Dist. 35, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 35
ARTICULUS II.
De modo, quo peccatum bonum corrumpit.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum principale quaeritur de modo corrumpendi bonum per peccatum. Et cum dicat Augustinus1, quod « malum sit corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis », circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
Primo quaeritur, utrum per quodlibet malum corrumpantur ista tria simul et inseparabiliter.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec tria per malum corrumpantur aequaliter sive aeque principaliter.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum possint corrumpi totaliter.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum modus, species et ordo per quodlibet malum corrumpantur simul et inseparabiliter.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum per quodlibet malum habeant ista tria, scilicet modus, species et ordo, corrumpi simul et inseparabiliter. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Primo per definitionem mali, quam ponit Augustinus2: « Malum est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis ». Si enim haec ratio recta est, ergo debet convenire cuilibet malo: ergo quodlibet malum est privativum istorum trium.
2. Item, impossibile est, esse modum sine specie et ordine, et e converso3; sed quae necessario se concomitantur in esse, necessario se concomitantur in privatione. Si ergo malum est privatio alicuius horum, necesse est, quod simul illa tria habeat corrumpere.
3. Item, maior est connexio in his tribus, videlicet modo, specie et ordine, quam sit in habitibus virtutum, qui sunt diversi formaliter secundum speciem4; sed propter connexionem habituum, cum amittitur unus habitus, necessario et omnes perduntur: ergo multo fortius, cum per malum privatur ordo, privatur simul species et modus.
4. Item, per donum gratiae melioratur anima et eius habilitas quantum ad haec tria, scilicet modum, speciem et ordinem — nam gratia reddit animam meliorem et pulcriorem et rectiorem — ergo cum culpa directe opponatur gratiae et tollat ipsam gratiam, videtur, quod haec tria simul et inseparabiliter corrumpat et minuat.
Sed contra:
Ad oppositum.
1. Modus attenditur in creatura per comparationem ad Deum sub ratione efficientis, et species sub ratione exemplaris, et ordo sub ratione finis5; sed quamvis creatura deordinetur a Deo secundum comparationem sub ratione finis, nihilominus tamen salvatur comparatio ipsius ad Deum sub ratione efficientis et exemplaris: ergo ad cor-
ruptionem ordinis non sequitur necessario corruptio modi et speciei.
2. Item, in corporibus videmus, modum auferri sine specie, et speciem etiam auferri posse sine ordine per aliquod malum, quod nocet bono naturae — nam aliquis habens indebitam quantitatem habet pulcritudinem formae, et e converso, et similiter est in ordine — sed sic se habet malum culpae ad modum, speciem et ordinem in spiritualibus, sicut malum, quod nocet naturae, ad modum, speciem et ordinem in corporalibus6: si ergo in corporalibus non privantur illa tria simul et inseparabiliter, videtur, quod nec in spiritualibus.
3. Item, nos videmus, quod alia bona naturalia sic se habent, quod unum potest auferri sine altero, sicut fortitudo sine eloquentia, et e converso: ergo si modus, species et ordo dicunt bona naturalia ipsius animae; videtur, quod unum sine altero privari habeat per malum culpae.
4. Item, « tantum unum uni opponitur »7: ergo unum malum opponitur uni bono; aut igitur quodlibet peccatum claudit in se tria peccata sive mala, aut si unicum est peccatum sive malum, videtur, quod non tollat simul et semel ista tria. Si tu dicas, quod ista tria simul concurrant in unum bonum; quaero, qualiter possit intelligi, cum videantur differre formaliter. — Et iterum, cum in omnibus habeant reperiri, qualiter dicuntur per malum culpae privari, quod non reperitur nisi in sola creatura rationali?
Conclusio.
Omne peccatum corrumpit circa voluntatem haec tria, modum, speciem et ordinem, simul et inseparabiliter.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod triplex fuit modus distinguendi et assignandi modum, speciem et ordinem in rebus.
Nam aliqui acceperunt ista tria secundum diversas proprietates in eadem re consideratas, ita quod modus dicat aliquid pertinens ad genus quantitatis, et species aliquid pertinens ad genus qualitatis, et ordo aliquid pertinens ad genus relationis. — Sed iste modus assignandi non consonat verbis Augustini8. Nam ipse vult, quod in quolibet quantumcumque parvo bono, non solum substantia, sed etiam proprietate substantiae sit reperire ista tria; unde haec tria se extendunt ad omnia entium et praedicamentorum genera.
Alius vero modus assignandi et distinguendi ista tria fuit per comparationem ad diversa. Quaelibet enim res tripliciter habet considerari, videlicet in se et per comparationem ad alias res universi et in comparatione ad finem. Ut autem in se consideratur, sic attenditur in ea modus; nam unaquaeque res in se ipsa finita est et modificata. Ut autem comparatur ad res alias, sic attenditur in ea species, sicut attenditur pulcritudo partium secundum situm, quem habent in toto. Ut autem comparatur in relatione ad finem, sic attenditur in ea ordo; unaquaeque enim res ordinata est, dum directe tendit ad finem, ad quem est. — Iste autem modus dicendi, etsi probabilior videatur elici ex verbis Augustini9, adhuc tamen perfecte veritatem non attingit. Omnibus enim aliis rebus circumscriptis, remanente una sola anima, adhuc potest peccare, et adhuc potest attendi in ea modus, species et ordo.
Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi praedictis rationabilior, quod modus, species et ordo considerantur in eadem re secundum diversas comparationes sive relationes ad idem. Attenduntur enim in unaquaque creatura, secundum quod ipsa est vestigium Creatoris; quod quidem vestigium consistit in comparatione creaturae ad Creatorem secundum triplex genus causae, sicut in primo libro10 dictum fuit, ita quod modus attenditur secundum comparationem creaturae ad Creatorem in ratione causae efficientis, species in ratione causae exemplaris, et ordo in ratione causae finalis. Et quia quodlibet ens, quantumcumque modicum, habet istam comparationem ad Deum, in quolibet ente creato reperiuntur haec tria.
Iuxta hunc igitur modum attendendum est, quod creatura rationalis et est natura quaedam, et est ulterius praeter alias creaturas operans per voluntatem. Et utroque modo habet comparari ad Deum; et utroque modo habet reperiri in ea modus, species et ordo; utroque etiam modo habet reperiri circa eam malum, quod est istorum trium corruptivum. Sed malum culpae proprie habet consistere circa ipsam, secundum quod est voluntarie operans; et ideo privare habet modum, speciem et ordinem, secundum quod consistunt circa ipsam voluntatem, ut est voluntarie operans. Voluntas autem, cum ha-
bet modum, speciem et ordinem, sicut debet, bona est. Tunc autem voluntas nostra bona est, quando in movendo sive operando continuatur divinae virtuti11 ut principio moventi, et conformatur ei ut regulae dirigenti, et unitur ei ut fini quietanti; et in primo attenditur modus, in secundo species, in tertio ordo secundum comparationem in triplici genere causae. Quandocumque vero aliquis peccat, necessario discontinuatur a Deo tanquam a principio movente, quia Deus nunquam movet ad peccatum; discordat a Deo tanquam a regula dirigente; et elongat se et deordinat tanquam12 a fine quietante, ponens creaturam finem. Et in omni peccato necesse est ista tria concurrere. — Et sic patet, quod omne peccatum corrumpit circa voluntatem haec tria, scilicet modum, speciem et ordinem simul et inseparabiliter. — Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes. Ad rationes vero in oppositum adductas facile est respondere.
1. Ad primum enim quod obiicitur, quod semper manet salva comparatio ad efficiens et exemplar; dicendum, quod voluntas ut natura quaedam est, habet ad Deum comparari illo triplici genere causae; et secundum hoc habet quendam modum, speciem et ordinem, in quibus communicat cum omni genere creaturae; et malum culpae non habet hoc modo illa privare. Alio modo, sicut praedictum est, habet comparari ad Deum ut moventem et dirigentem et quietantem; et hoc modo non manet salva comparatio ad Deum sub ratione exemplaris sive regulae dirigentis, nec etiam sub ratione moventis, sicut non manet sub ratione finis.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in corporibus unum potest adimi sine altero; dicendum, quod haec in corporibus dupliciter possunt accipi: uno modo, prout accipiuntur penes dispositiones diversas; et hoc modo unum potest adimi sine altero, sed hoc modo non attenditur in eis ratio vestigii. Alio modo, prout attenduntur penes idem secundum comparationes, videlicet prout eadem forma substantialis dat modum, speciem et ordinem secundum diversas comparationes in triplici genere causae; et hoc dico quantum ad primum esse; vel prout eadem forma accidentalis dat quantum ad bene esse13; et hoc modo nunquam fallit, quin, si fiat corruptio in modo, per consequens etiam fiat in specie et ordine, et e converso.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in aliis bonis naturalibus non est ita; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia alia bona naturalia essentialiter differunt; et ideo unum potest corrumpi et tolli sine altero. Non sic autem est in modo, specie et ordine, immo circa idem fundantur, sicut ostensum est.
4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum. Nam etsi modus, species et ordo videantur esse tria bona, non tamen sunt diversa per essentiam, sed dicunt tres comparationes eiusdem boni. — Patet etiam illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, quare scilicet culpa non est in omnibus, in quibus reperitur modus14, species et ordo, quia non est privatio illorum trium, secundum quod in eis consistit generalis ratio vestigii, et consistunt circa omnem creaturam, sed prout consistunt circa voluntatem deliberativam.
I. De modo, specie et ordine cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3. et d. 37. p. 1. a. 3. q. 2; item S. Thom., S. 1. q. 5. a. 5. — Supponitur hic, quod bonitas et perfectio creaturae consistit in Dei similitudine, quae attenditur secundum triplicem causalitatem divinam, scilicet in ratione efficientis, exemplaris et finalis. Ad hanc triplicem causalitatem S. Bonav. reducit illa tria, quae inseparabiliter Dei similitudinem et bonitatem in creaturis constituunt. Consentiunt in hac reductione Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Aegid. R. — Hinc malum in corruptione huius similitudinis consistit (hic q. 2.). Et bene notandum, quod secundum diversos bonorum gradus, diversi etiam gradus sunt modi, speciei et ordinis. Aliter igitur haec tria sunt in bonis gratiae, aliter in bonis naturae, aliter in bono naturae per se, aliter in ipsis potentiis, aliter in aptitudine potentiarum ad finem, circa quam attenditur corruptio, de qua sermo est. — Magni momenti est quod dicitur in fine corp., scilicet quod voluntas, quatenus peccando deficit, deviat a Deo secundum potentiam movente, secundum sapientiam regulante, secundum bonitatem finiente et quietante.
II. De tribus quaest. huius art. diffuse tractat Alex. Hal., S. 1. q. 19, et p. II. q. 95. m. 3. a. 1-4. — Alii commentatores Petri Lombardi easdem (vel saltem 1. et 2.) unica quaest. absolvunt, vel omnino omittunt. — De I. et 2. quaest.: Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, S. l. III. q. 85. a. 4. — S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 85. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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ARTICLE II.
On the manner in which sin corrupts the good.
Consequently, with respect to the second principal point, it is asked concerning the manner of corrupting the good through sin. And since Augustine says1 that « evil is the corruption of mode, species, and order », concerning this three things are asked.
First it is asked, whether by any evil these three are corrupted simultaneously and inseparably.
Secondly it is asked, whether these three are corrupted by evil equally or as-equally-principally.
Thirdly it is asked, whether they can be corrupted totally.
QUESTION I.
Whether mode, species, and order are corrupted by any evil simultaneously and inseparably.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether by any evil these three, namely mode, species, and order, must be corrupted simultaneously and inseparably. And that it is so, it seems:
1. First, by the definition of evil which Augustine sets down2: « Evil is the privation of mode, species, and order ». For if this account is correct, then it ought to apply to any evil: therefore any evil is privative of these three.
2. Likewise, it is impossible that there be mode without species and order, and conversely3; but things which necessarily accompany one another in being, necessarily accompany one another in privation. If therefore evil is the privation of any of these, it is necessary that it corrupt those three together.
3. Likewise, there is a greater connection in these three, namely mode, species, and order, than there is in the habits of the virtues, which are formally diverse according to species4; but on account of the connection of the habits, when one habit is lost, necessarily all of them too are lost: therefore much more strongly, when by evil order is taken away, species and mode are taken away together.
4. Likewise, by the gift of grace the soul and its capacity are bettered with respect to these three, namely mode, species, and order — for grace renders the soul better and more beautiful and more upright — therefore since guilt is directly opposed to grace and takes away grace itself, it seems that it corrupts and diminishes these three simultaneously and inseparably.
On the contrary:
To the opposite.
1. Mode is regarded in a creature by comparison to God under the character of efficient [cause], and species under the character of exemplar, and order under the character of end5; but although a creature be disordered from God according to comparison under the character of end, nevertheless its comparison to God under the character of efficient and exemplar is preserved: therefore upon the cor-
ruption of order there does not necessarily follow the corruption of mode and species.
2. Likewise, in bodies we see that mode is removed without species, and that species too can be removed without order by some evil which harms the good of nature — for someone having an undue quantity has [yet] the beauty of form, and conversely, and similarly it is in order — but the evil of guilt stands to mode, species, and order in spiritual things just as the evil which harms nature [stands] to mode, species, and order in corporeal things6: if therefore in corporeal things those three are not deprived simultaneously and inseparably, it seems that neither [are they] in spiritual things.
3. Likewise, we see that other natural goods are so disposed that one can be removed without the other, as fortitude without eloquence, and conversely: therefore if mode, species, and order state natural goods of the soul itself; it seems that one ought to be deprived without the other by the evil of guilt.
4. Likewise, « only one is opposed to one »7: therefore one evil is opposed to one good; either therefore any sin encloses within itself three sins or evils, or, if the sin or evil is single, it seems that it does not remove these three simultaneously and at once. If you say that these three concur together into one good; I ask how this can be understood, since they seem to differ formally. — And again, since they must be found in all things, how are they said to be deprived through the evil of guilt, which is not found except in the rational creature alone?
Conclusion.
Every sin corrupts, concerning the will, these three — mode, species, and order — simultaneously and inseparably.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that there was a threefold manner of distinguishing and assigning mode, species, and order in things.
For some took these three according to diverse properties considered in the same thing, such that mode states something pertaining to the genus of quantity, and species something pertaining to the genus of quality, and order something pertaining to the genus of relation. — But this manner of assigning does not accord with the words of Augustine8. For he holds that in any good however small, not only in substance, but also in the property of substance, these three are to be found; whence these three extend to all the genera of beings and of the predicaments.
But another manner of assigning and distinguishing these three was by comparison to diverse [things]. For any thing can be considered in three ways, namely in itself and by comparison to other things of the universe and in comparison to an end. As it is considered in itself, so mode is regarded in it; for each thing is in itself finite and modified. As it is compared to other things, so species is regarded in it, just as the beauty of the parts is regarded according to the position which they have in the whole. As it is compared in relation to an end, so order is regarded in it; for each thing is ordered when it directly tends to the end for which it is. — But this manner of speaking, although it seem more probably to be elicited from the words of Augustine9, yet does not perfectly attain the truth. For with all other things set aside, one sole soul remaining, it can still sin, and there can still be regarded in it mode, species, and order.
And therefore there is a third manner of speaking, more reasonable than the aforesaid, that mode, species, and order are considered in the same thing according to diverse comparisons or relations to the same. For they are regarded in each creature, insofar as it is a vestige of the Creator; which vestige indeed consists in the comparison of the creature to the Creator according to the threefold genus of cause, as was said in the first book10, such that mode is regarded according to the comparison of the creature to the Creator in the character of efficient cause, species in the character of exemplar cause, and order in the character of final cause. And because any being, however small, has this comparison to God, in any created being these three are found.
According to this manner, therefore, it is to be considered that the rational creature both is a certain nature, and is further, beyond other creatures, operating through the will. And in each way it is to be compared to God; and in each way there are to be found in it mode, species, and order; in each way also there is to be found concerning it the evil which is corruptive of these three. But the evil of guilt properly consists concerning it, insofar as it is voluntarily operating; and therefore it deprives [it of] mode, species, and order, insofar as they consist concerning the will itself, as it is voluntarily operating. But the will, when it ha-
s mode, species, and order, as it ought, is good. But our will is good when, in moving or operating, it is continued to the divine power11 as to the moving principle, and is conformed to it as to the directing rule, and is united to it as to the quieting end; and in the first mode is regarded, in the second species, in the third order, according to comparison in the threefold genus of cause. But whenever anyone sins, he is necessarily discontinued from God as from a moving principle, because God never moves to sin; he is discordant from God as from a directing rule; and he removes himself and is disordered as12 from a quieting end, setting up the creature as his end. And in every sin it is necessary that these three concur. — And thus it is clear that every sin corrupts, concerning the will, these three, namely mode, species, and order, simultaneously and inseparably. — And the reasons showing this are to be granted. But to the reasons adduced to the opposite it is easy to respond.
1. To the first then which is objected, that the comparison to the efficient and the exemplar always remains preserved; it must be said that the will, as it is a certain nature, has to be compared to God by that threefold genus of cause; and according to this it has a certain mode, species, and order, in which it communicates with every genus of creature; and the evil of guilt does not in this mode deprive [it of] those. In another mode, as was said before, it has to be compared to God as moving and directing and quieting; and in this mode the comparison to God under the character of exemplar or directing rule does not remain preserved, nor even under the character of mover, just as it does not remain under the character of end.
2. To that which is objected, that in bodies one can be taken away without the other; it must be said that these in bodies can be taken in two ways: in one way, as they are taken according to diverse dispositions; and in this way one can be taken away without the other, but in this way the character of vestige is not regarded in them. In another way, as they are regarded according to the same according to comparisons, namely as the same substantial form gives mode, species, and order according to diverse comparisons in the threefold genus of cause; and this I say as to first being; or as the same accidental form gives [them] as to well-being13; and in this way it never fails but that, if corruption occurs in mode, consequently it also occurs in species and order, and conversely.
3. To that which is objected, that in other natural goods it is not so; it must be said that it is not similar, because the other natural goods differ essentially; and therefore one can be corrupted and removed without the other. But it is not so in mode, species, and order, rather they are founded concerning the same, as has been shown.
4. And through this the response to the last [objection] is clear. For although mode, species, and order seem to be three goods, yet they are not diverse by essence, but state three comparisons of the same good. — There is clear also that which was lastly asked, namely why guilt is not in all things in which mode14, species, and order are found, [the reason being] that it is not the privation of those three insofar as in them consists the general character of vestige, and they consist concerning every creature, but [it is the privation of them] insofar as they consist concerning the deliberative will.
I. On mode, species, and order cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3. and d. 37. p. 1. a. 3. q. 2; likewise St. Thomas, Summa 1. q. 5. a. 5. — It is here supposed that the goodness and perfection of a creature consists in the likeness of God, which is regarded according to the threefold divine causality, namely in the character of efficient, exemplar, and final [cause]. To this threefold causality S. Bonaventure reduces those three which inseparably constitute the likeness and goodness of God in creatures. In this reduction Alexander of Hales, Petrus a Tarantasia, Richard of Middleton, and Aegidius Romanus agree. — Hence evil consists in the corruption of this likeness (here q. 2.). And it is well to be noted that according to the diverse grades of goods, there are also diverse grades of mode, species, and order. Therefore these three are otherwise in the goods of grace, otherwise in the goods of nature, otherwise in the good of nature itself, otherwise in the powers themselves, otherwise in the aptitude of the powers toward the end, concerning which the corruption is regarded of which there is discussion. — Of great moment is that which is said at the end of the body, namely that the will, insofar as in sinning it fails, deviates from God according to power as moving, according to wisdom as regulating, according to goodness as finalizing and quieting.
II. On the three questions of this article Alexander of Hales treats at length, Summa 1. q. 19, and p. II. q. 95. m. 3. a. 1-4. — Other commentators on Peter Lombard dispatch the same (or at least the 1st and 2nd) in a single question, or omit them altogether. — On the 1st and 2nd question: Scotus, in Hier. de Montefortino, Summa book III. q. 85. a. 4. — St. Thomas, Summa I. II. q. 85. a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 4. a. I. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.
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- De Natura boni, c. 4.On the Nature of the Good, c. 4.
- De Natura boni, c. 4. — De propos. seq., in qua pro haec ratio Vat. et edd. 3, 4 substituerunt haec definitio, cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 33. (VI. c. 10), ubi docetur, definitionem esse rationem (λόγον), et VI. Topic. c. 1, ubi inter alia habetur illud: Oportet enim hominis definitionem de omni homine verificari.On the Nature of the Good, c. 4. — On the following proposition, in which for haec ratio ("this account") the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 substituted haec definitio ("this definition"), cfr. Aristotle, VII. Metaphysics text 33. (VI. c. 10), where it is taught that a definition is an account (λόγον), and VI. Topics c. 1, where among other things this is held: For it is necessary that the definition of "man" be verified of every man.
- August., 83 Qq. q. 6: Omne igitur quod est, sine aliqua specie non est. Ubi autem aliqua species, necessario est aliquis modus, et modus aliquid boni est. — In fine arg. pro habeat edd. 1, 2 cum aliquot codd., ut B D E F K X Z bb, manifeste falso habeant.Augustine, 83 Questions q. 6: Therefore everything which is, is not without some species. But where there is some species, there is necessarily some mode, and mode is something of the good. — At the end of the argument, for habeat edd. 1, 2 with several codices, such as B D E F K X Z bb, [read] manifestly falsely habeant.
- Libr. III. Sent. d. 33. a. I. q. 2. agitur de formali diversitate virtutum, et ibid. d. 36. a. 1. q. I. et 3. de connexione ipsarum.[In] book III. of the Sentences d. 33. a. I. q. 2. the formal diversity of the virtues is treated, and ibid. d. 36. a. 1. q. I. and 3. their connection.
- August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 7. exponens illud Sap. II, 21: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti, dicit: Secundum id vero, quod mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem ac stabilitatem trahit, ille primitus et veraciter et singulariter ista [scil. tria] est, qui terminat omnia et format omnia et ordinat omnia etc. — Mox ed. 1 omittit secundum comparationem, pro quo ceterae edd. substituunt per comparationem.Augustine, IV. On Genesis according to the Letter c. 3. n. 7. expounding that [text] Wisdom XI, 21: Thou hast disposed all things in measure and number and weight, says: According to that, however, whereby measure prefixes the mode to every thing, and number affords the species to every thing, and weight draws every thing to rest and stability, he is primarily and truly and singularly these [namely, the three], who terminates all things and forms all things and orders all things etc. — Shortly [after], ed. 1 omits secundum comparationem ("according to comparison"), for which the other editions substitute per comparationem ("by comparison").
- Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4.See above the text of the Master, d. XXXIV. c. 4.
- Secundum Aristotelem, de quo cfr. supra pag. 812, nota 8.According to Aristotle, on whom cfr. above p. 812, note 8.
- De Natura boni, c. 3. Cfr. de Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seq.On the Nature of the Good, c. 3. Cfr. On True Religion c. 18. n. 35. seq.
- De Vera Relig. c. 7. n. 13: « Omnis enim res vel substantia vel essentia vel natura, vel si quo alio verbo melius enuntiatur, simul haec tria habet: ut et unum aliquid sit, et specie propria discernatur a ceteris, et rerum ordinem non excedat ». Et 83 Qq. q. 18: Omne quod est, aliud est quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit... Ideoque etiam cum veritas quaeritur, plus quam tria genera quaestionum esse non possunt, utrum omnino sit, utrum hoc an aliud sit, utrum approbandum improbandumve sit. Cfr. de Natura boni, c. 22. seqq.On True Religion c. 7. n. 13: « For every thing, whether substance or essence or nature, or if it is better expressed by any other word, has these three together: that it be some one thing, and be distinguished by its proper species from the rest, and not exceed the order of things ». And 83 Questions q. 18: Everything which is, is one thing by which it subsists, another by which it is distinguished, another by which it agrees... And therefore also when truth is sought, there cannot be more than three genera of questions: whether it is at all, whether it is this or another, whether it is to be approved or disapproved. Cfr. On the Nature of the Good, c. 22. seqq.
- Dist. 3. p. I. q. 2. in fine et dub. 3. — Praeter verba August., quae supra attulimus pag. 828, nota 5, considerentur hic et illa, quae 83 Qq. q. 18. habentur: Causam quoque eius [creaturae] trinam esse oportet: qua sit, qua hoc sit, qua sibi amica sit. Creaturae autem causam, id est auctorem, Deum dicimus. Oportet ergo esse Trinitatem, qua nihil praestantius, intelligentius et beatius invenire perfecta ratio potest.Dist. 3. p. I. q. 2. at the end and dub. 3. — Besides the words of Augustine which we adduced above p. 828, note 5, let those also be considered which are held in 83 Questions q. 18: Its cause too [namely, the creature's] must be threefold: that by which it is, that by which it is this, that by which it is friendly to itself. But the cause of the creature, that is the author, we call God. Therefore there must be a Trinity, than which perfect reason can find nothing more excellent, more intelligent, and more blessed.
- Vat. voluntati.The Vatican [edition] reads voluntati ("to the will") [for virtuti].
- Ita plures codd., ut F H W cc etc., cum ed. 1; alii non pauci, inter quos C K L O S Z bb ee, cum edd. 2, 3 aliquid, Vat. se pro tanquam.Thus several codices, such as F H W cc etc., with ed. 1; not a few others, among which C K L O S Z bb ee, with edd. 2, 3 [read] aliquid, the Vatican [edition reads] se for tanquam.
- Vat. addit salvat in esse, vel bene et beate esse. — Aliquanto superius pro prout attenduntur codd. K T V bb cc ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2, 3 prout attenditur.The Vatican [edition] adds salvat in esse, vel bene et beate esse ("preserves in being, or in well- and blessedly-being"). — Somewhat above, for prout attenduntur the codices K T V bb cc ee and others, with edd. 1, 2, 3, [read] prout attenditur.
- Codd. C L R S W bb etc. numerus.Codices C L R S W bb etc. [read] numerus ("number") [for modus].