum hominum tripliciter, scilicet quantum ad virtutum habitus et quantum ad usus et quantum ad effectus. Quantum ad habitus: nunquam enim aliqua creatura potest tantum proficere, quod tam nobilis et perfecti habitus sit capax, sicut anima coniuncta Deo in unitate personae. — Quantum ad usus virtutum: quia omnes virtutes in Christo habuerunt usus suos, qui spectant ad perfectionem; et propterea dicuntur fuisse in eo omnes sensusp279-10, quia usum habuit completum omnium donorum excellentiori modo, quam unquam ad hoc pertingi possit ab aliquo. — Quantum ad effectum similiter improportionabiliter excedit gratia Christi; quia propter hoc, quod ille homo erat Dei Filius, meritum illius pensatur secundum dignitatem illius personae, a qua exit opus; et propterea meritum passionis suae in infinitum excedit merita passionum nostrarum; et ob hoc, quod Deus erat, mors eius pensata fuit a Deo, quantus erat ille qui moriebatur. Et ideo quantum ad sufficientiam, si infinita millia hominum essent reatu originalis astricta, per illius passionis effectum potuissent esse liberata. p. 280 Concedendum est igitur, quod gratia Christi, secundum quod homo, est finita et mensurata, quia creata est in numero, pondere et mensura. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad partem istam.
1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur primo, quod datus est Christo spiritus non ad mensuram; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de datione aeterna, vel de datione per idiomatum communicationem, tunc privatur ibi mensura simpliciter. Si autem per spiritum datum intelligamus ipsam donationem donorum Spiritus sancti, sic non privatur ibi mensura simpliciter, sed commensuratio respectu nostri, quibus datur Spiritus sanctus ad usus aliquorum donorum determinate secundum spiritus distributionem, quemadmodum dicitur primae ad Corinthios duodecimop280-1: Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae etc. Sed Christo omnia data sunt illa dona sine aliqua arctatione; et pro tanto dicitur ei dedisse spiritum sine mensura.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non potuit dare plenius; dicendum, quod Deus non posse aliquid maius facerep280-2, hoc potest intelligi triplici ex causa: quoniam aut est ratio ex parte Dei operantis, aut ex parte producti, aut certe propter limitationem suscipientis. Cum ergo dicitur, quod non potuit plenius conferre, hoc non est intelligendum propter immensitatem rei collatae, vel finitatem divinae potentiae, sed propter limitationem potentiae susceptivae, quia, cum sit creata, est capacitatis finitae et non potest nisi finitum susciperep280-3. Et si tu obiicias, quod potuit dare capacitatem maiorem; dicendum, quod necesse est, quod creatura, eo ipso quod creatura est, habeat capacitatem finitam; et rursus, quia creatura est in tali specie vel genere, limitationem habet, ultra quam genus illud vel species se non potest extendere. Et sic in proposito intelligendum est.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod meritum Christi est infinitum; dicendum, quod infinitas meriti consurgit ex unione illius animae ad personam divinam — ob quam unionem non tantum homo, sed etiam Deus mori dicitur — propter quod meritum illud est infinitum, non ratione gratiae creatae in se, sed ratione infinitae dignitatis personae. Unde et hoc vult Anselmusp280-4 dicere, cum dicit, quod oportuerit illum qui satisfacere posset, esse Deum et hominem.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finitum non excedit aliud finitum nisi finite; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, quando omnino sunt eiusdem generis; nam si non sunt eiusdem generis proximi, falsitatem habet, sicut patet, quod linea in infinitum excedit punctum, et superficies lineamp280-5. Gratia autem Christi non tantum disponit ad fruitionem, secundum quod aliae gratiae, verum etiam ad unionem. Et hinc est, quod cum uniri cum deitate sit novus et singularis modus divinae existentiae et habitationis in creatura, quantum ad hoc potest attendi excessus sine mensura.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tanta est gratia, quantum est illud, ad quod disponit; dicendum, quod illud habere potest veritatem, si disponat per modum necessitatis sive condignitatisp280-6, sicut meritum ad praemium; sed gratia singularis personae disponit ad unionem dispositione congruitatis. Illa enim unio non tantum gratuita fuit, sed inter omnes gratias, ut dicit Augustinus, potissime tenuit rationem gratiae, sicut habitum est supra distinctione quartap280-7, quia nulla merita sufficientia potuerunt eam praevenire. Propter hoc non oportet, quodsi esse Deum sit bonum infinitum simpliciter, quod gratia ad hoc praeparans sit infinita. — Posset etiam et aliter dici, quod esse Deum dupliciter dicitur de aliquo: aut praedicatione per essentiam, aut per unionemp280-8. Si praedicatione per essentiam, tunc praedicatum praedicat infinitum bonum in rectitudine. Si per unionem, tunc praedicat infinitum bonum non circa illud, de quo praedicatur, sed circa illud quod praedicatur. Unde cum dicitur: iste homo est Deus, vel: iste homo est bonum infinitum, idem est, ac si diceretur: iste homo est unitus Deo immenso in unitatem personae; et tamen homo remanet in sua finitate, et Deus in sua immensitate. Quamvis enim humana natura exaltetur, non tamen desinit esse creatura.
6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum anima Christi possit ampliorem gratiam appetere; dicendum, quod non, quia adeo per illam gratiam Deo unitap280-9 p. 281 est, ut omnis eius appetitus sit in ipso bono immenso quietatus et terminatus quietatione perfecta. — Quod ergo obiicit, quod omni finito potest aliquid maius appeti: dicendum, quod verum est de finito in se, sed de illo finito, quod ordinat et unit bono infinito iunctura et ordinatione perfecta, non habet veritatem, quia quietare potest et stabilire ratione eius a quo et ad quod. Unde sicut gratia, quamvis sit vanitas, in quantum creatura, habet tamen animam stabilire ratione eius boni, a quo procedit et a quo non separatur nec recedit, sic etiam quietare potest ratione eius, cui immediate et inseparabiliter coniungit.
I. Communiter theologi in duobus consentiunt, scilicet quod gratia creata Christi non sit infinita in ratione entis et qualitatis nec possit dici simpliciter infinita; item, quod sola anima Christi habeat simpliciter plenitudinem gratiae, ita ut de facto ei collata sit summa gratia et quodam modo infinita. In explicatione secundae propositionis non conveniunt theologi, praesertim in solvenda quaestione, utrum gratia Christi augeri possit. S. Bonav. cum B. Alberto, Richardo a Med., Scoto, Durando (hic q. I.), Caietano aliisque docet, gratiam Christi absolute non posse augeri, tum ex natura ipsius gratiae tum ex parte capacitatis subiecti (cfr. hic praesertim fundamenta, solut. ad 2, et I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. I.). Etiam S. Thom. (S. III. q. 7. a. 12.) explicite dicit: «Sic igitur manifestum est, quod gratia Christi non potest augeri ex parte ipsius gratiae, sed neque ex parte subiecti». In Comment. (hic q. I. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.) de gratia creata dicit, quod licet secundum essentiam sit finita, tamen dici possit infinita tripliciter, tum ex coniunctione ad divinitatem, tum secundum rationem gratiae, tum quoad effectus. Et ibid. quaestiunc. 3. disertis verbis dicit, quod gratia Christi crescere non potuit. Etiam Quaest. disp. de Verit. q. 29. a. 3. concludit, gratiam Christi esse in perfectione gratiae infinitam. Nihilominus discipuli S. Thomae in vera ipsius mente explicanda non consentiunt. Plurimi autem eorum putant, praedicta debere intelligi solummodo de potentia Dei ordinaria, non de absoluta.
II. Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. III. q. 12. m. 3. a. I. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. in utroque Scripto hic q. 1-4. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 2.
III. In responsione ad seq. (3.) quaestionem omnes antiqui consentiunt, simulque docent, hanc plenitudinem gratiae simul cum visione beatifica ab instanti conceptionis fuisse in Christo consummatam eique soli propriam. De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2. quaestiunc. I; S. loc. cit. a. 9. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. I. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 3.
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Question II. Whether in Christ there is finite grace or immense grace.
Secondly it is asked whether in Christ there is finite grace or immense grace. And that in Christ there was grace without measure seems [to be the case] thus:
1. John, chapter threep278-1: God does not give the Spirit by measure; and Augustine says that to that man the Spirit was given not by measure; but what lacks measure is immense and infinite: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the Master in the textp278-2: «Indeed it can be said that he received so great a fullness of grace that God could not confer upon him a greater»; but than anything finite God can make something greater: therefore it seems that he received infinite grace.
3. Likewise, grace is as great as is the merit proceeding from it; but Christ's merit was infinite, since it can in no way be exhausted, and would have sufficed for infinite thousands of men, as Anselm saysp279-1: therefore the grace by which he merited seems to have immensity.
4. Likewise, a finite thing does not exceed another finite thing infinitely within the same genus: if therefore Christ's grace is finite, then it exceeds the graces of other men proportionately: therefore if other men couldp279-2 continually advance, it seems that they could be made equal to Christ through grace and exceed him. But if no one ever can attain to his perfection, however much he advances, it seems that his grace is immense.
5. Likewise, the disposing grace is as great as is that to which it disposes according to right relation and proportion; but the grace of that man disposed him to this, that he should be Godp279-3; the graces of other men dispose [them] to this, that they should enjoy God: if therefore to be God is an infinite good, and infinitely greater to be God than to have God, it seems that the grace of that man is infinite in itself and that it exceeds all graces infinitely.
6. Likewise, the soul of Christ either can desire a greater grace, or not. If it can desire a greater grace: then it seems that it is not perfect, since an addition can be made to itp279-4. If it cannot: since then to anything finite something greater can be desired, it seems that his grace is immense.
On the contrary: 1. Every created thing has a fixed weight, number, and measure, according to that which is said in Wisdom, chapter elevenp279-5; but the grace of that man, namely of Christ, is created: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, although grace does not always correspond to natural [endowments] by equality, it corresponds nevertheless according to due proportion, where there is no defect on the part of the recipientp279-6; but the natural [endowments] of Christ are not infinite nor do they exceed the natural [endowments] of any man infinitely: therefore neither do the gratuitous [ones].
3. Likewise, infinity in a creature takes away good and perfection, because what is infinite lacks end and termp279-7, therefore [lacks] goodness and completeness; but Christ's grace had these two pre-eminently: therefore it seems that the condition of finitude befits it pre-eminently.
4. Likewise, than the infinite nothing is greaterp279-8: therefore if Christ's grace, insofar as he is man, were infinite; then uncreated grace would not be greater than it: therefore Creator and creature would be made equal in nobility and excellence; but if this is impossible, it remains etc.
Conclusion.
Christ's grace, insofar as he is man, considered in itself, is finite; yet in comparison to the graces of other men it exceeds [them] infinitely.
I respond: It must be said that for something to lack measure or to be immense is [so] in two ways: either absolutely in itself, or in comparison. If therefore we speak of the grace conferred on Christ, insofar as he is a singular person, in itself; thus, since it implies a created gift, it is necessarily finite and measured. For finitude and measurement, with respect to a creature, express completeness rather than imperfectionp279-9. — But if we speak of it in comparison to the graces of other men; thus it exceeds [them] disproportionately by reason of the union to the person of the Word, to which union that grace disposed the soul of Christ. For that grace, on account of its supreme conjunction with the eternal Word, must exceed infinitely, that is, incommensurably, the graces of other men in three ways, namely as to the habits of the virtues, and as to their uses, and as to their effects. As to the habits: for no creature can ever advance so far as to be capable of so noble and perfect a habit as the soul conjoined to God in unity of person. — As to the uses of the virtues: because all the virtues in Christ had their uses, which pertain to perfection; and therefore all the sensesp279-10 are said to have been in him, because he had complete use of all the gifts in a more excellent mode than could ever be attained to by anyone. — As to the effect likewise the grace of Christ exceeds [other grace] disproportionately; because on account of this, that that man was the Son of God, his merit is weighed according to the dignity of that person from whom the work proceeds; and therefore the merit of his passion exceeds infinitely the merits of our passions; and on account of this, that he was God, his death was weighed by God [according to] how great was he who was dying. And therefore as to sufficiency, if infinite thousands of men were bound by the guilt of original [sin], through the effect of that passion they could have been freed. p. 280 It must therefore be granted that Christ's grace, insofar as he is man, is finite and measured, because it was created in number, weight, and measure. And the reasonings for this side must be granted.
1. To that, however, which is objected first, that the Spirit was given to Christ not by measure; it must be said that if it be understood of the eternal giving, or of the giving by the communication of idioms, then measure is denied [to it] simply. But if by the Spirit given we understand the very donation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, thus measure is not denied there simply, but [denied is] commensuration with respect to us, to whom the Holy Spirit is given for the uses of certain gifts determinately according to the distribution of the Spirit, as is said in First Corinthians, chapter twelvep280-1: To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, etc. But to Christ all those gifts were given without any restriction; and to that extent he is said to have given him the Spirit without measure.
2. To that which is objected, that God could not give more fully; it must be said that God's not being able to make something greaterp280-2 can be understood from a threefold cause: namely, either it is by reason on the part of God operating, or on the part of the thing produced, or indeed on account of the limitation of the recipient. When therefore it is said that he could not confer more fully, this must not be understood on account of the immensity of the thing conferred, or [on account of] the finitude of the divine power, but on account of the limitation of the receptive power, because, since it is created, it is of finite capacity and cannot receive [anything] but the finitep280-3. And if you object that he could have given a greater capacity; it must be said that it is necessary that a creature, by the very fact that it is a creature, have a finite capacity; and again, because the creature is in such a species or genus, it has a limitation, beyond which that genus or species cannot extend itself. And thus it must be understood in the matter at hand.
3. To that which is objected, that Christ's merit is infinite; it must be said that the infinity of the merit arises from the union of that soul to the divine person — by reason of which union not only man, but also God is said to die — on account of which that merit is infinite, not by reason of the created grace in itself, but by reason of the infinite dignity of the person. Whence Anselm too means to say thisp280-4, when he says that it behooved him who could make satisfaction to be God and man.
4. To that which is objected, that a finite thing does not exceed another finite thing except finitely; it must be said that that holds true when they are altogether of the same genus; for if they are not of the same proximate genus, it holds falsehood, as is plain, that a line exceeds a point infinitely, and a surface a linep280-5. But Christ's grace not only disposes to fruition, as do other graces, but also to union. And hence it is, that since to be united with the deity is a new and singular mode of divine existence and indwelling in a creature, as regards this an excess without measure can be observed.
5. To that which is objected, that grace is as great as that to which it disposes; it must be said that this can hold true if it dispose by way of necessity or condignityp280-6, as merit [disposes] to reward; but the grace of a singular person disposes to union by a disposition of congruity. For that union was not only gratuitous, but among all graces, as Augustine says, it held pre-eminently the character of grace, as was held above in distinction fourp280-7, because no sufficient merits could anticipate it. On account of this it is not necessary, even if to be God be simply an infinite good, that the grace preparing for this be infinite. — It could also be said otherwise, that to be God is said of something in two ways: either by predication through essence, or through unionp280-8. If by predication through essence, then the predicate predicates an infinite good in rectitude. If through union, then it predicates an infinite good not concerning that of which it is predicated, but concerning that which is predicated. Whence when it is said: this man is God, or: this man is an infinite good, it is the same as if it were said: this man is united to the immense God in unity of person; and yet the man remains in his finitude, and God in his immensity. For although human nature is exalted, nevertheless it does not cease to be a creature.
6. To that which is asked, whether the soul of Christ can desire a greater grace; it must be said, no, because through that grace it is so united to Godp280-9 p. 281 that all its appetite is quieted in that immense good itself and terminated by a perfect quieting. — As to what it then objects, that than anything finite something greater can be desired: it must be said that this is true of the finite in itself, but of that finite which orders and unites to the infinite good by a perfect joining and ordering, it does not hold true, because it can quiet and stabilize by reason of that from which and to which. Whence just as grace, although it be a vanity, insofar as it is a creature, has nevertheless [the power] to stabilize the soul by reason of that good from which it proceeds and from which it is not separated nor recedes, so also it can quiet by reason of that to which it immediately and inseparably conjoins [it].
I. Commonly the theologians agree in two things, namely that the created grace of Christ is not infinite in the character of being and of quality, nor can be called simply infinite; likewise, that the soul of Christ alone has simply the fullness of grace, so that in fact there was conferred on it the highest grace and one in a certain way infinite. In the explanation of the second proposition the theologians do not agree, especially in resolving the question whether Christ's grace can be increased. St. Bonaventure, with Bl. Albert, Richard of Mediavilla, Scotus, Durandus (here q. I.), Cajetan, and others, teaches that Christ's grace absolutely cannot be increased, both from the nature of the grace itself and on the part of the capacity of the subject (cf. here especially the fundamenta, the solution to [objection] 2, and I Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. I.). St. Thomas too (Summa III. q. 7. a. 12.) explicitly says: «Thus therefore it is manifest that Christ's grace cannot be increased on the part of the grace itself, nor on the part of the subject». In the Commentary (here q. I. a. 2. little-question 2.) he says of created grace that although according to essence it is finite, yet it can be called infinite in three ways: both from its conjunction to the divinity, and according to the character of grace, and as regards effects. And in the same place, little-question 3, he says in express words that Christ's grace could not grow. Likewise in the Disputed Questions on Truth q. 29. a. 3. he concludes that Christ's grace is infinite in the perfection of grace. Nevertheless the disciples of St. Thomas do not agree in explaining his true mind. But most of them think that the aforesaid must be understood only of God's ordinary power, not of his absolute [power].
II. Alexander of Hales, on this and the following question, [Summa] p. III. q. 12. m. 3. a. I. — Scotus, on this and the following question, in both Writings, here q. 1-4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I. a. 2. little-questions 2. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. 2.
III. In the response to the following (3rd) question all the ancients agree, and they likewise teach that this fullness of grace, together with the beatific vision, was consummated in Christ from the instant of conception and was proper to him alone. On this question: St. Thomas, here q. I. a. 2. little-question I; St. [Thomas] loc. cit. a. 9. 10. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. little-question I. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 3.
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- Vers. 34. — August. in hunc loc. (tr. 14. n. 10.) ait: Hominibus ad mensuram dat, unico Filio non dat ad mensuram... Christus, qui dat, non ad mensuram accipit. Cfr. 1. Retract. c. 19. n. 3, et hic lit. Magistri, in principio.Verse 34. — Augustine on this passage (Tractate 14. n. 10.) says: To men he gives by measure, to the only Son he does not give by measure... Christ, who gives, does not receive by measure. Cf. Retractations I. c. 19. n. 3, and here the text of the Master, at the beginning.
- Hic circa initium. — In minori pro sed omni finito potest edd. cum pluribus codd. sed cum finito possit (edd. 1, 2 potest).Here near the beginning. — In the minor [premise], for sed omni finito potest the editions with several codices [read] sed cum finito possit (editions 1, 2 [read] potest).
- Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 14.Book II, Cur Deus homo [Why God Became Man], c. 14.
- Non pauci codd. possint.Not a few codices [read] possint.
- Cfr. supra pag. 173, nota 6. et d. 2. n. 3. q. 2. in corp.Cf. above, p. 173, note 6, and d. 2. [a.] 3. q. 2. in the body [of the text].
- Secundum Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16), perfectum dicitur extra quod non est ullam accipere particulam. Cfr. III. Phys. text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.).According to Aristotle, Metaphysics V. text 21. (IV. c. 16), that is called perfect outside of which it is not [possible] to take any part. Cf. Physics III. text 63. and following (c. 6.).
- Vers. 21: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.Verse 21: Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 9. q. 3.Cf. II Sent. d. 9. q. 3.
- Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.), et II. Metaph. text. 8. (I. brevior c. 2.).Cf. Aristotle, Physics III. text 63. and following (c. 6.), and Metaphysics II. text 8. (I. shorter [recension] c. 2.).
- Cfr. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 130. (c. 12.).Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens and the Earth I. text 130. (c. 12.).
- Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro sic cum dicat non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 sic cum dicit, codd. A H bb sic cum sit. Paulo inferius pro ad gratias codd. A G H K T ad gratiam, et inferius etiam pro id est edd. cum paucis codd. et.See I Sent. d. 43. q. 3. — A little above, for sic cum dicat not a few codices and editions 1, 2 [read] sic cum dicit, codices A, H, bb [read] sic cum sit. A little below, for ad gratias codices A, G, H, K, T [read] ad gratiam, and further below also, for id est the editions with a few codices [read] et.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, in principio et Bonav. infra a. 2. q. I. — Mox pro ad hoc edd. adhuc.Cf. here the text of the Master, at the beginning, and Bonaventure below, a. 2. q. I. — Presently, for ad hoc the editions [read] adhuc.
- Vers. 8. — Superius post ipsam donationem cod. O adiicit creatam vel temporalem. In fine solut. pro dicitur ei [complures codd. perperam eis] dedisse spiritum edd. dicitur ei datus spiritus.Verse 8. — Above, after ipsam donationem codex O adds creatam vel temporalem. At the end of the solution, for dicitur ei [several codices wrongly eis] dedisse spiritum the editions [read] dicitur ei datus spiritus.
- Edd. quod Deum non posse aliquid plenius vel maius dare vel facere. Paulo inferius pro suscipientis cod. M potentiae susceptivae. Deinde post plenius cod. N supplet ei.The editions [read] quod Deum non posse aliquid plenius vel maius dare vel facere ["that God's not being able to give or make anything more fully or greater"]. A little below, for suscipientis codex M [reads] potentiae susceptivae. Then after plenius codex N supplies ei.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. I. ad 4, d. 17. p. II. q. 4. in corp., d. 44. a. I. q. 3. ad I.Cf. I Sent. d. 2. q. I. ad 4, d. 17. p. II. q. 4. in the body [of the text], d. 44. a. I. q. 3. ad I.
- Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 6. — Paulo superius pro mori edd. mereri.Book II, Cur Deus homo, c. 6. — A little above, for mori the editions [read] mereri.
- Nam punctus est absque dimensione; linea vero extenditur in longum, neque unquam ex punctis fieri potest linea, neque ex lineis superficies. Quod respiciens Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 71. (c. 8.) docet, lineae ad punctum nullam esse proportionem excessus, cum omnino differant. Cfr. I. Metaph. text. 43. (c. 9.), et lib. de Lineis insecabilibus. — Paulo superius post omnino sunt eiusdem generis Vat. supplet proximi. In fine solut. pro sine mensura edd. cum paucis codd. sive mensura. — De singulari modo existentiae divinae cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 2.For a point is without dimension; a line, however, extends in length, nor can a line ever be made out of points, nor a surface out of lines. Regarding which Aristotle, Physics IV. text 71. (c. 8.), teaches that there is no proportion of excess of a line to a point, since they differ altogether. Cf. Metaphysics I. text 43. (c. 9.), and the book On Indivisible Lines. — A little above, after omnino sunt eiusdem generis the Vatican [edition] supplies proximi. At the end of the solution, for sine mensura the editions with a few codices [read] sive mensura. — On the singular mode of divine existence cf. above, d. 6. a. 2. q. 2.
- Vat. condignationis, edd. 1, 2 perperam congruitatis. Mox pro congruitatis cod. U congruentiae.The Vatican [edition reads] condignationis, editions 1, 2 wrongly congruitatis. Presently, for congruitatis codex U [reads] congruentiae.
- Art. 2. q. I. — Verba Augustini ibid. q. 2. arg. I. et 3. ad oppos., nec non lit. Magistri, c. 2.Article 2, q. I. — The words of Augustine [are] in the same place, q. 2. arg. I. and 3. on the contrary, as well as in the text of the Master, c. 2.
- De divisione praedicationis hic relata, nec non de subnexis cfr. supra d. 7. a. I. q. I. — Mox pro tunc praedicatum praedicat infinitum bonum edd. tunc infinitum praedicat bonum, codd. A H tunc praedicat infinitum bonum. Plurimi autem codd. non bene omittunt infinitum ante bonum. Aliquanto inferius pro in unitatem cod. G in unitate.On the division of predication here reported, as well as on what follows, cf. above, d. 7. a. I. q. I. — Presently, for tunc praedicatum praedicat infinitum bonum the editions [read] tunc infinitum praedicat bonum, codices A, H [read] tunc praedicat infinitum bonum. But most codices not well omit infinitum before bonum. Somewhat below, for in unitatem codex G [reads] in unitate.
- Non pauci codd. falso unitus. Inferius pro omni finito bene multi codd. cum finito.Not a few codices falsely [read] unitus. Below, for omni finito rightly many codices [read] cum finito. ---