Dist. 42, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 42
## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod peccatum interdum est in aliquo reatu, postquam transit actu7. Videtur enim hoc esse falsum. Aut enim reatus sive obligatio peccati fundatur super actum peccati, aut super pronitatem, aut super deformitatem. Si super actum; ergo transeunte actu, necesse est ipsum transire: ergo non manet peccatum quantum ad reatum, postquam transit quantum ad actum8. Si super pronitatem; ergo cum pronitas remaneat in homine post gratiae susceptionem, videtur, quod reatus remaneat post peccatum, etiam post
gratiam susceptam; quod est plane falsum. Si super deformitatem; sed contra: deformitas dicit privationem, et privatio nihil est1: ergo fundatur reatus peccati super nihil: ergo pro nihilo obligatur homo ad poenam. Si ergo nihil est plus in peccato nisi ista tria, non videtur, quod peccatum possit remanere reatu et transire actu.
Quaeritur igitur, super quid fundetur reatus sive obligatio ad poenam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum quod tria sunt in peccato, videlicet actus peccandi, et habitus pronitatis sive macula peccati, et tertio defectus sive boni privatio, quae deformitas dicitur; secundum hoc triplex fuit hic modus dicendi.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod reatus peccati fundatur super actum; nec tamen sequitur, quod2 transeat cum actu, pro eo quod pro actu praeterito potest homo manere obligatus ad poenam futuram. Cum enim quis ex pravitate actionis suae reus poenae efficitur; etsi actus ille pertranseat, reatus sive obligatio non pertransit, sicut patet in latrone, vel in eo qui aliquod facinus perpetravit. — Sed huic modo dicendi obviat possibilitas3 absolutionis a reatu. Si enim reatus fundaretur super actum praeteritum; cum actum praeteritum necesse sit esse praeteritum, cum est reus, non potest non esse reus, quod manifeste falsum est.
Alius modus dicendi fuit, quod reatus fundatur super pronitatem, quae quidem pronitas dicitur esse macula peccati; et illa macula est quasi quaedam dispositio reddens animam cremabilem; et ratione amotionis illius maculae dicimur lavari in sanguine Christi a peccatis nostris4. — Sed huic modo dicendi obviat possibilitas amotionis illius pronitatis absque infusione gratiae; sicut patet: quando de avaro fit prodigus, aufertur ab eo pronitas ad avaritiam. Si ergo reatus fundaretur super illam pronitatem, cum aliquis de avaro fieret prodigus, absque gratia esset a reatu peccati absolutus, quod plane falsum est.
Tertius modus dicendi est, quod reatus fundatur super deformitatem5. Deformitas autem non tantum dicit boni privationem, sed etiam debitum habendi; et quia peccator debet Deo iustitiam et honorem; et, dum illis privatur per peccatum, deformatur, et ex hoc obligatur ad sustinendam poenam. Quia enim debitor erat et non poterat solvere in operibus, necesse erat, ut persolveret in passionibus6. — Sed huic modo dicendi obviat reatuum multiplicitas. Quot enim peccata homo actualiter perpetravit, tot poenis reus est; ex multis autem peccatis eiusdem speciei una resultat in anima deformitas. Praeterea, carentia boni in homine obligat ad carentiam summi boni, non ad passionem supplicii, sicut patet in originali peccato7b. Praeterea, remota deformitate per gratiam, adhuc remanet obligatio ad poenam.
Et propterea dici potest, quod reatus sive obligatio ad poenam duplex est: quaedam scilicet respectu poenae aeternae, et quaedam respectu poenae temporalis. Obligatio vero respectu poenae temporalis non semper requirit culpam praesentem, sed sufficit ad illam obligationem, quod culpa fuerit praeterita, et quod non subsecuta fuerit plena emenda8b. Obligatio autem ad poenam aeternam fundatur super ipsam culpam. Culpa autem, proprie loquendo, non est ipsa pronitas, sed ipsa deordinatio, sive quae est in actu, sive quae est in anima. Deordinatio autem in actu consistebat ex conversione et aversione; et secundum hanc duplicem comparationem anima deordinatur, cum peccat9; et illa deordinatio in anima ratione aversionis dicitur deformitas, ratione vero conversionis dicitur macula. — Dico ergo, quod reatus poenae aeternae fundatur super peccatum, et in quantum est deformitas, et in quantum est macula; sed differenter, quia ratione aversionis dignus est privari bono aeterno10, ratione vero conversionis dignus est supplicio. Fundatur autem reatus super maculam, et deformitatem, quae est in anima per comparationem ad actum, per quem illa macula vel deformitas est introducta; et ideo plurificantur reatus, secundum quod plurificantur peccata commissa11.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam dico, quod reatus poenae aeternae non simpliciter12 fundatur super maculam, secundum quod dicitur pronitas vel positio aliqua, sed potius secundum quod dicitur deordinatio et privatio. Dico etiam,
quod non fundatur super deformitatem solum ratione privationis, sed etiam ratione debiti; nec solum ratione aversionis, sed etiam ratione conversionis; nec solum super peccatum, secundum quod est deformitas, sed secundum quod est macula. Et hoc est quod dicit Magister in littera1b: « Reatu remanet peccatum in homine, cum pro eo, sive transierit, sive adsit, mens hominis polluta est et corrupta, totusque homo suppliciis est obligatus perpetuis »; et loquitur hic Magister, sicut patet, de reatu poenae aeternae, non temporalis; reatus enim poenae temporalis bene fundatur super illud quod pertransiit2b.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Modi peccatorum varias in Scriptura habent distinctiones. Videtur enim, quod non solummodo varias habeant, immo etiam infinitas; quia, sicut vult Philosophus3b, « bonum est uno modo, malum autem multifariam ». Et ipse etiam Dionysius dicit, quod « malum est infinitum »: ergo videtur, quod in Scriptura non possit habere distinctiones determinatas.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur de numero et sufficientia harum distinctionum, quas Magister ponit in littera4b. Videtur enim, quod aliquae inconvenienter assignentur; quia, cum omne peccatum sit in voluntate ex libidine mota5b, male distinguitur peccatum in peccatum, quod est ex amore, et quod est ex timore. — Item, cum omne peccatum sit in cogitatione et voluntate, male distinguitur peccatum per peccatum in cogitatione et verbo et opere. — Item, cum omne peccatum sit in Deum, male distinguitur peccatum per istas differentias: in Deum et in se et in proximum. — Item, cum in omni peccato sit defectus alicuius circumstantiae, omne peccatum videtur esse omissio: ergo male distinguitur per commissum et omissum. — Postremo videtur, cum omnis peccati initium sit superbia, quod male distinguatur peccatum per septem capitalia.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister in hac parte septem innuit divisiones peccati6b secundum septemplicem ipsius comparationem.
Primo namque peccatum comparatur ad causam suam, ex qua habet ortum; et sic est illa divisio peccati in actuale et originale.
Secundo vero comparatur ad poenam, ad quam terminatur; et sic est illa divisio peccati in mortale et veniale. Has duas divisiones Magister praemisit supra7c.
Tertio peccatum comparari habet ad motivum; et hoc quidem vel est ad bonum assequendum, vel ad malum fugiendum; et sic est tertia divisio, quam Magister ponit in peccatum ex amore et peccatum ex timore.
Quarto peccatum habet comparari ad actum substratum; et sic est quarta divisio peccati in peccatum cogitationis, verbi et operis, secundum triplicem potentiam, scilicet affectivam, interpretativam et operativam; cogitatio enim pro affectione ibi accipitur8c.
Quinto comparatur peccatum ad personam, quam offendit; et sic est quinta divisio peccati in Deum et in se et in proximum.
Sexto comparatur peccatum ad mandatum, cui opponitur; et sic est illa divisio in delictum et commissum, quia delictum est contra praeceptum affirmativum, et commissum contra negativum9b.
Septimo comparatur ad vitia, quae ex ipso oriuntur; et sic est illa divisio peccati in septem differentias capitalium.
Et sic Magister ponit septem divisiones secundum septem peccati comparationes. Quamvis tamen aliae divisiones reperiantur, ad aliquam harum reduci possunt, pro eo quod sumuntur secundum aliquam istarum comparationum; sicut illa divisio, qua beatus Ioannes in Canonica sua10b dividit peccatum in superbiam vitae et concupiscentiam oculorum et concupiscentiam carnis, reducitur ad illam, quae est ex parte motivi. — Similiter et illa divisio, qua Isidorus11b dividit peccatum in peccatum, quod est « ex malitia et infirmitate et ignorantia ». Similiter illa divisio, qua Gregorius dividit in peccata carnalia et spiritualia, quam sumit ex illo verbo Apostoli secundae ad Corinthios septimo: Mundemus nos ab omni inquinamento carnis et spiritus, reducitur ad illam, qua peccatum dividitur per comparationem
ad actus substratos. — Et sic patet sufficientia, numerus et ordo istarum divisionum.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod malum est infinitis modis; dicendum, quod si hoc verum est1c ex parte ipsius mali, et etiam per comparationes, quas habet ad particularia bona et ad particulares personas; verumtamen ratione boni sibi oppositi et ratione comparationum generalium modis finitis, quamvis variis, habet distingui.
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divisiones illae, quae hic assignantur, non recte sumuntur, maxime quia in illis tribus primis divisionibus primum membrum generale est ad omne peccatum; dicendum, quod in illis tribus divisionibus primum membrum accipiendum est cum praecisione, ut sit sensus, quod peccatum aliud est ex amore tantum, aliud ex amore pariter et timore; similiter et in aliis duabus. — Vel dic, quod dividit peccatum penes motivum et actum et obiectum, prout haec accipiuntur2c proprie et immediate. — Illud vero, quod obiicit contra illam divisionem, quae est in delictum et commissum, non valet; quia non quaecumque omissio cuiusque bonae circumstantiae dicitur delictum, sed illa quae est omissio actus debiti.
Ad ultimum dicendum, quod superbia dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, prout omnis contemptus et erectio mentis nomine superbiae continetur; et sic est initium omnis peccati3c; in omni enim peccato homo superbit et se erigit contra Deum. Alio modo dicitur superbia appetitus dignitatis et honoris; et hoc modo est speciale peccatum, distinctum ab aliis peccatis.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, septem esse vitia capitalia vel principalia; quia super illud Proverbiorum sexto4c: Sex sunt, quae odit Dominus; Glossa « sex capitalia vitia enumerat, quae in comparatione septimi minora sunt »; et ista non continentur sub illis: ergo videntur esse quatuordecim. — Item, Isidorus super Deuteronomium5c enumerat octo capitalia, scilicet « gastrimargiam, fornicationem, philargyriam, tristitiam, iram, cenodoxiam, acidiam, superbiam »; et ita videtur, vel quod ista divisio sit diminuta, vel alia superflua. — Item, cum vitia opponantur virtutibus, et nos habeamus habitus virtutum, donorum et beatitudinum; videtur, quod deberent esse capitalia vitia saltem viginti unum. — Item, cum virtus habeat sibi vitium oppositum penes superabundantiam et defectum6c; videtur, quod secundum numerum habituum bonorum debet duplari numerus capitalium vitiorum, ut sint quadraginta duo.
Iuxta hoc etiam quaeritur: cum habeamus capitale vitium penes gulam, quare non habemus alios penes luxuriam, vitium sensus tactus et gustus? — Quaeritur etiam7d, pro quanto dicatur aliquid capitale peccatum; et de numero et sufficientia istius divisionis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod capitale vitium dupliciter potest dici: aut quia praecipuum est et magnum in genere vitioso, aut quia caput est et principium aliorum. Primo modo accipitur in Glossa Proverbiorum sexto, ubi vocantur illa vitia capitalia, quia magna sunt, et homo dignus est magna poena. Secundo modo accipitur hic capitale; dicitur enim hic vitium capitale illud quod est ratio principiandi multa peccata; unde Gregorius8d cuilibet capitali vitio assignat filias. Peccatum autem hoc ipso ponitur esse caput et principium alterius, quo eius motivum adeo cadit in animae appetitum, quod potest praestare fomentum et motum, adeo ut ex ipso consurgat quoddam peccati corpus quodam modo metaphoricum, continens varietatem ramorum et membrorum, filiorum et filiarum9c. — Et hinc est, quod infidelitas, quae opponitur fidei, non ponitur esse capitale peccatum, quia error non cadit primo in animae appetitum; similiter nec prodigalitas, quae est opposita avaritiae. Inanis autem gloria uno modo est capitale vitium, alio modo est filia. Nam prout inanis gloria dicit appetitum dignitatis et excellentiae, sic est idem cum superbia et est capitale vitium. Et sic accipit Magister in littera10c, quia animus directe movetur ad excellentiam et dignitatem appetendam. Prout autem inanis gloria
dicitur appetitus laudis; sic est filia, quia non desideratur laus humana nisi propter excellentiam. — Et sic patet, quod non est controversia inter istam assignationem et illam Isidori. Isidorus enim accipit cenodoxiam sive inanem gloriam pro superbia proprie dicta, et ultimo superaddit superbiam septem capitalibus quasi omnium vitiorum reginam1d.
Sufficientia autem capitalium et numerus multipliciter potest accipi.
Uno modo sic. Cum peccatum capitale sit corruptio sive pronitas respectu eius, ad quod natura prona est ex corruptione primaria, multiplicari habet, sicut habet multiplicari illa pronitas. Pronitas autem illa potest multiplicari ex parte obiecti sic: quia aut attenditur quantum ad appetitum apparentis boni, aut quantum ad fugam apparentis mali. — Si primo modo, aut respectu boni interioris, et sic est superbia; aut exterioris, et sic est2d avaritia; aut inferioris, prout spectat ad conservationem propriae carnis, et sic est gula; aut conservationem speciei, et sic est luxuria. — Si respectu apparentis mali; hoc potest tripliciter esse: aut mali interioris, et sic est invidia; aut exterioris, et sic est ira; aut inferioris, et sic est acidia, quae refugit malum carnis. — Sed iste modus sumendi non videtur usquequaque conveniens. Omnis enim pronitas directe est respectu apparentis boni.
Et ideo est alius modus multiplicandi hanc pronitatem secundum diversitatem virium3d animae, quoniam pronitas aut attenditur in ipsa voluntate rationali secundum se, aut per coniunctionem ad sensibilem, aut per coniunctionem ad vegetabilem. — Si secundum se; sic potest esse tripliciter: aut in comparatione ad Deum, et sic est superbia; aut ad proximum, et sic est invidia; aut ad se ipsum, et sic est acidia. — Si per coniunctionem ad sensibilem; sic potest esse4d dupliciter, secundum quod duplex est motiva sensibilis, videlicet concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Si per coniunctionem ad concupiscibilem, sic est avaritia; si ad irascibilem, sic est ira. — Si attendatur per coniunctionem cum vegetabili; sic potest esse dupliciter: aut quantum ad generativam, et sic est luxuria; aut quantum ad nutritivam, et sic est gula. — Quantum ad augmentativam nulla est, quia illa est pure naturalis. — Sed quoniam ira ita est spirituale peccatum, sicut invidia et acidia, adhuc videtur, quod iste modus assignandi aliquam habeat inconvenientiam.
Propterea tertio modo potest dici, quod pronitas ad aliquod apparens bonum aut est respectu boni, quod respicit spiritum secundum se, aut respectu boni, quod respicit spiritum in carne. — Si respectu boni, quod respicit spiritum secundum se, hoc potest esse quadrupliciter secundum quatuor conditiones boni, ad quas pronus est appetitus noster. Appetit enim quis bonum sub ratione dignitatis, et hoc per superbiam; sub ratione proprietatis, et sic est invidia; sub ratione securitatis5d, et sic est ira; sub ratione quietis, et sic est acidia.
Si vero sit haec pronitas respectu boni, quod respicit spiritum in carne, hoc potest tripliciter esse secundum triplicem conditionem, sub qua spiritus carnalis bonum appetit. Aut enim appetit bonum sub ratione sufficientis, et sic est avaritia; aut sub ratione demulcentis, et sic est luxuria; aut sub ratione reficientis, et sic est gula.
Ex his patet sufficientia et numerus vitiorum capitalium. Non enim accipiuntur per oppositionem ad virtutes nec ad dona nec ad beatitudines, sed secundum pronitates respicientes conditiones boni apparentis. — Patet etiam, quare penes alios sensus non habemus capitalia vitia, sicut penes gustum et tactum, quia in his regnat pronitas amplior quam in aliis sensibus. Unde si delectationes quaeruntur in aliis sensibus, ad has reducuntur, utpote si aliquis velit aspicere mulierem pulcram, ut in ea delectetur et concupiscat, reducitur talis delectatio ad luxuriam. Similiter, si quis velit aspicere pulcrum equum vel librum, ut ipsum habeat, talis delectatio reducitur ad avaritiam. Sicut enim appetitus spiritus secundum se quodam modo quietatur, si habeat bonum excellens cum proprietate et securitate et quiete; sic appetitus carnalis quietatur, dum habet bonum sufficiens, demulcens, et reficiens, nec aliquid quaerit6d nisi propter haec tria.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Initium sive radix omnis peccati superbia est; quia dicit Chrysostomus super illud Psalmi7e: A facie insipientiae: « Omnis peccati initium insipientia est »: ergo, cum
non possint esse plura eiusdem initia prima et principalia, videtur, quod superbia non sit initium omnis peccati. — Item obiicitur, secundum quod Magister obiicit in littera1e, quia primae ad Timotheum ultimo: Radix omnium malorum est cupiditas. Si tu dicas, quod haec duo sunt radices peccatorum secundum diversam comparationem; quaeritur tunc de diversitate radicum; et quid intelligatur nomine radicis; et quae differentia sit inter capitale vitium et radicem; item, quae differentia sit inter initium et radicem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod differt dicere initium et radicem. Nam initium proprie dicit illud, a quo inchoat motus; radix vero dicit illud, unde trahit2e fomentum et nutrimentum. Et ideo, cum peccatum trahat fomentum ex parte appetibilis et dicat recessum a Deo, hinc est, quod initium attenditur ex parte aversionis, et radix ex parte conversionis, proprie loquendo. Et quoniam aversio est ratione3e contemptus, et conversio est ratione cupiditatis sive libidinis; hinc est, quod superbia, proprie loquendo, dicitur initium, et cupiditas dicitur esse radix. Et quoniam in omni peccato est aversio et conversio; hinc est, quod superbia dicitur initium omnium peccatorum, et cupiditas radix omnium malorum. Et simul possunt stare illa duo; accipitur tamen aliquando nomen radicis pro nomine initii, et e converso.
Capitale autem vitium differt a radice in hoc, quod sicut caput dicit principale membrum et membrum completum, et quod est principium aliorum quantum ad motum et sensum4e; sic capitale vitium nominat peccatum completum, a quo alia vitia oriuntur; radix vero dicit aliquid sub maiori incompletione: et ideo, proprie loquendo, radix non nominat genus peccati determinatum, sed pronitatem libidinis, quae concurrit ad omne peccatum.
Unde nota, quod radix aliquando accipitur generalissime, aliquando generaliter, aliquando vero minus generaliter. Generalissime, ut cum dicitur libido sive cupiditas esse5e radix omnium malorum. Generaliter vero, ut cum dicitur, quod duplex est radix: amor male accendens et timor male humilians. Amor enim accipitur respectu boni, et timor respectu mali. Minus vero generaliter, ut cum dicitur, quod triplex est radix, scilicet concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum et superbia vitae, per comparationem ad triplex bonum, videlicet ad bonum inferius, exterius et interius.
Similiter initium peccati tripliciter accipi potest sive nominari: aut prout dicit recessum liberi arbitrii a lege maiestatis, et sic dicitur superbia sive contemptus; aut a lege veritatis, et sic dicitur error; aut a lege bonitatis, et sic dicitur insipientia, quae est contraria sapientiae.
Et sic patet, quod non est contrarietas, quando dicitur, quod initium omnis peccati est superbia; et quando idem dicitur de errore et insipientia. — Patet etiam, quod non est contrarietas in hoc, quod aliquando dicitur, quod una est radix, aliquando, quod duae, aliquando, quod tres. — Patet etiam differentia initii et radicis6e, et ipsius radicis et vitii capitalis. — Et haec de generali divisione peccatorum dicta sufficiant.
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is asked about what he says, namely that sin sometimes remains in a certain liability after it has passed away in act7. For this seems to be false. For the liability or obligation of sin is founded either upon the act of the sin, or upon the proneness, or upon the deformity. If upon the act; then, when the act passes away, that liability must necessarily pass away too: therefore the sin does not remain as to liability after it passes away as to act8. If upon the proneness; then, since the proneness remains in a man after the reception of grace, it seems that the liability remains after sin, even after
grace has been received; which is plainly false. If upon the deformity; but, on the contrary: deformity bespeaks privation, and a privation is nothing1: therefore the liability of sin is founded upon nothing: therefore for nothing is man obliged to punishment. If, then, there is nothing more in sin than these three, it does not seem that sin can remain in liability and pass away in act.
It is asked, therefore, upon what the liability or obligation to punishment is founded.
I respond: It must be said that, according as there are three things in sin — namely the act of sinning, the habit of proneness or stain of sin, and thirdly the defect or privation of good, which is called deformity — accordingly there have been here three ways of speaking.
For some have said that the liability of sin is founded upon the act; nor yet does it follow that2 it passes away with the act, because for a past act a man can remain obliged to a future punishment. For when someone is made liable to punishment by the depravity of his action; although that act passes away, the liability or obligation does not pass away, as is plain in the case of a robber, or of one who has perpetrated some crime. — But against this way of speaking stands the possibility3 of absolution from the liability. For if the liability were founded upon the past act; since a past act must necessarily be past, when he is liable, he cannot not be liable, which is manifestly false.
Another way of speaking was that the liability is founded upon the proneness, which proneness indeed is said to be the stain of sin; and that stain is, as it were, a certain disposition rendering the soul combustible; and by reason of the removal of that stain we are said to be washed from our sins in the blood of Christ4. — But against this way of speaking stands the possibility of the removal of that proneness without the infusion of grace; as is plain: when from a miser a man becomes a spendthrift, the proneness to avarice is taken away from him. If, then, the liability were founded upon that proneness, when someone became from a miser a spendthrift, he would be absolved from the liability of sin without grace, which is plainly false.
The third way of speaking is that the liability is founded upon the deformity5. Now deformity bespeaks not only the privation of good, but also the debt of having it; and because the sinner owes God justice and honor; and, while he is deprived of these through sin, he is deformed, and on this account he is obliged to undergo punishment. For because he was a debtor and could not pay in works, it was necessary that he should pay in sufferings6. — But against this way of speaking stands the multiplicity of liabilities. For as many sins as a man has actually perpetrated, to so many punishments he is liable; but from many sins of the same species one deformity results in the soul. Moreover, the lack of good in a man obliges to the lack of the highest good, not to the suffering of punishment, as is plain in original sin7b. Moreover, when the deformity is removed by grace, there still remains an obligation to punishment.
And therefore it can be said that the liability or obligation to punishment is twofold: one, namely, in respect of eternal punishment, and another in respect of temporal punishment. Now the obligation in respect of temporal punishment does not always require present guilt, but it suffices for that obligation that the guilt was past, and that full amendment did not follow8b. But the obligation to eternal punishment is founded upon the guilt itself. Now guilt, properly speaking, is not the proneness itself, but the disorder itself, whether it is in the act, or whether it is in the soul. Now the disorder in the act consisted in conversion and aversion; and according to this twofold relation the soul is disordered when it sins9; and that disorder in the soul, by reason of aversion, is called deformity, and by reason of conversion is called stain. — I say therefore that the liability of eternal punishment is founded upon sin, both insofar as it is deformity and insofar as it is stain; but differently, because by reason of aversion he is worthy to be deprived of the eternal good10, whereas by reason of conversion he is worthy of torment. Now the liability is founded upon the stain and deformity which is in the soul by relation to the act by which that stain or deformity was introduced; and therefore the liabilities are multiplied according as the sins committed are multiplied11.
And through this the response to the objections is plain. For I say that the liability of eternal punishment is not founded simply12 upon the stain, according as it is called a proneness or some disposition, but rather according as it is called disorder and privation. I say also,
that it is founded upon the deformity not only by reason of privation, but also by reason of debt; nor only by reason of aversion, but also by reason of conversion; nor only upon sin according as it is deformity, but according as it is stain. And this is what the Master says in the text1b: « By liability sin remains in a man, since on its account, whether it has passed or is present, the mind of the man is polluted and corrupted, and the whole man is obliged to perpetual punishments »; and the Master here speaks, as is plain, of the liability of eternal punishment, not of temporal; for the liability of temporal punishment is indeed founded upon that which has passed away2b.
Doubt II.
Likewise there is asked about what he says: The modes of sins have various distinctions in Scripture. For it seems that they have not only various but even infinite distinctions; because, as the Philosopher holds3b, « the good is in one way, but the evil in manifold ways ». And Dionysius himself also says that « evil is infinite »: therefore it seems that in Scripture it cannot have determinate distinctions.
In connection with this there is asked about the number and sufficiency of these distinctions, which the Master sets down in the text4b. For it seems that some are assigned unsuitably; because, since every sin is in the will moved by desire5b, sin is ill distinguished into the sin which is from love and that which is from fear. — Likewise, since every sin is in thought and will, sin is ill distinguished through sin of thought and of word and of deed. — Likewise, since every sin is against God, sin is ill distinguished through these differences: against God and against self and against neighbor. — Likewise, since in every sin there is a defect of some circumstance, every sin seems to be an omission: therefore it is ill distinguished through commission and omission. — Finally it seems, since the beginning of every sin is pride, that sin is ill distinguished through the seven capital sins.
I respond: It must be said that the Master in this part intimates seven divisions of sin6b according to its sevenfold relation.
For first sin is compared to its cause, from which it has its origin; and thus there is that division of sin into actual and original.
Secondly it is compared to the punishment to which it is ordered; and thus there is that division of sin into mortal and venial. These two divisions the Master set down above7c.
Thirdly sin has to be compared to its motive; and this indeed is either toward attaining a good or toward fleeing an evil; and thus there is the third division, which the Master sets down into sin from love and sin from fear.
Fourthly sin has to be compared to the underlying act; and thus there is the fourth division of sin into sin of thought, of word, and of deed, according to the threefold power, namely the affective, the interpretative, and the operative; for thought is there taken for affection8c.
Fifthly sin is compared to the person whom it offends; and thus there is the fifth division of sin into [sin] against God and against self and against neighbor.
Sixthly sin is compared to the commandment to which it is opposed; and thus there is that division into transgression and commission, because transgression is against an affirmative precept, and commission against a negative one9b.
Seventhly it is compared to the vices which arise from it; and thus there is that division of sin into the seven differences of the capital sins.
And thus the Master sets down seven divisions according to the seven relations of sin. Yet although other divisions may be found, they can be reduced to one of these, because they are taken according to one of these relations; as that division by which blessed John in his Canonical Epistle10b divides sin into the pride of life and the concupiscence of the eyes and the concupiscence of the flesh, is reduced to that one which is on the side of the motive. — Likewise also that division by which Isidore11b divides sin into the sin which is « from malice and infirmity and ignorance ». Likewise that division by which Gregory divides into carnal and spiritual sins, which he draws from that word of the Apostle in the second to the Corinthians, chapter seven: Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit, is reduced to that one by which sin is divided through relation
to the underlying acts. — And thus the sufficiency, number, and order of these divisions is plain.
To that, then, which is objected, that evil is in infinite modes; it must be said that, if this is true1c on the side of evil itself, and also through the relations which it has to particular goods and to particular persons; nevertheless by reason of the good opposed to it and by reason of the general relations, it has to be distinguished in finite modes, though various ones.
To that which is objected, that those divisions which are here assigned are not rightly taken, chiefly because in those first three divisions the first member is general to every sin; it must be said that in those three divisions the first member is to be taken with precision, so that the sense is that one sin is from love alone, another from love together with fear; and likewise in the other two. — Or say that he divides sin by way of motive and act and object, as these are taken2c properly and immediately. — But that which is objected against the division which is into transgression and commission, is of no force; because not just any omission of any good circumstance is called a transgression, but that which is the omission of a due act.
To the last it must be said that pride is spoken of in two ways: in one way, insofar as every contempt and elevation of the mind is contained under the name of pride; and thus it is the beginning of every sin3c; for in every sin a man becomes proud and exalts himself against God. In another way pride is called the appetite for dignity and honor; and in this way it is a special sin, distinct from the other sins.
Doubt III.
Likewise there is asked about what he says, that there are seven capital or principal vices; because upon that text of Proverbs, chapter six4c: There are six things which the Lord hates; the Gloss « enumerates six capital vices, which in comparison with the seventh are lesser »; and these are not contained under those: therefore they seem to be fourteen. — Likewise, Isidore upon Deuteronomy5c enumerates eight capital vices, namely « gluttony, fornication, avarice, sadness, wrath, vainglory, sloth, pride »; and so it seems either that this division is deficient, or the other superfluous. — Likewise, since vices are opposed to virtues, and we have the habits of virtues, of gifts, and of beatitudes; it seems that there should be at least twenty-one capital vices. — Likewise, since a virtue has a vice opposed to it on the side of excess and defect6c; it seems that according to the number of the good habits the number of capital vices ought to be doubled, so that there are forty-two.
In connection with this it is also asked: since we have a capital vice on the side of gluttony, why do we not have others on the side of lust, the vice of the sense of touch and of taste? — It is also asked7d, in what sense something is called a capital sin; and about the number and sufficiency of this division.
I respond: It must be said that a capital vice can be spoken of in two ways: either because it is chief and great in the genus of vice, or because it is a head and principle of the others. In the first way it is taken in the Gloss on Proverbs six, where those vices are called capital because they are great, and a man is worthy of great punishment. In the second way capital is taken here; for a capital vice is here said to be that which is the ground of giving rise to many sins; whence Gregory8d assigns to each capital vice its daughters. For sin is by this very fact held to be the head and principle of another, in that its motive so falls into the soul's appetite that it can furnish fomentation and movement, so that from it there arises a certain body of sin, in a manner metaphorical, containing a variety of branches and members, of sons and daughters9c. — And hence it is that unbelief, which is opposed to faith, is not held to be a capital sin, because error does not fall first into the soul's appetite; likewise neither is prodigality, which is opposed to avarice. But vainglory is in one way a capital vice, in another way a daughter. For insofar as vainglory bespeaks the appetite for dignity and excellence, thus it is the same as pride and is a capital vice. And so the Master takes it in the text10c, because the mind is directly moved to the seeking of excellence and dignity. But insofar as vainglory
is called the appetite for praise; thus it is a daughter, because human praise is not desired except for the sake of excellence. — And thus it is plain that there is no controversy between this assignment and that of Isidore. For Isidore takes vainglory or vainglory for pride properly so called, and lastly superadds pride to the seven capital vices as, so to speak, the queen of all vices1d.
The sufficiency of the capital vices and their number can be taken in many ways.
In one way thus. Since a capital sin is a corruption or proneness in respect of that to which nature is prone by reason of the primary corruption, it has to be multiplied as that proneness has to be multiplied. Now that proneness can be multiplied on the side of the object thus: because it is regarded either as to the appetite for an apparent good, or as to the flight from an apparent evil. — If in the first way, either in respect of an interior good, and thus it is pride; or of an exterior good, and thus it is2d avarice; or of an inferior good, insofar as it pertains to the conservation of one's own flesh, and thus it is gluttony; or to the conservation of the species, and thus it is lust. — If in respect of an apparent evil; this can be in three ways: either of an interior evil, and thus it is envy; or of an exterior evil, and thus it is wrath; or of an inferior evil, and thus it is sloth, which flees the evil of the flesh. — But this manner of taking it does not seem altogether suitable. For every proneness is directly in respect of an apparent good.
And therefore there is another mode of multiplying this proneness according to the diversity of the powers3d of the soul, since the proneness is regarded either in the rational will itself in itself, or by conjunction with the sensible, or by conjunction with the vegetative. — If in itself; thus it can be in three ways: either in comparison to God, and thus it is pride; or to the neighbor, and thus it is envy; or to oneself, and thus it is sloth. — If by conjunction with the sensible; thus it can be4d in two ways, according as the sensible motive power is twofold, namely the concupiscible and the irascible. If by conjunction with the concupiscible, thus it is avarice; if with the irascible, thus it is wrath. — If it is regarded by conjunction with the vegetative; thus it can be in two ways: either as to the generative, and thus it is lust; or as to the nutritive, and thus it is gluttony. — As to the augmentative there is none, because that is purely natural. — But since wrath is a spiritual sin just as envy and sloth are, it still seems that this manner of assigning has some unsuitability.
Therefore in a third way it can be said that the proneness toward some apparent good is either in respect of a good which regards the spirit in itself, or in respect of a good which regards the spirit in the flesh. — If in respect of the good which regards the spirit in itself, this can be in four ways according to the four conditions of the good to which our appetite is prone. For one desires the good under the ratio of dignity, and this through pride; under the ratio of propriety, and thus it is envy; under the ratio of security5d, and thus it is wrath; under the ratio of rest, and thus it is sloth.
But if this proneness is in respect of the good which regards the spirit in the flesh, this can be in three ways according to the threefold condition under which the carnal spirit desires the good. For it desires the good either under the ratio of the sufficient, and thus it is avarice; or under the ratio of the soothing, and thus it is lust; or under the ratio of the refreshing, and thus it is gluttony.
From these the sufficiency and number of the capital vices is plain. For they are not taken by opposition to the virtues, nor to the gifts, nor to the beatitudes, but according to the pronenesses regarding the conditions of the apparent good. — It is also plain why we do not have capital vices on the side of the other senses, as on the side of taste and touch, because in these there reigns a greater proneness than in the other senses. Hence, if pleasures are sought in the other senses, they are reduced to these, as for instance if someone wishes to behold a beautiful woman, that he may delight in her and lust, such delight is reduced to lust. Likewise, if someone wishes to behold a beautiful horse or book, that he may have it, such delight is reduced to avarice. For just as the appetite of the spirit in itself is in a certain way quieted, if it has an excellent good with propriety and security and rest; so the carnal appetite is quieted while it has a good that is sufficient, soothing, and refreshing, and seeks nothing6d except for the sake of these three.
Doubt IV.
Likewise there is asked about what he says: The beginning or root of every sin is pride; because Chrysostom says, upon that text of the Psalm7e: From the presence of folly: « The beginning of every sin is folly »: therefore, since
there cannot be several first and principal beginnings of the same thing, it seems that pride is not the beginning of every sin. — Likewise it is objected, according as the Master objects in the text1e, because in the first to Timothy, the last chapter: The root of all evils is covetousness. If you should say that these two are roots of sins according to a diverse relation; then it is asked about the diversity of roots; and what is understood by the name of root; and what difference there is between a capital vice and a root; likewise, what difference there is between a beginning and a root.
I respond: It must be said that to say beginning and root differ. For beginning properly bespeaks that from which motion starts; but root bespeaks that whence it draws2e its fomentation and nourishment. And therefore, since sin draws its fomentation from the side of the desirable and bespeaks a withdrawal from God, hence it is that the beginning is regarded on the side of aversion, and the root on the side of conversion, properly speaking. And since aversion is by reason of3e contempt, and conversion is by reason of covetousness or desire; hence it is that pride, properly speaking, is called the beginning, and covetousness is said to be the root. And since in every sin there is aversion and conversion; hence it is that pride is called the beginning of all sins, and covetousness the root of all evils. And those two can stand together; yet sometimes the name of root is taken for the name of beginning, and conversely.
A capital vice, moreover, differs from a root in this, that as a head bespeaks a principal member and a complete member, and that which is the principle of the others as to motion and sense4e; so a capital vice names a complete sin, from which other vices arise; but a root bespeaks something under greater incompleteness: and therefore, properly speaking, the root does not name a determinate genus of sin, but the proneness of desire, which concurs in every sin.
Whence note that root is sometimes taken most generally, sometimes generally, sometimes less generally. Most generally, as when desire or covetousness is said to be5e the root of all evils. But generally, as when it is said that the root is twofold: love evilly kindling and fear evilly humbling. For love is taken in respect of good, and fear in respect of evil. But less generally, as when it is said that the root is threefold, namely the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life, by relation to the threefold good, namely to the inferior, the exterior, and the interior good.
Likewise the beginning of sin can be taken or named in three ways: either insofar as it bespeaks the withdrawal of free choice from the law of majesty, and thus it is called pride or contempt; or from the law of truth, and thus it is called error; or from the law of goodness, and thus it is called folly, which is contrary to wisdom.
And thus it is plain that there is no contrariety, when it is said that the beginning of every sin is pride; and when the same is said of error and folly. — It is also plain that there is no contrariety in the fact that sometimes it is said that the root is one, sometimes that it is two, sometimes that it is three. — It is also plain the difference of beginning and root6e, and of root itself and the capital vice. — And let these things said about the general division of sins suffice.
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- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.
- Quod insinuatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Omnes edd. et Magistri et Comment. cum codd. habent postquam transit pro postquam transiit. Unde nihil immutavimus.Which is implied here in the text of the Master, c. 2. — All the editions both of the Master and of the Commentary, together with the codices, have postquam transit (after it passes) for postquam transiit (after it has passed). Hence we have changed nothing.
- Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3. — Pro sed contra: deformitas dicit edd. cum paucis codd. et illa dicit.Cf. above p. 111, note 3. — For sed contra: deformitas dicit the editions, with a few codices, read et illa dicit.
- Edd. hic repetunt reatus.The editions here repeat reatus.
- Edd., omisso verbo dicendi, pro possibilitas substituunt potestas et mox fundatur pro fundaretur.The editions, omitting the word dicendi, substitute potestas for possibilitas and soon fundatur for fundaretur.
- Apoc. 1, 5: Qui [Christus] dilexit nos et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo. — Paulo superius pro cremabilem cod. bb melius, ut videtur, criminalem.Apoc. 1:5: He [Christ] who loved us and washed us from our sins in his blood. — A little above, for cremabilem, codex bb reads, better as it seems, criminalem.
- Non pauci codd., F K (T a prima manu) W Y bb ce etc., deformitates.Not a few codices — F, K, T (in the first hand), W, Y, bb, ce, etc. — read deformitates.
- Cfr. Anselm., l. Cur Deus homo, c. 14. et 23. seq. — Paulo ante edd. contra codd. voculam et ante ex hoc obligatur omittunt, et Vat. etiam interpunctionem mutat transponendo comma, quod ante deformatur habetur, ante per peccatum. Mox pro reatuum edd. reatus et post pauca reus erit pro reus est.Cf. Anselm, Cur Deus homo I, cc. 14 and 23 ff. — A little before, the editions, against the codices, omit the particle et before ex hoc obligatur, and the Vatican edition also changes the punctuation by transposing the comma, which stands before deformatur, to before per peccatum. Soon, for reatuum, the editions read reatus, and a little after reus erit for reus est.
- Vide supra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Subinde edd. 1, 2 omittunt Praeterea, pro quo vocabulo Vat. et edd. 3, 4 substituunt quia.See above d. 33, a. 1, q. 1 f. — Thereafter editions 1 and 2 omit Praeterea, in place of which word the Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 substitute quia.
- Cfr. supra d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. — In edd. desideratur non ante subsecuta, et paulo inferius pro ipsam culpam habetur illam culpam.Cf. above d. 36, a. 2, q. 2. — In the editions non is wanting before subsecuta, and a little lower, for ipsam culpam, illam culpam is found.
- Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 2.Cf. above d. 35, a. 1, q. 2.
- Cod. I summo; Vat. dignus est privatione summi boni; edd. 1, 2, 3 nec non pauci codd., perperam omissis verbis privari bono aeterno etc., breviter exhibent dignus est supplicio. Voci supplicio cod. II adiungit aeterno. Deinde pro Fundatur autem Vat. Fundatur etiam.Codex I reads summo; the Vatican edition dignus est privatione summi boni; editions 1, 2, 3, as well as a few codices, wrongly omitting the words privari bono aeterno etc., briefly present dignus est supplicio. To the word supplicio codex II adds aeterno. Then, for Fundatur autem, the Vatican edition reads Fundatur etiam.
- Cfr. supra d. 38. a. 1. q. 2.Cf. above d. 38, a. 1, q. 2.
- Codd. F Y hic interiiciunt: fundatur super actum praeteritum, et ideo non transit cum illo. Dico etiam, quod non.Codices F and Y here insert: it is founded upon the past act, and therefore does not pass away with it. I say also, that not.
- Hic c. 2. In dicto Magistri, contra originale et Vat. aliae edd. et codd. quousque pro totusque. Mox pro non temporalis codd. H T bb et alii cum edd. 1, 2 exhibent non temporali. In fine solut. edd. et nonnulli codd. pro pertransiit habent pertransit.Here c. 2. In the saying of the Master, contra originale; and the Vatican and other editions and codices read quousque for totusque. Soon, for non temporalis, codices H, T, bb and others, together with editions 1 and 2, present non temporali. At the end of the solution the editions and several codices read pertransit for pertransiit.
- De hoc dub. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 6, q. 108. m. 1. a. 1. et q. III. m. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2. et circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. I; Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 2.On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 106, m. 6, q. 108, m. 1, a. 1, and q. III, m. 7; Bl. Albert, here a. 2; St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 2 and around the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 3; Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. I; Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. 2.
- Vide supra pag. 638, nota 3. — De verbo Dionysii cfr. supra pag. 811, nota 1.See above p. 638, note 3. — On the word of Dionysius cf. above p. 811, note 1.
- Cfr. supra pag. 845, nota 5. et pag. 952, nota 6. — In propos. seq. edd. cum aliquibus codd. omittunt in post peccatum.Cf. above p. 845, note 5, and p. 952, note 6. — In the following proposition the editions, with some codices, omit in after peccatum.
- Hic c. 2. seq. et supra d. XXXV. c. 1. nec non d. XXXVI. c. 3. — Pro divisiones edd. differentias.Here c. 2 f. and above d. XXXV, c. 1, as also d. XXXVI, c. 3. — For divisiones the editions read differentias.
- Hic c. 2.Here c. 2.
- Cfr. supra d. 35. dub. I.Cf. above d. 35, dub. I.
- Divisionem peccati in delictum et commissum Scholastici derivarunt ex illo dicto, quod habetur in August. opere de Perfectione iustitiae hominis, c. 5. n. 11, quodque ex libro Definitionum, Caelestio tributo, sumtum est: Quaerendum est, quot modis constet omne peccatum; duobus, ni fallor: si aut illa fiant, quae prohibentur, aut illa non fiant, quae iubentur. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 112. m. 2.The division of sin into transgression and commission the Scholastics derived from that saying which is found in Augustine's work On the Perfection of Man's Justice, c. 5, n. 11, and which was taken from the Book of Definitions attributed to Caelestius: It must be asked in how many ways every sin consists; in two, if I am not mistaken: either if those things be done which are forbidden, or those things be not done which are commanded. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 112, m. 2.
- I. Epist. 2, 16.1 [John] 2:16.
- Libr. II. Sent. c. 17. n. 3. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XLI. c. 4. in fine, et ibid. Comment. dub. 2.[Isidore,] Sentences II, c. 17, n. 3. See above the text of the Master, d. XLI, c. 4 at the end, and there the Commentary, dub. 2.
- Libr. XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 88, ubi recensitis septem vitiis capitalibus, ait: Ex quibus videlicet septem, quinque spiritualia duoque carnalia sunt. — Verba s. Script. habentur loc. cit. v. 1.[Gregory,] Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88, where, having reviewed the seven capital vices, he says: Of which seven, namely, five are spiritual and two carnal. — The words of holy Scripture are found in the place cited, v. 1.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 quod etsi hoc verum sit.The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads quod etsi hoc verum sit.
- Vat. prout accipitur, ceterae edd. prout hic accipitur. Pro haec etiam codd. F L O V W X Z et alii habent hic. Paulo superius pro similiter et in aliis duabus edd. sic et in aliis duobus.The Vatican edition reads prout accipitur, the other editions prout hic accipitur. For haec etiam codices F, L, O, V, W, X, Z and others read hic. A little above, for similiter et in aliis duabus, the editions read sic et in aliis duobus.
- Eccli. 10, 15: Quoniam initium omnis peccati est superbia. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 107. m. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 4; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. seq.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I; Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 2.Ecclus. 10:15: For pride is the beginning of all sin. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 107, m. 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 5; Summa p. II, tr. 18, q. 114, m. 4; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1 f.; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 3 and around the text; Richard of Middleton, here a. I, q. I; Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. 2.
- Vers. 16. — Glossa, quae habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum, ex verbis Rabani super hunc locum Script. formata est. Rabanus dicit: Sex... quae tamen comparatione discordias seminantis quasi minora deponit.Verse 16. — The Gloss, which is found in Strabo and in Lyra, was formed from the words of Rabanus upon this passage of Scripture. Rabanus says: Six... which however, in comparison with the one that sows discord, it sets down as, so to speak, lesser.
- Quaest. sive Comment. in Deut. c. 16, quo loco licet exponat, septem illos gentes, quas Dominus filiis Israel exstirpandas tradidit (Deut. 7, 1.), septem intelligi vitia principalia, tamen expositione procedente octo capitalia enumerat eaque eodem fere ordine, quo hic in testimonio exhibentur. Item Ioan. Cassianus, Collationes, coll. 5. c. 17. seqq. octo enumerat.Questions or Commentary on Deuteronomy c. 16, where, although he expounds that the seven nations which the Lord delivered to the children of Israel to be rooted out (Deut. 7:1) are to be understood as the seven principal vices, yet as the exposition proceeds he enumerates eight capital vices, and these in nearly the same order in which they are presented here in the testimony. Likewise John Cassian, Conferences, coll. 5, c. 17 ff., enumerates eight.
- Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro duplari Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit duplicari et subinde pro numerus capitalium vitiorum cum omnibus edd. habitus capitalium vitiorum.See Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6 ff. — A little lower, for duplari, the Vatican edition with editions 3 and 4 substitutes duplicari, and thereupon, for numerus capitalium vitiorum, with all the editions, habitus capitalium vitiorum.
- Cod. T Quaeritur ergo.Codex T reads Quaeritur ergo.
- Libr. XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 88. — Praecedentem propos. Vat. et edd. 3, 4 sic contrahunt: Secundo modo hoc dicitur vitium capitale, quod est etc. Paulo inferius pro Peccatum autem edd. Peccatum enim.[Gregory,] Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 88. — The preceding proposition the Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 contract thus: In the second way that is called a capital vice, which is etc. A little lower, for Peccatum autem, the editions read Peccatum enim.
- Cfr. S. Bonav. opusculum, quod inscribitur Speculum animae, in quo arbor vitiorum eiusque rami describuntur.Cf. St. Bonaventure's opusculum entitled Speculum animae (Mirror of the Soul), in which the tree of vices and its branches are described.
- Hic c. 6.Here c. 6.
- Pariter S. Gregor., XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 87. de superbia loquitur: Ipsa namque vitiorum regina superbia, cum devictum plene cor coeperit, mox illud septem principalibus vitiis quasi quibusdam suis ducibus devastandum tradit.Likewise St. Gregory, Moralia XXXI, c. 45, n. 87, speaks of pride: For pride herself, the queen of vices, when she has fully taken possession of the conquered heart, soon hands it over to the seven principal vices, as it were to certain of her own captains, to be laid waste.
- Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt hic et etiam pluries in seqq. est.Many codices and editions 1, 2 omit hic, and likewise several times in what follows est.
- Codd. D F R X Z ce et primae edd. vitiorum.Codices D, F, R, X, Z, ce and the first editions read vitiorum.
- Codd. F K W Y bb ee et alii nec non edd. 1, 2 omittunt potest esse; cod. T pro sic potest esse substituit hoc est.Codices F, K, W, Y, bb, ee and others, as well as editions 1, 2, omit potest esse; codex T substitutes hoc est for sic potest esse.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 severitatis; sed vide finem solutionis, ubi haec lectio corrigitur verbo securitatis.The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads severitatis; but see the end of the solution, where this reading is corrected by the word securitatis.
- ita cod. T (cod. bb a secunda manu), in aliis codd. et edd. nec acquirit. Codd. C K L O S (T a prima manu) V et edd. 1, 2, priore huius propositionis enuntiatione omissa, verbis Sicut enim (edd. 1, 2 et nonnulli codd. Sic enim) immediate annectunt appetitus carnalis quietatur etc. — De hoc dub. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 136. m. 1-3; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 116. seqq.; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2.So codex T (codex bb in the second hand); in the other codices and editions nec acquirit. Codices C, K, L, O, S (T in the first hand), V and editions 1, 2, omitting the former enunciation of this proposition, attach immediately, after the words Sicut enim (editions 1, 2 and several codices Sic enim), appetitus carnalis quietatur etc. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 136, m. 1-3; Bl. Albert, here a. 6; Summa p. II, tr. 18, q. 116 ff.; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1; Richard of Middleton, here around the text; Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1, 2.
- Psalm. 37, 6. — Testimonium Chrysost. habetur in eius Homil. 11. in Ioan. n. 3. Post quod testim. edd. 1, 2 omittunt ergo, cuius loco Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 ponit sed, et subinde pro possint cod. T substituit possunt.Psalm 37:6. — The testimony of Chrysostom is found in his Homily 11 on John, n. 3. After this testimony editions 1, 2 omit ergo, in place of which the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 puts sed, and thereupon, for possint, codex T substitutes possunt.
- Hic c. 7. — Locus ex I. ad Timoth. ultim. allatus est v. 10.Here c. 7. — The passage cited from the first to Timothy, the last chapter, is v. 10.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 trahitur. Paulo superius pro inchoat cod. bb substituit inchoatur; paulo inferius post trahat cod. T subiicit nutrimentum et.The Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, reads trahitur. A little above, for inchoat, codex bb substitutes inchoatur; a little lower, after trahat, codex T adds nutrimentum et.
- Edd. hic et paulo post ex ratione.The editions here and a little after read ex ratione.
- Cfr. Aristot., II. de Partib. animal. c. 10. — Aliquanto superius pro aliquando cod. T habet quandoque, et deinde cum codd. F V W etc. Capitale autem initium pro Capitale autem vitium. Iidem codd. etiam paulo inferius pro vitium exhibent initium.Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals II, c. 10. — Somewhat above, for aliquando, codex T reads quandoque, and then, with codices F, V, W etc., Capitale autem initium for Capitale autem vitium. The same codices also, a little lower, present initium for vitium.
- Cod. T est. Mox post duplex est radix cod. O adiicit peccati. De hac duplici radice peccati vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.Codex T reads est. Soon, after duplex est radix, codex O adds peccati. On this twofold root of sin see here the text of the Master, c. 4.
- Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt et radicis. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 136. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 118. m. 3; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 7; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. et dub. lit. 7.The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 omit et radicis. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 136, m. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 8; Summa p. II, tr. 18, q. 118, m. 3; St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1, ad 7; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here around the text; Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1 and dub. on the text 7.