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Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 33

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO II.

Utrum primus parens potuerit satisfacere pro posteris, sicut potuit eos ex culpa sua vitiare.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum primus parens pro posteris suis potuerit satisfacere, sicut potuit eos ex culpa sua vitiare. Et quod sic, videtur.

Ad oppositum.

1. Anselmus de Conceptu virginali, capitulo vigesimo quarto: « Si Adam nequisset ad eos quos generaturus erat, iustitiam suam producere1, nequaquam posset ad eos iniustitiam transmittere »: si ergo hoc verum est, sequitur, quod si Adam potuit sua culpa filios reddere culpabiles, sua satisfactione potuit eos facere excusabiles.

2. Item, omnes in Adam peccaverunt, quia fuerunt in Adam peccante: ergo pari ratione, si omnes fuerunt in Adam satisfaciente, videtur, quod omnes in ipso satisfecerunt per locum a simili2.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. « Si oppositum est causa oppositi, ergo propositum est causa propositi3 »; sed Adae transgressio fuit causa nostrae corruptionis: ergo videtur, quod eius iustificatio et satisfactio fuerit causa nostrae reparationis. Sicut igitur in Adam peccavimus, ita videtur, quod in eodem satisfecerimus. — Et istae tres rationes sumtae sunt per locum a simili.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per locum a minori4. Pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum; sed divina iustitia pro transgressione Adae condemnavit totam posteritatem poena mortalitatis: ergo multo fortius divina misericordia pro satisfactione Adae debuit reddere gratiam iustificationis.

5. Item, potentior est gratia in bono, quam sit culpa in malo; sed culpa Adae potuit totam posteritatem inficere et reddere Deo odiosam: ergo multo

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fortius gratia, quae fuit collata Adae, potuit totam posteritatem reparare et reddere Deo gratam.

6. Item, secundum leges humanas tutor potius potest pupilli conditionem meliorare quam deteriorare. Si ergo multo maioris benignitatis est lex divina, quam sit humana; videtur, quod potius conditio nostra in primo parente5 de peiori potuit fieri melior, quam de meliori deterior: ergo si transgrediendo potuit transfundere culpam, multo fortius satisfaciendo potuit transmittere iustitiam.

Sed contra:

Fundamenta.

1. Statim Adam, cum peccavit, ab immortalitate cecidit in necessitatem moriendi: ergo si gratia superveniens non aufert immutabilitatem divinae sententiae, remansit igitur post gratiam mortalis. Sed mortalis de necessitate generat mortalem: ergo quantumcumque Adam satisfaceret, generaret filios suos morti obnoxios. Sed nulla creatura rationalis est morti obnoxia nisi propter culpam6: ergo nunquam potuit satisfacere, quin transmitteret culpam.

2. Item, iustitia originalis consistit in quadam mentis et carnis integritate; sed quia virginitas dicit incorruptionem mentis et carnis, ex quo semel perditur, nunquam per satisfactionem potest recuperari: ergo pari ratione neque originalis iustitiae donum per satisfactionem recuperatur. Si ergo ex illius iustitiae privatione est in nobis originalis culpa, impossibile fuit, quod Adam satisfaceret pro posteritate sua.

3. Item, omnis satisfactio peccatoris fundatur super gratiam gratum facientem; sed gratia gratum faciens nunquam potest transire ab uno homine in alium, sicut in primo libro7 probatum est, sed gratia immediate a solo Deo datur: videtur ergo, quod in primo parente satisfacere non potuerit genus humanum.

4. Item, efficacior est in unoquoque fides sua sibi et gratia, quam sit alii; sed Adam non potuit pro se ipso satisfacere, sed opportunum fuit, Filium Dei pati, sicut ostendit Anselmus in libro Cur Deus homo8: ergo non videtur, quod potuerit satisfactionis iustitiam in alios derivare.

Conclusio.

Impossibile fuit, Adam pro posteris suis satisfacere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum tota posteritas in Adam potuerit satisfacere, sicut in eo potuit vitiari, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod Adam posteris communicaret et9 culpam et satisfactionem simul; aut ita, quod communicaret satisfactionem, sed non culpam; aut ita, quod in se satisfaceret et pro se, ita quod posteris non communicaret culpam. (Conclusio 1.) — Primi duo modi non solum sunt impossibiles, sed etiam non intelligibiles, quia claudunt in se duo opposita. Si enim Adam communicasset posteris simul culpam et satisfactionem, simul essent culpabiles et satisfacerent: ergo simul essent iusti et iniusti. — Similiter, si communicaret satisfactionem, et non culpam: ergo innocentes satisfacerent; et hoc similiter non est intelligibile, non enim fit satisfactio nisi pro offensa; et si Adam non communicaret posteris culpam, ipsi haberent omnimodam innocentiam; et si hoc, locum non haberet in eis satisfactio aliqua; pro innocente enim satisfacere non est intelligibile. — (Conclusio 2.) Tertius autem modus dicendi, videlicet quod Adam sic satisfaceret pro culpa sua, ut sua satisfactione impediretur transfusio originalis culpae, etsi intelligibilis sit, impossibilis tamen fuit ipsi Adae.

Et ratio huius melius reddetur in tertio10, cum agetur de modo redemptionis humanae. Ad praesens autem hoc dixisse sufficiat, quod Adam sic satisfacere non poterat, ut impediretur transfusio culpae originalis in posteritatem suam. (Triplex ratio.) Et ratio huius sumitur et a parte ipsius Adae et a parte gratiae et a parte corruptionis naturae. A parte Adae, quoniam ipse debitor mortis erat et dignus poenalitate et miseria; et ideo, quamcumque mortem vel poenam sustineret pro transgressione sua, Deo satisfacere non poterat sufficienter. — A parte vero gratiae, per quam satisfaciebat, ratio sumitur, quoniam illa gratia erat gratia poenitentialis, quae quidem respiciebat ipsam voluntatem personae; et ideo per ipsam non curabatur morbus concupiscentiae, quae11 radicabatur in carne; et propterea, quantumcumque satisfaceret, remanebat natura corrupta, et ita necessitas ad transfundendam originalem culpam. — Ex parte vero naturae sumitur ratio, quia, cum natura humana tota in ipso vitiata esset, tantum pensabatur illa corruptio naturae, quanti pretii est tota humana natura; et ideo quidquid Adam faceret, longe inferius esset eo quod exigebat Deus ad tantae corruptionis et damnationis recompensationem; et ideo pro illa non poterat satisfacere.

(Additur 4. ratio.) Posset etiam12 nihilominus assignari ratio ex parte divinae offensae, quae, cum esset infinita ratione eius, quia est contra infinitum, non recipiebat recompensationem, nisi aliquis satisfaceret, qui esset infinite bonus. Et ideo non indocte dicunt aliqui, quod non solum satisfactio pro peccato Adae, sed

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etiam pro quocumque alio peccato fundata est super meritum et satisfactionem Christi, in cuius fide et Sacramentis Deus parcit quibuscumque parcit. Et ideo contingit, omnes de plenitudine eius accipere et ipsum dici caput totius Ecclesiae, tam finalis quam primitivae13. — Patet igitur, quod quocumque modo dicatur, impossibile fuit, Adam pro posteris satisfacere. Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Anselmi, quod si nequisset iustitiam producere..... etc.; dicendum, quod Anselmus loquitur ibi de iustitia originali, et illam dicit quod Adam et servare potuit posteris et transfundere. Hoc autem intelligendum est (Notandum.) sane, non quia aliqua qualitas, quae esset in anima Adae, per multiplicationem ad posteros descenderet, sed quia anima Adae innocens coniuncta fuerat carni purae et immaculatae; et si stetisset, anima potuisset illam carnem servare et a corruptione mortis et a corruptione libidinis; et haec rectitudo erat originalis iustitia. Si autem in hac Adam perstitisset, cum generaret posteros, carnem immaculatam transfunderet. Et similiter, dum anima creata a Deo innocens tali carni uniretur, illud idem posse14 et eandem rectitudinem haberet, quam habuit anima Adae, et per hoc originalem iustitiam. Et pro tanto originalis iustitia transfundi dicitur, quia, si hanc habet pater, necesse est, quod hanc habeat filius; et hoc est ex ratione bonae dispositionis ex parte carnis, quam originalis iustitia concernit. Non sic est de iustitia satisfactionis, quae voluntatem respicit, non carnis integritatem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut fuimus in Adam peccante, ita fuimus in ipso satisfaciente; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia peccatum Adae, pro eo quod illam iustitiam originalem privabat, non tantum respiciebat personam, sed etiam naturam. Sed quia illa15 satisfactio illam innocentiam non restituebat, personam, non naturam respiciebat; et ideo non sic in posteros redundare potuit satisfactio, sicut redundavit ibi transgressio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si oppositum est causa oppositi etc.; dicendum, quod istud (Notandum.) intelligendum est in his oppositis, quorum utrumque est aliqua natura, et in eis quae recte16 sunt opposita, et secundum illud, in quo opponuntur. Et (Desunt 3 conditiones.) ratione huius triplicis conditionis illa propositio non habet locum in proposito. Primum quidem, quia culpa non dicit aliquam naturam17, sed potius privationem. — Secundo vero, quia iustitia satisfactionis non directe opponitur culpae originali, sed potius originalis iustitia; et si illa originalis iustitia fuisset in Adam generante, fuisset causa oppositi. — Tertio vero, quia culpa ipsius Adae opponitur ipsi satisfactioni, in quantum corrumpebat personam, non in quantum corrumpebat naturam; et in quantum corrumpebat personam, meritum erat aeternae damnationis; in quantum vero corrumpebat naturam, principium erat universalis corruptionis. Iustitia ergo satisfactionis auferebat ab ipso Adam meritum aeternae damnationis; et secundum illud opponebatur ei et erat causa oppositi, videlicet aeternae beatitudinis per modum meriti; vitium autem corruptionis non auferebat nec eius oppositum causabat, quia secundum illud non opponebatur ei.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum; (Notandum.) dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi misericordia sic habet locum, quod non excludit iustitiam. Iustitia autem requirebat maiorem satisfactionem, quam Adam posset facere; et ideo misericordia pro illa modica satisfactione Adae non debebat toti generi humano donare offensam, sed quod nobis et sibi deerat decebat eum supplere; quod et fecit, cum propter nimiam caritatem suam Filium suum unigenitum misit in similitudinem carnis peccati, et cum essemus mortui peccatis, convivificavit nos Christo18.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentior est gratia, quam sit culpa; responderi potest dupliciter: primo, quod illud intelligendum est respectu illius effectus, ad quem gratia ordinatur. Gratia autem gratum faciens, ipsi Adae collata, non ordinabatur ad removendam carnis corruptionem, sed voluntatis deordinationem, quia reformativa erat imaginis, non reparativa carnis. Nihilominus tamen in reparatione carnis potentior est aliquo modo quam culpa, dum per gratiam meretur homo secundam stolam19. — (Alia solutio.) Aliter potest dici, quod etsi gratia potentior sit quam culpa, non tamen sequitur, quod totum reformet, quod culpa destruxit. Multo enim « facilius est destruere quam construere20 ». Unde unus malus cibus aliquando plus corrumpit naturam, quam centum bonae medicinae possint eam reparare, quamvis medicinae illae sint valde potentes et virtuosae.

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6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de lege pupillorum, dicendum, quod Adam ad posteros non comparatur sicut tutor ad pupillos, sed sicut pater ad filios. Unde sicut pater facilius potest bona sua dissipare et destruere, et per consequens hereditatem filiorum suorum devastare, quam possit illam post devastationem et consumtionem reparare; sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere.

Scholion

I. S. Bonav. (hic in corp.) ipse observat, hanc quaestionem magis determinari in tractatu de Incarnatione (III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 2-4.). Posita autem est ipsa hoc loco, quia nonnulla de iustitia originali et de propagatione eiusdem ac iniustitiae originalis dicta in eadem illustrantur ac determinantur. — De hac quaest. in hoc tractatu tantum tractat Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 31. q. 1. a. 2. — Quoad ipsam doctrinam cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 1. m. 5; S. Thom., S. III. q. 1. a. 2. 4, et alii commentatores Magistri in III. Sent. d. 20.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

Whether the first parent could make satisfaction for his posterity, just as he could vitiate them by his own fault.

Secondly it is asked, whether the first parent could make satisfaction for his posterity, just as he could vitiate them by his own fault. And that he could, it seems.

To the opposite.

1. Anselm, On the Virginal Conception, chapter twenty-four: « If Adam had not been able to produce1 justice in those whom he was going to generate, he could in no way transmit injustice to them »: if therefore this is true, it follows that, if Adam was able by his fault to render his sons culpable, by his satisfaction he was able to render them excusable.

2. Likewise, all sinned in Adam, because they were in Adam when he sinned: therefore by parity of reasoning, if all were in Adam when he made satisfaction, it seems that all made satisfaction in him by a place from the like2.

3. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [to follow] by reason. « If the opposite is the cause of the opposite, then the proposed is the cause of the proposed3 »; but Adam's transgression was the cause of our corruption: therefore it seems that his justification and satisfaction was the cause of our reparation. As therefore we sinned in Adam, so it seems that we made satisfaction in the same. — And these three reasons are taken by a place from the like.

4. Likewise, this same [thing] is shown by a place from the lesser4. God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn; but the divine justice, for Adam's transgression, condemned the whole posterity with the penalty of mortality: therefore much more strongly ought the divine mercy, for Adam's satisfaction, to have rendered the grace of justification.

5. Likewise, grace is more powerful in good than fault is in evil; but Adam's fault was able to infect the whole posterity and render it odious to God: therefore much more

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strongly was the grace, which was conferred on Adam, able to repair the whole posterity and render it pleasing to God.

6. Likewise, according to human laws a guardian is rather able to better the condition of his ward than to worsen it. If therefore the divine law is of much greater benignity than the human, it seems that rather our condition in the first parent5 could be made better from a worse [state] than [be made] worse from a better: therefore if by transgressing he was able to transfuse fault, much more strongly by making satisfaction was he able to transmit justice.

On the contrary:

Fundamenta.

1. As soon as Adam sinned, he fell from immortality into the necessity of dying: therefore if supervening grace does not take away the immutability of the divine sentence, he remained, then, mortal after grace. But a mortal of necessity generates a mortal: therefore however much Adam might make satisfaction, he would generate his sons subject to death. But no rational creature is subject to death except on account of fault6: therefore he could never make satisfaction without transmitting fault.

2. Likewise, original justice consists in a certain integrity of mind and flesh; but since virginity bespeaks an incorruption of mind and flesh, once it is lost it can never be recovered by satisfaction: therefore by parity of reasoning neither is the gift of original justice recovered by satisfaction. If therefore original fault is in us from the privation of that justice, it was impossible that Adam should make satisfaction for his posterity.

3. Likewise, every satisfaction of a sinner is founded upon sanctifying grace; but sanctifying grace can never pass from one human to another, as was proved in the first book7, but grace is given immediately by God alone: it seems therefore that the human race could not make satisfaction in the first parent.

4. Likewise, in each one his own faith and grace are more efficacious for himself than for another; but Adam could not make satisfaction for himself, but it was needful that the Son of God should suffer, as Anselm shows in the book Why God [Became] Man8: therefore it does not seem that he could derive the justice of satisfaction unto others.

Conclusion.

It was impossible for Adam to make satisfaction for his posterity.

I respond: It must be said that, when it is asked whether the whole posterity could make satisfaction in Adam, just as it could be vitiated in him, this can be understood in three ways: either thus, that Adam should communicate to his posterity both9 fault and satisfaction at once; or thus, that he should communicate satisfaction, but not fault; or thus, that he should make satisfaction in himself and for himself, in such a way that he should not communicate fault to his posterity. (Conclusion 1.) — The first two modes are not only impossible, but also unintelligible, because they enclose in themselves two opposites. For if Adam had communicated to his posterity at once fault and satisfaction, they would be at once culpable and would be making satisfaction: therefore they would be at once just and unjust. — Likewise, if he should communicate satisfaction, and not fault: then the innocent would be making satisfaction; and this likewise is not intelligible, for satisfaction is not made except for an offense; and if Adam should not communicate fault to his posterity, they would have complete innocence; and if so, no satisfaction would have place in them; for to make satisfaction for an innocent [person] is not intelligible. — (Conclusion 2.) But the third mode of speaking, namely that Adam should so make satisfaction for his fault that by his satisfaction the transfusion of original fault should be impeded, although it is intelligible, was nevertheless impossible for Adam himself.

And the reason of this will be better rendered in the third [book]10, when treatment is made of the mode of human redemption. But for the present let it suffice to have said this, that Adam could not so make satisfaction that the transfusion of original fault into his posterity should be impeded. (A threefold reason.) And the reason of this is taken both on the part of Adam himself, and on the part of grace, and on the part of the corruption of the nature. On the part of Adam, because he himself was a debtor of death and worthy of penalty and misery; and therefore, whatever death or penalty he might sustain for his transgression, he could not sufficiently make satisfaction to God. — But on the part of grace, by which he made satisfaction, the reason is taken because that grace was a penitential grace, which indeed regarded the will itself of the person; and therefore through it the disease of concupiscence was not cured, which11 was rooted in the flesh; and on that account, however much he might make satisfaction, the nature remained corrupted, and thus the necessity of transfusing original fault. — But on the part of the nature the reason is taken because, since the whole human nature was vitiated in him, that corruption of nature was weighed at as much as the whole human nature is worth in price; and therefore whatever Adam might do would be far inferior to what God demanded for the recompense of so great a corruption and damnation; and therefore for it he could not make satisfaction.

(A fourth reason is added.) Nonetheless a reason could also12 be assigned on the part of the divine offense, which, since it was infinite by reason of this, that it is against the infinite, did not admit of recompense, unless someone should make satisfaction who was infinitely good. And therefore not unlearnedly do some say that not only satisfaction for the sin of Adam, but

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also for any other sin whatsoever is founded upon the merit and satisfaction of Christ, in whose faith and Sacraments God spares whomsoever he spares. And therefore it comes about that all receive of his fullness and that he is called the head of the whole Church, both of the final and of the primitive [Church]13. — It is clear therefore that, in whatever way it be said, it was impossible for Adam to make satisfaction for his posterity. Whence the reasons showing this are to be granted.

Solution of the opposing [arguments].

1. To that which is objected concerning the word of Anselm, that if he had not been able to produce justice... etc.; it must be said that Anselm there speaks of original justice, and says of it that Adam could both preserve it for his posterity and transfuse it. But this is to be understood (To be noted.) soundly, not as if some quality which was in the soul of Adam should descend to his posterity through multiplication, but because the innocent soul of Adam had been joined to pure and immaculate flesh; and, if he had stood [firm], the soul could have preserved that flesh both from the corruption of death and from the corruption of lust; and this rectitude was original justice. But if Adam had persisted in this, when he generated posterity, he would transfuse immaculate flesh. And likewise, while a soul created innocent by God should be united to such flesh, it could have14 that same [power] and the same rectitude which the soul of Adam had, and through this original justice. And to that extent original justice is said to be transfused, because, if the father has this, it is necessary that the son have this; and this is from the ground of the good disposition on the part of the flesh, which original justice concerns. It is not so with the justice of satisfaction, which regards the will, not the integrity of the flesh.

2. To that which is objected, that as we were in Adam when he sinned, so we were in him when he made satisfaction; it must be said that it is not similar, because the sin of Adam, in that it deprived [him] of that original justice, regarded not only the person, but also the nature. But because that15 satisfaction did not restore that innocence, it regarded the person, not the nature; and therefore satisfaction could not so redound upon the posterity as the transgression redounded there.

3. To that which is objected, that if the opposite is the cause of the opposite etc.; it must be said that this is (To be noted.) to be understood in those opposites, of which each is some nature, and in those things which are properly16 opposed, and according to that in which they are opposed. And (Three conditions are lacking.) by reason of this threefold condition that proposition does not have place in the matter proposed. First indeed, because fault does not bespeak any nature17, but rather a privation. — Secondly, because the justice of satisfaction is not directly opposed to original fault, but rather original justice [is]; and if that original justice had been in Adam when generating, it would have been the cause of the opposite. — Thirdly, because the fault of Adam himself is opposed to satisfaction itself insofar as it corrupted the person, not insofar as it corrupted the nature; and insofar as it corrupted the person, it was the merit of eternal damnation; but insofar as it corrupted the nature, it was the principle of universal corruption. The justice of satisfaction therefore took away from Adam himself the merit of eternal damnation; and according to that it was opposed to it and was the cause of the opposite, namely of eternal beatitude by way of merit; but the vice of corruption it did not take away, nor did it cause the opposite of it, because according to that it was not opposed to it.

4. To that which is objected, that God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn; (To be noted.) it must be said that this is true where mercy has place in such a way that it does not exclude justice. But justice required a greater satisfaction than Adam could make; and therefore mercy, for that slight satisfaction of Adam, ought not to have remitted the offense for the whole human race, but what was lacking to us and to him it was fitting that he should supply; which also he did, when on account of his exceeding charity he sent his only-begotten Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and when we were dead in sins, he made us alive together in Christ18.

5. To that which is objected, that grace is more powerful than fault; it can be answered in two ways: first, that this is to be understood with respect to that effect to which grace is ordained. But sanctifying grace, conferred on Adam himself, was not ordained to removing the corruption of the flesh, but the disorder of the will, because it was reformative of the image, not reparative of the flesh. Nevertheless in the reparation of the flesh it is in some manner more powerful than fault, while through grace the human merits the second stole19. — (Another solution.) It can be said otherwise, that even if grace be more powerful than fault, it does not nevertheless follow that it should reform the whole which fault destroyed. For « it is much easier to destroy than to construct20 ». Whence one bad food sometimes corrupts the nature more than a hundred good medicines could repair it, although those medicines be very potent and efficacious.

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6. To that which is objected concerning the law of wards, it must be said that Adam is not compared to his posterity as a guardian to wards, but as a father to sons. Whence just as a father can more easily squander and destroy his goods, and consequently devastate the inheritance of his sons, than he can repair it after the devastation and consumption; so also in the matter proposed it is to be understood to be.

Scholion

I. S. Bonaventure (here in the body) himself observes that this question is more fully determined in the treatise on the Incarnation (III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 2-4.). But it is placed here because certain [things] said about original justice and about the propagation of the same and of original injustice are illustrated and determined in the same. — Of this question in this treatise only Petrus a Tarantasia treats, II. Sent. d. 31. q. 1. a. 2. — As to the doctrine itself, cfr. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 1. m. 5; St. Thomas, Summa III. q. 1. a. 2. 4, and the other commentators of the Master on III. Sent. d. 20.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. cum textu origin. et edd. 3, 4 hic, sicut in corp. quaest. praeced., perducere pro producere. Cfr. de hoc supra pag. 783, nota 6.
    The Vatican [edition] with the original text and edd. 3, 4 here, just as in the body of the preceding question, [reads] perducere for producere. Cfr. concerning this above p. 783, note 6.
  2. Qui locus a simili secundum Boeth., III. de Differ. topic. hac exprimitur propositione: « De similibus idem est iudicium ». Cfr. Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Locis topicis. — Pro satisfecerunt cod. cc et ed. 1 satisfecerint.
    Which place from the like, according to Boethius, III. On Topical Differences, is expressed by this proposition: « Of like [things] the judgment is the same ». Cfr. Peter of Spain, Summulae, tract on Topical Places. — For satisfecerunt cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] satisfecerint.
  3. Huius axiomatis verba qualiter in Aristot. habeantur, vide supra pag. 763, nota 2. Pro ergo propositum omnes edd. et propositum, et paulo inferius, excepta 1, redemptionis pro reparationis.
    As to how the words of this axiom are had in Aristotle, see above p. 763, note 2. For ergo propositum all the editions [read] et propositum, and a little below, except 1, redemptionis for reparationis.
  4. De hoc modo argumentandi cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5. Pro a minori cod. M a maiori. — August., Serm. 18 (alias 220 de Tempore) c. 2. n. 2: Non enim amat Deus damnare, sed salvare. — Paulo inferius pro mortalitatis edd., excepta 1, nec non aliqui codd. mortis.
    Concerning this mode of arguing cfr. tom. I. p. 835, note 5. For a minori cod. M [reads] a maiori. — Augustine, Sermon 18 (alias 220 On the Season) c. 2. n. 2: For God does not love to condemn, but to save. — A little below, for mortalitatis the editions, except 1, as well as some codices [read] mortis.
  5. Cod. aa de ipso parente.
    Cod. aa [reads] de ipso parente.
  6. Vide supra pag. 714, nota 4.
    See above p. 714, note 4.
  7. Dist. 14. a. 2. q. 2, ubi ostensum est, omnino falsum et impossibile esse, gratiam sive Spiritum sanctum dari ab homine sicut a principio effectivo.
    Dist. 14. a. 2. q. 2, where it was shown that it is wholly false and impossible that grace or the Holy Spirit be given by a human as by an effective principle.
  8. Libr. I. c. 20. 23. 25; II. c. 6. 15. 17. seqq. — De maiori vide supra pag. 661, nota 6.
    Book I. c. 20. 23. 25; II. c. 6. 15. 17. seqq. — On the major [premise] see above p. 661, note 6.
  9. Vat. et edd. 3, 4 hic omittunt ita, et paulo ante cum multis codd. post aut ita voculam quod.
    The Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 here omit ita, and a little before, with many codices, [omit] after aut ita the little word quod.
  10. Dist. 20. q. 3. seq.
    Dist. 20. q. 3. seq.
  11. Codd. F Y ee qui; subinde pro radicabatur cod. F radicatur.
    Codd. F Y ee [read] qui; thereupon for radicabatur cod. F [reads] radicatur.
  12. Cod. aa tamen. Mox pro ratione eius, quia cod. T ratione eius, quod.
    Cod. aa [reads] tamen. Presently for ratione eius, quia cod. T [reads] ratione eius, quod.
  13. Ioan. 1, 16: Et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus. Eph. 1, 22: Et ipsum dedit caput super omnem Ecclesiam; et ibid. 5, 23: Sicut Christus caput est Ecclesiae. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro dici Vat. dedit.
    John 1, 16: And of his fullness we have all received. Eph. 1, 22: And he gave him as head over the whole Church; and ibid. 5, 23: As Christ is the head of the Church. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 1. — For dici the Vatican [edition reads] dedit.
  14. Edd., excepta 1, posset. Subinde Vat. omittit eandem.
    The editions, except 1, [read] posset. Thereupon the Vatican [edition] omits eandem.
  15. In codd. K T Y aa cc et aliis nec non in ed. 1 deest illa; in cod. bb sic legitur: sed quia satisfactio illa innocentiam etc. Post pauca pro redundavit codd. T V substituunt redundat.
    In codd. K T Y aa cc and others, as well as in ed. 1, illa is lacking; in cod. bb it reads thus: sed quia satisfactio illa innocentiam etc. After a few [words], for redundavit codd. T V substitute redundat.
  16. Vox recte hic idem dicit ac directe, ut ex subnexis apparet.
    The word recte ("rightly") here says the same as directe ("directly"), as appears from what is subjoined.
  17. Edd. 2, 3 positionem, Vat. positionem sine naturam. Paulo inferius pro sed potius originalis iustitia codd. cum primis edd. perperam sed potius originali iustitiae. Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1. ad 6.
    Edd. 2, 3 [read] positionem, the Vatican [edition] positionem without naturam. A little below, for sed potius originalis iustitia the codices with the first editions wrongly [read] sed potius originali iustitiae. Cfr. below a. 2. q. 1. ad 6.
  18. Vide Eph. 2, 4; Rom. 8, 3; Eph. 2, 5. Vulgata: convivificavit nos in Christo.
    See Eph. 2, 4; Rom. 8, 3; Eph. 2, 5. The Vulgate [reads]: he made us alive together in Christ.
  19. Id est glorificationem corporis, quod quatuor ornatur dotibus, scil. agilitate, claritate, subtilitate et impassibilitate. Opponitur haec secunda stola primae, quae significat ornamentum animae, quod consistit in visione, tentione et fruitione (cfr. III. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.).
    That is, the glorification of the body, which is adorned with four endowments, namely agility, clarity, subtlety, and impassibility. This second stole is opposed to the first, which signifies the adornment of the soul, which consists in vision, holding, and fruition (cfr. III. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. in the body).
  20. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.). Vide supra pag. 155, nota 9.
    Aristotle, VII. Topics c. 3 (c. 4). See above p. 155, note 9.
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