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Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 15

Textus Latinus
p. 354

Quaestio IV. Utrum opera satisfactoria, facta extra caritatem, adveniente caritate, reviviscant sive vivificentur.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum opera satisfactoria, facta extra caritatem, adveniente caritate, reviviscant sive vivificentur et debeant computari in sortem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud Levitici vigesimo quinto1: Si attenuatus frater tuus etc.; Glossa exponit, quod fructus bonae conversationis debent ei computari ab eo tempore, ex quo peccavit; et secundum hoc videtur, quod caritate adveniente, possunt bona opera computari.

2. Item, baptismus acceptus a ficto extra caritatem, adveniente caritate, incipit valere2: ergo similiter, cum satisfactio sit opus sacramentale, poterit valere, adveniente caritate. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia in baptismo imprimitur character; contra hoc est de restitutione, quae tunc valet ad salutem, cum advenit caritas, nec oportet iterari.

3. Item, facilius est in natura vivificare quod non3 vixit, quam quod vixit et est mortuum sive mortificatum — primum enim est naturale, secundum supra naturam — ergo cum opera mortificata adveniente caritate, vivificentur, multo magis mortua, vel saltem aequaliter.

p. 355

4. Item, bonum moris magis propinquum est gratiae quam bonum naturae; sed naturalia4 vivificantur et gratia informantur: ergo et bona in genere prius facta.

5. Item, ratio, quare Deus remittit culpam et non remittit poenam, est, ne peccatum remaneat impunitum: ergo si iste peccator punitus est ante adventum gratiae tantum, quantum deberet5 puniri post gratiam, vel in parte; aut nullo modo puniri debet, aut non tantum: ergo bona opera computantur.

Contra: 1. Quod nullo modo vivit nec est a principio vivente nona habet potentiam ad vitam; sed tale est opus extra caritatem factum: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne satisfactorium est meritorium; sed nullum est meritorium nisi ex caritate; sed opus illud non fuit ex caritate nec amplius potest esse, quia impossibile est, quod mutet originem: ergo impossibile est inter opera satisfactoria computari.

3. Item, peccator ante satisfactionem est obligatus ad poenam infinitam; sed ab infinito nihil adimitur, et quod adimitur nihil facitb: quantumcumque ergo se affligat, tenetur ad aequalem poenam: ergo non debent talia opera computari.

4. Item, opus ex caritate procedens excedit improportionaliter opus extra caritatem factum; sed quod improportionaliter excedit aliud non accrescit ex additione illius: ergo quantumcumque opera fecerit ante caritatem, nihil addunt ad opera post caritatem, sicut nec punctus ad lineamc: ergo in nihilum debent computari.

Conclusio. Probabile est, quod opera satisfactoria, facta extra caritatem, adveniente caritate, reviviscant quoad remissionem poenae, non quoad meritum vitae aeternae; sed securius est tenere, quod nullo modo vivificantur et computantur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio.d — Una quidem fuit, quod opus satisfactorium, quantum est de sua ratione perfecta, meretur collationem gloriae et meretur remissionem poenae6: collationem gloriae, quia fit ex caritate; remissionem poenae, quia fit in caritate, in quantum sacramentale est; et ideo sufficit, quod fiat in caritate, quantum ad hoc; quia per caritatem poena debita satisfacienti fit proportionalis poenae, quam sustinet. Dicunt ergo, quod opera illa vivificari quantum ad meritum vel retributionem vitae aeternae est impossibile, quia non fuerunt ex caritate, et amplius impossibile est esse ex caritate; sed quantum ad meritum remissionis poenae — quia non erat alius defectus, nisi quia poena non erat proportionalis — isto posito in caritate, et poena facta proportionali, vivificantur quantum ad hoc et computari debent in sortem. Unde7 aliter vivificantur quam opera mortificata, quia illa ad aeternam retributionem, haec solum ad poenae dimissionem.

Alia est positio, quod omne opus satisfactorium est opus meritorium vitae aeternae, et oportet fieri ex caritate movente imperio coniuncto, vel saltem primo8; sicut est de eo qui vadit ad sanctum Iacobum; unde dicunt, quod talia nullo modo vivificantur nec computantur. — Prima positio est multum probabilis, sed haec securior est.9

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium prius huius, quod debent fructus computari; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur, si statim post peccatum incepit conteri, et tunc opera satisfactoria fuerunt ab illo tempore, etiam antequam absolveretur a sacerdote. — Vel dicendum, quod fructus computantur quantum ad superexcrescentiam10 usurarii, quia merito illorum fructuum diabolus non traxit illum ad multa scelera.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de baptismo, dicendum, quod est opus Dei ad hominem, et hoc nunquam est mortuum, tamen propter inconvenientiam suscipientis privatur effectu; et tale est baptismus. — Est opus hominis ad hominem, et tale consideratur solum exterius, quia homo non videt nisi ea quae extra sunt11; et tale est restitutio, et hoc non oportet esse vivum. — Aliud est opus hominis ad Deum, et tale potest esse mortuum, sed debet esse vivum ad hoc, quod sit satisfactorium, aliter enim Deo non est acceptum; et tale est opus satisfactionis, quo homo reconciliatur Deo. Et ideo non est simile de baptismo et satisfactione12.

p. 356

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vivificare quod nunquam vixit est facilius; dicendum, quod hoc verum est in his quae ideo vivunt, quia recipiunt vitam, sed non in his quae ideo possunt vivere, quia procedunt a vita; et talia sunt operae.

4. Ad aliud dicendum, quod non est simile de habitibus et potentiis et actibus, quia isti manent, illi non, nec informari nec vivificari possunt.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod causa satisfaciendi est, ne sit peccati impunitasf; dicendum, quod illa non est tota ratio, sed etiam haec: quia homo est amicus Dei effectus per gratiam et dignus aliquando beatificari; ideo solum ad poenam temporalem astrictus est, et ideo, antequam sit amicus, ad aeternam astringitur. — Praeterea, opus factum ex caritate improportionaliter, sicut factum est in opponendog, excedit opus factum extra caritatem, et ita poena supportata ex caritate et mera voluntate excedit poenam supportatam sine caritate; et ideo Deus poenam aeternam aeternaliter portandam ex mala voluntate, cuiusmodi est in damnatis, rationabiliter in poenam temporalem commutat ex caritate portandam; tantum placet ei talis tolerantia. Et ideo alia poena extra caritatem portata tanquam omnino improportionalis non augmentat illam; sed Deush illam solam reputat satisfactoriam, cuius tolerantia et assumtio sumitur ex caritate sincera, quia in aliam non commutabat poenami.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether satisfactory works done outside charity revive or are vivified when charity comes.

Fourthly it is asked, whether satisfactory works, done outside charity, when charity comes, revive or are vivified and ought to be counted to one's account. And that they are, it seems.

1. Upon that text of Leviticus, chapter twenty-five1: If your brother be reduced etc.; the Gloss explains that the fruits of good conduct ought to be reckoned to him from the time at which he sinned; and according to this it seems that, when charity comes, good works can be reckoned.

2. Likewise, baptism received by a feigning person outside charity begins to avail when charity comes2: therefore likewise, since satisfaction is a sacramental work, it will be able to avail when charity comes. If you say that the case is not alike, because in baptism a character is imprinted; against this stands the case of restitution, which then avails unto salvation when charity comes, nor need it be repeated.

3. Likewise, it is easier in nature to vivify what has not3 lived than what has lived and is dead or mortified — for the first is natural, the second above nature — therefore, since mortified works, when charity comes, are vivified, much more are dead ones, or at least equally so.

4. Likewise, the good of conduct is nearer to grace than the good of nature; but natural things4 are vivified and informed by grace: therefore also goods in their kind done beforehand.

5. Likewise, the reason why God remits guilt and does not remit the penalty is, lest sin remain unpunished: therefore if this sinner has been punished before the coming of grace as much as he would have deserved5 to be punished after grace, or in part; he ought either to be punished in no way, or not so much: therefore good works are reckoned.

On the contrary: 1. What in no way lives nor is from a living principle does nota have the potency unto life; but such is a work done outside charity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every satisfactory work is meritorious; but nothing is meritorious except from charity; but that work was not from charity nor can it be any longer, because it is impossible that it change its origin: therefore it is impossible for it to be counted among satisfactory works.

3. Likewise, the sinner before satisfaction is bound to an infinite penalty; but from the infinite nothing is taken away, and what is taken away effects nothingb: however much therefore he afflict himself, he is held to an equal penalty: therefore such works ought not to be reckoned.

4. Likewise, a work proceeding from charity exceeds disproportionately a work done outside charity; but what exceeds another disproportionately does not grow by the addition of it: therefore however many works he has done before charity, they add nothing to the works after charity, just as a point adds nothing to a linec: therefore they ought to be counted as nothing.

Conclusion. It is probable that satisfactory works, done outside charity, when charity comes, revive as to the remission of penalty, not as to the merit of eternal life; but it is safer to hold that they are in no way vivified and reckoned.

I respond: It must be said that concerning this there has been a twofold opinion.d — One indeed was that a satisfactory work, as far as belongs to its perfect formal character, merits the bestowal of glory and merits the remission of penalty6: the bestowal of glory, because it is done from charity; the remission of penalty, because it is done in charity, inasmuch as it is sacramental; and therefore it suffices that it be done in charity, as to this; because through charity the penalty owed by the one making satisfaction becomes proportional to the penalty which he undergoes. They say therefore that for those works to be vivified as to the merit or retribution of eternal life is impossible, because they were not from charity, and it is further impossible for them to be from charity; but as to the merit of the remission of penalty — since there was no other defect, except that the penalty was not proportional — once this is set in charity, and the penalty made proportional, they are vivified as to this and ought to be reckoned to one's account. Hence7 they are vivified otherwise than mortified works, because the latter are vivified unto eternal retribution, these only unto the remission of penalty.

Another is the position that every satisfactory work is a work meritorious of eternal life, and must be done from charity moving by a conjoined command, or at least firstly8; as is the case with one who goes to St. James; whence they say that such works are in no way vivified nor reckoned. — The first position is highly probable, but this one is safer.9

1. To that, therefore, which is objected to the contrary before this, that fruits ought to be reckoned; it must be said that this is to be understood if immediately after the sin he began to be contrite, and then the satisfactory works were his from that time, even before he was absolved by the priest. — Or it must be said that the fruits are reckoned as to the surplus increase10 of the usurer, because by the merit of those fruits the devil did not drag him into many crimes.

2. To that which is objected concerning baptism, it must be said that it is a work of God toward man, and this is never dead, yet on account of the unfitness of the recipient it is deprived of its effect; and such is baptism. — There is a work of man toward man, and such is considered only outwardly, because man sees only those things which are outward11; and such is restitution, and this need not be alive. — Another is a work of man toward God, and such can be dead, but it must be alive for this, that it be satisfactory, for otherwise it is not acceptable to God; and such is the work of satisfaction, by which man is reconciled to God. And therefore the case of baptism and of satisfaction is not alike12.

3. To that which is objected, that to vivify what has never lived is easier; it must be said that this is true in those things which live because they receive life, but not in those things which can live because they proceed from life; and such are workse.

4. To the other it must be said that the case is not alike concerning habits and potencies and acts, because the latter remain, the former do not, and can neither be informed nor vivified.

5. To that which is objected, that the cause of making satisfaction is, lest there be impunity of sinf; it must be said that this is not the whole reason, but also this: that man is made a friend of God through grace and worthy at some time to be beatified; therefore he is bound only to a temporal penalty, and therefore, before he is a friend, he is bound to an eternal one. — Moreover, a work done from charity disproportionately, as was done in the objecting argumentg, exceeds a work done outside charity, and thus a penalty borne from charity and pure will exceeds a penalty borne without charity; and therefore God reasonably commutes the eternal penalty, to be borne eternally out of an evil will, such as is the case in the damned, into a temporal penalty to be borne out of charity; so much does such endurance please him. And therefore the other penalty, borne outside charity, as being altogether disproportionate, does not augment it; but Godh reckons that alone satisfactory whose endurance and undertaking is drawn from sincere charity, because he did not commute the penalty into anotheri.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Vers. 25. seqq. — Glossam exhibet Rabanus ex Hesychio, qui in hunc versum dicit: « Uniuscuiusque ergo hominis possessio bona conversatio est, quam sortiti sumus a Deo »; et in v. 30: Computavit [Rabanus: Computabit] autem ab anno, quo semetipsum vendidit [i. e. peccavit], usque ad annum iubilaei sive remissionis, a quo videlicet peccans eguit consilio et doctrina, usquedum integram et omnimodam peragat poenitentiam, in qua remissionem accipiens, aequalis ei fiat, qui penitus non peccavit etc. Cfr. Gratian., C. Quis aliquando vidit (87.), de Poenitentia d. 1. § 13.
    Verses 25 and following. — The Gloss is given by Rabanus from Hesychius, who on this verse says: "The possession of each man, therefore, is the good conduct which we have received by lot from God"; and on v. 30: He "reckoned" [Rabanus: "shall reckon"] from the year in which he sold himself [i.e. sinned], up to the year of jubilee or remission, from which, namely, the sinner stood in need of counsel and teaching, until he should complete an entire and total penance, in which, receiving remission, he might become equal to one who had not sinned at all, etc. Cf. Gratian, C. Quis aliquando vidit (87), On Penance, d. 1, § 13.
  2. 2
    Ut ostensum est supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.
    As was shown above, d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6.
  3. 3
    Codd. E F G K L nunquam, cod. O melius nondum. Mox post quam quod cod. I addit aliquando.
    Codices E F G K L read nunquam ("never"), codex O melius nondum ("rather, not yet"). Soon after quam quod codex I adds aliquando.
  4. 4
    Cuiusmodi sunt potentiae, habitus etc. animae.
    Of which kind are the potencies, habits, etc. of the soul.
  5. 5
    Edd. gratiae, nunquam debet. Eaedem edd. cum multis codd. post vel in parte addunt debet.
    The editions read gratiae, nunquam debet. The same editions with many codices add debet after vel in parte.
  6. 6
    Pro fit cod. bb a secunda manu meretur remissionem poenae, quae verba codd. B H (F a secunda manu) addunt post sacramentale est. Inferius pro ad hoc; quia... fit Vat. cum pluribus codd. ad hoc, quod... sit.
    For fit, codex bb in a second hand reads meretur remissionem poenae ("merits the remission of penalty"), which words codices B H (F in a second hand) add after sacramentale est. Below, for ad hoc; quia... fit, the Vatican edition with several codices reads ad hoc, quod... sit.
  7. 7
    Non pauci codd. cum ed. Vel, Vat. Et ita.
    Not a few codices with the edition read Vel ("Or"), the Vatican edition Et ita ("And thus").
  8. 8
    Codd. A E a secunda manu praevio, Vat. praevio vel primo. — Cfr. II. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6.
    Codices A E in a second hand read praevio, the Vatican edition praevio vel primo. — Cf. II Sent., d. 41, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6.
  9. 9
    Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6.
  10. 10
    Quod secundum Du Cange, Glossarium etc., idem est quod accretio sive incrementum, et usurarium sive usuaria significat usumfructum seu potius ius utendi; usurarius dicitur vulgo de feneratore et distinguitur ab usuario. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 7.
    Which, according to Du Cange, Glossarium etc., is the same as accretion or increment, and usurarium or usuaria signifies usufruct or rather the right of using; usurarius is said commonly of a money-lender and is distinguished from usuarius. — See here the text of the Master, c. 7.
  11. 11
    Respicitur I. Reg. 16, 7: Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem intuetur cor.
    Reference is made to 1 Kings [1 Samuel] 16:7: For man sees the things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart.
  12. 12
    Cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1.
    Cf. above, d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1.
  13. a
    Ita codd. A E F G aa bb; in aliis et edd. nec. Edd. post ad vitam addunt non potest vivificari.
    So codices A E F G aa bb; in others and in the editions, nec. The editions add after ad vitam the words non potest vivificari ("it cannot be vivified").
  14. b
    Edd. omittunt et quod adimitur nihil facit [i. e. non diminuit].
    The editions omit et quod adimitur nihil facit [i.e. "it does not diminish"].
  15. c
    Cfr. tom. III. pag. 222, nota 10. et pag. 280, nota 3. — Superius post quantumcumque Vat. addit vel quaecumque.
    Cf. tome III, p. 222, note 10, and p. 280, note 3. — Above, after quantumcumque, the Vatican edition adds vel quaecumque.
  16. d
    Marginal note: Opinio 1. — Prima opinio.
    Marginal note: Opinion 1. — The first opinion. (Quaracchi marks the two positions and the conclusion with marginal labels Opinio 1., Opinio 2., Conclusio.)
  17. e
    Marginal note: Notandum.
    Marginal note: Note.
  18. f
    Marginal note: Notandum.
    Marginal note: Note.
  19. g
    Sc. supra, Contra, arg. 4 (sicut nec punctus ad lineam); Edd. variant in lectione in opponendo.
    Namely above, in the Contra, argument 4 (just as a point adds nothing to a line); the editions vary in the reading in opponendo.
  20. h
    Marginal note: Notandum.
    Marginal note: Note.
  21. i
    Edd. addunt referentiam ad seq. quaest. (QUAEST. V), quae incipit Utrum homo per talia opera aliquid mereatur.
    The editions add a reference to the following question (QUAEST. V), which begins Whether man merits anything by such works.
Cited by

3 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether it is necessary to rise again in equal charity, or even in greater
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 14 · 2×
infra d. 15. p. I. a. 1. q. 4.
Whether by such works a man merits anything
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 15
supra pag. 355, nota 5
Whether the feigner receives the reality after the Sacrament, when the feigning departs
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 4 · 2×
infra d. 15. p. I. q. 4.

8 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

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