Dist. 28, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 28
Articulus II. De potestate liberi arbitrii absque gratia gratis data.
Consequenter quaeritur de potestate liberi arbitrii, quantum se extendat absque gratia gratis data. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
Primo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratis data possit se ad gratiam gratum facientem sufficienter disponere.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum omni gratia destitutum possit alicui tentationi resistere.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum possit per se, absque omni gratia, in bonum1 in genere.
Quaestio I. Utrum liberum arbitrium, destitutum gratia gratis data, possit ad gratiam gratum facientem sufficienter se disponere.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium, destitutum gratia gratis data, possit ad gratiam gratum facientem se sufficienter disponere. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Zachariae primo2: Convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos, dicit Dominus. Si igitur Deum converti ad nos non est aliud quam gratiam impartiri; antequam aliqua gratia conferatur, liberum arbitrium potest ad eum converti; sed se convertendo ad Deum disponit se ad gratiam: ergo etc.
2. Item, Boethius3: « Naturaliter est inserta nobis veri boni cupiditas »: omni igitur gratia gratis data circumscripta, salva animae rationalis natura, potest liberum arbitrium verum bonum desiderare; sed desiderando verum bonum disponitur ad donum gratuitum: ergo etc.
3. Item, omnis potentia naturalis naturaliter appetit suam perfectionem, eo ipso quo illa indiget et ab ea nata est compleri4. Si igitur liberum arbitrium aptum natum est compleri per donum gratiae et gloriae; omni gratia privatum perfectionem gratiae desiderabit et quaeret. Si igitur hoc est ad gratiam gratum facientem se disponere, videtur etc.
4. Item, sufficienter se ad gratiam disponit qui facit quod in se est; facere autem quod in se est, dicitur homo, quando facit illud quod est in sua potestate. Sed liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, potest facere quod in se est — nullus enim dubitat, quin possit facere quod potest — ergo absque omni gratia potest se disponere ad gratiam gratum facientem.
5. Item, liberum arbitrium, destitutum gratia gratis data, aut potest aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil potest: ergo nemo5 esset inculpandus ex hoc, quod non se praeparat ad gratiam. Si aliquid potest, vocetur illud quod potest A, tunc verum est dicere, quod liberum arbitrium potest in A; sed faciendo A toto suo posse se praeparat ad gratiam; et quicumque sic se praeparat, sufficienter se disponit: ergo etc.
6. Item, omne peccatum non tantum est expulsivum gratiae, sed etiam nocivum naturae6; sed omnis natura refugit sibi contrarium et nocivum: ergo liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum et sibi relictum, per naturam habet detestari peccatum et refugere; sed detestando et refugiendo culpam se disponit homo ad gratiam: ergo etc.
Sed contra:
1. Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus7: « Manet ad quaerendam salutem libertas arbitrii, sed admonente prius Deo et invitante ad salutem, ut vel eligat aut sequatur aut agat occasione salutis, hoc est inspirationis Dei »: ergo videtur, quod nunquam liberum arbitrium nostrum potest se ad viam salutis praeparare, nisi adiuvetur per aliquam gratiam gratis datam.
2. Item, timor servilis est illud, quo mediante declinatur a malo, sicut dicitur Proverbiorum decimo quinto8: In timore declinat omnis a malo; sed timere serviliter est donum Dei, et nullus potest se disponere ad gratiam, nisi declinet a malo: ergo nullus potest ad gratiam se disponere sine aliquo dono gratiae.
3. Item, dispositio est eiusdem generis cum eo ad quod disponit9: ergo ad bonum gratuitum non potest quis se disponere nisi per aliquid gratis datum: ergo impossibile est, quod ad illud se disponat liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum.
4. Item, dispositio praevenit illud ad quod disponit: si ergo liberum arbitrium posset se ad gratiam gratum facientem per se ipsum disponere, ergo posset gratiam praevenire: si igitur hoc est contra naturam gratiae praevenientis, videtur igitur etc.
Conclusio
Liberum arbitrium, omni dono gratiae gratis datae destitutum, non potest se ad gratiam gratum facientem de congruo disponere.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod vix aut nunquam liberum arbitrium destituitur omni gratia gratis data; quoniam nomine gratiae gratis datae non solummodo intelligimus illa quae enumerat Apostolus primae ad Corinthios duodecimo10 Alii datur per Spiritum etc., sed etiam vocatur hic gratia gratis data, quidquid illud sit, quod superadditum est naturalibus, adiuvans aliquo modo et praeparans voluntatem ad habitum vel usum gratiae, sive illud gratis datum sit habitus, sicut timor servilis, vel pietas aliquorum visceribus inserta ab infantia, sive sit etiam aliquis actus, sicut aliqua vocatio vel locutio, qua Deus excitat animam hominis, ut se requirat11. — Sine hac quidem gratia gratis data vix aut nunquam aliquis habens usum liberi arbitrii reperitur; et sine hac concedendum est, liberum arbitrium nunquam sufficienter disponi nec posse se disponere ad gratiam gratum facientem, sicut dicit Bernardus expresse in libro de Libero Arbitrio, capitulo decimo tertio12: « Conatus liberi arbitrii ad bonum cassi sunt, si a gratia non adiuvantur, et nulli, si non excitantur ». Et post dicit, quod « gratia excitat liberum arbitrium, dum seminat cogitatum ». Si igitur prima dispositio, quae fit ad gratiam gratum facientem13, est cogitatio, et haec non est absque dono gratiae gratis datae; impossibile est, quod liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, ad gratiam gratum facientem disponat se ipsum.
Ratio autem huius est haec: non quia gratia gratum faciens necessario praeexigat dispositionem gratiae gratis datae, sed quia ipsa est quid divinum et res existens supra liberum arbitrium et etiam supra naturale iudicatorium14. Ideo liberum arbitrium nunquam assurgit nec ad cognoscendam gratiam nec ad petendam, nisi aliquo modo a sursum excitetur et per aliquod donum gratiae gratis datae, quod tenet quasi medium inter donum gratiae gratum facientis et naturalem libertatem voluntatis. Tenendum est igitur, quod liberum arbitrium, si excitetur per aliquod donum gratiae gratis datae, potest ad gratiam gratum facientem se de congruo disponere; si autem omni tali munere contingat ipsum destitui, nunquam posset ad illam disponi. — Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod liberi arbitrii est converti ad Deum; dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium lapsum nunquam ad Deum converteretur, nisi aliquo munere gratiae excitaretur; quod quia praesto est, ideo dicit Dominus: Convertimini ad me. Hoc enim ipso, quod invitat et vocat, exhibet homini aliquod donum gratuitum, per quod excitetur, et excitatus aliqualiter ad ipsum convertatur, et conversus per gratiam gratum facientem a Deo acceptetur; et ex hoc dicitur Deus converti ad ipsum.
— Unde si quis velit attendere ordinem liberi arbitrii et gratiae divinae, expresse insinuat Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus15, ponens quatuor gradus, inter quos gratia praevenit liberum arbitrium. Ait enim sic: « Initium salutis nostrae Deo miserante habemus; ut acquiescamus salutari inspirationi, nostrae potestatis est; ut adipiscamur quod acquirendum admonitione cognovimus, divini est muneris; ut non labamur, iam adepto salutis munere, sollicitudinis nostrae est et caelestis pariter adiutorii ». In hoc ergo verbo, si quis diligenter inspiciat, insinuatur valde clare, quantum possit liberum arbitrium respectu gratiae. Nam cum sint in salutis opere ista quatuor, videlicet invitare, acquiescere, adiuvare et permanere; primum est inspirationis Dei, secundum libertatis arbitrii, tertium muneris divini, quartum sollicitudinis nostrae16 et divini pariter adiutorii. Et per hoc satis aperitur via ad dissolvendum rationes sequentes.
Ad 2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod inserta est nobis veri boni cupiditas; dicendum, quod verum est in generali; ut autem cognoscatur in speciali, quid sit illud bonum, et desideretur et requiratur, hoc non est absque Dei dono. Illa autem generalis cupiditas non sufficit ad disponendum ad gratiam, sicut patet in philosophis, qui beatitudinem multum desideraverunt, nunquam tamen gratiam Dei adepti sunt17.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura appetit suam perfectionem etc.; dicendum, quod verum est de perfectione illa, quae est infra18 terminos naturae; non autem oportet de illa, quae supra naturam est; aut si de illa intelligatur, eo modo appetit, quo cognoscit. Per se autem non cognoscit in speciali, sed in generali tantum. Sic autem cognoscendo et appetendo non se disponit sufficienter ad donum gratiae, sicut prius ostensum est.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sufficienter se disponit qui facit quod in se est; dicendum, quod facere quod in se est, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo positive, quia facit aliquid ordinatum ad gratiam, et tantum facit, quantum potest; et hoc modo verum habet sermo praedictus. Alio modo potest intelligi privative, ut dicatur facere quod in se est, quia facit quod potest, quamvis illud non sit ordinatum ad gratiae susceptionem; et hoc modo liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, potest facere quod in se est; et sic praedictus sermo non habet veritatem.
Ad 5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens. Quod enim quaeritur: aut potest aliquid, aut nihil; dicendum, quod aliquid potest; sed illud aliquid nihil est respectu gratiae suscipiendae, sicut posse comedere aliquod posse est: nihil tamen facit ad hoc, quod aliquis suscipiat donum gratiae.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium potest detestari culpam virtute propriae naturae; dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit detestari culpam: aut quia est offensiva maiestatis et aequitatis divinae, aut quia est laesiva propriae naturae. Primus modus detestandi disponit ad gratiam gratum facientem, nec unquam est absque dono gratiae gratis datae in statu naturae lapsae. Cognoscere enim, quod per culpam offendatur Deus19, donum Dei est. Alio modo est detestari peccatum, in quantum est laesivum naturae, sicut aliquis detestatur fornicationem, quia per ipsam amisit visum, vel incurrit alium morbum; et talis detestatio potest esse a virtute naturae; sed haec non disponit ad gratiam gratum facientem.
Et sic patent quaesita. Patet etiam, qualiter erraverit Pelagius, qui liberum arbitrium non solum dixit habere potentiam disponendi se ad gratiam gratum facientem, sed etiam merendi eam propria virtute. Dupliciter enim mendax fuit: et in hoc quod dixit, primam gratiam sub merito cadere, et in hoc quod dixit etiam, liberum arbitrium propriis viribus ad gratiam posse se disponere.
I. In tribus huius articuli quaest. S. Doctor regia via veritatis incedit inter duo extrema, quorum alterum cum Pelagianis necessitati gratiae penitus derogat, alterum vero cum Luthero, Calvino, Baio et Iansenio humanae naturae lapsae denegat tum cooperationem liberi arbitrii in negotio salutis, tum vires naturales ad faciendum ipsum bonum honestum ordinis naturalis.
Haec prima quaestio intelligitur de praeparatione ad gratiam suscipiendam sufficiente (ut declaratur in corp.) sive de dispositione positiva (solut. ad 4.). — Quo sensu hoc loco accipienda sit locutio gratia gratis data, perspicue in corp. declaratur (vide etiam supra d. 26. a. I. schol.); et dignum est observatione, quod eadem dicitur tenere « quasi medium inter donum gratiae gratum facientis et naturalem libertatem voluntatis ». Cfr. etiam hic dub. 1. — Quo sensu haec dispositio vocetur de congruo, explicatur IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 5. et q. 2. (cfr. etiam supra d. 9. q. 3.). Plura de praeparatione ad gratiam vide IV. Sent. d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3, a. 2. q. 2. 3. Concordat autem respons. optime cum decretis Concilii Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 5. et can. 4.) et Arausicani II. (can. 6. 7.). — Notatu digna est etiam in solut. ad 4. duplex explicatio celebris axiomatis: Facienti quod est in se etc.
II. Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 4.) distinguit duplicem praeparationem; remotam « per quodlibet opus de genere bonorum; et tali dispositione potest se homo per se disponere »; et propinquam « per appetitum seu desiderium seu consensum gratiae; et tali non potest se homo per se disponere sine gratia gratis data ». Idem docent Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2.) aliique antiqui magistri; quod secundum doctrinam nostri Doctoris in solut. ad 4. exponendum est. S. Thom. in Comment. (hic a. 4.) quaedam obscura profert, quae ipse alibi, et praesertim in S. I. II. q. 109. a. 6, declarat, « dicta sua in II. Sent. ad meliorem sensum reducens declarando et addendo » (ita Caietanus in locum cit.). Sed Durand. (hic q. 5.) omnino corrigendus est; qui dicit, quod speciale adiutorium et immediata motio a Deo non requiratur, et quod bonum morale iam habeat ad gratiam immediatum ordinem. Similiter iudicandum de pluribus Nominalibus. Etiam Scoti verba (IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 2. n. 14.) explicatione egent et a multis carpuntur, ut videri potest ibid. in scholio ad defensionem eius scripto. In Summa Hier. a Montefortino (p. III. q. 109. a. 6.) afferuntur dicta Scoti, quae non discordant a doctrina communi.
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Article II. On the power of free choice apart from freely given grace.
Next there is inquiry concerning the power of free choice, how far it extends apart from freely given grace. And concerning this three questions are asked.
First it is asked whether free choice, apart from freely given grace, can sufficiently dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.
Secondly it is asked whether, deprived of all grace, it can resist any temptation.
Thirdly it is asked whether it can, of itself, apart from all grace, [tend] toward a good1 in general.
Question I. Whether free choice, deprived of freely given grace, can sufficiently dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.
Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether free choice, deprived of freely given grace, can sufficiently dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing. And that it can, it seems.
1. Zechariah, chapter one2: Turn to me, and I will turn to you, says the Lord. If, then, for God to turn to us is nothing other than to impart grace; before any grace is conferred, free choice can turn to Him; but by turning itself to God it disposes itself to grace: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, Boethius3: "There is naturally implanted in us a desire for the true good": therefore, with all freely given grace set aside, the nature of the rational soul remaining intact, free choice can desire the true good; but by desiring the true good it is disposed to the gratuitous gift: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, every natural power naturally seeks its own perfection, by the very fact that it stands in need of it and is born to be completed by it4. If, then, free choice is naturally apt to be completed by the gift of grace and of glory; deprived of all grace it will desire and seek the perfection of grace. If, then, this is to dispose oneself to the grace that makes pleasing, it seems, etc.
4. Likewise, he sufficiently disposes himself to grace who does what is in him; and a man is said to do what is in him when he does that which is in his own power. But free choice, deprived of all grace, can do what is in it — for no one doubts that it can do what it can — therefore apart from all grace it can dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.
5. Likewise, free choice, deprived of freely given grace, either can do something, or nothing. If it can do nothing: then no one5 would be blameworthy on this ground, that he does not prepare himself for grace. If it can do something, let that which it can do be called A; then it is true to say that free choice has power over A; but by doing A with its whole power it prepares itself for grace; and whoever thus prepares himself, sufficiently disposes himself: therefore, etc.
6. Likewise, every sin is not only expulsive of grace, but also harmful to nature6; but every nature flees what is contrary and harmful to it: therefore free choice, deprived of all grace and left to itself, has by nature to detest and flee sin; but by detesting and fleeing fault a man disposes himself to grace: therefore, etc.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine, in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas7: "Freedom of choice remains for seeking salvation, but with God first admonishing and inviting to salvation, so that one may either choose or follow or act on the occasion of salvation, that is, of the inspiration of God": therefore it seems that our free choice can never prepare itself for the way of salvation unless it is helped by some freely given grace.
2. Likewise, servile fear is that by means of which one turns aside from evil, as it is said in Proverbs, chapter fifteen8: In fear each one turns aside from evil; but to fear in a servile way is a gift of God, and no one can dispose himself to grace unless he turns aside from evil: therefore no one can dispose himself to grace without some gift of grace.
3. Likewise, a disposition is of the same genus as that to which it disposes9: therefore one cannot dispose himself to a gratuitous good except through something freely given: therefore it is impossible that free choice, deprived of all grace, should dispose itself to it.
4. Likewise, a disposition precedes that to which it disposes: if, then, free choice could dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing through itself, then it could anticipate grace: if, therefore, this is contrary to the nature of prevenient grace, it seems, therefore, etc.
Conclusio
Free choice, deprived of every gift of freely given grace, cannot congruously dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that scarcely or never is free choice deprived of all freely given grace; for by the name of freely given grace we understand not only those things which the Apostle enumerates in the first letter to the Corinthians, chapter twelve10, To one is given through the Spirit etc., but also there is here called freely given grace whatever it be that is superadded to the natural endowments, helping in some way and preparing the will for the habit or use of grace, whether that freely given thing be a habit, such as servile fear, or a piety implanted in the inmost parts of some from infancy, or whether it be also some act, such as some calling or speaking by which God arouses the soul of man to seek Him11. — Scarcely or never indeed is anyone having the use of free choice found without this freely given grace; and without this it must be granted that free choice is never sufficiently disposed nor can dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing, as Bernard says expressly in the book On Free Choice, chapter thirteen12: "The efforts of free choice toward the good are vain, if they are not helped by grace, and null, if they are not aroused." And afterward he says that "grace arouses free choice when it sows the thought." If, then, the first disposition, which is made toward the grace that makes pleasing13, is the thought, and this is not without the gift of freely given grace; it is impossible that free choice, deprived of all grace, should dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing.
And the reason for this is the following: not because the grace that makes pleasing necessarily presupposes a disposition of freely given grace, but because it is itself something divine and a thing existing above free choice and even above the natural power of judgment14. Therefore free choice never rises either to knowing grace or to seeking it, unless it is in some way aroused from above and through some gift of freely given grace, which holds as it were a middle between the gift of the grace that makes pleasing and the natural liberty of the will. It must therefore be held that free choice, if it is aroused by some gift of freely given grace, can congruously dispose itself to the grace that makes pleasing; but if it should happen to be deprived of every such gift, it could never be disposed to it. — Hence the arguments showing this are to be granted.
To the arguments for the affirmative side:
To 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that it belongs to free choice to turn to God; it must be said that fallen free choice would never turn to God unless it were aroused by some gift of grace; and because this is at hand, therefore the Lord says: Turn to me. For by this very thing, that He invites and calls, He bestows on man some gratuitous gift, by which he is aroused, and being aroused turns in some way to Him, and being turned is accepted by God through the grace that makes pleasing; and from this God is said to turn to him.
— Hence, if anyone wishes to attend to the order of free choice and of divine grace, Augustine expressly intimates it in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas15, setting forth four steps, among which grace precedes free choice. For he says thus: "The beginning of our salvation we have by the mercy of God; that we acquiesce in the saving inspiration is of our power; that we attain what we have learned by admonition to be sought is of the divine gift; that we do not fall away, the gift of salvation having been received, is of our solicitude and equally of the heavenly help." In this saying, therefore, if anyone inspects it diligently, it is intimated very clearly how much free choice can do with respect to grace. For since in the work of salvation there are these four, namely to invite, to acquiesce, to help, and to persevere; the first is of the inspiration of God, the second of the liberty of choice, the third of the divine gift, the fourth of our solicitude16 and equally of the divine help. And by this the way is sufficiently opened for resolving the arguments that follow.
To 2. To that, however, which is objected, that a desire for the true good is implanted in us; it must be said that this is true in general; but that it should be known in particular what that good is, and be desired and sought, this is not without the gift of God. But that general desire does not suffice for disposing toward grace, as is evident in the philosophers, who greatly desired blessedness, yet never attained the grace of God17.
To 3. To that which is objected, that nature seeks its own perfection, etc.; it must be said that this is true of that perfection which is within18 the bounds of nature; but it need not be so of that which is above nature; or if it be understood of that, it seeks it in the manner in which it knows it. But of itself it does not know in particular, but only in general. And thus knowing and desiring it does not sufficiently dispose itself to the gift of grace, as was shown before.
To 4. To that which is objected, that he sufficiently disposes himself who does what is in him; it must be said that to do what is in him can be understood in two ways: in one way positively, because he does something ordered to grace, and does as much as he can; and in this way the aforesaid saying holds true. In another way it can be understood privatively, so that one is said to do what is in him because he does what he can, although that is not ordered to the reception of grace; and in this way free choice, deprived of grace, can do what is in it; and thus the aforesaid saying does not hold true.
To 5. And by this the answer to what follows is evident. For as to what is asked, whether it can do something, or nothing; it must be said that it can do something; but that something is nothing with respect to the receiving of grace, just as to be able to eat is a certain ability: yet it contributes nothing to this, that anyone should receive the gift of grace.
To 6. To that which is objected, that free choice can detest fault by the power of its own nature; it must be said that it happens in two ways to detest fault: either because it is offensive to the majesty and equity of God, or because it is harmful to one's own nature. The first manner of detesting disposes toward the grace that makes pleasing, nor is it ever without the gift of freely given grace in the state of fallen nature. For to know that by fault God is offended19 is a gift of God. In another way it is to detest sin inasmuch as it is harmful to nature, as someone detests fornication because through it he lost his sight, or incurred some other disease; and such detestation can be from the power of nature; but this does not dispose toward the grace that makes pleasing.
And thus the things asked are clear. It is also clear in what way Pelagius erred, who said that free choice not only has the power of disposing itself to the grace that makes pleasing, but also of meriting it by its own power. For he was twofold a liar: both in this that he said the first grace falls under merit, and in this that he said also that free choice can dispose itself to grace by its own strength.
I. In the three questions of this article the holy Doctor walks the royal way of truth between two extremes, of which the one, with the Pelagians, utterly detracts from the necessity of grace, while the other, with Luther, Calvin, Baius, and Jansenius, denies to fallen human nature both the cooperation of free choice in the business of salvation, and the natural powers for doing the very honorable good of the natural order.
This first question is understood concerning sufficient preparation for receiving grace (as is declared in the body) or concerning positive disposition (solution to 4). — In what sense the expression freely given grace is to be taken in this place is clearly declared in the body (see also above, d. 26, a. I, schol.); and it is worthy of note that the same is said to hold "as it were a middle between the gift of the grace that makes pleasing and the natural liberty of the will." Cf. also here, dubium 1. — In what sense this disposition is called of congruity is explained in IV Sent., d. 15, p. I, q. 5 and q. 2 (cf. also above, d. 9, q. 3). More concerning preparation for grace, see IV Sent., d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, 3; a. 2, q. 2, 3. And the response agrees very well with the decrees of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. 5 and can. 4) and of the Second Council of Orange (can. 6, 7). — Worthy of note also in the solution to 4 is the twofold explanation of the celebrated axiom: To one who does what is in him etc.
II. Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 2, a. 4) distinguishes a twofold preparation: a remote one "through any work of the genus of good things; and by such a disposition a man can dispose himself by himself"; and a proximate one "through appetite or desire or consent of grace; and by such a one a man cannot dispose himself by himself without freely given grace." The same is taught by Richard of Mediavilla (here, a. 1, q. 2) and other ancient masters; which is to be expounded according to the doctrine of our Doctor in the solution to 4. St. Thomas in his Commentary (here, a. 4) brings forward certain obscure things, which he himself elsewhere, and especially in S. I-II, q. 109, a. 6, declares, "reducing his statements in II Sent. to a better sense by declaring and adding" (so Cajetan on the passage cited). But Durandus (here, q. 5) must be entirely corrected; he says that a special help and an immediate motion from God is not required, and that moral good already has an immediate order toward grace. The like is to be judged of several Nominalists. The words of Scotus too (IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, n. 14) need explanation and are censured by many, as can be seen there in the scholion written in defense of him. In the Summa of Hieronymus of Montefortino (p. III, q. 109, a. 6) are adduced sayings of Scotus which do not disagree with the common doctrine.
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- Vat. et ed. 4 subiungunt aliquod.The Vatican edition and edition 4 subjoin aliquod ("some").
- Vers. 3. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum ed. 4, post conferatur omisso commate, pro liberum arbitrium substituit libero arbitrio, et dein disposuit pro disponit. (Zach. 1, 3.)Verse 3. — A little below, the Vatican edition with edition 4, the comma after conferatur being omitted, substitutes libero arbitrio for liberum arbitrium, and then disposuit for disponit. (Zechariah 1:3.)
- Libr. III. de Consol. prosa 2: Est enim mentibus hominum veri boni naturaliter inserta cupiditas. Vat. veri bonique.Book III of On the Consolation [of Philosophy], prose 2: "For there is naturally implanted in the minds of men a desire for the true good." The Vatican edition: veri bonique ("of the true and good").
- Sive, ut Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. (VIII. c. 8.) ait: Finis vero actus et huius gratia potentia sumitur; non enim ut visum [potentiam videndi] habeant, animalia vident; sed ut videant, visum habent.Or, as Aristotle says, Metaphysics IX, text 13 (VIII, c. 8): "But the end is the act, and for the sake of this the power is assumed; for animals do not see in order to have sight [the power of seeing], but they have sight in order to see."
- Codd. K T W aa bb cc et alii cum edd. 1, 2 nulla ratione substituunt non.Codices K T W aa bb cc and others, with editions 1, 2, without any reason substitute non.
- Cfr. infra d. 35. a. I. q. I. seqq. — De propos. seq. vide Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa II. — Circa finem arg. sola Vat. omittit et refugere; sed detestando.Cf. below, d. 35, a. I, q. I and following. — On the following proposition see Boethius, On the Consolation, III, prose II. — Near the end of the argument the Vatican edition alone omits et refugere; sed detestando ("and to flee; but by detesting").
- Cap. 21, ubi textus originalis post arbitrii adiungit id est rationalis voluntas, et, bis substituto vel pro aut, in fine legit, ut et Vat., inspiratione Dei pro inspirationis Dei.Chapter 21, where the original text after arbitrii adds id est rationalis voluntas ("that is, the rational will"), and, vel being twice substituted for aut, reads at the end, as also the Vatican edition, inspiratione Dei for inspirationis Dei.
- Vers. 27; Per timorem autem Domini declinat omnis a malo. — Quod timor servilis sit donum Dei, ostenditur III. Sent. d. 34. p. II. a. 1. q. I. (Prov. 15, 27.)Verse 27: "But by the fear of the Lord each one turns aside from evil." — That servile fear is a gift of God is shown in III Sent., d. 34, p. II, a. 1, q. I. (Proverbs 15:27.)
- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relatione, in quo inter relativa recensetur dispositio, quae a Boethio, II. Comment. super hunc loc., sic definitur: Dispositio est ad aliquam rem mobilis applicatio, ut si quisquam flammae propinquus caleat, ille dispositus dicitur ad calorem i. e. habens aliquam applicationem coniunctionemque ad calorem.Cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Relation, in which disposition is reckoned among relatives, and is thus defined by Boethius, II Commentary on this passage: "A disposition is a mobile application toward some thing, as if anyone near a flame grows warm, he is said to be disposed toward heat," that is, having some application and conjunction toward heat.
- Vers. 8.Verse 8. (1 Cor. 12:8.)
- Scilicet, ut se, i. e. Deum, quaerat. Vat. cum edd. 1, 4 ut se praeparet, codd. C O R S et alii cum ed. 2 ut se reptat, cod. L ut resipiscat; nostra lectio nititur auctoritate codd. A F (T a secunda manu) Y aa bb ee etc.That is, that it may seek itself, i. e. God. The Vatican edition with editions 1, 4 reads ut se praeparet, codices C O R S and others with edition 2 read ut se reptat, codex L ut resipiscat; our reading rests on the authority of codices A F (T by a second hand) Y aa bb ee etc.
- Num. 42; Cuius quippe conatus ad bonum et cassi sunt, si a gratia non adiuventur, et nulli, si non excitentur. Codd. et edd. allegant c. 17. — Seq. textus est ibid. c. 14. n. 47. — Paulo superius pro sufficienter disponi cod. O se disponere, alii codd., ut C R S T aa bb ee etc., cum edd. 1, 2, 3 se [i. e. a se] disponi.Number 42; "Whose efforts toward the good are indeed both vain, if they are not helped by grace, and null, if they are not aroused." Codices and editions cite c. 17. — The following text is in the same place, c. 14, n. 47. — A little above, for sufficienter disponi, codex O reads se disponere, other codices, such as C R S T aa bb ee etc., with editions 1, 2, 3 read se [i. e. a se] disponi.
- Codd. F H I T V Z aa bb ee et alii cum edd. 2, 3, 4 perperam quae fit a gratia gratum faciente.Codices F H I T V Z aa bb ee and others, with editions 2, 3, 4, wrongly read quae fit a gratia gratum faciente ("which is made by the grace that makes pleasing").
- Cfr. infra d. 39. a. I. q. 2. in fine, et I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 4. schol. II. — Edd., excepta I, iudicium. Paulo inferius pro aliquod donum Vat. adiutorium, edd. 2, 3, 4 additionem.Cf. below, d. 39, a. I, q. 2 at the end, and I Sent., d. 17, p. 1, q. 4, schol. II. — The editions, except 1, read iudicium. A little below, for aliquod donum the Vatican edition reads adiutorium, editions 2, 3, 4 read additionem.
- Cap. 21, ubi textus origin. exhibet: salutiferae pro salutari, deinde quod acquiescendo admonitioni cupimus pro quod acquirendum admonitione cognovimus, denique ab indepto pro iam adepto.Chapter 21, where the original text presents salutiferae for salutari, then quod acquiescendo admonitioni cupimus for quod acquirendum admonitione cognovimus, and finally ab indepto for iam adepto.
- Codd. K T Y et alii cum edd. 1, 2 naturae, cod. ee nostrae naturae.Codices K T Y and others, with editions 1, 2, read naturae, codex ee reads nostrae naturae.
- Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. a. I. q. 2.Cf. IV Sent., d. 49, p. I, a. I, q. 2.
- Cod. aa melius intra; sed etiam alibi a nostro auctore ista locutio in eodem sensu sumitur.Codex aa reads better intra ("within"); but elsewhere too this expression is taken by our author in the same sense.
- Cod. aa divina maiestas. Paulo inferius pro visum Vat. usum.Codex aa reads divina maiestas ("the divine majesty"). A little below, for visum the Vatican edition reads usum.