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Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
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ARTICULUS I.

De comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum identitatem.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum peccatum sit poena peccati.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit poena peccati. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Apocalypsis ultimo1: Qui in sordibus est, sordescat adhuc; Glossa: « iustum est ». Sed esse in sordibus non est aliud quam esse in peccatis, et sordescere non est aliud quam peccare: ergo peccatum est meritum alterius peccati: igitur a relativis, peccatum sequens est retributio praecedentis; sed retributio peccati non est nisi poena: ergo etc.

2. Item, Gregorius expressius dicit, et habetur in littera2: « Inter primum peccatum apostasiae et ultimam poenam ignis aeterni media quae sunt, et peccata sunt et poena peccati ».

3. Item, Isidorus3: « Deus occultam superbiam clericorum vindicat per manifestam luxuriam »; sed vindicta peccati est poena: ergo manifesta luxuria est poena superbiae.

4. Item, ex hoc, quod homo peccat, meretur a Deo relinqui; sed ex hoc, quod relinquitur, cadit consequenter in aliud peccatum: ergo si hoc iustum est, qui unum peccatum commisit meretur per consequens dimitti cadere in aliud: ergo si dimissus cadit in aliud peccatum, illud quod secundo perpetratur, ordinem habet ad primum sicut ad meritum. Sed omne tale est poena peccati4: ergo etc.

5. Item, omne illud est peccati poena, in quo homo damnificatur et laeditur, et in quod per illud peccatum inducitur; sed superbus hoc ipso, quod vult alium excellere, necessario cadit in invidiam, quando videt, alium superare. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione5: « Necesse habet alii invidere qui non vult ab alio superari ». Ergo videtur, quod invidia sit poena superbiae; et invidia absque dubio est peccatum: ergo peccatum est poena peccati.

Sed contra:

1. Omnis poena peccati est laudabilis; nulla culpa est laudabilis: ergo nulla culpa est poena peccati. Maior probatur, quia omne quod iustum est, laudabile est; sed « omnis poena peccati iusta est », sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera6. Minor vero per se patet.

2. Item, omnis poena est ordinativa culpae, et per hoc faciens ad universi decorem7; sed culpa subsequens non ordinat culpam praecedentem nec decorat, immo magis deturpat: ergo culpa non est peccati poena.

3. Item, si culpa subsequens est poena praecedentis: ergo a relativis, culpa praecedens est meritum sequentis: pari ratione, illa culpa, quae est subsequens, est meritum alterius, et sic deinceps. Si ergo nullum peccatum debet remanere impunitum8, videtur, quod homo debeat peccare in aeternum. Si ergo hoc est inconveniens et indignum, patet, quod peccatum non est peccati meritum: ergo nec unum peccatum est alterius punitivum.

4. Item, si sequens peccatum punit praecedens: ergo cum Deus non puniat bis in id ipsum9, culpa sequenti perpetrata, culpa praecedens non debet puniri; aut si punitur, non debet tantum puniri. Quodsi hoc esset verum, reportaret quis commodum de malitia; quodsi hoc est inconveniens, patet etc.

5. Item, si peccatum est poena peccati, et Deus non punit supra condignum, nunquam peccatum sequens esset maius peccatum praecedenti. Quodsi hoc de plano est falsum, quia de minori peccato devenitur ad maius, planum est, quod peccatum non est poena peccati.

Conclusio.

Peccatum sequens non tantum causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter est poena praecedentis peccati.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut auctoritates Sanctorum expresse dicunt, tenendum est, quod peccatum est poena peccati.

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Sed attendendum est, quod circa hoc est duplex modus intelligendi, secundum quod Magister in littera10 innuit. Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod peccatum est poena peccati; non tamen essentialiter, sive secundum id quod est, sed ratione eius quod concomitatur, vel ratione eius quod consequitur; sicut patet, quod peccatum manifestum, ex quo consurgit infamia, dicitur esse vindicta peccati occulti, non ratione ipsius transgressionis, sed ratione infamiae consequentis; vel peccatum, in quo est manifesta ignominia, est poena peccati superbiae, sicut peccatum contra naturam et alia huiusmodi, quae vocat Apostolus11 passiones ignominiae, poena est ratione ignominiae, non ratione culpae. Et breviter quodlibet peccatum potest dici poena peccati praecedentis ratione laesionis, quam infert; et sic idem dicitur peccatum et poena peccati, ita tamen, quod peccatum dicitur essentialiter, et poena peccati causaliter.

Sed quoniam secundum istum modum non tantum unum peccatum posset dici poena alterius, sed etiam unum peccatum posset dici poena sui, causaliter loquendo, quia peccans se ipsum laedit; et iterum, sicut ostensum fuit in praecedentibus12, non tantum actio inordinata est culpa, verum etiam ipsa deformitas, quae remanet in anima, et ipsa animae deformatio non modica est ei poena; et rursus, sicut rationes primae ostendunt, quaedam ordinatio meriti et retributionis est inter culpam praecedentem et sequentem, etiam quantum ad id quod culpae sunt: ideo est alia opinio, cui magis videtur consentire Magister, quod peccatum sequens non tantum causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter, ut sic loquamur, est poena peccati praecedentis. Et hoc dicendo, sicut Magister13 dicit, in nullo fit praeiudicium veritati, immo hoc est satis planum. Nam poena duo dicit: et dicit malum sive damnum, et dicit ordinem ad praecedens meritum; et haec duo contingit reperire circa sequens peccatum. Damnificatio enim et nocumentum est in ipso, secundum quod peccatum; eo enim est peccatum, quo nocet14; et magnum malum incurrit quis, cum incidit in peccatum, etiam si nihil aliud deberet habere posterius. Ordinationem vero habet in eo, quod sequens; hoc ipso enim, quod homo est in peccato, dignus est dimitti cadere in aliud, iuxta illud Apocalypsis ultimo15, sicut dicitur in Glossa: « Iustum est », ut qui in sordibus est sordescat adhuc. — Concedendum est igitur simpliciter, quod peccatum potest esse poena peccati, ut expresse dicunt auctoritates Sanctorum.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod omnis poena est laudabilis; dicendum, quod illa propositio dupliciter potest intelligi: aut quod laus attribuatur poenae, secundum id quod est; aut in quantum poena. Si attribuatur poenae secundum id quod est, sic est falsa; multae enim sunt poenae, quae sunt passiones ignominiae et non sunt laudabiles, sed vituperabiles. Si autem attribuatur poenae sub ratione poenae, hoc est, in quantum est praecedentis peccati punitiva; sic omnis poena est laudabilis, propter hoc quod est ordinata. Et per eundem modum intelligenda est haec propositio: omnis poena est iusta. Cum ergo infertur, quod peccatum sit iustum vel quod sit laudabile, est ibi sophisma secundum accidens16, quia proceditur a laudabilitate ordinis ad laudem rei ordinabilis. Hoc autem non sequitur, quia frequenter laus ordinis extranea est ordinabili, maxime cum illud quod est vituperabile, ordinatur convenienter et laudabiliter.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis poena est ordinativa culpae; dicendum, quod verum est, quod eo modo ordinat, quo modo punit; et illa quae simpliciter est poena et simpliciter punit, est simpliciter ordinativa; et illa, quae sufficienter punit, sufficienter ordinat. Quae vero est poena secundum quid et non punit sufficienter, ordinat solum secundum quid. Et verum est illud, quod sicut quidam ordo laudabilis est — licet magis manifestus — poenae infernalis ad culpam; ita quidam ordo est laudabilis — licet minus manifestus — peccati subsequentis ad peccatum praecedens; et in hoc ordine laudatur divina iustitia, quae committentem unum peccatum iusto iudicio permisit labi in aliud.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod culpa praecedens non17 est meritum sequentis; dicendum, quod est meritum congrui, et est meritum condigni. Et cum dicitur culpa praecedens esse meritum sequentis, hoc non est quantum ad meritum condigni, sed congrui, quae quidem congruitas in alia congruitate de facili potest recompensari. Sicut enim est congruum, quod Deus peccatorem permittat labi in aliud peccatum, sic etiam congruum est, ut, quia male usus est vita, eam sibi auferat et in infernum demergat. Sicut etiam congruum est, ut dimittat eum cadere in aliud peccatum, sic etiam congruum est, ut si velit abstinere, det ei auxilium, ut in aliam culpam non corruat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non punit bis in id ipsum; dicendum, quod peccatum sequens non erat poena, in qua fieret retributio de condigno, sed solum de congruo. Et sicut18 retri-

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butio eius quod meretur quis quantum ad meritum congrui, non praeiudicat ei quod meretur quantum ad meritum condigni — dat enim Deus iustis bona in praesenti, non propter hoc dat minora in futuro — sic intelligendum est se habere in proposito.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Deus non punit supra condignum etc.; iam patet responsio. Hoc enim intelligitur de poena, quae a Deo infligitur proprie, et de ea, quae circa peccatum praecedens respicit meritum condigni; utrumque autem horum deficit in proposito. Nam culpa sequens, secundum id quod est, non est a Deo; culpa etiam sequens non ordinatur ad praecedens peccatum secundum rationem condigni, sed secundum rationem congrui. Congruit enim hoc ordini divinae iustitiae, sicut ostensum est.

Scholion

I. Difficultas, quae hic solvitur, praesupponit solutionem generalioris quaestionis, utrum scilicet peccatum possit esse causa alterius peccati; de qua breviter agit Seraphicus hic dub. 1, et fusius Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 94. m. 9.); alii autem commentatores Magistri cum S. Thoma (hic a. 1; S. I. II. q. 75. a. 4.) in speciali quaestione docent, quod peccatum possit esse causa alterius peccati in genere causae efficientis, per accidens tamen, non per se (ut removendo prohibens), finalis, materialis et etiam aliquo modo (scilicet per reductionem) formalis. — Quaestio autem hic tractata est, utrum peccatum ab alio peccato causatum habeat rationem poenae respectu praecedentis peccati, et qua ratione. Prima opinio vult, quod peccatum habeat rationem poenae, non quatenus est essentialiter peccatum, sed causaliter, id est, quatenus habet plura annexa, ab ipso causata, quae rationem poenae manifeste habent. Secunda opinio communis sequitur Magistrum et tenet, quod peccatum, etiam essentialiter sumtum, induat rationem poenae. Res satis difficilis et subtilis est, cum peccatum, ut peccatum est, sit voluntarium, sit iniustum, sit non a Deo; poena autem, ut poena, sit voluntati contraria, sit iusta, sit a Deo. Solutio difficultatis eruitur ex eo, quod idem possit esse culpa et poena, non tamen secundum eandem rationem (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2.); sicut in eodem actu voluntatis est actio et passio, ut actio ab agente, ut passio a patiente; tamen ut actio non est passio, et e converso (Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.). Hinc illa deformitas, quae causatur in anima per ipsum actum peccati, habet rationem tum culpae tum poenae (supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). Similiter deformitas peccati, ex praecedenti peccato orti, essentialiter, et non tantum causaliter, est laesio animae per se involuntaria et ad aliquid praecedens demeritum ordinata; et sub hac ratione est poena, ut explicatur in textu. Contraria sententia late proponitur a Magistro hic c. 2. 3.

II. Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 131. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1, a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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English Translation

ARTICLE I.

On the comparison of guilt to punishment with respect to identity.

QUESTION I.

Whether sin is the punishment of sin.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether sin is the punishment of sin. And that it is, it seems:

1. The Apocalypse, last [chapter]1: Let him who is in filth be filthy still; the Gloss: « it is just ». But to be in filth is nothing other than to be in sins, and to grow filthy is nothing other than to sin: therefore sin is the merit of another sin: therefore, from relatives, the following sin is the retribution of the preceding; but the retribution of sin is nothing other than punishment: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory says it more expressly, and it is had in the text2: « Between the first sin of apostasy and the last punishment of eternal fire, the things that are in between are both sins and the punishment of sin ».

3. Likewise, Isidore3: « God avenges the hidden pride of clerics through manifest lust »; but the avenging of sin is punishment: therefore manifest lust is the punishment of pride.

4. Likewise, from the fact that the human sins, he merits to be abandoned by God; but from the fact that he is abandoned, he consequently falls into another sin: therefore if this is just, he who has committed one sin consequently merits to be allowed to fall into another: therefore if, abandoned, he falls into another sin, that which is perpetrated in the second place has an ordering to the first as to a merit. But every such thing is the punishment of sin4: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, everything is the punishment of sin in which the human is damaged and harmed, and into which he is led through that sin; but the proud man, by the very fact that he wishes to excel another, necessarily falls into envy, when he sees another surpass [him]. For as Augustine says in the book On True Religion5: « He who does not wish to be surpassed by another necessarily envies another ». Therefore it seems that envy is the punishment of pride; and envy is without doubt a sin: therefore sin is the punishment of sin.

On the contrary:

1. Every punishment of sin is praiseworthy; no guilt is praiseworthy: therefore no guilt is the punishment of sin. The major is proved, because everything that is just is praiseworthy; but « every punishment of sin is just », as Augustine says, and it is had in the text6. The minor is plain of itself.

2. Likewise, every punishment is ordinative of guilt, and through this contributes to the beauty of the universe7; but the subsequent guilt does not order the preceding guilt nor adorn [it], but rather more disfigures [it]: therefore guilt is not the punishment of sin.

3. Likewise, if the subsequent guilt is the punishment of the preceding: therefore, from relatives, the preceding guilt is the merit of the following: by parity of reasoning, that guilt which is subsequent is the merit of another, and so on. If therefore no sin ought to remain unpunished8, it seems that the human ought to sin forever. If therefore this is unfitting and unworthy, it is plain that sin is not the merit of sin: therefore neither is one sin punitive of another.

4. Likewise, if the following sin punishes the preceding: therefore since God does not punish twice in the self-same thing9, once the following guilt has been perpetrated, the preceding guilt ought not to be punished; or if it is punished, it ought not to be punished as much. But if this were true, one would derive an advantage from malice; but if this is unfitting, the point is plain etc.

5. Likewise, if sin is the punishment of sin, and God does not punish beyond the condign, the following sin would never be a greater sin than the preceding. But if this is plainly false, because one passes from a lesser sin to a greater, it is plain that sin is not the punishment of sin.

Conclusion.

The following sin is the punishment of the preceding sin not only causally, but also essentially.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt, as the authorities of the Saints expressly say, it must be held that sin is the punishment of sin.

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But it is to be attended to that concerning this there is a twofold mode of understanding, according to what the Master intimates in the text10. For some have wished to say that sin is the punishment of sin; yet not essentially, that is, according to that which it is, but by reason of that which accompanies [it], or by reason of that which follows [it]; just as it is clear that a manifest sin, from which there arises infamy, is said to be the avenging of a hidden sin, not by reason of the transgression itself, but by reason of the consequent infamy; or a sin, in which there is manifest ignominy, is the punishment of the sin of pride, just as the sin against nature and other things of this kind, which the Apostle11 calls passions of ignominy, is punishment by reason of the ignominy, not by reason of the guilt. And in brief any sin can be called the punishment of a preceding sin by reason of the harm which it inflicts; and thus the same thing is called sin and the punishment of sin, yet in such a way that it is called sin essentially, and the punishment of sin causally.

But since according to this mode not only could one sin be called the punishment of another, but also one sin could be called the punishment of itself, speaking causally, since the one who sins harms himself; and again, as was shown in the preceding12, not only is the disordered action guilt, but also the very deformity which remains in the soul, and the deformation of the soul itself is no small punishment to it; and again, as the first reasons show, there is a certain ordering of merit and retribution between the preceding guilt and the following, even as regards that which they are as guilt: therefore there is another opinion, to which the Master seems rather to consent, that the following sin is the punishment of the preceding sin not only causally, but also essentially, so to speak. And in saying this, as the Master13 says, no prejudice at all is done to the truth, but rather this is plain enough. For punishment states two things: it states evil or harm, and it states an ordering to a preceding merit; and these two things are found to occur in the following sin. For damage and harm is in it, insofar as it is sin; for it is sin by the very thing whereby it harms14; and one incurs a great evil when one falls into sin, even if he ought to have nothing else afterward. But it has ordering in that it is following; for by the very fact that the human is in sin, he is worthy to be allowed to fall into another, according to that of the Apocalypse, last [chapter]15, as is said in the Gloss: « It is just », that he who is in filth be filthy still. — It must therefore be granted simply that sin can be the punishment of sin, as the authorities of the Saints expressly say.

1. To that, however, which is first objected, that every punishment is praiseworthy; it must be said that that proposition can be understood in two ways: either that praise be attributed to punishment according to that which it is; or insofar as it is punishment. If it is attributed to punishment according to that which it is, thus it is false; for there are many punishments which are passions of ignominy and are not praiseworthy, but blameworthy. But if it is attributed to punishment under the character of punishment, that is, insofar as it is punitive of a preceding sin; thus every punishment is praiseworthy, because it is ordered. And in the same way is this proposition to be understood: every punishment is just. When therefore it is inferred that sin is just or that it is praiseworthy, there is here a fallacy of accident16, because one proceeds from the praiseworthiness of the order to the praise of the orderable thing. But this does not follow, because frequently the praise of the order is foreign to the orderable thing, especially when that which is blameworthy is ordered fittingly and praiseworthily.

2. To that which is objected, that every punishment is ordinative of guilt; it must be said that it is true, that it orders in the same way in which it punishes; and that which is simply punishment and simply punishes, is simply ordinative; and that which punishes sufficiently, orders sufficiently. But that which is punishment in a certain respect and does not punish sufficiently, orders only in a certain respect. And that is true, that just as a certain order is praiseworthy — though more manifest — of the infernal punishment to guilt; so a certain order is praiseworthy — though less manifest — of the subsequent sin to the preceding sin; and in this order the divine justice is praised, which by a just judgment permitted him who committed one sin to slip into another.

3. To that which is objected, that the preceding guilt is not17 the merit of the following; it must be said that there is a merit of congruity, and there is a merit of condignity. And when the preceding guilt is said to be the merit of the following, this is not as regards the merit of condignity, but of congruity, which congruity indeed can easily be recompensed by another congruity. For just as it is congruous that God permit the sinner to slip into another sin, so also it is congruous that, because he has used life ill, He take it away from him and plunge [him] into hell. Just as it is also congruous that He let him fall into another sin, so also it is congruous that, if he wishes to abstain, He give him help, that he may not fall into another guilt.

4. To that which is objected, that God does not punish twice in the self-same thing; it must be said that the following sin was not a punishment in which a retribution of condignity should be made, but only of congruity. And just as18 the retri-

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bution of that which one merits as regards the merit of congruity does not prejudice that which he merits as regards the merit of condignity — for God gives the just good things in the present, [and] does not on this account give them lesser ones in the future — so it is to be understood to be in the case at hand.

5. To that which is objected last, that God does not punish beyond the condign etc.; the response is now plain. For this is understood of the punishment which is inflicted by God properly, and of that which, concerning the preceding sin, regards the merit of condignity; but both of these are lacking in the case at hand. For the following guilt, according to that which it is, is not from God; the following guilt also is not ordered to the preceding sin according to the character of condignity, but according to the character of congruity. For this is congruous to the order of divine justice, as has been shown.

Scholion

I. The difficulty which is here solved presupposes the solution of a more general question, namely whether sin can be the cause of another sin; concerning which the Seraphic [Doctor] treats briefly here in dub. 1, and more fully Alexander of Hales (Summa p. II. q. 94. m. 9.); but the other commentators on the Master, with St. Thomas (here a. 1; Summa I. II. q. 75. a. 4.), teach in a special question that sin can be the cause of another sin in the genus of the efficient cause, yet per accidens, not per se (as removing an impediment), [in the genus] of the final, the material, and also in some manner (namely by reduction) of the formal. — But the question here treated is whether sin caused by another sin has the character of punishment with respect to the preceding sin, and on what account. The first opinion holds that sin has the character of punishment, not insofar as it is essentially sin, but causally, that is, insofar as it has several things annexed, caused by it, which manifestly have the character of punishment. The second, common, opinion follows the Master and holds that sin, even taken essentially, puts on the character of punishment. The matter is difficult and subtle enough, since sin, as it is sin, is voluntary, is unjust, is not from God; but punishment, as it is punishment, is contrary to the will, is just, is from God. The solution of the difficulty is drawn from this, that the same thing can be guilt and punishment, yet not according to the same character (cfr. below a. 2. q. 2.); just as in the same act of the will there is action and passion, as action from the agent, as passion from the patient; yet as action it is not passion, and conversely (Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2.). Hence that deformity which is caused in the soul by the act itself of sin has the character both of guilt and of punishment (above d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). Similarly the deformity of a sin sprung from a preceding sin is, essentially and not only causally, a harm of the soul per se involuntary and ordered to some preceding demerit; and under this character it is punishment, as is explained in the text. The contrary opinion is set forth at length by the Master here c. 2. 3.

II. Scotus, in each Scriptum, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here a. 3; Summa I. II. q. 87. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 1. 3; Summa p. II. tr. 22. q. 131. m. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 11. — Glossa tam ordinaria quam interlinearis verba allata adiungit. Cfr. Strabus et Lyranus. — Quoad modum argumentandi a relativis Boeth., III. de Differ. topic. dicit: « In relativis, absque se relativa esse non posse ». Et Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Locis topicis: Locus a relativis est habitudo unius relativorum ad aliud; et est constructivus et destructivus. Constructive sic: pater est, ergo filius est; item: filius est, ergo pater est. Locus a relativis: Maxima: posito uno relativorum, necessario ponitur et reliquum. Destructive sic: pater non est, ergo filius non est, et e converso. Maxima: remoto uno relativorum, removetur et reliquum.
    Verse 11. — Both the ordinary and the interlinear Gloss add the words adduced. Cfr. Strabus and Lyranus. — As to the mode of arguing from relatives, Boethius, III. On Topical Differences, says: « Among relatives, the relatives cannot be without one another ». And Petrus Hispanus, Summulae, tr. On Topical Places: The place from relatives is the relation of one of the relatives to the other; and it is constructive and destructive. Constructively thus: the father exists, therefore the son exists; likewise: the son exists, therefore the father exists. The place from relatives: Maxim: one of the relatives being posited, the other is necessarily posited also. Destructively thus: the father does not exist, therefore the son does not exist, and conversely. Maxim: one of the relatives being removed, the other is removed also.
  2. Hic c. 1. — Verba hic Gregorio tributa sunt Augustini.
    Here c. 1. — The words here attributed to Gregory are Augustine's.
  3. Libr. II. Sent. c. 39. n. 1: Deus autem nonnunquam deiicit occultam mentis superbiam per carnis manifestam ruinam.
    Sentences book II. c. 39. n. 1: But God sometimes casts down the hidden pride of the mind through the manifest ruin of the flesh.
  4. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    Cfr. here the Master's text, c. 3.
  5. Cap. 45. n. 85. Verba vide supra pag. 683, nota 7. in fine. — Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 verbo superare praefigit se.
    Chapter 45. n. 85. For the words see above p. 683, note 7, at the end. — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 prefixes se to the word superare.
  6. Hic c. 2.
    Here c. 2.
  7. Cfr. loc. ex August. supra pag. 769, nota 5. et pag. 770, nota 1. citt. — In minori post decorat Vat. supplet universum.
    Cfr. the passages from Augustine cited above p. 769, note 5. and p. 770, note 1. — In the minor after decorat the Vatican [edition] supplies universum.
  8. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 44. n. 18: Puniendum est peccatum; si puniendum non esset, nec peccatum esset. Praeveni illum [Deum]; non vis, ut ipse puniat, tu puni. Cfr. ibid. in Ps. 38. serm. 1. n. 13; Richard. a S. Vict., V. in Apocal. prolog.
    Augustine, Enarrations on the Psalms, on Ps. 44. n. 18: Sin must be punished; if it were not to be punished, neither would it be sin. Forestall Him [God]; you do not wish that He himself punish, [then] you punish. Cfr. ibid. on Ps. 38. serm. 1. n. 13; Richard of St. Victor, V. on the Apocalypse, prologue.
  9. Nahum 1, 9, ex versione secundum Septuag.: Non vindicabit bis id ipsum in tribulatione. Vulgata: Non consurget duplex tribulatio. — Immediate post Vat. culpa sequentis peccati pro culpa sequenti.
    Nahum 1, 9, from the version according to the Septuagint: He will not avenge the self-same thing twice in tribulation. The Vulgate: A double tribulation shall not rise up. — Immediately after, the Vatican [edition] [reads] culpa sequentis peccati for culpa sequenti.
  10. Hic c. 2. seqq.
    Here c. 2. and following.
  11. Rom. 1, 26. — Paulo ante pro peccatum contra naturam Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 peccatum haeresis.
    Rom. 1, 26. — A little before, for peccatum contra naturam ("sin against nature") the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] peccatum haeresis ("the sin of heresy").
  12. Dist. 33. a. 1. q. 2.
    Dist. 33. a. 1. q. 2.
  13. Hic c. 4.
    Here c. 4.
  14. Vide supra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 2.
    See above d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. fundamentum 2.
  15. Vers. 11.
    Verse 11.
  16. Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 58, nota 5. — Mox pro laudabilitate cod. F laude.
    Cfr. tom. 1. p. 58, note 5. — Soon, for laudabilitate cod. F [reads] laude.
  17. Edd., excepta 2, omittunt non; utraque lectio explicari potest. Paulo inferius pro esse meritum codd. F K T cc et alii cum ed. 1 est meritum.
    The editions, except 2, omit non; either reading can be explained. A little below, for esse meritum codd. F K T cc and others, with ed. 1, [read] est meritum.
  18. Vat. sic; nostra lectio defenditur a cod. cc et ed. 1; cod. Y pro sic habet si, et subinde pro eius cum codd. F K T et aliis est. Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 in fine solut. ante habere omittunt se.
    The Vatican [edition] [reads] sic; our reading is defended by cod. cc and ed. 1; cod. Y for sic has si, and thereafter for eius with codd. F K T and others [reads] est. Most codices and edd. 1, 2 at the end of the solution before habere omit se.
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