Bonaventure

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum modus, species et ordo corrumpantur per peccatum aequaliter.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec tria per quodlibet peccatum corrumpantur aequaliter. Et quod sic, videtur:

Fundamenta.

1. Primo per Augustinum in libro de Natura boni¹: « Ubi haec magna sunt, magnum est bonum; ubi parva, parvum »: ergo secundum haec tria at-

tenditur intensio et diminutio in omni bono: ergo si idem bonum non potest esse maius et minus se ipso, necesse est, quod cum ista tria privantur, quod aequaliter priventur.

2. Item, ista tria sunt vestigium Trinitatis summae, ubi est perfecta aequalitas et consubstantialitas: ergo sicut haec tria sunt consubstantialia, quod² unum sine altero esse non potest, sic etiam sunt aequalia: ergo quantum diminuitur de uno, necesse est, tantum diminui de reliquo.

3. Item, haec tria privari non est nisi bonum privari, sicut prius³ ostensum est; sed in eodem et secundum idem non est magis et minus reperire: ergo si per idem malum ista tria privantur, necesse est privari aequaliter.

4. Item, quanto voluntas plus recipit a Deo, tanto est Deo similior, et quanto Deo similior est, tanto magis ad Deum tendit: ergo necesse est, quod quantum habet de modo, tantum habeat de specie et ordine; et si hoc, necesse est, illa tria bona per malum privari aequaliter.

Sed contra:

Ad oppositum.

1. Videtur, quod malum principaliter privet ordinem, quoniam malitia in opere principaliter attenditur penes intentionis deordinationem⁴: ergo si penes hanc principaliter consistit ordo, videtur, quod malum plus habeat privare ordinem quam modum vel speciem.

2. Item, modus, species et ordo correspondent illis tribus, videlicet unitati, veritati et bonitati⁵; sed malum principaliter et plus aufert de bonitate, quam auferat de unitate et veritate: ergo si haec tria correspondent illis tribus, videtur, quod non adimantur ista tria aequaliter.

3. Item, his tribus, in quibus attenditur ratio vestigii, videlicet modus, species et ordo, correspondent illa tria, in quibus attenditur ratio imaginis, videlicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntas. Sed peccatum, cum deformat imaginem, non deformat omnes potentias aequaliter, immo principalius et magis deformat voluntatem⁶: ergo pari ratione, non corrumpit aequaliter modum, speciem et ordinem, sed principalius aufert ordinem quam modum vel speciem.

4. Item, peccatum, loquendo essentialiter et proprie, deformitas est; sed omnis deformitas principaliter dicit privationem formae sive pulcritudinis, ergo speciei: igitur culpa non privat haec tria aequaliter, sed principalius privat speciem.

5. Item, malum aliquo modo bene potest ordinari, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio⁷; sed nullo modo potest speciem habere, cum sit privatio: ergo videtur, quod in malo magis fiat privatio speciei quam ordinis: non ergo fit privatio illorum trium aequaliter.

6. Item, non fit privatio in aliquo respectivo nisi per privationem prius factam in aliquo absoluto; « in ad aliquid enim per se et proprie nec est motus nec mutatio⁸ »: ergo si ordo dicit relationem ad alterum, non potest fieri corruptio in ordine nisi per corruptionem factam in specie; videtur igitur, quod corruptio facta per malum non respiciat illa tria aequaliter.

Conclusio.

Modus, species et ordo per quodlibet peccatum aequaliter corrumpuntur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum ista tria, videlicet modus, species et ordo, prout privantur per malum culpae, sint conditiones eiusdem bonae voluntatis, non solum ab invicem inseparabiles⁹, verum etiam aequales, aequaliter privantur per quodcumque malum culpae. (Conclusio.) — Quodlibet enim malum culpae in tantum deordinat, in quantum facit Deo dissimilem, et in quantum facit Deo dissimilem, in tantum elongat a Deo, (Ratio.) ita quod, quemadmodum gratia aequaliter reddit animam ordinatam et speciosam et potentem in bonum tantum vel maius¹⁰; et quemadmodum in gloria similiter est adaequatio dotum: sic etiam in culpa aequaliter fit privatio horum trium. Et ideo, sicut dicitur « visio in gloria esse tota merces¹¹ », propter connexionem et aequalitatem in dotibus gloriosis; sic etiam, ut dicit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum, quod « totum nomen mali de speciei privatione repertum est », non quia per malum solum species privetur vel principalius, sed quia in privatione speciei intelligitur privatio aliorum. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod malitia principaliter consistit penes intentionem; dicendum,

quod verum est; sed quod ipse obiicit, quod ordo attenditur penes intentionem; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur penes quandam appropriationem. Nam circa ipsam intentionem consistit modus, species et ordo, ex quibus et bona est intentio, et bona est actio, quae ex intentione procedit.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod modo, speciei et ordini respondent unitas, veritas et bonitas; dicendum, quod verum est, prout in illis tribus consideratur generalis ratio vestigii; (Notandum.) prout autem in ipsis attenditur corruptio mali culpae, quae consistit circa voluntatem, haec tria habent considerari in bono, secundum quod bonum est, sicut in praecedenti problemate patuit. Et ideo aequaliter per malum habent privari, quoniam directe opponitur illis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum non aequaliter deformat omnes potentias imaginis; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia illae potentiae sunt diversae et ad diversos actus ordinatae, ita quod aliqui illorum actuum respiciunt culpam et iustitiam secundum plus et minus. Non sic autem est in proposito; nam haec tria sola comparatione differunt, et cum habeant idem fundamentum, necesse est, quod quantum diminuitur unum, diminuatur et alterum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum culpae est deformitas; dicendum, quod non tantum est deformitas opposita pulcritudini, sed etiam est curvitas¹² opposita rectitudini. Ideo non sequitur, quod magis privet speciem quam ordinem; non enim dicitur deformitas per solius pulcritudinis privationem, sed etiam in hoc intelligitur privatio aliorum; magis tamen denominatur a privatione speciei et formae propter hoc, quod species est ratio cognoscendi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum est ordinabile; dicendum, quod duplex est ordo. (Duplex ordo.) Est enim ordo ante factum esse, qui est ex intentione facientis. Et est ordo post factum esse, qui quidem attenditur secundum iustitiam retribuentis. Primus ordo est ille, qui privatur a¹³ malo per malum; et hunc ordinem malum non potest habere, sicut nec speciem. Secundus vero ordo non privatur per malum, immo malum est ordinabile in poenis secundum illum ordinem.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non fit privatio in respectivo nisi per aliquid absolutum; dicendum, quod tam species quam ordo, ut hic accipitur, utrumque est respectivum; ideo non magis privatur unum per alterum quam e converso. Nihilominus tamen haec tria tolluntur per mutationem factam circa aliquid absolutum; tunc enim privantur, cum liberum arbitrium peccat inordinate movendo se ipsum¹⁴.

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QUESTION II.

Whether mode, species, and order are corrupted by sin equally.

Secondly it is asked, whether these three are corrupted equally by every sin. And that they are, it seems:

Fundamenta.

1. First, by Augustine in the book On the Nature of the Good¹: « Where these are great, the good is great; where small, [it is] small »: therefore according to these three is reckoned the intensity and diminution in every good: therefore if the same good cannot be greater and lesser than itself, it is necessary that, when these three are deprived, they be deprived equally.

2. Likewise, these three are a vestige of the supreme Trinity, where there is perfect equality and consubstantiality: therefore just as these three are consubstantial, so that² one cannot exist without the other, so also they are equal: therefore as much as is diminished from one, it is necessary that as much be diminished from the rest.

3. Likewise, for these three to be deprived is nothing other than for the good to be deprived, as was shown before³; but in the same [thing] and according to the same there is no more and less to be found: therefore if by the same evil these three are deprived, it is necessary that they be deprived equally.

4. Likewise, the more the will receives from God, the more it is like God, and the more it is like God, the more it tends toward God: therefore it is necessary that, as much as it has of mode, it have as much of species and order; and if this, it is necessary that those three goods be deprived equally by evil.

On the contrary:

To the opposite.

1. It seems that evil principally deprives [it] of order, since the malice in a work is principally reckoned according to the disorder of the intention⁴: therefore if order consists principally in this, it seems that evil has [the power] to deprive [it] of order more than of mode or species.

2. Likewise, mode, species, and order correspond to those three, namely to unity, truth, and goodness⁵; but evil principally and more takes away from goodness than it takes away from unity and truth: therefore if these three correspond to those three, it seems that these three are not taken away equally.

3. Likewise, to those three in which the character of the vestige is reckoned, namely mode, species, and order, there correspond those three in which the character of the image is reckoned, namely memory, understanding, and will. But sin, when it deforms the image, does not deform all the powers equally, but rather principally and more deforms the will⁶: therefore by parity of reasoning, it does not corrupt mode, species, and order equally, but principally takes away order more than mode or species.

4. Likewise, sin, speaking essentially and properly, is a deformity; but every deformity principally signifies a privation of form or of beauty, therefore of species: therefore guilt does not deprive [it of] these three equally, but principally deprives [it] of species.

5. Likewise, evil can in some manner be well ordered, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion⁷; but it can in no way have species, since it is a privation: therefore it seems that in evil there is rather made a privation of species than of order: therefore the privation of those three is not made equally.

6. Likewise, no privation is made in something relative except through a privation previously made in something absolute; « for in the relative there is properly and per se neither motion nor change⁸ »: therefore if order signifies a relation to another, corruption cannot be made in order except through a corruption made in species; it seems therefore that the corruption made by evil does not regard those three equally.

Conclusion.

Mode, species, and order are corrupted equally by every sin.

I respond: It must be said that since these three, namely mode, species, and order, insofar as they are deprived through the evil of guilt, are conditions of the same good will, not only inseparable from one another⁹, but also equal, they are deprived equally by every evil of guilt. (Conclusion.) — For every evil of guilt disorders insofar as it makes [one] unlike God, and insofar as it makes [one] unlike God, to that extent it removes [one] far from God, (Reason.) so that, just as grace equally renders the soul ordered and beautiful and powerful toward a good [that is] as great or greater¹⁰; and just as in glory there is likewise an equalization of the endowments: so also in guilt the privation of these three is made equally. And therefore, just as it is said that « the vision in glory is the whole reward¹¹ », on account of the connection and equality in the glorious endowments; so also, as Augustine says in the book Of the Eighty-three Questions, that « the whole name of evil is found from the privation of species », not because by evil species alone is deprived, or principally, but because in the privation of species is understood the privation of the others. — The reasons therefore which are adduced for the first part are to be granted.

Solution of the opposing [arguments].

1. To that therefore which is objected, that malice consists principally in the intention; it must be said

that it is true; but as for what he himself objects, that order is reckoned according to the intention; it must be said that this is understood according to a certain appropriation. For mode, species, and order consist about the intention itself, from which both the intention is good and the action is good which proceeds from the intention.

2. But to that which is objected, that to mode, species, and order there correspond unity, truth, and goodness; it must be said that it is true, insofar as in those three the general character of the vestige is considered; (To be noted.) but insofar as the corruption of the evil of guilt is reckoned in them, which consists about the will, these three are to be considered in the good, according as it is good, as appeared in the preceding problem. And therefore they are deprived equally by evil, since [evil] is opposed directly to them.

3. To that which is objected, that evil does not deform all the powers of the image equally; it must be said that it is not similar; because those powers are diverse and ordered to diverse acts, in such a way that some of those acts regard guilt and justice according to more and less. But it is not so in the case at hand; for these three differ only by comparison, and since they have the same foundation, it is necessary that, as much as one is diminished, the other also be diminished.

4. To that which is objected, that the evil of guilt is a deformity; it must be said that it is not only a deformity opposed to beauty, but is also a crookedness¹² opposed to rectitude. Therefore it does not follow that it deprives [it] of species more than of order; for it is not called a deformity through the privation of beauty alone, but in this is also understood the privation of the others; nevertheless it is more denominated from the privation of species and form on account of this, that species is the character of knowing.

5. To that which is objected, that evil is capable of being ordered; it must be said that order is twofold. (Twofold order.) For there is an order prior to the thing's being made, which is from the intention of the maker. And there is an order after the thing's being made, which indeed is reckoned according to the justice of the one requiting. The first order is that which is deprived by¹³ evil through evil; and this order evil cannot have, just as neither [can it have] species. But the second order is not deprived through evil, but rather evil is capable of being ordered in punishments according to that order.

6. To that which is objected, that no privation is made in the relative except through something absolute; it must be said that both species and order, as taken here, are each relative; therefore one is not deprived through the other any more than conversely. Nevertheless these three are taken away through a change made about something absolute; for then they are deprived, when the free will sins by moving itself inordinately¹⁴.

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