Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 35
QUAESTIO III.
Utrum peccatum ex eo, quod corrumpit bonum, contrarietur bono increato.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum peccatum ex hoc, quod corrumpit bonum, contrarietur bono increato. Et quod sic, videtur:
Argg. pro parte affirmativa.
1. Primo per Augustinum, duodecimo de Civitate Dei1: « Vitium contrarium est Deo, tanquam malum bono; naturae vero, quam vitiat, non tantum est contrarium, sed etiam noxium »: ergo videtur, malum in eo, quod corrumpit naturam, contrariari summo bono.
2. Item, quod facit hominem rebellem et contrarium Deo, illud potissime Deo contrariatur; sed peccatum facit hominem inimicum Dei, et pugnare adversus Deum et resistere, sicut ex diversis locis Scripturae2 accipi potest: ergo etc.
3. Item, contrarietas effectuum attestatur contrarietati causarum, maxime quando causa sic est in alterum contrariorum, quod non potest esse in reliquum3; sed summi boni est iustitiam facere, peccati vero est iustitia privare, nec Deus potest privare iustitia, nec malum potest facere iustitiam: ergo videtur, quod malitia sit summo bono contraria in hoc, quod privat iustitiam.
4. Item, quod contrariatur praecepto alicuius contrariatur ipsi praecipienti; sed malum contrariatur verbis et mandatis Dei in hoc, quod est corruptio, et corrumpit illud quod mandata Dei praecipiunt servari: ergo etc.
5. Item, caritas et cupiditas opponuntur, similiter gratia et culpa opponuntur; sed caritas et gratia Deo uniunt et assimilant, et in hoc maximam habent cum summo bono convenientiam4: ergo econtra cupiditas et culpa reddunt animam Deo deformem et ab eo separant; et si hoc, ergo habent cum Deo contrarietatem et repugnantiam.
Sed contra:
Pro parte negativa.
1. Malum nulli contrariatur, nisi ei cui est malum, et nulli est malum, nisi ei cui nocet: si ergo nullum malum summo bono potest nocere, quia iam non esset summum; videtur, quod ratione privationis boni non contrarietur malum aliquod summo bono5.
2. Item, omnia « contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem6 »; sed malum nullo modo natum est fieri circa summum bonum: ergo nullo modo contrariatur summo bono.
3. Item, omnium contrariorum aliqua est proportio7; sed mali ad bonum increatum nulla est proportio: ergo nulla contrarietas est istius mali ad illud summum bonum.
4. Item, omne contrarium aliquo modo resistit et repugnat suo contrario; sed divinae virtuti, cum sit omnipotentissima, nihil potest resistere8: ergo impossibile est, malum contrariari Deo, nec in se nec in suo opere.
5. Item, nihil quod facit ad pulcritudinem operis, contrariatur sapientiae artificis; sed mala, quae perpetrantur, faciunt ad decorem universitatis9: ergo nullo modo contrariantur nec bonitati nec sapientiae Conditoris.
Quaeritur ergo, pro quanto habeat illud intelligi, quod malum facit hominem Deo inimicum et Deo adversarium, cum Dei voluntas impleatur ex omnibus, et omnia subiaceant eius voluntati et nutui.
Conclusio.
Peccatum, bonum corrumpens, contrariatur bono increato tantum in effectu eiusdem, et quidem in parte, non simpliciter et universaliter.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquod malum contrariari alicui bono dupliciter potest intelligi: aut in se et secundum formam, aut in suo effectu et in operatione. (Conclusio 1.) Primo modo malum non potest contrariari summo bono, cum illud sit bonum per essentiam, cui nihil omnino est contrarium. (Conclusio 2.) Secundo vero modo quodam modo potest contrariari, et quodam modo non. Nam dupliciter potest aliquis repugnare alicui in suo effectu: aut quia repugnat ex parte virtutis ipsius agentis, aut quia repugnat ex parte idoneitatis ipsius suscipientis. (Conclusio 3.) — Primo modo nihil potest repugnare Deo in suo opere, quoniam virtus Dei omnipotentissima est, et ideo nullum potest invenire obstaculum. Secundo modo subdistinguendum est, quia nocumentum inferre effectui, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut simpliciter et universaliter, aut in parte. (Conclusio 4.) — Primo modo nihil potest contrariari Deo in opere suo. Tantus enim est et talis ordo universitatis, quem ei Conditor dedit, ut a nullo possit malo perturbari, secundum quod in pluribus locis vult Augustinus10. (Conclusio 5.) Ultimo vero modo aliquid potest repugnare Deo in effectu suo, quia per malum bene contingit aliquem Dei effectum reddi minus habilem ad susceptionem divinae influentiae ad obtentum perfectionis et beatitudinis, ad quam ordinatur ex sua primaria conditione. — Et sic patet, quod uno modo malum potest dici contrariari Deo in suo effectu, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt; aliis vero modis non, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur; et ita diversis viis verum concludunt et concedendae sunt.
(Ad quaesitum incidens.) Per hunc etiam modum solvendum est ad illud, quod ultimo quaerebatur, scilicet pro quanto quis dicatur Dei inimicus. Nam iuxta modum praedictum distinguenda est voluntas beneplaciti et voluntas signi. Voluntas beneplaciti est ipse Deus; voluntas vero signi dicit aliquem effectum creatum11. Cum ergo dicitur, quod aliquis homo adversatur Deo, hoc non intelligitur, quod adversetur et inimicetur voluntati beneplaciti, cui nullus potest resistere, immo semper impletur vel ab homine, vel de homine12; sed hoc dicitur quantum ad voluntatem signi, quia, cum Deus praecipiat unum, homo malus facit contrarium et ita Deo adversatur; et talem hominem, qui sic adversatur Deo, Deus odit, non affectu et repugnantia voluntatis, sed effectu punitionis13; sic enim hominem affligit, sicut quis affligeret suum adversarium; et sic eum affligendo, ordinat eum ad honorem suum et reddit eum sibi subiectum. Et sic voluntati beneplaciti ceterae voluntates subserviunt
et militant, quamvis aliquae contrariae videantur ratione eius, quod repugnat voluntati signi. Sic etiam omnia mala a Deo ordinantur, quamvis repugnare videantur divino ordini in aliquo effectu particulari. Et per haec quae dicta sunt, satis potest faciliter ad quaesita responderi.
I. Aliis verbis, sed non alio sensu, quoad hanc quaestionem loquitur S. Thom. (S. I. q. 48. a. 6.): « Malum poenae privat bonum creaturae... Malum vero culpae opponitur proprie bono increato. Contrariatur enim impletioni divinae voluntatis et divino amori, quo bonum divinum in se ipso amatur, et non solum secundum quod participatur a creatura » (cfr. I. II. q. 79. a. 1. ad 4.). — De controversia, qua ratione peccatum propter oppositionem ad Deum infinita sit offensa, S. Bonav. tantum loquitur de infinitate obiectiva et secundum quid (cfr. supra d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. in fine corp., infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. 2; III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3; IV. Sent. d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. 2, d. 44. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.).
II. De hac quaestione, quae non est sine utilitate, alii antiqui Scholastici explicite non tractant nisi: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 8. a. 1; Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 3. a. 2.), qui exhibet doctrinam S. Bonaventurae breviter contractam, et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 5.), qui transcribit tantum eiusdem responsionem.
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QUESTION III.
Whether sin, from the fact that it corrupts the good, is contrary to the uncreated good.
Thirdly it is asked, whether sin, from the fact that it corrupts the good, is contrary to the uncreated good. And that it is, it seems:
Arguments for the affirmative part.
1. First, by Augustine, in the twelfth [book] On the City of God1: « A vice is contrary to God as evil to good; but to the nature which it vitiates it is not only contrary, but also noxious »: therefore it seems that evil, in that it corrupts a nature, is contrary to the highest good.
2. Likewise, that which makes a human rebellious and contrary to God, that is especially contrary to God; but sin makes the human an enemy of God, and [makes him] fight against God and resist [him], as can be gathered from various places of Scripture2: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, contrariety of effects attests to a contrariety of causes, especially when the cause is so toward one of the contraries that it cannot be toward the other3; but it belongs to the highest good to make justice, whereas it belongs to sin to deprive of justice, and God cannot deprive of justice, nor can evil make justice: therefore it seems that malice is contrary to the highest good in this, that it deprives of justice.
4. Likewise, that which is contrary to someone's precept is contrary to the one commanding it; but evil is contrary to the words and commandments of God in this, that it is corruption, and corrupts that which the commandments of God enjoin to be kept: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, charity and cupidity are opposed, and similarly grace and guilt are opposed; but charity and grace unite [us] to God and make [us] like [him], and in this they have the greatest agreement with the highest good4: therefore conversely cupidity and guilt render the soul deformed before God and separate [it] from him; and if so, then they have contrariety and repugnance toward God.
On the contrary:
For the negative part.
1. Evil is contrary to nothing except that to which it is an evil, and is an evil to nothing except that to which it does harm: if therefore no evil can harm the highest good, because then it would no longer be the highest; it seems that, by reason of the privation of the good, no evil is contrary to the highest good5.
2. Likewise, all « contraries are by nature apt to come to be about the same [subject]6 »; but evil is in no way apt to come to be about the highest good: therefore it is in no way contrary to the highest good.
3. Likewise, of all contraries there is some proportion7; but of evil to the uncreated good there is no proportion: therefore there is no contrariety of this evil to that highest good.
4. Likewise, every contrary in some way resists and is repugnant to its contrary; but nothing can resist the divine power, since it is most omnipotent8: therefore it is impossible that evil be contrary to God, neither in itself nor in his work.
5. Likewise, nothing that contributes to the beauty of a work is contrary to the wisdom of the artificer; but the evils which are perpetrated contribute to the adornment of the universe9: therefore in no way are they contrary either to the goodness or to the wisdom of the Creator.
It is asked therefore in what measure that is to be understood, [namely] that evil makes the human an enemy and adversary of God, since the will of God is fulfilled out of all things, and all things lie subject to his will and command.
Conclusion.
Sin, corrupting the good, is contrary to the uncreated good only in its effect, and indeed in part, not simply and universally.
I respond: It must be said that some evil being contrary to some good can be understood in two ways: either in itself and according to form, or in its effect and in operation. (Conclusion 1.) In the first way evil cannot be contrary to the highest good, since that is good by essence, to which nothing whatever is contrary. (Conclusion 2.) But in the second way it can be contrary in a certain manner, and in a certain manner not. For in two ways one can be repugnant to another in its effect: either because it is repugnant on the part of the power of the agent itself, or because it is repugnant on the part of the fitness of the recipient itself. (Conclusion 3.) — In the first way nothing can be repugnant to God in his work, since the power of God is most omnipotent, and therefore can find no obstacle. In the second way a subdistinction must be made, because to inflict harm on the effect can be twofold: either simply and universally, or in part. (Conclusion 4.) — In the first way nothing can be contrary to God in his work. For so great and such is the order of the universe, which the Creator gave to it, that it cannot be perturbed by any evil, according to what Augustine holds in many places10. (Conclusion 5.) But in the last way something can be repugnant to God in his effect, because through evil it well happens that some effect of God is rendered less fit for the reception of the divine influence toward attaining the perfection and beatitude to which it is ordained by its primary condition. — And thus it is clear that in one way evil can be said to be contrary to God in his effect, as the reasons adduced for the first part show; but in the other ways not, as the reasons show which are adduced for the second part; and thus by diverse ways they conclude truly and are to be granted.
(To the incidental question.) By this same manner there must also be a solution to that which was last asked, namely in what measure someone is called an enemy of God. For according to the aforesaid manner the will of good-pleasure and the will of sign are to be distinguished. The will of good-pleasure is God himself; but the will of sign signifies some created effect11. When therefore it is said that some human is adverse to God, this is not understood [to mean] that he is adverse and hostile to the will of good-pleasure, which no one can resist, but rather it is always fulfilled either by the human or concerning the human12; but this is said as regards the will of sign, because, since God commands one thing, the evil human does the contrary and so is adverse to God; and such a human, who is thus adverse to God, God hates, not by affection and repugnance of will, but by the effect of punishment13; for thus he afflicts the human, just as one would afflict his adversary; and thus by afflicting him, he orders him to his own honor and renders him subject to himself. And thus to the will of good-pleasure the other wills are subservient
and do service, although some seem contrary by reason of that which is repugnant to the will of sign. So too all evils are ordered by God, although they seem to be repugnant to the divine order in some particular effect. And by these things which have been said, the things asked can readily enough be answered.
I. In other words, but not in another sense, S. Thomas speaks regarding this question (S. I. q. 48. a. 6.): « The evil of punishment deprives [one] of the good of the creature... But the evil of guilt is opposed properly to the uncreated good. For it is contrary to the fulfillment of the divine will and to the divine love, by which the divine good is loved in itself, and not only insofar as it is participated by the creature » (cfr. I. II. q. 79. a. 1. ad 4.). — On the controversy by what reason sin, on account of its opposition to God, is an infinite offense, S. Bonaventure speaks only of objective infinity and [infinity] in a certain respect (cfr. above d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. at the end of the body, below d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. 2; III. Sent. d. 20. q. 3; IV. Sent. d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. 2, d. 44. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.).
II. Concerning this question, which is not without usefulness, the other ancient Scholastics do not treat explicitly except: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 94. m. 8. a. 1; Petrus a Tarantasia (here q. 3. a. 2.), who sets forth the doctrine of S. Bonaventure briefly compressed, and Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 5.), who transcribes only his response.
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- Cap. 3, in textu origin. post bono plura sunt addita, et dein pro non tantum est contrarium legitur non tantum malum.Chapter 3; in the original text after bono several things are added, and then for non tantum est contrarium there is read non tantum malum.
- Isai. 50, 2; Rom. 5, 10; Iac. 4, 4. — Ier. 5, 23; Iob 9, 4; Act. 7, 51; Rom. 13, 2.Isaiah 50, 2; Romans 5, 10; James 4, 4. — Jeremiah 5, 23; Job 9, 4; Acts 7, 51; Romans 13, 2.
- Communiter secundum Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13, et VII. c. 1. dicitur: Quorum effectus sunt contrarii, et ipsa sunt contraria. Cfr. tom. I, pag. 51, nota 11.It is commonly said, according to Aristotle, I. Topics c. 13, and VII. c. 1: Those whose effects are contrary are themselves also contrary. Cfr. tom. I, p. 51, note 11.
- Vide supra d. 26. q. 2. et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.See above d. 26. q. 2. and d. 29. a. 1. q. 1, in the body.
- Hoc arg. insinuat August., II. de Morib. Manich. c. 3. n. 5; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. — Paulo superius pro nulli est edd., excepta 1, nulli inest.This argument Augustine insinuates, II. On the Morals of the Manichees c. 3. n. 5; XII. On the City of God, c. 3. — A little above, for nulli est the editions, except 1, [read] nulli inest.
- Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et 11. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). Idem XII. Metaph. text. 36. (XI. c. 10.) ait: Primo autem nihil contrarium est.Aristotle, On the Categories, chapter On Opposites, and 11. Topics c. 3. (c. 7.). The same [author], XII. Metaphysics text 36. (XI. c. 10.) says: But to the First nothing is contrary.
- Cfr. supra pag. 748, nota 2. et pag. 750, nota 1. — In fine arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt illud.Cfr. above p. 748, note 2, and p. 750, note 1. — At the end of the argument cod. cc and ed. 1 omit illud ("that").
- Rom. 9, 19: Voluntati enim eius quis resistit?Romans 9, 19: For who resists his will?
- Ut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 46. q. 6.As was shown in I. Sent. d. 46. q. 6.
- Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 33; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 18. et XIV. c. 27.Book III. On Free Will c. 12. n. 33; XI. On the City of God, c. 18. and XIV. c. 27.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 3. q. 1. seq. et d. 47. q. 1. seq., nec non August., III. de Trin. c. 4. n. 9.Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 3. q. 1. seq. and d. 47. q. 1. seq., and also Augustine, III. On the Trinity c. 4. n. 9.
- August., Enchirid. c. 107. n. 28. Verba vide supra d. XXIV. lit. Magistri, c. 1.Augustine, Enchiridion c. 107. n. 28. For the words see above d. XXIV. text of the Master, c. 1.
- Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 1. in corp.Cfr. above d. 26. q. 1, in the body.