Dist. 5, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 5
ARTICULUS III.
De conversione bonorum Angelorum.
Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur de conversione bonorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur de ipsa conversione in comparatione ad suum principium. Secundo quaeritur de eadem in comparatione ad praemium.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum conversio bonorum Angelorum fuerit virtute naturae, vel auxilio gratiae.
Quaeritur igitur primo, utrum conversio bonorum1 Angelorum ad Deum fuerit virtute naturae, vel auxilio gratiae. Et quod virtute naturae, videtur:
1. Primo auctoritate Magistri in littera2: «Non indigebat Angelus gratia, per quam iustificaretur», ergo iustus erat etiam praeter gratiam; sed qui iustus est recte et ordinate convertitur ad fontem omnis iustitiae: ergo videtur, quod hoc potuerint Angeli sine auxilio gratiae.
2. Item, Philosophus in tertio de Anima3: «Intellectus semper est rectus»; sed hoc non esset, nisi rectitudo esset ei connaturalis: ergo Angeli intellectus vere et proprie de natura sua erat rectus. Sed nullus est rectus, nisi is qui sursum est conversus et qui habet caput mentis erectum ad divina: ergo videtur, quod hoc habuerit per naturam.
3. Item, facilius potest quis illud ad quod naturaliter ordinatur, quam illud ad quod non ordinatur; sed Angelus erat ordinatus ad Deum magis quam ad aliud, et natura erat ordinata in ipso: ergo cum sine aliquo adiutorio posset converti ad bonum commutabile et averti a Deo, multo fortius absque auxilio aliquo potest converti ad ipsum.
4. Item, naturale est alicui converti ad illud quod naturaliter magis diligit; sed Angelus naturali dilectione magis diligebat Deum quam aliquod creatum, ut in praecedentibus est habitum4: ergo videtur, quod naturaliter converteretur ad ipsum.
5. Item, simus in instanti conversionis et aversionis; nulla est differentia inter Angelos ante hoc instans; si ergo aliqua incipit esse differentia, hoc est5 aversione et conversione: ergo prior est aversio et conversio quam gratiae infusio: ergo conversio non potuit esse a gratia.
6. Item, si conversio fuisset a gratia et non a natura, ergo illis Angelis, qui nunquam habuerunt gratiam, sed sola naturalia, non esset imputandum, quod ad Deum non sunt conversi: ergo nec diabolus esset culpandus nec puniendus, quod Domino non adhaesit.
Ad oppositum arguitur primo auctoritate et postea demonstratione6.
1. Auctoritate sic. Magister dicit in littera7: «Conversio iustos fecit, sed aversio iniustos»; sed nihil facit iustum, nisi sit gratuitum: ergo conversio fuit a gratia. Si dicas, quod intelligit de iustitia naturali; hoc nihil est, quia illam habebant omnes Angeli a sua origine.
2. Item, conversio creaturae spiritualis ad Deum, ut dicit Augustinus8, est dies, quia ibi est fulgor cognitionis et calor affectionis; sed per naturam lux praecedit diem: cum ergo Angelus non sit lux nisi p. 155per informationem gratiae, prius suscepit gratiam, quam converteretur ad bonitatem divinam.
3. Item, non est meritum sine gratia, sicut melius patet infra9, quia non hominem propter opus, sed opus propter auctorem acceptat Deus; sed Angeli in sua conversione meruerunt, sicut alii in aversione demeruerunt: ergo etc.
4. Item, si per sola naturalia fuisset conversio, cum ergo in naturalibus praecelleret lucifer, potius videtur, quod ipse esset conversus quam alii. Si ergo non fuit conversus, non a virtute naturae fuit illa conversio, sed magis ab auxilio gratiae.
Conclusio.
Conversio bonorum Angelorum non potuit esse sine gratia.
Respondeo: Ad intelligentiam obiectorum praenotandum est, quod in conversione ad Deum attenditur rectitudo substantiae spiritualis quantum ad eius mentem, maxime ratione partis motivae10; nec potest esse recta, nisi actu vel habitu sit ad Deum conversa. Quemadmodum igitur duplex est rectitudo, sic duplex est conversio. Est enim quaedam rectitudo naturae institutae, et penes hanc est iustitia originalis; et est rectitudo gratiae, et penes hanc est iustitia meritoria, quam acceptat iudex summus ad retributionem aeternam. Et quia videt in ea pulcritudinem gratiae, merito eius11 animam traducit in sponsam, et opera eius sunt ipsi amabilia. — Sic intelligendum est, quod duplex est conversio, quaedam a naturali rectitudine, quaedam a rectitudine gratiae. Primam potuerunt habere Angeli absque gratia, sed secundam non sine gratia.
Quando igitur quaeritur, a quo principio fuerit illa conversio; dicendum est, quod12 illa conversio fuit meritoria et Deo placita; et ideo non potuit esse sine gratia. Rursus, quia per illam conversionem obtinuerunt gratiam, oportet ponere, quod conversionem illam inchoaverit voluntas libera, sed consummaverit gratia; et ideo fuit ibi gratia subsequens, non praeveniens; gratia cooperans, non operans, ut dicit Magister in littera13. — Concedendum est ergo, quod illa Angelorum conversio, in qua confirmati sunt, non fuit sine gratiae auxilio.
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non indigebat Angelus gratia iustificante; dicendum, quod iustificationis actus dupliciter intelligitur. Est enim iustificare de non-iusto facere iustum. Non-iustum autem dupliciter accipitur, scilicet privative et negative. Privative idem est non-iustum, quod iniustum, et tunc iustificare idem est quod de impio facere pium; et hoc modo non fuit gratia in Angelis ad hunc effectum. Alio modo dicitur non-iustum negative, et sic non tantum dicitur non-iustum quod habet impietatem, sed quod non habet iustitiam gratiae; et sic fuit in Angelis iustificatio per gratiam, et ab hac iustitia fuerunt opera eorum meritoria14.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus semper est rectus; iam patet responsio: nam intelligit de rectitudine naturali. Illud tamen verbum Philosophi debet intelligi, ut dicatur semper esse rectus respectu illorum ad quae movetur ut natura sive naturaliter; et sic nos dicimus in theologia synderesim semper rectam15. Si autem intelligatur respectu eorum in quae movetur ut deliberans, falsum est; immo, circumscripto omni imaginabili et phantasmate, posset intellectus peccare sive praevaricari, sicut forte fecit angelicus.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod facilius potest quis in id ad quod ordinatur etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, si illud sit intra16 terminos naturae; sed converti conversione perfecta et meritoria, hoc est supra naturam; sed deficere hoc est infra; ideo ratio illa non cogit. — Vel dic, quod illud est verum, quando genus operis, ad potentiam comparatum, est aequalis difficultatis, si in se consideretur; alias non habet veritatem, sicut patet in multis exemplis17.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de conversione, quod sequitur dilectionem; dicendum, quod uniformiter sumta conversione cum ipsa dilectione, non habet instantiam. Sicut enim quaedam dilectio est a voluntate naturali, ut18 qua desideratur Deus ut beatificans; quaedam a voluntate electiva, qua quis optat Deo honorem et gloriam; quaedam a gratuita, qua in obsequium divinum captivatur ipsa voluntas tota: sic et conversio per appetitum concupiscentiae est a natura; conversio per affectum amicitiae est a voluntate deliberativa sive electiva; conversio vero per obsequium obedientiae gratae est ab ipsa gratia. Et sic patet illud. p. 156
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in nullo differebant; dicendum, quod illud concludit, quod gratia non inchoaverit, sed non excludit, quin confirmaverit19; et hoc est verum.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non esset imputandum malis, si conversio esset a gratia; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia stare poterant et non averti, si volebant; et ideo aversio eis imputatur in culpam20.
I. Non defuerunt qui, male intelligentes aliqua huius quaestionis verba, non sint veriti traducere S. Bonaventuram et etiam S. Thomam tanquam Pelagianismo faventes. Hinc ut sententia S. Doctoris recte intelligatur, haec observamus.
1. S. Bonav. cum sententia tunc communiore supponit, Angelos non simul cum creatione etiam gratiam sanctificantem accepisse (supra d. 4. a. 1. q. 2.); voluntatem autem eorum ab instanti creationis quoad appetitum naturalem ad Deum conversam fuisse, ita ut facile etiam per motum deliberativum et liberum Deo super omnia naturali dilectione adhaerere potuerint (hic ad 4, et supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.). Hinc sequitur, quod Angelus cum solo concursu Dei generali se convertere potuerit ad Deum ut auctorem naturae. Attamen «non potuit mereri ex his quae acceperat» (supra d. 4. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6.), et quidem nec gratiam sanctificantem nec gloriam supernaturalem, immo proprie loquendo, ne dispositionem quidem potuit acquirere sufficientem ad infusionem gratiae sanctificantis (infra d. 28. a. 2. q. 1.).
2. Verba (in corp.): «Ideo fuit ibi gratia subsequens, non praeveniens, gratia cooperans, non operans, ut dicit Magister in littera», quo sensu secundum modum loquendi illius aetatis accipienda sint, tangitur hic dub. 2, et diffusius explicatur infra d. 27. dub. 1. in fine. Ex quo patet, quod ista divisio respicit gratiam sanctificantem secundum duplicem eius effectum (cfr. etiam infra d. 26. q. 6; d. 4. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et 6.). Unde Richard. a Med. (I. Sent. d. 6. a. 2. q. 1.) secundum mentem Seraphici dicit: «Quod conversio bonorum Angelorum per naturam fuit inchoata, et per gratiam gratum facientem promota et facta placita, et per gloriam consummata; et quamvis inter illa non fuerit ordo secundum prius et posterius in duratione, tamen inter illa fuit prius et posterius ordine naturae».
3. De dispositione proxima et congrua ad infusionem gratiae sanctificantis hic explicite nihil dicitur; unde applicanda sunt principia infra d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. proposita; et verba, quod «conversionem illam inchoaverit voluntas libera, sed consummaverit gratia» [sanctificans], non intelligenda sunt ita, ut excludatur auxilium supernaturale actuale, sed tantum habituale, si auctor loquatur de motu voluntatis, quatenus est proprie dispositio congrua ad susceptionem gratiae sanctificantis, et quatenus implicat conversionem ad Deum ut finem supernaturalem (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 62. a. 2.). Vel dicendum esset, quod loquatur de motu voluntatis, non quatenus est dispositio sufficiens ad gratiam sanctificantem, sed de sola substantia actus, sive de conversione ad finem naturalem. In hoc sensu plures antiqui intelligendi esse videntur, quando negant, gratiam gratis datam necessariam esse ad hanc conversionem. Ita Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.) dicit: «Nec fuit necessaria gratia gratis data, vel gratum faciens ad eliciendam substantiam actus, sicut quidam dixerunt, cum natura sana esset et integra, nulli subiecta vitio vel culpae» (cfr. Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.). In hoc etiam sensu, ni fallimur, explicari potest modus loquendi in Comment. S. Thomae (hic q. 2. a. 1.), qui differt ab eo quem adhibet in Summa (loc. cit.), quia in illo explicite negat, necessariam esse gratiam gratis datam, a qua elicitur substantia actus, et quae liberum arbitrium inclinat ad volendum. Sed istam gratiam ponere non videtur necessarium, nisi ipsa libertas arbitrii gratia dicatur, quae procul dubio nobis a Deo est. Deinde dicit: «Ad eliciendum actum conversionis sufficit liberum arbitrium, quod se ad habendam gratiam per hunc actum praeparat et disponit; sed efficacia conversionis ad meritum non potest esse nisi per gratiam. Unde unus et idem motus est conversionis liberi arbitrii, in quo gratia infunditur, qui est dispositio ad gratiam, secundum quod exit a libero arbitrio, et meritorius, secundum quod gratia informatur». Etiam B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. m. 4.) ait: «In actum meritorium non potuit Angelus ex solis naturalibus, sed indiguit gratia cooperante, quae stantibus est apposita ex merito congrui, non ex merito condigni. Congruum enim fuit, ut illis qui ex solis naturalibus bonum aeternum elegerunt, apponeretur gratia, qua illud efficaciter obtinere possent». De quo textu observandum est, terminum meritum congrui ab antiquis Scholasticis saepe accipi in sensu largissimo, ut iam observavit P. Trigosus (cfr. d. 41. a. 1. q. 4.), et accuratius cl. Dr. Scheeben, in praeclaro opere: Handbuch der Kathol. Dogmatik, t. II. § 172 n. 964.
II. Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. II. q. 10. m. 2. — Loci Scoti collecti ab Hier. de Montefortino t. II. q. 62. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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ARTICLE III.
On the conversion of the good Angels.
Consequently, in the third place, it is asked about the conversion of the good [Angels]. And concerning this two [things] are asked. First it is asked about the conversion itself in comparison to its principle. Secondly it is asked about the same in comparison to the reward.
QUESTION I.
Whether the conversion of the good Angels was by the power of nature, or by the help of grace.
It is asked, then, first, whether the conversion of the good1 Angels to God was by the power of nature, or by the help of grace. And that [it was] by the power of nature, it seems:
1. First, by the authority of the Master in the text2: «The Angel did not need a grace by which he might be justified», therefore he was just even apart from grace; but he who is just is rightly and orderly converted to the fount of all justice: therefore it seems that the Angels could [do] this without the help of grace.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the third [book] On the Soul3: «The intellect is always right»; but this would not be unless rightness were connatural to it: therefore the Angel's intellect was truly and properly of its own nature right. But no one is right except he who is converted upward and who has the head of the mind erect toward divine things: therefore it seems that he had this by nature.
3. Likewise, one can more easily [attain] that to which he is naturally ordered, than that to which he is not ordered; but the Angel was ordered to God more than to anything else, and nature was ordered in him: therefore, since without any aid he could be converted to a changeable good and averted from God, much more strongly can he without any help be converted to him.
4. Likewise, it is natural for someone to be converted to that which he naturally loves more; but the Angel by natural love loved God more than any creature, as has been had in the preceding4: therefore it seems that he would naturally be converted to him.
5. Likewise, let us be at the instant of conversion and aversion; there is no difference among the Angels before this instant; if therefore some difference begins to be, this is by aversion and conversion5: therefore the aversion and conversion is prior to the infusion of grace: therefore the conversion could not be from grace.
6. Likewise, if the conversion had been from grace and not from nature, then to those Angels who never had grace, but only natural [gifts], it would not be imputable that they were not converted to God: therefore neither would the devil be blameworthy or punishable for not having adhered to the Lord.
To the opposite it is argued first by authority and then by demonstration6.
1. By authority thus. The Master says in the text7: «The conversion made [them] just, but the aversion [made them] unjust»; but nothing makes [one] just unless it be gratuitous: therefore the conversion was from grace. If you say that he means [it] of natural justice; this is nothing, because all the Angels had that from their origin.
2. Likewise, the conversion of a spiritual creature to God, as Augustine says8, is day, because there is the brightness of cognition and the warmth of affection; but by nature light precedes day: since therefore the Angel is not light except p. 155through the information of grace, he first received grace before he was converted to the divine goodness.
3. Likewise, there is no merit without grace, as is clearer below9, because God accepts not the man on account of the work, but the work on account of the author; but the Angels merited in their conversion, just as the others demerited in [their] aversion: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if the conversion had been by natural [gifts] alone, since then Lucifer excelled in natural [gifts], it rather seems that he would be converted rather than the others. If therefore he was not converted, that conversion was not by the power of nature, but rather by the help of grace.
Conclusion.
The conversion of the good Angels could not be without grace.
I respond: For the understanding of the objections it must be premised that in conversion to God the rightness of the spiritual substance is considered with respect to its mind, especially by reason of the motive part10; nor can it be right unless it be converted to God in act or in habit. As therefore rightness is twofold, so conversion is twofold. For there is a certain rightness of instituted nature, and according to this is original justice; and there is a rightness of grace, and according to this is meritorious justice, which the supreme judge accepts for eternal retribution. And because he sees in it the beauty of grace, by its merit11 he leads the soul into a bride, and its works are lovable to him. — Thus it must be understood that conversion is twofold, one from natural rightness, one from the rightness of grace. The first the Angels could have without grace, but the second not without grace.
When therefore it is asked from what principle that conversion was; it must be said that12 that conversion was meritorious and pleasing to God; and therefore it could not be without grace. Again, because through that conversion they obtained grace, it must be posited that the free will began that conversion, but grace consummated [it]; and therefore there was there a subsequent grace, not a preceding one; a cooperating grace, not an operating one, as the Master says in the text13. — It must therefore be conceded that that conversion of the Angels, in which they were confirmed, was not without the help of grace.
To 1. To that, then, which is objected, that the Angel did not need a justifying grace; it must be said that the act of justification is understood in two ways. For to justify is to make just out of the non-just. But non-just is taken in two ways, namely privatively and negatively. Privatively, non-just is the same as unjust, and then to justify is the same as to make pious out of the impious; and in this way there was not grace in the Angels for this effect. In another way non-just is said negatively, and thus non-just is said not only [of] that which has impiety, but [of] that which does not have the justice of grace; and thus there was in the Angels justification through grace, and from this justice their works were meritorious14.
To 2. To that which is objected, that the intellect is always right; the response is now clear: for he means [it] of natural rightness. Yet that word of the Philosopher must be understood so that it is said always to be right with respect to those things to which it is moved as nature or naturally; and thus in theology we say that synderesis is always right15. But if it is understood with respect to those things into which it is moved as deliberating, it is false; nay, with everything imaginable and [every] phantasm circumscribed, the intellect could sin or transgress, as perhaps the angelic [intellect] did.
To 3. To that which is objected, that one can more easily [attain] that to which he is ordered etc.; it must be said that it is true, if that be within16 the bounds of nature; but to be converted by a perfect and meritorious conversion, this is above nature; but to fail is below; therefore that argument does not compel. — Or say that that is true when the kind of work, compared to the power, is of equal difficulty, if it be considered in itself; otherwise it does not have truth, as is clear in many examples17.
To 4. To that which is objected concerning conversion, that it follows love; it must be said that, conversion being taken uniformly with love itself, it has no instance [against it]. For just as a certain love is from the natural will, as18 [that] by which God is desired as beatifying; a certain [love] from the elective will, by which one wishes honor and glory to God; a certain [love] from the gratuitous [will], by which the whole will itself is taken captive into the divine service: so also conversion by the appetite of concupiscence is from nature; conversion by the affection of friendship is from the deliberative or elective will; but conversion by the service of pleasing obedience is from grace itself. And so that is clear. p. 156
To 5. To that which is objected, that they differed in nothing; it must be said that that concludes that grace did not begin [it], but does not exclude that it confirmed19 [it]; and this is true.
To 6. To that which is objected, that it would not be imputable to the evil [Angels], if the conversion were from grace; it must be said that it is false, because they could stand and not be averted, if they willed; and therefore the aversion is imputed to them as a fault20.
I. There were not lacking those who, ill understanding some words of this question, did not shrink from traducing St. Bonaventure and also St. Thomas as favoring Pelagianism. Hence, that the opinion of the holy Doctor may be rightly understood, we observe these things.
1. St. Bonaventure, with the then more common opinion, supposes that the Angels did not receive sanctifying grace at the same time as [their] creation (above, d. 4, a. 1, q. 2); but that their will, from the instant of creation, was, as to the natural appetite, converted to God, so that they could easily, even by a deliberative and free motion, adhere to God above all things by natural love (here ad 4, and above, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1). Hence it follows that the Angel, with the general concurrence of God alone, could convert himself to God as the author of nature. Yet «he could not merit from those things which he had received» (above, d. 4, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6), and indeed neither sanctifying grace nor supernatural glory, nay, properly speaking, he could not even acquire a disposition sufficient for the infusion of sanctifying grace (below, d. 28, a. 2, q. 1).
2. The words (in the body): «Therefore there was there a subsequent grace, not a preceding one, a cooperating grace, not an operating one, as the Master says in the text», in what sense they are to be taken according to the manner of speaking of that age, is touched here in dub. 2, and is more diffusely explained below, d. 27, dub. 1, at the end. From which it is clear that this division regards sanctifying grace according to its twofold effect (cf. also below, d. 26, q. 6; d. 4, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1 and 6). Whence Richard of Mediavilla (I Sent., d. 6, a. 2, q. 1), according to the mind of the Seraphic [Doctor], says: «That the conversion of the good Angels was begun through nature, and through grace making [them] pleasing was promoted and made pleasing, and through glory consummated; and although among those there was no order according to prior and posterior in duration, yet among those there was prior and posterior by order of nature».
3. Concerning the proximate and congruous disposition to the infusion of sanctifying grace nothing is here explicitly said; whence the principles proposed below, d. 28, a. 2, q. 1, are to be applied; and the words, that «the free will began that conversion, but grace consummated [it]» [sanctifying], are not to be understood so that supernatural actual help is excluded, but only habitual, if the author speaks of the motion of the will, insofar as it is properly a congruous disposition to the reception of sanctifying grace, and insofar as it implies conversion to God as a supernatural end (cf. St. Thomas, S. I, q. 62, a. 2). Or it would have to be said that he speaks of the motion of the will, not insofar as it is a disposition sufficient for sanctifying grace, but of the substance of the act alone, or of conversion to a natural end. In this sense several of the ancients seem to be understood, when they deny that grace freely given is necessary for this conversion. Thus Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 1) says: «Neither was a grace freely given, or making [one] pleasing, necessary for eliciting the substance of the act, as some have said, since the nature was sound and entire, subject to no vice or fault» (cf. Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1). In this sense too, unless we are mistaken, can be explained the manner of speaking in the Commentary of St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 1), which differs from that which he uses in the Summa (loc. cit.), because in the former he explicitly denies that a grace freely given is necessary, from which the substance of the act is elicited, and which inclines the free will to willing. But to posit that grace does not seem necessary, unless the very liberty of choice be called a grace, which without doubt is to us from God. Then he says: «For eliciting the act of conversion the free will suffices, which by this act prepares and disposes itself to having grace; but the efficacy of the conversion unto merit cannot be except through grace. Whence one and the same is the motion of the conversion of the free will, in which grace is infused, which is the disposition to grace, according as it goes forth from the free will, and meritorious, according as it is informed by grace». Albert also (S. p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, m. 4) says: «The Angel could not [come] to a meritorious act from natural [gifts] alone, but needed a cooperating grace, which is applied to those who stand from the merit of congruity, not from the merit of condignity. For it was congruous that to those who from natural [gifts] alone chose the eternal good, grace should be applied, by which they might efficaciously obtain it». Concerning which text it must be observed that the term merit of congruity is often taken by the ancient Scholastics in the broadest sense, as P. Trigosus has already observed (cf. d. 41, a. 1, q. 4), and more accurately the renowned Dr. Scheeben, in the excellent work: Handbuch der Kathol. Dogmatik, t. II, § 172, n. 964.
II. Besides those praised: Alexander of Hales, on this and the following q., S. p. II, q. 10, m. 2. — The places of Scotus collected by Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. II, q. 62, a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.
- Ita codd. F K V bb; multi alii cum Vat. beatorum.Thus codices F K V bb; many others, with the Vatican edition, [read] beatorum.
- Hic c. 4.Here, chapter 4.
- Text. 51. (c. 10.): Intellectus igitur omnis rectus est. — Mox plures codd. cum ed. 1 angelicus intellectus pro Angeli intellectus. In fine argum. cod. T a natura pro per naturam. — De definitione recti, quae mox affertur, cfr. S. Bernard., in Cant. Cant. serm. 24. n. 6. seq., ex quo iam supra pag. 124, nota 3. quaedam proposuimus.Text 51 (c. 10): Therefore every intellect is right. — Soon, several codices with edition 1 [read] angelicus intellectus for Angeli intellectus. At the end of the argument codex T [reads] a natura for per naturam. — On the definition of the right, which is soon adduced, cf. St. Bernard, on the Song of Songs, sermon 24, n. 6 ff., from which we have already proposed some things above, p. 124, note 3.
- Dist. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.Distinction 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1.
- Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 haec est.Some codices, with edition 1, [read] haec est.
- Ita cod. U, quae lectio confirmatur incongrua lectione ceterorum codd. et edd. 1, 2 qui, retenta voce primo, omittunt postea. Vat. omittit primo et postea.Thus codex U, which reading is confirmed by the incongruous reading of the other codices and editions 1, 2 which, retaining the word primo, omit postea. The Vatican edition omits primo and postea.
- Hic c. 1.Here, chapter 1.
- Libr. IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 22. n. 39. seqq.; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. — De conclusione cfr. August., I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 32.Book IV On Genesis according to the letter, c. 22, n. 39 ff.; XI On the City of God, c. 7. — On the conclusion cf. Augustine, I On Genesis according to the letter, c. 17, n. 32.
- Dist. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Vat. post Item bene addit demonstratione sic; certe supplendum. Paulo inferius plures codd. pro propter auctorem substituunt propter hominem. Circa finem argumenti cod. bb voci aversione praemittit sua.Distinction 29, a. 1, q. 1 ff. — The Vatican edition after Item well adds demonstratione sic; certainly to be supplied. A little below, several codices substitute propter hominem for propter auctorem. Near the end of the argument codex bb prefixes sua to the word aversione.
- Sive voluntatis. — De iis quae sequuntur, cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1.Or of the will. — On those things which follow, cf. below, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1.
- Plurimi codd. cuius, incongrue.Very many codices [read] cuius, incongruously.
- Codd. U Y, hic addito quia, paulo inferius ante ideo omittunt et, quod etiam in aliis non paucis codd. et ed. 1 deest.Codices U Y, with quia added here, a little below before ideo omit et, which is also lacking in not a few other codices and edition 1.
- Hic c. 3. et 4.Here, chapters 3 and 4.
- Eodem modo respondet Magister, hic c. 4.The Master responds in the same way, here, c. 4.
- De synderesi fusius infra d. 39. a. 2.On synderesis more fully below, d. 39, a. 2.
- Multi codd. cum ed. 1 perperam infra, inter quos est cod. V, qui paulo inferius cum edd. 2, 3 pro infra substituit contra.Many codices with edition 1 wrongly [read] infra, among which is codex V, which a little below, with editions 2, 3, substitutes contra for infra.
- Sub quo respectu Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. ait: «Nam facilius est quodlibet fecisse, quam bene fecisse; manifestum igitur, quoniam peccatum circa hoc plusculum, eo quod laboriosius». Et ibid. VII. c. 3. (c. 4.): Facilius est corrumpere quam facere, et destruere quam construere. Cfr. etiam Anselm., Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 3, ubi hoc ostendit de potentia videndi, ad quam plura requiruntur, quam ad non videndum.Under which respect Aristotle, VI Topics, c. 1, says: «For it is easier to have done anything than to have done [it] well; it is manifest therefore that the sin [is] about this little more, in that it is more laborious». And ibid., VII, c. 3 (c. 4): It is easier to corrupt than to make, and to destroy than to construct. Cf. also Anselm, Dialogue on free choice, c. 3, where he shows this concerning the power of seeing, for which more is required than for not seeing.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt ut.Codex cc and edition 1 omit ut.
- Vat. consummavit.The Vatican edition [reads] consummavit.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5.