Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 15
Quaestio V. Utrum homo per talia opera aliquid mereatur.
Quinto supposito, quod per opera facta extra caritatem non fiat satisfactio, nec vivificentur; quaeritur, utrum homo per ea aliquid mereatur. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia, sicut dicit auctoritas communis1 «nullum malum impunitum, et nullum bonum irremuneratum»; sed divina iustitia nunquam malum quantulumcumque dimittit, quin puniat: ergo nec quantulumcumque bonum, quin remuneret.
2. Item, si non remunerantur, ergo aequaliter se habet iudex ad eum qui nullum bonum fecit, et ad eum qui fecit multa bona: ergo stultum est alicui peccatori consulere, quod faciat aliquod bonum opus.
3. Item, Exodi vigesimo2: Honora patrem tuum, ut sis longaevus; aut hoc dicitur habenti caritatem aut non habenti. Si habenti tantum, haec est parva remuneratio, quia ipse non amat istam vitam, sed aliam. Ergo dicitur non habenti: ergo meretur aliquid, si honorat, et sic etc.
4. Item, Dominus dicit de hypocrita Matthaei sexto3, qui facit opus bonum propter gloriam, quod recepit mercedem suam; esto ergo, quod aliquis faciat opus bonum propter Deum, non propter gloriam; cum non sit peius, quam illud quod fuit ad gloriam, immo melius: ergo dignum est mercede aliqua.
Contra:
1. Augustinus4: «Peccator non est dignus pane, quo vescitur»: ergo si peccator non est dignus vivere, multo minus est dignus remunerari.
2. Item, qui nihil est in conspectu alicuius apud illum nihil meretur; sed peccator nihil est in conspectu Dei; Psalmus5: Ad nihilum deductus est in conspectu eius malignus: ergo etc.
3. Item, Sapientiae decimo quarto6: Similiter odio sunt Deo impius et impietas eius; sed impietas omnino displicet Deo: ergo et impius. Sed qui omnino displicet alii nihil meretur apud ipsum: ergo etc.
4. Item, nihil meretur organum nisi vivum in operatione servili7 — unde ligo nihil meretur, dum operatur homo in vinea — sed peccator organum est non vivum: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Peccator potest apud Deum aliquid mereri, sed tantum de congruo.
Respondeo: Aliqui dicunt, quod peccator nihil omnino meretur apud Deum, neque ex congruo, neque ex condigno; sed tamen Deus ratione abundantissimae largitatis bona eius opera non dimittit irremunerata, immo remunerat; et est bonum peccatori bene operari, quamvis non sit iustum, eum remunerari, sed magis benignum.
Alii dicunt et probabilius, quod est mereri de congruo et de condigno; peccator autem apud Deum nihil meretur de condigno, sed tamen mereri potest de congruo. Peccator enim aliquando facit bonum opus in genere ad gloriam suam, ut cum dat eleemosynam propter gloriam; et ex hoc opere non meretur mercedem, sed poenam, quia procedit ex contumelia. Aliquando facit ad Dei gloriam et propter amorem Dei, quem habet, et hoc non potest esse sine aliqua gratia gratis data, quae disponit de congruo ad gratiam gratum facientem8, quam Deus aliquo modo acceptat; et ex hoc meretur de congruo. Illud autem meritum comparatum merito caritatis est improportionale, sicut linea latitudini et superficiei9. Unde sicut linea nihil est in comparatione ad superficiem, aliquid tamen est in se; sic est de peccatore ad iustum, et de eius amore ad amorem caritatis, et de merito ad meritum.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1, 2. Ex his patent obiecta; et primo ad illud Augustini: Non est dignus etc., dico bene, quod non meretur ex condigno. Similiter ad duo sequentia, quod nihil est in comparatione caritatis.
Ad 3. Ad illud de Sapientia: Similiter est odio impius; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur per se secundum quod impius, non secundum quod habens naturam bonam et aliqua dona gratis data10; et cum facit opus secundum quod impius, nihil meretur; sed quando secundum gratiam gratis datam, aliquid saltem meretur de congruo.
Ad 4. Ad ultimum de instrumento dicendum, quod non vivum dicitur dupliciter: negative, quod nec vivit nec natum est vivere; et privative, quod non vivit, sed tamen natum est vivere11. Per primum nec de congruo nec de condigno, per secundum autem est meritum de congruo, eo quod non privatur simpliciter vita; vivit enim in morte et voluntarie operatur bonum et est quodam modo Dei adiutor12.
---
Question V. Whether by such works a man merits anything.
Fifthly, it being supposed that by works done outside charity satisfaction is not made, nor are they vivified, it is asked whether a man merits anything by them. And that he does, it seems:
1. Because, as the common authority1 says, «no evil is unpunished, and no good unrewarded»; but the divine justice never dismisses any evil, however small, without punishing it: therefore neither any good, however small, without rewarding it.
2. Likewise, if they are not rewarded, then the judge stands equally toward him who did no good and toward him who did many good works: therefore it is foolish to counsel any sinner to do some good work.
3. Likewise, Exodus twenty2: Honor your father, that you may be long-lived; either this is said to one having charity or to one not having it. If only to one having it, this is a small reward, because he himself does not love this life, but another. Therefore it is said to one not having it: therefore he merits something, if he honors, and so on.
4. Likewise, the Lord says of the hypocrite, Matthew six3, who does a good work for the sake of glory, that he has received his reward; let it be granted, then, that someone does a good work for God's sake, not for the sake of glory; since it is not worse than that which was for glory, but rather better: therefore it is worthy of some reward.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine4: «The sinner is not worthy of the bread on which he feeds»: therefore if the sinner is not worthy to live, much less is he worthy to be rewarded.
2. Likewise, he who is nothing in someone's sight merits nothing with him; but the sinner is nothing in the sight of God; Psalm5: The malicious one is brought to nothing in his sight: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, Wisdom fourteen6: Alike are hateful to God the impious one and his impiety; but impiety is wholly displeasing to God: therefore also the impious one. But he who is wholly displeasing to another merits nothing with him: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, an instrument merits nothing unless it is alive in a servile operation7 — whence the mattock merits nothing while a man works in the vineyard — but the sinner is an instrument that is not alive: therefore etc.
Conclusion. The sinner can merit something with God, but only congruently.
I respond: Some say that the sinner merits nothing whatsoever with God, neither congruently nor condignly; but nevertheless God, by reason of his most abundant generosity, does not leave his good works unrewarded, but rather rewards them; and it is good for the sinner to act well, although it is not just that he be rewarded, but rather benign.
Others say, and more probably, that there is meriting congruently and condignly; but the sinner merits nothing condignly with God, yet he can merit congruently. For the sinner sometimes does a good work in its kind for his own glory, as when he gives alms for the sake of glory; and from this work he does not merit a reward, but punishment, because it proceeds from contumely. Sometimes he acts for God's glory and out of the love of God which he has, and this cannot be without some grace freely given, which disposes him congruently toward the grace that makes one pleasing8, which God in some way accepts; and from this he merits congruently. But that merit, compared to the merit of charity, is disproportionate, as a line to breadth and to a surface9. Whence just as a line is nothing in comparison to a surface, yet is something in itself; so it is with the sinner relative to the just man, and with his love relative to the love of charity, and with merit relative to merit.
To the arguments:
To 1, 2. From these the objections are clear; and first, to that of Augustine: He is not worthy, etc., I say well, that he does not merit condignly. Likewise to the two following, that he is nothing in comparison to charity.
To 3. To that from Wisdom: Alike is the impious one hateful; it must be said that this is understood of him in himself insofar as he is impious, not insofar as he has a good nature and certain gifts freely given10; and when he does a work insofar as he is impious, he merits nothing; but when according to grace freely given, he merits at least something congruently.
To 4. To the last, concerning the instrument, it must be said that "not alive" is said in two ways: negatively, of that which neither lives nor is born to live; and privatively, of that which does not live, but nevertheless is born to live11. By the first, neither congruently nor condignly; but by the second there is merit congruently, because he is not deprived of life simply; for he lives in death and works good voluntarily and is in some way God's helper12.
---
- 1Vide supra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3. et 4. — Codd. M O supplent satisfactoria. Omnes codd. et ed. (4.) solutionem praeponunt huic (3.). Cum nulla appareat ratio huius transpositionis, retinuimus rectum ordinem Vaticanae.See above, d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 3, ad 3 and 4. — Codices M O supply satisfactoria. All codices and the edition place solution (4.) before this (3.). Since no reason for this transposition appears, we have retained the correct order of the Vatican edition.
- 2Retinuimus lectionem edd.; codd. I K (E a secunda manu) quod impunitas est causa impossibilitatis satisfaciendi; alii, hanc obiectionem cum ultimo fundamento confundentes, quod improportionalitas est causa impossibilitatis [vel impotentiae] satisfaciendi.We have retained the reading of the editions; codices I K (E in a second hand) [read] that impunity is the cause of the impossibility of making satisfaction; others, conflating this objection with the last fundamentum, [read] that disproportion is the cause of the impossibility [or incapacity] of making satisfaction.
- 3Scilicet fundamento 4. — Pro sed Deus ed. I ergo, Vat. quia. Post pauca pro sumitur non pauci codd. sumuntur, cod. V fuit. Subinde edd. omittunt sincera, et pro commutabat ed. I substituit computat, Vat. commutat, codd. F G commutabit.Namely, fundamentum 4. — For sed Deus edition I [reads] ergo, the Vatican [edition] quia. Shortly after, for sumitur not a few codices [read] sumuntur, codex V fuit. Then the editions omit sincera, and for commutabat edition I substitutes computat, the Vatican [edition] commutat, codices F G commutabit.
- 4Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.
- 5De hac auctoritate, quam August. (Enarrat. in Ps. 118. serm. 23. n. 3.) sic proponit: Nec recte factum infructuosum, nec peccatum creditur impunitum, cfr. tom. I. pag. 713, nota 2. Vide etiam Gregor., XXI. Moral. c. 5. n. 10, et Hugo a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. XIV. c. 9. circa finem.Concerning this authority, which Augustine (Expositions on the Psalms, 118, sermon 23, n. 3) proposes thus: Neither is a right deed unfruitful, nor is sin believed to be unpunished, cf. vol. I, p. 713, note 2. See also Gregory, XXI Morals, c. 5, n. 10, and Hugh of St. Victor, II On the Sacraments, p. XIV, c. 9, near the end.
- 6Vers. 12.Verse 12.
- 7Vers. 2. et 5: Amen dico vobis, receperunt [hypocritae] mercedem suam. — Inferius post gloriam cod. X bis addit suam.Verses 2 and 5: Amen I say to you, [the hypocrites] have received their reward. — Below, after gloriam, codex X adds suam twice.
- 8Hanc sententiam in operibus August. non invenimus. I. Nicolai in ed. Pantheologiae Raynerii de Pisis (Lugd. 1655), tom. III. tit. de Satisfactione, c. 3. § 3, ubi ex S. Thoma haec sententia adducitur, ait: «Citat sine indice S. Thomas, nec occurrit in Augustino, ut nec eius loquelam sapit». Cfr. Comment. in Epist. ad Tit. (inter opera Ambros.) 1, 15, ubi de peccatoribus: Indigni habiti sunt tota uti Dei creatura.We have not found this sentence in the works of Augustine. I. Nicolai, in the edition of the Pantheologia of Rainerius of Pisa (Lyons, 1655), vol. III, title On Satisfaction, c. 3, § 3, where this sentence is adduced from St. Thomas, says: «St. Thomas cites it without reference, nor does it occur in Augustine, nor does it savor of his manner of speech». Cf. the Commentary on the Epistle to Titus (among the works of Ambrose) 1, 15, where, concerning sinners: They were held unworthy to use the whole creation of God.
- 9Psalm. 14, 4.Psalm 14, 4.
- 10Vers. 9.Verse 9.
- 11Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 11.Cf. Aristotle, VIII Ethics, c. 11.
- 12Vide II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. — De merito congrui et condigni cfr. ibid. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. — Superius pro contumelia cod. V concupiscentia. — (p. 357, n. 1) Cfr. supra pag. 355, nota 5. (n. 2) Vide III. Sent. d. 28. q. 3. ad 2. — Inferius pro saltem edd. ad salutem. (n. 3) De differentia negationis et privationis cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et IV. Metaph. text. 4. (III. c. 2.). (n. 4) Epist. I. Cor. 3, 9: Dei enim sumus adiutores. — Pro in morte [I. Tim. 5, 6: Vivens mortua est], et edd. in merito, si. — Vide scholion ad 3. quaest.See II Sentences, d. 28, a. 2, q. 1. — On the merit of congruity and condignity cf. ibid., d. 27, a. 2, q. 2. — Above, for contumelia codex V [reads] concupiscentia. — (p. 357, n. 1) Cf. above p. 355, note 5. (n. 2) See III Sentences, d. 28, q. 3, ad 2. — Below, for saltem the editions [read] ad salutem. (n. 3) On the difference of negation and privation cf. Aristotle, On the Categories, chapter On Opposites, and IV Metaphysics, text 4 (III, c. 2). (n. 4) Epistle I Corinthians 3, 9: For we are God's helpers. — For in morte [I Timothy 5, 6: Living, she is dead], the editions also [read] in merito, si. — See the scholion to question 3. ---