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Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 33

Textus Latinus
p. 782

ARTICULUS I.

De originali quoad causam praecedentem.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum peccata proximorum parentum filiis imputentur vel ad eos transmittantur.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccata parentum proximorum filiis imputentur vel ad eos transmittantur. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate, Exodi vigesimo1: Ego sum Deus zelotes, vindicans peccata patrum in filios etc.: si ergo Deus non vindicat nisi pro culpa, et vindicta Dei transit a patre in filium, pari ratione videtur, quod culpa.

2. Item, hoc videtur exemplo, tertii Regum decimo quarto2: Ego inducam malum super Ieroboam et super universam domum eius; et ibi habetur, quomodo tota posteritas propter peccatum patris fuit consumta: ergo videtur, quod peccata proximorum parentum filiis imputentur.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. « In habentibus symbolum facilior est transitus3 »; sed maius est symbolum et convenientia parentis proximi ad prolem quam parentis remoti: si igitur parens remotus potuit culpam transmittere in posteros, multo fortius videtur de parentibus propinquis.

4. Item, parens proximus transmittit peccatum in filium, quod aliunde suscepit; sed magis unusquisque potest communicare quod habet a se, quam quod habet ab alio: ergo videtur, quod multo fortius ad prolem possit transmittere peccatum, quod commisit, si transmittere potest peccatum, quod aliunde contraxit.

5. Item, ideo peccatum Adae transit ad posteros, quia in Adam fuimus, cum ipse peccavit4: ergo pari ratione, si parens proximus peccavit, quando proles eius erat in lumbis eius; videtur similiter, quod peccatum parentis proximi in prolem transfundatur.

6. Item, ratio, quare peccatum originale transfunditur, est, quia est infectio virtutis generativae circa actum generandi5: ergo si aliquod peccatum consistit circa actum generationis, videtur, quod tale debeat in prolem transfundi. Sed tale est peccatum adulterii: ergo videtur, quod saltem illud peccati genus debeat in posterum redundare, ac per hoc peccatum originale intendere et multiplicare.

Sed contra:

Ad oppositum.

1. Ezechielis decimo octavo6: Filius non portabit iniquitatem patris: ergo si hoc non est verum de parente remoto, ut de Adam, saltem veritatem habet circa propinquos.

2. Item, ad Galatas sexto7: Unusquisque onus suum portabit; sed si peccata parentum redundarent in prolem, non portaret unusquisque onus suum, immo etiam onus alterius: ergo etc. Et iterum alibi: Unusquisque pro se rationem reddet Deo.

3. Item, Anselmus de Conceptu virginali, capitulo vigesimo quarto: « Parentum proximorum peccata ad originale peccatum non aestimo pertinere »; sed si transfunderentur a parente in prolem, pertinerent ad originale peccatum: ergo etc.

4. Item, non est maior ratio, quare transfundit iniustitiam quam iustitiam; sed pater sanctus non generat filium sanctum, et baptizatus non generat baptizatum, sicut ostensum fuit supra8: ergo pari ratione parens proximus peccatum suum non transmittit ad prolem.

5. Item, nullum peccatum transmittitur a parente in prolem, nisi mediante carne9; sed peccata actualia, quae committuntur, carnem non immutant nec nova infectione inficiunt: ergo videtur, quod ad prolem transmitti non possint.

6. Item, si peccata actualia transmitterentur a parente in prolem: ergo filius semper esset peior patre et dignus maiori punitione. Si ergo est magnae crudelitatis et impietatis dicere, quod parvulus natus peior sit iniquo parente; patet etc.

CONCLUSIO.

Peccata actualia proximorum parentum ad originale non pertinent nec cum originali transfunduntur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod peccatum parentum transire ad prolem potest intelligi tripliciter: aut punitione, aut imitatione, aut transfusione. — Si punitione, ut proles puniatur pro peccato paren-

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tis, sic attendendum est, quod duplex est punitio: una aeterna et alia temporalis. Quantum ad punitionem aeternam nullo modo transit, videlicet quod aliquis damnetur pro solo peccato parentis. Unde Anselmus de Conceptu virginali10 dicit, quod parvuli non damnantur pro culpa Adae tantum, sed pro culpa propria, quam habent, licet non habeant eam agendo, sed contrahendo. Si autem loquamur de temporali punitione, sic, quia pater punitur in filio, sicut ad litteram videmus, et Scriptura11 ostendit, bene transit peccatum parentis in prolem, sive prole volente sive nolente, et hoc est de severitate divinae iustitiae. — Alio modo dicitur peccatum transire a parente in prolem per imitationem. Et sic peccatum diaboli quodam modo transivit in genus humanum, et peccatum Adae in posteros, et peccata proximorum parentum in filios frequenter pertranseunt, iuxta illud Sapientiae secundo12: Invidia diaboli mors introivit etc.; non tamen transit in omnes, sed in eos qui imitari volunt. — Tertio modo dicitur peccatum transire a parente in prolem, et hoc transfusione, sicut infectio nova13 causari habet ab alia infectione; et hoc modo peccatum transfundi habet in prolem a solo primo parente.

Ratio autem huius est, quia duo sunt in peccato, videlicet privatio debiti et conversio indebita; et secundum hoc duo ponuntur in peccato: deformitas et macula. Macula namque ponitur ex conversione, sed deformitas ex debiti privatione, manente obligatione. Ad hoc igitur, quod aliquis possit peccatum ex patre contrahere, necesse est, quod in illo possit ad aliquid obligari, et possit eo bono, ad quod obligatur, in ipso privari, et quod possit etiam maculari; hoc autem solum fuit in primo parente. Ad aliquid enim tota humana natura, et omnes eius posteri in illo obligati fuerunt, videlicet ad habendam rectitudinem iustitiae sive non concupiscendum; et in illo per eius aversionem illa rectitudine privati sumus. Et quia illa obligatio14 carnem suam infecit infectione foeditatis et passione mortalitatis; et caro nostra habet propagari ex illa: hinc est, quod in illo habemus infici, et ab ipso traducimus singulariter peccatum secundum plenam rationem. In nullo autem posterorum nova obligatione obligantur filii in parente, nec etiam caro transfundenda inficitur nova infectione ex alicuius culpae actualis perpetratione. Et hinc est, quod nullus parens proximus potest in prolem suam culpam actualem transfundere.

Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Conceptu virginali, capitulo vigesimo quarto. « Parentum proximorum peccata ad originale peccatum non aestimo pertinere. Quippe si Adam nequisset ad eos quos generaturus erat, iustitiam suam traducere15, nequaquam posset iniustitiam suam eis transmittere ». — Hoc autem intelligit, quantum est de transfusione culpae, ad quam consequitur aeterna damnatio; sed de transitu quantum ad punitionem temporalis poenae subiungit in fine capituli: « Non nego, propter merita bona parentum filiis multa et magna beneficia corporis et animae impendi, et propter peccata parentum filios et nepotes usque in tertiam et quartam generationem, et forsitan ultra, diversis in hac vita tribulationibus flagellari et ea perdere bona in corpore et in anima16, quae forsitan consequerentur, si iusti fuissent; quorum exemplum longum est hic inserere ».

Ex his igitur patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Concedendum est enim, quod peccata actualia proximorum parentum ad originale non pertinent nec cum originali transfunduntur, sicut rationes ad secundam partem inductae ostendunt.

1. 2. Nihilominus tamen aliquo modo transeunt quantum ad vindictam et punitionem temporalem, sicut primo probatur auctoritate Exodi et deinde exemplo.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur per rationem, quod facilior est transitus in habentibus symbolum: dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando utrobique aequaliter salvatur ratio principii agentis. Peccans autem actualiter non habet potestatem vitiandi prolem, nisi ille solus, in quo habuimus obligari, et in quo tota massa generis humani potuit vitiari, sicut ostensum est; et ideo illud non cogit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur17: transmittit quod aliunde suscepit; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod transmittat illud quod est a se. Peccatum enim, quod aliunde suscepit, est peccatum naturale; sed peccatum, quod ipse facit, est peccatum personale; communicatio autem alicuius proprietatis per

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viam generationis plus respicit virtutem naturae18 quam actum personae, sicut supra ostensum est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ideo peccavimus in Adam, quia fuimus in ipso, dum peccavit; dicendum, quod ista non est tota causa, sed simul cum hoc exigitur, quod in primo parente omnes posteri possent obligari, et caro omnium posterorum posset infici et foedari; hoc autem in alio quam in Adam non habet reperiri: ideo patet etc.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum adulterii attenditur circa actum generativae; dicendum, quod etsi circa actum generativae attendatur, non tamen dicit corruptionem, quae sit in ipsa virtute generativa secundum se, sed quae consistit circa voluntatem rationalem, et ita circa personam; et propter hoc culpa adulterii, secundum quod culpa19, in prolem transfundi non habet. Nihilominus tamen, quia circa actum generativae consistit, plus imputatur proli quam alia peccata parentum; unde vilis et abiectus reputatur ille qui natus est de adulterio, et etiam secundum leges humanas hereditate paterna reputatur indignus. Unde illud peccatum plus redundat in prolem quam alia actualia, non tamen sic redundat, ut primi parentis culpa, quae posteritatem suam non tantum obligavit ad ignorantiam et poenam, sed etiam foedavit peccati originalis macula, ob quam quilibet, cum nascitur, dignus est ira et indignus visione Dei.

Scholion

I. Hac quaestione bene illustratur differentia, quae est inter peccatum originans (scilicet primum peccatum protoparentum) et peccatum actuale parentum posterorum. S. Bonav. de transmissione peccati parentum agit simul quoad culpam et quoad poenam, dum de his non pauci magistri distinctis quaestionibus disputant. In doctrina omnes satis conveniunt. — Notandum autem est, quod S. Bonav. in alio sensu accipit vocem maculam ac S. Thomas. Ab illo enim macula accipitur esse illa deordinatio virium, quae consequitur conversionem inordinatam ad creaturas; deformitas autem intelligitur esse spoliatio vel privatio debitae iustitiae, quae respondet aversioni (hic in corp., infra d. 42. dub. 1; IV. Sent. d. 18. p. I. dub. 1.). Sed S. Thomae macula potius est defectus seu privatio gratiae (II. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. a. 1. in corp.; S. I. II. q. 109. a. 7. in corp.). Tamen uterque voci macula interdum etiam largiorem sensum tribuere videtur, ita ut comprehendat utrumque v. g. S. Bonav., IV. Sent. d. 20. p. I. dub. 6, S. Thom., loc. cit. q. 86. a. 1. 2.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 5. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. II. q. 81. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 107. m. 1. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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English Translation

ARTICLE I.

On the original [sin] as to its preceding cause.

QUESTION I.

Whether the sins of proximate parents are imputed to children or transmitted to them.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether the sins of proximate parents are imputed to children or transmitted to them. And that they are, it seems:

1. First, by authority, Exodus, twentieth [chapter]1: I am a jealous God, avenging the sins of the fathers upon the sons etc.: if therefore God does not avenge except for guilt, and God's vengeance passes from the father into the son, by parity of reasoning it seems that the guilt [does so too].

2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by example, third [book] of Kings, fourteenth [chapter]2: I will bring evil upon Jeroboam and upon his whole house; and there it is recorded how the whole posterity was consumed on account of the father's sin: therefore it seems that the sins of proximate parents are imputed to children.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason. « Among things having a common bond the passing-over is easier3 »; but greater is the common bond and the affinity of the proximate parent to the offspring than of the remote parent: if therefore the remote parent was able to transmit guilt into his descendants, much more strongly does it seem [so] concerning near parents.

4. Likewise, the proximate parent transmits into the son a sin which he received from elsewhere; but each one can the more communicate what he has of himself than what he has from another: therefore it seems that much more strongly can he transmit to the offspring the sin which he committed, if he can transmit the sin which he contracted from elsewhere.

5. Likewise, the sin of Adam passes to his descendants for the reason that we were in Adam when he sinned4: therefore by parity of reasoning, if the proximate parent sinned when his offspring was in his loins; it seems likewise that the sin of the proximate parent is transfused into the offspring.

6. Likewise, the reason why original sin is transfused is that it is an infection of the generative power as regards the act of generating5: therefore if any sin consists as regards the act of generation, it seems that such a sin ought to be transfused into the offspring. But such is the sin of adultery: therefore it seems that at least that kind of sin ought to redound into the descendant, and thereby intensify and multiply original sin.

On the contrary:

To the opposite.

1. Ezekiel, eighteenth [chapter]6: The son will not bear the iniquity of the father: therefore if this is not true of the remote parent, as of Adam, at least it holds true concerning near parents.

2. Likewise, to the Galatians, sixth [chapter]7: Each one will bear his own burden; but if the sins of parents redounded into the offspring, each one would not bear his own burden, but rather even the burden of another: therefore etc. And again elsewhere: Each one will render an account for himself to God.

3. Likewise, Anselm, On the Virginal Conception, chapter twenty-fourth: « The sins of proximate parents I do not judge to pertain to original sin »; but if they were transfused from the parent into the offspring, they would pertain to original sin: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, there is no greater reason why he transfuses injustice than justice; but a holy father does not beget a holy son, and a baptized [father] does not beget a baptized [son], as was shown above8: therefore by parity of reasoning the proximate parent does not transmit his own sin to the offspring.

5. Likewise, no sin is transmitted from the parent into the offspring except by the mediation of the flesh9; but actual sins, which are committed, do not change the flesh nor infect it with a new infection: therefore it seems that they cannot be transmitted to the offspring.

6. Likewise, if actual sins were transmitted from the parent into the offspring: therefore the son would always be worse than the father and deserving of greater punishment. If therefore it is of great cruelty and impiety to say that a newborn child is worse than the wicked parent; it is evident etc.

Conclusion.

The actual sins of proximate parents do not pertain to original [sin] nor are transfused along with the original [sin].

I respond: It must be said that the sin of parents passing to the offspring can be understood in three ways: either by punishment, or by imitation, or by transfusion. — If by punishment, so that the offspring is punished for the sin of the par-

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ent, then it is to be attended to that punishment is twofold: one eternal and the other temporal. As to eternal punishment it in no way passes over, namely that anyone be damned for the sin of the parent alone. Whence Anselm, On the Virginal Conception10, says that little children are not damned for the guilt of Adam only, but for the proper guilt which they have, although they do not have it by acting, but by contracting. But if we speak of temporal punishment, then, because the father is punished in the son, as we see to the letter, and as Scripture11 shows, the sin of the parent does indeed pass into the offspring, whether the offspring is willing or unwilling, and this is from the severity of divine justice. — In another way sin is said to pass from the parent into the offspring by imitation. And thus the sin of the devil in a certain manner passed into the human race, and the sin of Adam into his descendants, and the sins of proximate parents frequently pass through into the children, according to that [text] of Wisdom, second [chapter]12: By the envy of the devil death entered etc.; yet it does not pass into all, but into those who are willing to imitate. — In a third way sin is said to pass from the parent into the offspring, and this by transfusion, just as a new infection13 is caused by another infection; and in this way sin is to be transfused into the offspring from the first parent alone.

But the reason for this is that there are two things in sin, namely the privation of what is due and the undue turning-toward; and according to this two things are posited in sin: deformity and stain. For the stain is posited from the turning-toward, but the deformity from the privation of what is due, the obligation remaining. To this end, therefore, that anyone may be able to contract sin from a father, it is necessary that in him it be possible to be obligated to something, and that he be able in the good to which he is obligated to be deprived in himself, and that he be able also to be stained; but this was only in the first parent. For to something the whole human nature, and all his descendants in him, were obligated, namely to having the rectitude of justice or to not concupiscing; and in him by his turning-away we were deprived of that rectitude. And because that obligation14 infected his flesh with the infection of foulness and the suffering of mortality; and our flesh is to be propagated from that: hence it is that in him we have [the capacity] to be infected, and from him we draw down in a singular way the sin according to its full character. But in none of the descendants are the children obligated by a new obligation in a parent, nor even is the flesh to be transmitted infected with a new infection from the perpetration of anyone's actual guilt. And hence it is that no proximate parent can transfuse his actual guilt into his offspring.

And this is what Anselm says in the book On the Virginal Conception, chapter twenty-fourth. « The sins of proximate parents I do not judge to pertain to original sin. For indeed, if Adam had not been able to transmit his justice15 to those whom he was going to beget, he could in no way transmit his injustice to them ». — But this he understands as far as concerns the transfusion of guilt, upon which eternal damnation follows; but concerning the passing-over as to the punishment of temporal penalty he adds at the end of the chapter: « I do not deny that, on account of the good merits of parents, many and great benefits of body and soul are bestowed upon children, and that on account of the sins of parents, children and grandchildren even to the third and fourth generation, and perhaps beyond, are scourged in this life with diverse tribulations and lose those goods of body and soul16 which perhaps they would have obtained, had they been just; an example of which it is too long to insert here ».

From these things, therefore, the response to the question proposed is evident. For it must be conceded that the actual sins of proximate parents do not pertain to original [sin] nor are transfused along with the original [sin], as the reasons adduced for the second part show.

1. 2. Nevertheless they do in some manner pass over as to vengeance and temporal punishment, as is first proved by the authority of Exodus and then by the example.

3. To that, however, which is objected by reason, that the passing-over is easier among things having a common bond: it must be said that that is true when on both sides the character of the acting principle is equally preserved. But the one who sins actually does not have the power of vitiating the offspring, except he alone in whom we had [the capacity] to be obligated, and in whom the whole mass of the human race could be vitiated, as was shown; and therefore that [argument] does not compel.

4. To that which is objected17: he transmits what he received from elsewhere; it must be said that from this it does not follow that he transmits that which is of himself. For the sin which he received from elsewhere is a natural sin; but the sin which he himself does is a personal sin; but the communication of any property by

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the way of generation regards the power of nature18 more than the act of the person, as was shown above.

5. To that which is objected, that we sinned in Adam for the reason that we were in him when he sinned; it must be said that this is not the whole cause, but together with it there is required that in the first parent all the descendants could be obligated, and the flesh of all the descendants could be infected and defiled; but this is not to be found in any other than Adam: therefore it is evident etc.

6. To that which is objected, that the sin of adultery is considered as regards the generative act; it must be said that although it is considered as regards the generative act, yet it does not state a corruption which is in the generative power itself in itself, but one which consists as regards the rational will, and so as regards the person; and on account of this the guilt of adultery, insofar as it is guilt19, is not to be transfused into the offspring. Nevertheless, because it consists as regards the generative act, it is imputed to the offspring more than the other sins of parents; whence vile and abject is reckoned he who is born of adultery, and even according to human laws he is reckoned unworthy of paternal inheritance. Whence that sin redounds into the offspring more than other actual [sins], yet it does not so redound as the guilt of the first parent, which not only obligated his posterity to ignorance and punishment, but also defiled [it] with the stain of original sin, on account of which everyone, when he is born, is worthy of wrath and unworthy of the vision of God.

Scholion

I. By this question the difference is well illustrated which is between originating sin (namely the first sin of the protoparents) and the actual sin of later parents. S. Bonaventure treats of the transmission of the parents' sin at once as to guilt and as to punishment, whereas not a few masters dispute about these things in distinct questions. In doctrine all agree well enough. — But it is to be noted that S. Bonaventure takes the word stain in a different sense than St. Thomas. For by him stain is taken to be that disordering of the powers which follows the inordinate turning-toward creatures; but deformity is understood to be the despoiling or privation of due justice, which corresponds to the turning-away (here in the body, below d. 42. dub. 1; IV. Sent. d. 18. p. I. dub. 1.). But for St. Thomas the stain is rather a defect or privation of grace (II. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. a. 1. in the body; S. I. II. q. 109. a. 7. in the body). Yet each seems sometimes to attribute also a broader sense to the word stain, so that it comprehends both, e.g. S. Bonaventure, IV. Sent. d. 20. p. I. dub. 6, St. Thomas, in the cited place q. 86. a. 1. 2.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 106. m. 5. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. II. q. 81. a. 2. — B. Albert, Summa p. II. tr. 18. q. 107. m. 1. a. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 5. — Paulo superius pro vel ad eos edd. et ad eos.
    Verse 5. — A little above, for vel ad eos ("or to them") the editions [read] et ad eos ("and to them").
  2. Vers. 10: Idcirco ecce ego inducam mala super domum Ieroboam et percutiam de Ieroboam etc.
    Verse 10: Therefore behold, I will bring evils upon the house of Jeroboam and will strike down [the males] of Jeroboam etc.
  3. Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 25. (c. 4.). Symbolum (σύμβολα) dicit cognationem, convenientiam, sive, ut S. Bonav., IV. Sent. d. 20. p. I. q. 4. ad 1. exponit, similitudinem. Aristoteles loc. cit. voce symboli significat convenientiam, quam elementa habent inter se respectu primarum qualitatum (calidum, frigidum, siccum et humidum) et ratione cuius unum elementum facilius convertitur in aliud, ut ex. gr. ignis facilius convertitur in aerem quam in aquam.
    Aristotle, II. On Generation and Corruption text 25. (c. 4.). Symbolum (σύμβολα) signifies kinship, affinity, or, as S. Bonaventure expounds in IV. Sent. d. 20. p. I. q. 4. ad 1., likeness. Aristotle in the cited place by the word symbol signifies the affinity which the elements have among themselves in respect of the primary qualities (hot, cold, dry, and moist) and by reason of which one element is more easily converted into another, as for example fire is more easily converted into air than into water.
  4. Ut supra ostensum est d. 30. a. 1. q. 2.
    As was shown above d. 30. a. 1. q. 2.
  5. Cfr. supra d. 31. a. 1. q. 3. — Paulo inferius pro in posterum Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 in posteros.
    Cfr. above d. 31. a. 1. q. 3. — A little below, for in posterum the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] in posteros.
  6. Vers. 20.
    Verse 20.
  7. Vers. 5. — Seq. textus est Rom. 14, 12, ubi Vulgata post Unusquisque addit nostrum.
    Verse 5. — The following text is Rom. 14, 12, where the Vulgate after Unusquisque ("each one") adds nostrum ("of us").
  8. Dist. 32. a. 1. q. 2.
    Dist. 32. a. 1. q. 2.
  9. Vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.
    See above d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.
  10. Cap. 26, ubi obiicienti, quod parvuli eadem ratione, qua damnantur propter peccatum Adae, damnari deberent etiam propter peccata parentum, respondet: Consideret diligenter, quia non portant infantes peccatum Adae, sed suum. Nam aliud fuit peccatum Adae, aliud est peccatum infantum, quia differunt, ut dictum est: illud enim fuit causa, istud est effectus. Adam caruit debita iustitia, non quia alius, sed quia ipse deseruit. Infantes carent ea, non quoniam ipsi, sed quoniam alius dereliquit. Non est ergo idem peccatum Adae et infantum... Quapropter, cum damnatur infans pro peccato originali, damnatur non pro peccato Adae, sed pro suo. Nam si ipse non haberet suum peccatum, non damnaretur... Haec autem causa, quae fuit in Adam, ut infantes in peccato nascantur, non est in aliis parentibus etc.
    Chapter 26, where, to one objecting that little children, by the same reasoning by which they are damned on account of Adam's sin, ought also to be damned on account of the sins of their parents, he replies: Let him consider diligently that infants do not bear the sin of Adam, but their own. For the sin of Adam was one thing, the sin of the infants is another, since they differ, as has been said: for the former was a cause, the latter is an effect. Adam lacked due justice, not because another, but because he himself deserted [it]. The infants lack it, not because they themselves, but because another abandoned [it]. It is therefore not the same sin, Adam's and the infants'... Wherefore, when an infant is damned for original sin, he is damned not for Adam's sin, but for his own. For if he himself did not have his own sin, he would not be damned... But this cause, which was in Adam, that infants are born in sin, is not in the other parents etc.
  11. Vers. 24.
    Verse 24.
  12. Vat. cum paucis codd. ima.
    The Vatican [edition] with a few codices [reads] ima.
  13. Vat. cum textu originali perducere.
    The Vatican [edition] with the original text [reads] perducere ("to lead through").
  14. Ita codd. et edd., sed omnino videtur legendum obligatio vel privatio, cum sermo sit de effectu peccati in ipso Adam.
    Thus the codices and editions, but it seems altogether that one should read obligatio or privatio, since the discourse is about the effect of sin in Adam himself.
  15. Cod. bb producere, quod verbum in seq. quaest. arg. 1. ad opposit. omnes codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 exhibent, quodque secundum Maurinos etiam in multis codd. et edd. oper. S. Anselmi hoc loco exstat; Vat. cum textu originali perducere.
    Cod. bb [reads] producere, which word in the following question, arg. 1. to the opposite, all the codices and also edd. 1, 2 exhibit, and which according to the Maurists also stands in this place in many codices and editions of the works of S. Anselm; the Vatican [edition] with the original text [reads] perducere.
  16. Textus originalis, omissis verbis in corpore, post perdere bona sic prosequitur: etiam in anima, quae forsitan per illos consequerentur, si iusti essent; quorum exempla nimis longum est hic inserere.
    The original text, the words in the body omitted, after lose [those] goods continues thus: even in the soul, which perhaps through them they would obtain, had they been just; examples of which it is far too long to insert here.
  17. Vide arg. 1. et 2. ad opposit.
    See arg. 1. and 2. to the opposite.
  18. Dist. 30. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 31. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro virtutem naturae edd. veritatem naturae.
    Dist. 30. a. 1. q. 2. and d. 31. a. 1. q. 3. — For virtutem naturae ("the power of nature") the editions [read] veritatem naturae ("the truth of nature").
  19. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 qui.
    The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] qui.
← Dist. 33, Divisio TextusDist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 2→