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Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 42

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II. De comparatione peccati venialis ad mortale.

Quaestio II. Utrum veniale conveniat cum mortali in reatu poenae aeternae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum veniale conveniat cum mortali in reatu poenae aeternae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Poena assumta pro mortali est proportionabilis1 poenae assumtae pro veniali, et quantum ad acerbitatem et quantum ad durationem: ergo si poenae arbitrariae pensantur secundum magnitudinem reatus peccati, videtur, quod reatus venialis et mortalis sint utroque modo proportionabiles. Sed poena aeterna non est proportionabilis nisi aeternae: si ergo unum obligat ad poenam aeternam, videtur, quod et reliquum. Si tu dicas, quod per gratiam mortale fit veniale, et commutatur poena aeterna in temporalem; obiicitur tunc: quia, cum veniale similiter remittatur per gratiam, si misericordia Dei est ordinata, sicut aeternam commutat in temporalem, ita temporalem deberet commutare in instantaneam2! Quod si non facit, videtur, quod illa responsio nulla sit.

2. Item, esto quod aliquis decedat cum mortali et veniali, et quod de neutro fuerit in hac vita punitus: si ergo peccatum non remanet impunitum3, ergo pro utroque punitur iste, sed non nisi in inferno, et in inferno punitur in aeternum. Sed non punitur ultra, quam meruit: ergo pro peccato veniali merebatur puniri aeternaliter. Si tu dicas, quod punitur aeternaliter ratione mortalis adiuncti; obiicitur, quod non. Esto quod mortale illud puniatur, quantum meruit4 puniri; tunc ergo pro veniali aut punietur aeternaliter ratione sui, aut ratione mortalis adiuncti. Non ratione mortalis adiuncti, quia illud sufficienter punitur per se. Si ergo punitur aeternaliter, hoc est ratione sui; sed Deus nullum punit supra condignum: ergo dignum erat, propter veniale peccatum aliquem aeternaliter puniri.

3. Item, veniale stat cum gratia et stat cum mortali, et utrobique salvatur ratio venialis; et constat, quod magis salvatur cum mortali quam cum gratia, quia gratia delet ipsum, mortale5 nunquam: ergo si abstrahatur ab utroque, magis tenebit proprietatem, quam habet cum mortali, quam cum gratia. Sed quando est cum gratia, debetur ei poena temporalis; quando cum mortali, debetur ei poena aeterna: ergo veniali de se et secundum se debetur poena aeterna. Si tu dicas, quod obiectio teneret, si poena temporalis deberetur ei ratione gratiae; sed hoc non est verum, quia debetur ei ratione sui; contra: impossibile est, sufficienter puniri peccatum, nisi remittatur, quia, quamdiu durat culpa, debet durare poena — non enim debet esse « dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae6 » — sed nec mortale nec veniale dimittitur nisi per gratiam: ergo tam mortali quam veniali debetur poena aeterna, quantum est de se.

4. Item, esto quod aliquis tantum habeat peccatum veniale, nec tamen habeat gratiam; aut esset dignus poena aeterna, aut temporali. Si temporali: ergo illa persoluta, esset omnino absolutus a culpa; sed potest per se ipsum poenam illam solvere: ergo per se posset ad innocentiam resurgere. Quodsi non potest per se ipsum ad innocentiam redire, nunquam potest, quantum est de se, poenam sufficientem pro illa culpa sustinere: ergo nisi auxilium gratiae superveniat7, veniali peccato debetur poena aeterna.

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Si tu dicas, quod solvendo poenam disponeret se ad gratiam, quae culpam deleret; hoc non solvit, quia, si se similiter puniret pro peccato mortali, Deus gratiam infunderet, quae illam culpam mortalem deleret.

5. Item, delectatio mortalis peccati non excedit delectationem venialis in infinitum: ergo si reatus respondet delectationi, nec reatus excedit reatum in infinitum, sed aeternum excedit temporale in infinitum; si ergo mortale obligat ad poenam aeternam, ergo et veniale. Si tu dicas, quod quamvis non excedat simpliciter, excedit tamen secundum reputationem, quia mortale diligit8 supra Deum, qui est bonum infinitum, veniale vero minime; contra hoc est, quia, cum veniale peccatum a Deo puniatur et Deo displiceat, aliquo modo offensivum est Dei. Ergo si tanta est offensa, quantus is qui offenditur; cum per veniale peccatum offendatur Deus, qui est infinitus; videtur, quod reatus peccati venialis debeat reputari infinitus, sicut et mortalis: ergo sicut per mortale peccatum meretur homo puniri infinite, ita et per veniale.

Sed contra: 1. Hugo de sancto Victore9: « Veniale peccatum est illud, cui secundum se debetur poena transitoria »: ergo reatus peccati venialis solummodo est poenae temporalis.

2. Item, poena aeterna est mors secunda; sed nulli debetur mors secunda nisi propter primam, quae est per separationem animae a Deo: si igitur veniale a Deo non separat, sicut supra10 ostensum fuit, ergo non obligat ad poenam aeternam.

3. Item, si veniale facit hominem dignum poena aeterna, laedit hominem usque ad mortem; sed quod est huiusmodi debet dici mortale: ergo veniale peccatum est mortale.

4. Item, si veniale obligat ad poenam aeternam; cum omne aeternum careat fine, et quod caret fine caret remissione et venia, peccatum veniale dicit oppositionem ad remissionem et veniam; sed quod est huiusmodi, non est veniale: ergo peccatum veniale non est veniale11.

5. Item, si veniale facit dignum poena aeterna, et gratia facit hominem dignum vita aeterna; cum veniale peccatum et gratia simul sint in eodem12, simul est homo dignus vita aeterna et poena aeterna: ergo si fit ei retributio, secundum quod meruit, simul posset esse in aeterna beatitudine et in aeterna poena, quo nihil magis13 est impossibile.

Conclusio.

Veniali peccato non debetur poena aeterna per se, sed tantum ratione coniunctionis cum mortali.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod sicut fides nostra dicit, peccato mortali debetur poena aeterna.

Quare autem peccato mortali debeatur poena aeterna, multiplex consuevit assignari ratio; ad praesens autem sufficiat una, quia ista quaestio alibi habet locum, scilicet in quarto14, ubi quaeritur de aeternitate poenae infernalis. Praecipua enim inter rationes, quare debetur peccato mortali poena aeterna, est, quia, dum homo peccat mortaliter, separat se a vita gratiae et subiicit se perpetuae impotentiae exeundi de culpa, quantum est de se. Nemo enim potest a culpa mortali resurgere nisi per creationem15 et infusionem novae gratiae et novae vitae; et propterea ratione istius impotentiae peccato mortali annexa est obligatio ad aeternitatem poenae. — Haec autem poena aeterna, etsi omni peccato mortali debeatur, non tamen omni persolvitur; quia, quamvis mortale peccatum reddat hominem impotentem ad resurgendum per se ipsum, contingit tamen, hominem relevari per divinum auxilium. Debetur igitur peccato mortali poena aeterna, quia separat hominem a vita; persolvitur autem poena aeterna in eo, quod tenet hominem in aeternum separatum a vita. — Quoniam igitur veniale peccatum nec separat hominem a vita, quia non excludit gratiam, nec tenet hominem in perpetuum separatum a vita; hinc est, quod peccatum veniale nec de se obligat ad poenam aeternam, nec ei secundum se redditur poena aeterna.

Quia vero peccatum veniale coniungi habet ei quod separat a vita, et etiam ei quod tenet separatum a vita; hinc est, quod ratione adiuncti poena aeterna debetur, et poena aeterna persolvitur. Unde si aliquis decedat cum mortali simul et cum veniali, aeternaliter pro utroque16 punietur.

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Et ratio huius est, quia nullum peccatum deleri potest absque gratia; et quamdiu durat culpa, debet durare et poena. Et ideo, cum venialis culpa duret cum mortali in infinitum, ratione coniunctionis cum illa in infinitum punitur. Nihilominus tamen ei, quantum est de se, debetur poena temporalis, cum simul possit stare cum gratia; et propterea veniale nominatur, ut in hoc distinguatur a genere peccati mortalis; quia mortale aufert principium vitae et veniae, videlicet ipsam gratiam, veniale autem, quantum est de se, non aufert, immo simul cum illa manet17. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod veniali peccato non debetur poena aeterna secundum se.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena satisfactoria pro veniali et mortali est proportionabilis; dici potest, quod ratio illa non concludit18, quod debeatur veniali poena aeterna, nisi prout est coniunctum mortali. Praeterea, ratio illa non cogit, quia, sicut in opponendo dictum est, in infusione19 gratiae poena mortalis peccati commutatur in temporalem; poena vero venialis peccati non commutatur in non-temporalem. — Et si tu quaeras, unde hoc, cum misericordia Dei debeat esse ordinata; dicendum, quod quia obligatio ad poenam aeternam non potest simul stare cum gratia, necessario per infusionem gratiae fit absolutio a reatu poenae aeternae. Sed gratia bene stat cum poena temporali; et ideo non oportet, per infusionem gratiae poenam temporalem in momentaneam commutari.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui decedit cum veniali et mortali; dicendum, quod talis tam pro veniali quam mortali aeternaliter punitur; sed hoc non est ratione venialis principaliter, sed ratione mortalis adiuncti. — Nec valet quod obiicit, quod mortale punitur in se, quantum meruit; quia, sicut bonum vigoratur ex bono, ita malum vigoratur ex malo eo modo, quo dicitur malum vigorari. Ideo quamvis veniali, quantum est de se, non debeatur poena aeterna, nihilominus tamen potest ei deberi, in quantum est coniunctum mortali; et ideo, cum Deus punit tam veniale quam mortale in eodem20 poena aeterna, neutrum punit supra condignum, sed utrumque punit, prout puniri meretur, non solum in se, sed etiam, prout est alteri coniunctum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis salvatur ratio venialis cum mortali quam cum gratia; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de gratia quantum ad actum, verum est; nam actus gratiae sive motus gratiae delet veniale peccatum. Si autem intelligatur quantum ad habitum, falsum est; quia veniale cum gratia magis salvatur in propria ratione quam cum mortali; tunc enim nec reatus eius augetur nec minuitur nec mutatur. Sed cum veniale iunctum est mortali, tunc reatus eius augetur et quodam modo mutatur, quia iunctum malo vigoratur. — Nec valet quod obiicit, quod veniali non debetur poena temporalis nisi ratione gratiae, quia semper duraret, nisi esset gratia. Dicendum enim, quod verum est, quod semper duraret, nisi esset gratia; quia tamen ipsum de se gratiam non excludit, sicut mortale, simul stat cum principio suae remissionis et deletionis: ideo, quamvis non possit deleri sine gratia, nihilominus tamen, quantum est de sua21 natura, delebile est et terminabile. Non sic est de mortali, quod omnino excludit donum gratiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aliquis esset in solo veniali et moreretur, in aeternum cruciaretur; dicendum, quod haec22 positio est impossibilis. Primum, quia nunquam fuit nec est nec erit, quod aliquis in solo peccato veniali fuerit, ita quod non habeat gratiam. Nihil enim est medium nunc, quin homo habeat gratiam, aut sit in mortali peccato. Et in primo statu nihil fuit medium inter innocentiam et mortalem culpam, quia puritas innocentiae non potuit perdi nisi per mortalem culpam, sicut supra23 ostensum est; et ideo positio illa vana est. — Esto tamen, quod aliquis puer esset in veniali, dico, quod Deus nunquam educeret eum de statu meriti, quin vel ipse peccaret mortaliter, vel ipse daret ei gratiam. — Et si quaerat, utrum isti veniali debeatur poena aeterna, vel temporalis; dico, quod debetur poena temporalis. Et si procedat ulterius: ergo illa persoluta, erit omnino immunis a culpa;

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dicendum, quod verum est; sed quia nunquam potest eam Deo persolvere, ita quod Deus eam24 acceptet sine gratia; hinc est, quod Deus, ne cogeretur istum supra condignum punire, gratiam sibi infunderet, per quam solutionem poenae acceptaret. Et ideo non sequitur, quod illi peccato debeatur poena aeterna25 secundum se; nec sequitur, quod homo per se possit resurgere a culpa ad innocentiam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod delectatio non excedit delectationem in infinitum; dicendum, quod non excedit in infinitum secundum veram intensionem delectationis, sed secundum reputationem peccantis. — Exemplum autem huius ponitur in caritate, quae diligit aliquod bonum creatum et diligit increatum; et adeo bonum increatum reputat bonum, quod si bonum creatum infinities multiplicaretur26, adhuc non aequaret illi in amore; sed plus amaret Deum quam bonum creatum infinities multiplicatum, licet utrumque finite diligat. Sic etiam in proposito est intelligendum in amore concupiscentiae, quae caritatem perimit, et quae cum caritate salvatur. Nam una, scilicet quae caritatem perimit, praefert creaturam Deo, qui erat praeferendus infinitis bonis creatis; altera vero, quae cum caritate manet, non praefert creaturam Deo: et ideo secundum reputationem et peccantis et Dei punientis mortale excedit veniale improportionabiliter.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per veniale offenditur Deus; dicendum, quod falsum est; non enim dicitur Deus offendi, nisi cum contemnitur. Sed verum est, quod cum veniali peccato minus Deus amatur, secundum quod Augustinus dicit in libro Confessionum27: « Minus te amat qui tecum aliquid amat, quod non propter te amat ». Ideo veniale vitam aeternam non aufert, sed retardat, quia a Deo non separat, sed elongat; nec obligat ad poenam aeternaliter cruciantem, quantum est de se, sed temporaliter affligentem.

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English Translation

Article II. On the comparison of venial sin to mortal sin.

Question II. Whether the venial sin agrees with the mortal in the liability to eternal punishment.

Secondly it is asked whether the venial sin agrees with the mortal in the liability to eternal punishment. And that it does so, seems to follow.

1. The punishment assigned for the mortal sin is proportionable1 to the punishment assigned for the venial, both as to severity and as to duration: therefore if arbitrary punishments are weighed according to the magnitude of the guilt of the sin, it seems that the guilt of the venial and of the mortal are proportionable in both ways. But an eternal punishment is not proportionable except to what is eternal: if therefore the one binds to eternal punishment, it seems that the other does too. If you say that through grace the mortal sin becomes venial, and the eternal punishment is commuted into a temporal one; the objection then arises: since the venial is likewise remitted through grace, if the mercy of God is ordered, then just as it commutes the eternal into the temporal, so it ought to commute the temporal into the instantaneous2! And if it does not do this, it seems that that reply is null.

2. Likewise, suppose that someone dies in mortal and venial sin, and that he was punished in this life for neither: if then a sin does not remain unpunished3, then he is punished for both, but only in hell, and in hell he is punished eternally. But he is not punished beyond what he deserved: therefore for the venial sin he deserved to be punished eternally. If you say that he is punished eternally by reason of the adjoined mortal sin; the objection is raised that this is not so. Suppose that that mortal sin be punished as much as it deserved4 to be punished; then therefore for the venial sin he will be punished either eternally by reason of itself, or by reason of the adjoined mortal sin. Not by reason of the adjoined mortal sin, because that is sufficiently punished by itself. If therefore he is punished eternally, this is by reason of itself; but God punishes no one beyond what is condign: therefore it was fitting that someone be punished eternally on account of venial sin.

3. Likewise, the venial sin stands with grace and stands with the mortal, and in both cases the character of the venial is preserved; and it is agreed that it is more preserved with the mortal than with grace, because grace blots it out, the mortal sin never5: therefore if it be abstracted from both, it will hold its property more such as it has with the mortal than with grace. But when it is with grace, a temporal punishment is owed to it; when with the mortal, an eternal punishment is owed to it: therefore to the venial of itself and according to itself an eternal punishment is owed. If you say that the objection would hold if a temporal punishment were owed to it by reason of grace; but this is not true, because it is owed to it by reason of itself; on the contrary: it is impossible that a sin be sufficiently punished unless it be remitted, because, as long as the fault lasts, the punishment ought to last — for there ought not to be « the disgrace of sin without the comeliness of justice6 » — but neither the mortal nor the venial is remitted except through grace: therefore to the mortal as much as to the venial an eternal punishment is owed, so far as concerns itself.

4. Likewise, suppose that someone has only venial sin, yet does not have grace; he would be worthy either of eternal punishment or of temporal. If of temporal: then once that is paid, he would be entirely absolved from the fault; but he can pay that punishment by himself: therefore by himself he could rise again to innocence. But if he cannot by himself return to innocence, he can never, so far as concerns himself, sustain a punishment sufficient for that fault: therefore unless the help of grace supervenes7, an eternal punishment is owed to the venial sin.

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If you say that by paying the punishment he would dispose himself to grace, which would blot out the fault; this does not solve it, because, if he were likewise to punish himself for a mortal sin, God would infuse grace, which would blot out that mortal fault.

5. Likewise, the delight of mortal sin does not exceed the delight of the venial infinitely: therefore if the guilt corresponds to the delight, neither does the guilt exceed the guilt infinitely, whereas the eternal exceeds the temporal infinitely; if therefore the mortal binds to eternal punishment, then so does the venial. If you say that although it does not exceed simply, it nonetheless exceeds according to reckoning, because the mortal loves [the creature]8 above God, who is the infinite good, whereas the venial does so least of all; against this is the fact that, since the venial sin is punished by God and is displeasing to God, it is in some way offensive to God. Therefore if the offense is as great as he who is offended; since by venial sin God is offended, who is infinite; it seems that the guilt of venial sin ought to be reckoned infinite, just as the mortal also is: therefore just as by mortal sin a man deserves to be punished infinitely, so also by the venial.

On the contrary: 1. Hugh of Saint Victor9: « A venial sin is that to which, according to itself, a transitory punishment is owed »: therefore the guilt of venial sin is only of temporal punishment.

2. Likewise, eternal punishment is the second death; but the second death is owed to no one except on account of the first, which is by the separation of the soul from God: if therefore the venial does not separate from God, as was shown above10, then it does not bind to eternal punishment.

3. Likewise, if the venial makes a man worthy of eternal punishment, it harms a man unto death; but what is of this kind ought to be called mortal: therefore the venial sin is mortal.

4. Likewise, if the venial binds to eternal punishment; since everything eternal lacks an end, and what lacks an end lacks remission and pardon, the venial sin states an opposition to remission and pardon; but what is of this kind is not venial: therefore the venial sin is not venial11.

5. Likewise, if the venial makes one worthy of eternal punishment, and grace makes a man worthy of eternal life; since the venial sin and grace are simultaneously in the same [subject]12, a man is simultaneously worthy of eternal life and eternal punishment: therefore if a recompense be made to him according to what he deserved, he could be simultaneously in eternal beatitude and in eternal punishment, than which nothing13 is more impossible.

Conclusion.

To venial sin an eternal punishment is not owed of itself, but only by reason of its conjunction with the mortal.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, as our faith says, an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin.

Now as to why an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin, many reasons are wont to be assigned; but for the present let one suffice, since this question has its place elsewhere, namely in the fourth [book]14, where it is asked concerning the eternity of infernal punishment. For the chief among the reasons why an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin is this: that, while a man sins mortally, he separates himself from the life of grace and subjects himself to a perpetual impotence of coming out of the fault, so far as concerns himself. For no one can rise again from a mortal fault except through the creation15 and infusion of a new grace and a new life; and therefore by reason of that impotence an obligation to the eternity of punishment is annexed to mortal sin. — But this eternal punishment, although it be owed to every mortal sin, is nevertheless not paid by every one; because, although a mortal sin renders a man impotent to rise again by himself, it nonetheless happens that a man is relieved through divine help. Therefore an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin, because it separates a man from life; but the eternal punishment is paid in this, that it holds a man eternally separated from life. — Since therefore the venial sin neither separates a man from life, because it does not exclude grace, nor holds a man perpetually separated from life; hence it is that the venial sin neither of itself binds to eternal punishment, nor is an eternal punishment rendered to it according to itself.

But since the venial sin is apt to be conjoined to that which separates from life, and also to that which holds [one] separated from life; hence it is that by reason of the adjoined [sin] an eternal punishment is owed, and an eternal punishment is paid. Whence if someone dies in mortal sin together with the venial, he will be punished eternally for both16.

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And the reason of this is that no sin can be blotted out without grace; and as long as the fault lasts, the punishment too ought to last. And therefore, since the venial fault lasts with the mortal infinitely, by reason of its conjunction with it, it is punished infinitely. Nevertheless to it, so far as concerns itself, a temporal punishment is owed, since it can stand together with grace; and therefore it is named venial, that in this it be distinguished from the genus of mortal sin; for the mortal takes away the principle of life and pardon, namely grace itself, whereas the venial, so far as concerns itself, does not take it away, but rather remains together with it17. — Therefore the reasons showing that an eternal punishment is not owed to venial sin according to itself are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that a satisfactory punishment for the venial and the mortal is proportionable; it can be said that that reasoning does not conclude18 that an eternal punishment is owed to the venial, except insofar as it is conjoined to the mortal. Furthermore, that reasoning does not compel, because, as was said in the objecting, in the infusion19 of grace the punishment of mortal sin is commuted into a temporal one; but the punishment of venial sin is not commuted into a non-temporal one. — And if you ask whence this is, since the mercy of God ought to be ordered; it must be said that, because the obligation to eternal punishment cannot stand together with grace, necessarily through the infusion of grace there comes about an absolution from the liability to eternal punishment. But grace stands well with temporal punishment; and therefore it is not necessary that through the infusion of grace the temporal punishment be commuted into an instantaneous one.

2. To that which is objected concerning him who dies with the venial and the mortal; it must be said that such a one is punished eternally both for the venial and for the mortal; but this is not by reason of the venial principally, but by reason of the adjoined mortal. — Nor does it avail that he objects that the mortal is punished in itself as much as it deserved; because, just as the good is invigorated from the good, so evil is invigorated from evil, in that mode in which evil is said to be invigorated. Therefore although to the venial, so far as concerns itself, an eternal punishment is not owed, it can nonetheless be owed to it, insofar as it is conjoined to the mortal; and therefore, when God punishes both the venial and the mortal in the same20 eternal punishment, He punishes neither beyond what is condign, but punishes both, as each deserves to be punished, not only in itself, but also as it is conjoined to another.

3. To that which is objected, that the character of the venial is more preserved with the mortal than with grace; it must be said that if it be understood of grace as to its act, it is true; for the act of grace or the motion of grace blots out venial sin. But if it be understood as to its habit, it is false; because the venial with grace is more preserved in its proper character than with the mortal; for then its guilt is neither increased nor diminished nor changed. But when the venial is joined to the mortal, then its guilt is increased and in a certain way changed, because what is joined to evil is invigorated. — Nor does it avail that he objects that a temporal punishment is not owed to the venial except by reason of grace, because it would always last unless there were grace. For it must be said that it is true that it would always last unless there were grace; yet because it of itself does not exclude grace, as the mortal does, it stands together with the principle of its remission and blotting-out: therefore, although it cannot be blotted out without grace, nonetheless, so far as concerns its own21 nature, it is blottable-out and terminable. It is not so with the mortal, which altogether excludes the gift of grace.

4. To that which is objected, that if someone were in venial sin alone and were to die, he would be tormented eternally; it must be said that this22 supposition is impossible. First, because it never was nor is nor will be that anyone was in venial sin alone, in such a way that he does not have grace. For there is no middle state now, but that a man either has grace or is in mortal sin. And in the first state there was no middle between innocence and mortal fault, because the purity of innocence could not be lost except through mortal fault, as was shown above23; and therefore that supposition is vain. — Yet granted that some child were in venial sin, I say that God would never lead him out of the state of merit, but that either he himself would sin mortally, or He Himself would give him grace. — And if it be asked whether to this venial [sinner] an eternal punishment is owed, or a temporal one; I say that a temporal one is owed. And if one proceed further: then once that is paid, he will be entirely free from fault;

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it must be said that this is true; but because he can never pay it to God, in such a way that God may accept it24 without grace; hence it is that God, lest He be compelled to punish this man beyond what is condign, would infuse grace upon him, through which He would accept the payment of the punishment. And therefore it does not follow that an eternal punishment is owed to that sin25 according to itself; nor does it follow that a man can by himself rise again from fault to innocence.

5. To that which is objected, that the delight does not exceed the delight infinitely; it must be said that it does not exceed infinitely according to the true intensity of the delight, but according to the reckoning of the sinner. — An example of this is set in charity, which loves some created good and loves the uncreated; and it so reckons the uncreated good as good that, if the created good were multiplied infinitely26, it still would not equal it in love; but it would love God more than the created good multiplied infinitely, although it loves each finitely. So also in the matter at hand it is to be understood concerning the love of concupiscence, which destroys charity, and that which is preserved with charity. For the one, namely that which destroys charity, prefers the creature to God, who was to be preferred to infinite created goods; but the other, which remains with charity, does not prefer the creature to God: and therefore according to the reckoning both of the sinner and of God who punishes, the mortal exceeds the venial disproportionably.

6. To that which is objected, that by the venial God is offended; it must be said that this is false; for God is not said to be offended except when He is contemned. But it is true that with venial sin God is loved less, according to what Augustine says in the book of the Confessions27: « He loves Thee less who loves anything together with Thee, which he does not love on account of Thee ». Therefore the venial does not take away eternal life, but delays it, because it does not separate from God, but estranges; nor does it bind to a punishment eternally tormenting, so far as concerns itself, but to one temporally afflicting.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Pro proportionabilis codd. F T bb ee et alii in hoc arg. constanter exhibent proportionalis.
    For proportionabilis codices F T bb ee and others in this argument consistently give proportionalis.
  2. Edd., excepta I, momentaneam.
    The editions, except the first, [read] momentaneam (instantaneous).
  3. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 118. serm. 23. n. 3: Nec recte factum infructuosum, nec peccatum creditur impunitum. Cfr. Serm. ad fratres in eremo (inter opera August.), serm. 41. et 44., nec non supra pag. 843, nota 8.
    Augustine, Exposition of Psalm 118, sermon 23, n. 3: "Neither is a rightly-done deed believed to be fruitless, nor a sin to go unpunished." Cf. Sermons to the Brothers in the Hermitage (among the works of Augustine), sermons 41 and 44, and also above, p. 843, note 8.
  4. Codd. C K L O S Y et alii cum ed. 1 meruit. Circa finem arg. pro Deus nullum punit cod. O Deus malum non punit.
    Codices C K L O S Y and others, with the first edition, [read] meruit. Near the end of the argument, for Deus nullum punit (God punishes no one) codex O [reads] Deus malum non punit (God does not punish evil).
  5. Cod. bb sic: delet ipsum mortale, veniale nunquam.
    Codex bb thus: the mortal blots it out, the venial never.
  6. Ut ait August., cuius verba integra vide supra pag. 770, nota 1.
    As Augustine says, whose words in full see above, p. 770, note 1.
  7. Cod. T subveniat.
    Codex T [reads] subveniat (come to aid).
  8. Simul audi: creaturam.
    Supply at the same time: the creature.
  9. Richard. a S. Vict. in opusculo, quod inscribitur de Differentia peccati mortalis et venialis, quaestionem, de qua hic agitur, tangit et obiicienti, quodsi in peccatore decedenti cum mortali simul et cum veniali utrumque peccatum aeternaliter puniretur, quod tunc differentia inter peccata mortalia et venialia tolleretur, respondet: Miror, cur non aeque ex alia consideratione attendis et simili ratione contendis, utrumque [peccatum] esse veniale. Nam sicut in quibusdam utrumque aeterna poena punitur, sic in quibusdam utrumque temporali poena purgatur... utrumque mundatur poena transitoria. Quid ergo? Eritne utrumque veniale et non veniale, mortale et non mortale? Sed si vis inter utrumque recte discernere, attendere debes, quid utrumque faciat per se sine alterius adiectione... Videtur mihi veniale peccatum, quod in Christo renatis per se solum nunquam inducit aeternum supplicium, etiamsi defuerit poenitentiae remedium; mortale vero peccatum, etiamsi fuerit solum, si poenitentiae remedium defuerit, aeternam mortem inducit etc.
    Richard of St. Victor, in the opuscule entitled On the Difference of Mortal and Venial Sin, touches on the question here treated, and to one objecting that, if in a sinner dying with mortal sin together with venial both sins were punished eternally, then the difference between mortal and venial sins would be removed, he replies: "I wonder why you do not equally attend from another consideration and contend with like reasoning that both [sins] are venial. For just as in some men both are punished with eternal punishment, so in some both are purged with temporal punishment... both are cleansed with transitory punishment. What then? Will both be venial and not venial, mortal and not mortal? But if you wish to discern rightly between the two, you ought to attend to what each does by itself without the addition of the other... It seems to me that a venial sin, which in those reborn in Christ never by itself alone induces eternal torment, even if the remedy of penance be lacking; but a mortal sin, even if it be alone, if the remedy of penance be lacking, induces eternal death," etc.
  10. Quaest. praeced. — De maiori cfr. Apoc. 21, 8.
    The preceding question. — On the major [premise] cf. Revelation 21:8.
  11. Richard. a S. Vict. loc. supra cit. ait: Veniale itaque peccatum in Christo renatis, quantum in se solo est, semper pertinet ad veniam; mortale vero, quantum in se solo est, semper pertinet ad mortem aeternam.
    Richard of St. Victor, in the place cited above, says: "And so a venial sin, in those reborn in Christ, so far as it is in itself alone, always pertains to pardon; but a mortal sin, so far as it is in itself alone, always pertains to eternal death."
  12. Plerique codd. et ed. 2 maius.
    Most codices and the second edition [read] maius (greater).
  13. Dist. 44. p. II. a. I. q. 1.
    Distinction 44, part II, article I, question 1.
  14. Cod. cc et ed. I recreationem. Subinde pro infusionem cod. T reinfusionem.
    Codex cc and the first edition [read] recreationem (re-creation). Then for infusionem (infusion) codex T [reads] reinfusionem (re-infusion).
  15. In Vat. deest pro utroque.
    In the Vatican edition pro utroque (for both) is lacking.
  16. Plures alias de hac re opiniones Praepositivus affert in sua Summa, p. II, dicens: Sunt quidam, qui ad hoc respondent, quod in morte omnia venialia peccata delentur, et ita non transit quis nisi cum mortalibus peccatis, pro quibus aeternaliter punitur. Sed si in malo homine venialia peccata delentur in morte, multo magis in bono: ergo bonus non portat secum aliquod veniale; quod est contra auctoritates. Alii sunt qui dicunt, quod venialia in morte ex contemptu fiunt mortalia in eo qui transit cum veniali et mortali... Alii sunt qui dicunt, quod veniale peccatum punitur in isto aeternaliter, ipse tamen non meruit puniri illa poena pro illo peccato... Alii dicunt, quod non est aliqua poena determinata, qua quis puniatur pro isto peccato vel pro illo, sed pro omnibus una poena est, sicut in eo qui suspenditur pro multis peccatis, una est poena suspensionis pro omnibus illis, non autem potest dici, quod illam poenam meruit hoc peccato vel illo, sed pro illis simul dignus est ea... Nobis autem magis placet via magistri nostri dicentis, quod pro veniali punitur iste aeternaliter; sed pro veniali peccato meretur quis poenam temporalem directe et absolute, aeternam sub conditione, sicut e converso mortali peccato meretur quis poenam aeternam directe, temporalem indirecte... sub conditione, scil. si poenituerit etc. — Verbis non aufert cod. O praemittit eam.
    Praepositivus brings forward several other opinions on this matter in his Summa, part II, saying: "There are some who answer to this that in death all venial sins are blotted out, and so one passes only with mortal sins, for which he is punished eternally. But if in an evil man venial sins are blotted out in death, much more in a good man: therefore the good man does not carry any venial sin with him; which is against the authorities. There are others who say that venial sins in death become mortal through contempt in him who passes with the venial and the mortal... There are others who say that the venial sin is punished in him eternally, yet he himself did not deserve to be punished with that punishment for that sin... Others say that there is no determinate punishment by which one is punished for this sin or for that, but for all there is one punishment, just as in him who is hanged for many sins there is one punishment of hanging for all of them, and it cannot be said that he deserved that punishment by this sin or by that, but for them together he is worthy of it... But the way of our master pleases us more, who says that for the venial this man is punished eternally; but for a venial sin one deserves a temporal punishment directly and absolutely, an eternal one under a condition, just as conversely for a mortal sin one deserves an eternal punishment directly, a temporal one indirectly... under a condition, namely if he shall have repented," etc. — Before the words non aufert codex O prefixes eam.
  17. Supra in obiectione prima, ubi etiam videre est, quod poena non-temporalis, quae hic memoratur, idem significat ac poena instantanea. — Paulo superius pro non concludit codd. C H L R S (K et T a prima manu) ee perperam non excludit. Paulo inferius pro in infusione codd. F T ee infusione tantum.
    Above in the first objection, where it can also be seen that the non-temporal punishment here mentioned signifies the same as an instantaneous punishment. — A little above, for non concludit (does not conclude) codices C H L R S (K and T by the first hand) ee wrongly [read] non excludit (does not exclude). A little below, for in infusione codices F T ee [read] infusione only.
  18. Non pauci codd., inter quos F K T (bb a prima manu) cc ee, atque edd. 1, 2 venialis.
    Not a few codices, among them F K T (bb by the first hand) cc ee, and editions 1 and 2, [read] venialis.
  19. Codd. H bb eadem. In fine arg. pro alteri coniunctum codd. F K T et nonnulli alii alterius coniunctum.
    Codices H bb [read] eadem. At the end of the argument, for alteri coniunctum (conjoined to another) codices F K T and some others [read] alterius coniunctum (conjunction of another).
  20. Codd. I V Y Z sui.
    Codices I V Y Z [read] sui (its own).
  21. Codd. T W bb omittunt haec.
    Codices T W bb omit haec (this).
  22. Dist. 21. a. 3. q. I. — Enuntiatio, quae antecedit, scil. quia puritas... mortalem culpam, desideratur in codd. T bb.
    Distinction 21, article 3, question 1. — The statement which precedes, namely quia puritas... mortalem culpam ("because the purity... mortal fault"), is wanting in codices T bb.
  23. Cod. cc et ed. 1 animam.
    Codex cc and the first edition [read] animam (the soul).
  24. Fere omnes codd. et primae edd. omittunt aeterna. Paulo ante pro poenae cod. T substituit bene.
    Nearly all the codices and the first editions omit aeterna. A little before, for poenae codex T substitutes bene.
  25. Edd. cum paucis codd. multiplicetur.
    The editions, with a few codices, [read] multiplicetur.
  26. Libr. X. c. 29. n. 40.
    [Augustine, Confessions,] Book X, c. 29, n. 40.
  27. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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