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Dist. 35, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO III.

Utrum modus, species et ordo per malum possint totaliter corrumpi.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum per malum contingat haec tria corrumpi totaliter. Et quod non, videtur:

Fundamenta.

1. Per Augustinum in Enchiridio1: « Bonum minui malum est, quamvis, quantumcumque minuatur, aliquid remaneat »: ergo per culpam nunquam aufertur totum bonum, quod per malum corrumpitur; sed tale bonum attenditur in modo, specie et ordine: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Natura boni2, loquens de his tribus: « Ubi haec magna sunt, magnum bonum est; ubi parva, parvum; ubi nulla nullum »: ergo si per culpam totaliter fieret horum trium ademptio, fieret peccantis annihilatio; sed hoc est impossibile, quod anima peccando annihiletur: ergo impossibile est, quod ista tria totaliter corrumpantur.

3. Item, malum, si malum est, aliquid adimit3; sed impossibile est, quod aliquis tot mala faciat et tantum peccet, quin adhuc possit peccare: ergo nunquam tantum peccat, quin adhuc inveniat in eo culpa aliquod bonum, quod possit adimere. Sed hoc bonum consistit in modo, specie et ordine: ergo etc.

4. Item, de nemine desperandum est, dum est in via4: ergo quantumcumque peccet, adhuc habilitatem habet bene faciendi; sed quamdiu habet habilitatem bene faciendi, adhuc habet aliquod bonum, quod malum potest corrumpere; et si hoc, habet modum, speciem et ordinem: ergo nunquam ista corrumpuntur totaliter per malum culpae.

5. Item, demus, quod in aliquo corrumpantur totaliter; tunc quaeritur: aut ille desinit esse, aut non. Si sic: ergo per peccatum contingit corrumpere substantiam immortalem et incorruptibilem, animam scilicet rationalem; quod est impossibile. Si autem non desinit esse: aut ergo potest peccare, aut non potest. Si potest peccare: ergo aliquod bonum potest perdere; et si hoc, adhuc habet aliquid de habilitate et modo et specie et ordine, quae corrumpuntur per malum culpae. Si non potest, et substantia rationalis, quae non potest peccare, habens

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liberam voluntatem, melior est illa quae potest peccare5, quia Deo similior est: ergo per multitudinem peccatorum perveniret homo ad statum meliorem. Sed hoc est falsum et impossibile: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, videlicet quod modus, species et ordo totaliter adimantur per peccatum.

Sed contra:

Ad oppositum.

1. Omne illud, a quo fit ademptio et ablatio, si non est infinitum, aliquando totaliter est ademptum; sed omne bonum, quod est in anima, sive sit habilitas sive potentia, finitum est: ergo si per malum culpae tollitur et adimitur, necesse est, quod aliquando totaliter adimatur6.

2. Item, si tantum malum adimit tantum de bono: ergo maius malum maius adimit, et duplo malum duplo adimit; sed nullum est peccatum ita magnum, quin adhuc possit esse maius: ergo si unum parvum peccatum adimit aliquid de bono, possibile est, quod anima committat ita magnum peccatum, quod totaliter amittat7 bonum, quod per peccatum privatur.

3. Item, quantacumque corporali quantitate data, quantumcumque modicum inde auferatur, utpote si a mari auferatur gutta aquae, contingit intelligere, quod aliquando totum auferatur: ergo pari ratione videtur in quantitate virtutis, quod quantumcumque parum aufertur per malum, si homo peccet continue, aliquando totum erit consumtum.

4. Item, sicut se habet gratia ad pronitatem, sic se habet culpa ad bonam habilitatem; sed gratia adeo potest crescere, quod omnino aufert8 pronitatem, sicut patet in Christo et beata Virgine, in quibus fuit tanta gratia, quod nulla fuit in eis ad malum pronitas: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod adeo potest crescere culpa, quod totaliter perdatur ad bonum habilitas.

5. Item, sicut status gloriae confirmat in bono, ita status damnationis confirmat in malo: ergo sicut per gloriam redditur homo impossibilis ad malum, ita per damnationem aeternam redditur impossibilis ad bonum; sed ubicumque est ad bonum impossibilitas, ibi nulla est ad bonum habilitas: si ergo habilitas ad bonum est illud quod adimitur per peccatum, et cuius modus, species et ordo tollitur per culpam; videtur, quod haec aliquando totaliter sint adempta.

Conclusio.

Habilitas voluntatis ad bonum, et in ea modus, species et ordo per culpam semper minui, sed nunquam totaliter tolli possunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio per malum culpae non contingit omnino removere et privare habilitatem voluntatis ad bonum, nec modum, speciem et ordinem, quae secundum illam attenduntur. Et hoc manifeste apparet, quia nunquam voluntas potest esse sine naturali habilitate et aptitudine ad bonum. Sicut ergo non potest voluntas peccando desinere esse, sic non potest totam habilitatem illam perdere et modum et speciem et ordinem, quae secundum illam attenduntur, totaliter amittere. Et hoc quidem dicit Augustinus expresse, et communiter consentiunt in hoc omnes doctores. — Sed qualiter per peccatum habilitas illa continue diminuatur et nunquam finiatur sive consumatur, difficile est assignare; et super hoc diversi senserunt diversimode.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, (opinio 1.) quod illa habilitas nunquam totaliter tollitur, pro eo quod, etsi sit finita in se, est tamen ordinabilis ad infinitum bonum et ad infinitos actus; et ideo nunquam potest tolli, nec per peccati magnitudinem nec per peccati multitudinem. — Sed iste modus dicendi non satisfacit. Nam habilitas, quantumcumque diminuatur per peccatum, adhuc est ad infinitum bonum, adhuc etiam est ad infinitos actus: ergo ex illa parte ita magna est, sicut prius erat: ergo in nullo est diminuta: ergo ordinatio ad boni infinitatem, vel ad actuum multitudinem nihil facit ad illius habilitatis diminutionem; immo potius ex hoc posset argui, quod nullo modo minuitur, cum infinitum non sit minus infinito ex ea parte, qua infinitum9.

Et propterea alii dixerunt aliter, (opinio 2.) quod illa habilitas, etsi semper diminuatur, nunquam totaliter tollitur, quia divisibilis est in infinitum. Sicut enim in corporalibus quantitas molis divisibilis est in infinitum et nunquam potest adeo per divisionem diminui, quin adhuc possit minor effici; sic in spiritualibus habilitas potentiae, quae est quantitas virtutis, nunquam potest per peccatum adeo parva effici, quin adhuc possit minor fieri; et hoc10 nihil prohibet, quod aliquid sit finitum actu et infinitum divisione, et ita, quod sit semper diminuibile et nunquam totaliter consumtibile. — Sed nec iste modus dicendi satisfacit. Nam quamvis continuum sit divisibile in infinitum, tamen nunquam est continuum aliquod ita magnum, quodsi diminuatur diminutione quantumcumque parva, et postmodum consequenter fiat ablatio partis ita parvae sicut prius, et sic consequenter procedendo, quin aliquando totum consumatur — sicut patet, si a monte auferretur ita modicum, sicut est unus atomus — ergo si malum aliquid tollit de illa habilitate, cum non sint ibi infinita tanta11, aliquando erit totaliter consumta. Si tu dicas, quod hoc verum esset, si in sequenti culpa tantum adimeretur, sicut in prima; nunc autem non

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est sic, quia semper minus et minus adimitur, et ita nunquam finitur — si quis enim in diminuendo acciperet millesimam partem diminuibilis, et postmodum millesimam partem residui, et sic procedendo nunquam totaliter tolleret12 — si, inquam, hoc modo dixeris, non satisfacis, pro eo quod maior culpa plus tollit de bono; et minorem culpam praecedentem potest subsequi maior culpa, et sic consequenter procedendo: ergo semper potest fieri maior et maior ademptio, et ita necessario aliquando poterit fieri illius totius boni consumtio.

Et ideo dixerunt aliqui aliter, (opinio 3.) videlicet quia, quod illa habilitas semper minuitur et nunquam finitur, hoc venit ex hoc, quod est durabilis et continuabilis in infinitum, quamvis sit actu finita. Unde (exemplum) sicut aqua, quae est in fonte scaturiente, actu finita est; nunquam tamen potest tantum exhauriri, quin semper remaneat, propter hoc quod est ibi virtus continue influendi: sic et in proposito dicunt se habere, quod ipsa habilitas ad bonum ortum habet a libertate voluntatis; et quantumcumque voluntas se actu dehabilitet, quia tamen semper remanet libera, semper potest se ad bonum habilitare. Et ideo, sicut si aliquis subtraheret radios soli illuminanti, sol posset continue radios suos restaurare, quamvis habeant13 actualiter finitatem; sic et in proposito dicunt se habere. Et ideo, cum peccatum non possit ipsam voluntatem, quae est radix et principium illius habilitatis, perimere, et voluntas semper possit illam habilitatem continuare; malum culpae nunquam potest eam totaliter consumere, quamvis aliquo modo possit diminuere. — Sed nec iste modus dicendi satisfacit. Nam si ideo habilitas non finiretur, propter hoc quod continue restauratur; sic duo sequerentur inconvenientia, quorum unum esset, quod nec habilitas minueretur nisi ad tempus, sicut nec aqua fontis; aliud esset, quod homo posset resurgere a peccato per se ipsum, si illam habilitatem posset voluntas sine gratia restaurare et restaurando continuare.

Et propterea est quartus modus dicendi, (opinio 4.) videlicet quod habilitas semper potest minui et nunquam totaliter consumi, et hoc, quia est elongabilis a rectitudine in infinitum. Sicut enim linea curva potest infinities elongari a rectitudine, (exemplum) id est, nunquam tantum elongari, quin adhuc possit magis; sic cum malum corrumpat habilitatem elongando ipsam a rectitudine, pro eo quod ipsum malum sive malitia est curvitas, et intensio in malo est per recessum a bono; habilitas illa nunquam adeo diminuitur, quin adhuc possit magis diminui, quia nunquam adeo elongatur, quin magis possit elongari, et nunquam adeo curvatur, quin possit magis curvari; et ideo semper potest per malum diminui et nunquam totaliter tolli. — Hic autem modus dicendi inter ceteros praedictos (magis approbatur) magis videtur esse rationabilis, pro eo quod fundatur super modum adimendi ipsius mali. Corrumpit enim, sicut dictum est, per elongationem a bono, sicut Augustinus dicit, et Magister in fine distinctionis recitat in littera14.

Ad huius igitur modi intelligentiam ampliorem habendam (confirmatur) notandum est, quod culpa sic corrumpit et diminuit habilitatem illam, sicut ei opponitur. (Notandum.) Sed non opponitur illi habilitati secundum id quod est, ut praedictum est supra15, sive prout fundatur in natura, sed secundum id, ad quod est, id est, prout ordinatur ad gratiam; et ideo nunquam corrumpit eam nec minuit ita, quod aliquam partem sui auferat secundum id, quod est, sed quia deordinat ab eo ad quod est; ac per hoc sic minuit, quod relinquit; et ideo sic corrumpit, quod nunquam totaliter tollit. Unde, sicut dicit Magister16, quod concupiscentia ex usu caritatis continue minuitur et nunquam finitur, quia caritas non opponitur ipsi concupiscentiae secundum radicem suam et secundum id in quo radicatur, sed secundum id ad quod inclinat; sic intelligendum est esse in proposito. — Et illud melius manifestatur, (exemplum) si sumatur exemplum in terminis. Habilitas enim illa, quam dicimus diminui, non est aliud quam idoneitas animae ad suscipiendum gratiam et ad cooperandum gratiae iam susceptae. In hoc igitur dicitur culpa illam habilitatem minuere, quod reddit animam minus idoneam ad utrumque. Dum enim homo peccat, Deum offendit, (comprobatur) et ex hoc efficitur indignus et ineptus ad suscipiendum gratiam Dei. In hoc etiam, quod peccat, pronus ad malum redditur, et in hoc efficitur ineptus ad opera virtutum17. — Sed planum est illud, quod nunquam est aliquis adeo indignus gratia Dei, quin adhuc possit esse indignior, quia nunquam tantum18 offendit, quin adhuc possit offendere; nunquam est adeo indignus, quin, quamdiu est in statu viae, sit susceptibilis gratiae; et ita nunquam ex illa parte efficitur inhabilis in summo ad susceptionem gratiae. — Similiter ex parte pronitatis nullus est adeo pronus, quin possit adhuc magis pronus effici, pro

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eo quod voluntas semper est libera; et ideo nunquam pronitas in voluntate potest fieri necessitas; et ita potest homo semper fieri magis ac magis pronus et magis ineptus ad cooperandum gratiae. Et per hoc ex neutra parte totaliter dehabilitatur.

(Conclusio.) — Et sic patet, quod habilitas illa per culpam semper potest minui et nunquam totaliter tolli. Et ratio huius est, quia non minuitur alicuius partis ablatione, sed elongatione, non secundum id quod est, sed secundum id ad quod est. Hoc enim modo19 illi habilitati opponitur, et ideo per hunc modum ab ea diminuitur. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quae hoc ostendunt. Ad rationes ad oppositum satis plana est responsio.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. 2. 3. Nam quod obiicit primo et secundo et tertio per hoc solvitur, quia illae tres rationes ex malo intellectu diminutionis procedunt. Arguunt enim, ac si habilitas minueretur secundum id quod est, et eius pars aliquota20 tolleretur; hoc autem non est sic, sed per elongationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo nunquam potest tot peccatis dehabilitari, quin adhuc possit magis pluribus, nec etiam tanto peccato, quin adhuc maiori. (Notandum.) Et ideo dicit Dionysius21, quod « malum est infinitum »; non quia aliquod sit malum summum, quo nihil possit esse peius; sed quia non est aliquod ita malum, quin adhuc possit esse peius. Et ideo per quantumcumque malum nunquam adimitur habilitas secundum totum; quamvis enim sit finita, modus tamen adimendi ipsam protendit se usque in infinitum, non infinitate actuali, sed potentiali, qua scilicet dicimus, quod curvum a recto in infinitum potest recedere.

4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod gratia totaliter tollit concupiscentiam; dicendum, quod (Notandum.) quaedam est gratia, quae opponitur ipsi concupiscentiae secundum id quod est; quaedam vero, quae opponitur ipsi solum secundum id ad quod est. Et prima est quaedam gratia gratis data, et totaliter potest tollere concupiscentiam, dum sanat et reintegrat naturam vitiatam. Alia vero est gratia gratum faciens; et de hac dicit Augustinus22, quod quamvis diminuat concupiscentiam, nunquam tamen finit eam; et huic gratiae assimilatur culpa respectu habilitatis, non alteri. Nam sicut dictum est, non opponitur illi habilitati secundum se sive secundum id in quo est, sed secundum id ad quod est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gloria reddit impossibilem ad malum; dicendum, quod etiam poena reddit impossibilem ad bonum; sed tamen aliter et aliter, quia gloria reddit impossibilem ad malum in hoc, quod in ea23 aufertur radix mali, scilicet ipsa concupiscentia, et datur plenitudo boni. Damnatio vero aeterna reddit impossibilem ad bonum non quia ibi sit plenitudo omnis mali, nec etiam, quia auferatur naturalis aptitudo ad bonum, sed quia aufertur merendi spatium, et Deus amplius non offert gratiam iuvantem ad bonum24. (Notandum.) Et ideo illa impossibilitas non dicitur per privationem habilitatis omnimodam, sed potius propter bene faciendi impedimenta. Unde si aliquis damnatus ad statum viae reduceretur, nulla sibi habilitate collata, de novo habilitatem haberet ad susceptionem gratiae. Et propterea, quamvis ordinatio habilitatis impediatur, tamen habilitas nunquam totaliter tollitur. — Esto autem, (Aliter.) quod concederetur, quod tolleretur in inferno, adhuc tamen non sequeretur, quod totaliter tolleretur per peccatum. Nulla enim culpa ponit hominem extra statum viae; et ideo nec aufert homini habilitatem ad susceptionem gratiae.

Scholion

I. Alii commentatores de eadem re quaerunt sub titulo, utrum malum possit corrumpere totum bonum humanae naturae, quod intelligunt de aptitudine sive inclinatione naturali ad bonum, non de ipsa natura sive voluntate; unde Richard. a Med. bene in ipso titulo praecise hoc exprimit, quaerendo, utrum aptitudo naturalis in anima per peccatum totaliter possit tolli. Concorditer omnes antiqui respondent, istam aptitudinem semper posse diminui, non tamen penitus auferri. — Sed de modo, quo fiat haec diminutio, multae exortae sunt opiniones. Praeter quatuor hic relatas, Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 4. a. 2.) recenset tres alias, quarum illam ceteris praefert, quae tenet, praefatam aptitudinem non minui secundum essentiam, quae finita est, sed secundum efficientiam, quae quodam modo infinita est, quatenus ex ipsa sine fine generari possunt actus et dispositiones. — S. Thom. in Sum. (1. II. q. 85. a. 2.) convenit cum S. Bonav. primo in hoc, quod ista diminutio debeat intelligi non ex parte radicis sive secundum id quod est, sed ex parte termini sive secundum id ad quod est vel secundum ordinem in finem. Secundo conveniunt etiam in hoc, quod eadem non fit per subtractionem. — Sed quomodo igitur fit ista diminutio? S. Bonav. vult eam fieri « per elongationem a bono » vel obliquationem et incurvationem rectitudinis in ordine ad actum, quod explicatur exemplo lineae, quae potest in infinitum curvari. Iisdem fere verbis utitur S. Thom. in Comment., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 5. et d. 25. a. 5. Sed in Sum. (loc. cit.) dicit, hanc diminutionem per peccatum fieri, « in quantum ponitur impedimentum perlingendi ad terminum ». Hanc ultimam sententiam veriorem esse, cum aliis multis posterioribus dicit Guliel. Marra (in Comment. hic) et eam exponit de impedimentis extrinsecus advenientibus, ut sunt dispositiones malae ac maligni habitus. Paulo aliter et magis ad mentem S. Bonaventurae Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. Sed cfr. etiam quod dicit S. Bonav., hic ad 3. et supra a. 1. q. 1. schol.

II. Praeter locos in praeced. scholio et hic citatos: Scot., Report. hic q. unica n. 3. seqq. — S. Thom., S. c. gent. III. c. 12; de Malo, q. 2, a. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. 1. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 4.

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English Translation

QUESTION III.

Whether mode, species, and order can be totally corrupted by evil.

Thirdly it is asked, whether it can happen that these three be totally corrupted by evil. And that they cannot, it seems:

Fundamenta.

1. By Augustine in the Enchiridion1: « To diminish the good is evil, although, however much it is diminished, something remains »: therefore by guilt the whole good is never taken away which is corrupted by evil; but such good is reckoned in mode, species, and order: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On the Nature of the Good2, speaking of these three: « Where these are great, the good is great; where small, [it is] small; where none, [it is] nothing »: therefore if by guilt there were made a total removal of these three, there would be made an annihilation of the sinner; but this is impossible, that the soul should be annihilated by sinning: therefore it is impossible that these three be totally corrupted.

3. Likewise, evil, if it is evil, takes away something3; but it is impossible that anyone should commit so many evils and sin so much that he could not still sin: therefore he never sins so much that guilt does not still find in him some good which it can take away. But this good consists in mode, species, and order: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no one is to be despaired of while he is on the way4: therefore however much he sins, he still has the aptitude for doing well; but as long as he has the aptitude for doing well, he still has some good which evil can corrupt; and if this, he has mode, species, and order: therefore these are never totally corrupted by the evil of guilt.

5. Likewise, let us grant that in someone they are totally corrupted; then it is asked: either he ceases to be, or not. If so: therefore by sin it happens that an immortal and incorruptible substance is corrupted, namely the rational soul; which is impossible. But if he does not cease to be: then either he can sin, or he cannot. If he can sin: therefore he can lose some good; and if this, he still has something of aptitude and of mode and species and order, which are corrupted by the evil of guilt. If he cannot, then the rational substance which cannot sin, having

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a free will, is better than that which can sin5, because it is more like God: therefore through a multitude of sins a man would arrive at a better state. But this is false and impossible: therefore so also is that from which it follows, namely that mode, species, and order are totally taken away by sin.

On the contrary:

To the opposite.

1. Everything from which removal and subtraction is made, if it is not infinite, is at some time totally removed; but every good which is in the soul, whether it be an aptitude or a power, is finite: therefore if by the evil of guilt it is taken away and removed, it is necessary that at some time it be totally removed6.

2. Likewise, if a given evil takes away a given amount of good: then a greater evil takes away more, and a double evil takes away double; but there is no sin so great that it could not still be greater: therefore if one small sin takes away something of the good, it is possible that the soul commit so great a sin that it totally lose7 the good of which it is deprived by sin.

3. Likewise, given any corporeal quantity, however little is taken away from it — as if from the sea a drop of water were taken — it can be understood that at some time the whole is taken away: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [to hold] in the quantity of power, that however little is taken away by evil, if a man sins continually, at some time the whole will be consumed.

4. Likewise, as grace stands to proneness, so does guilt stand to good aptitude; but grace can so increase that it altogether takes away8 proneness, as appears in Christ and the blessed Virgin, in whom there was so much grace that there was in them no proneness to evil: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that guilt can so increase that aptitude for the good is totally lost.

5. Likewise, as the state of glory confirms in the good, so the state of damnation confirms in evil: therefore as through glory a man is rendered incapable of evil, so through eternal damnation he is rendered incapable of the good; but wherever there is an incapacity for the good, there is no aptitude for the good: if therefore the aptitude for the good is that which is taken away by sin, and whose mode, species, and order is taken away by guilt; it seems that these are at some time totally removed.

Conclusion.

The will's aptitude for the good, and in it mode, species, and order, can by guilt always be diminished, but never totally taken away.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt by the evil of guilt it does not happen that the will's aptitude for the good is altogether removed and deprived, nor [its] mode, species, and order, which are reckoned according to it. And this manifestly appears, because the will can never be without a natural aptitude and fitness for the good. As therefore the will cannot by sinning cease to be, so it cannot lose that whole aptitude and totally lose the mode and species and order which are reckoned according to it. And this indeed Augustine says expressly, and all the doctors commonly agree in this. — But how that aptitude is continually diminished by sin and yet never finished or consumed, is difficult to assign; and on this diverse [authors] have thought in diverse ways.

For some wished to say (opinion 1) that that aptitude is never totally taken away, on account of this, that, even though it be finite in itself, it is nevertheless orderable to an infinite good and to infinite acts; and therefore it can never be taken away, neither through the magnitude of sin nor through the multitude of sin. — But this manner of speaking does not satisfy. For the aptitude, however much it is diminished by sin, is still [ordered] to an infinite good, is still also [ordered] to infinite acts: therefore on that side it is as great as it was before: therefore in nothing is it diminished: therefore the ordering to the infinity of the good, or to the multitude of acts, contributes nothing to the diminution of that aptitude; nay rather from this it could be argued that it is in no way diminished, since the infinite is not less than the infinite on that side on which it is infinite9.

And therefore others said otherwise, (opinion 2) that that aptitude, even though it be always diminished, is never totally taken away, because it is divisible to infinity. For just as in corporeal things the quantity of mass is divisible to infinity and can never be so diminished by division that it could not still be made smaller; so in spiritual things the aptitude of the power, which is a quantity of strength, can never be made so small by sin that it could not still be made smaller; and this10 in no way prevents that something be finite in act and infinite in division, and thus that it be always diminishable and never totally consumable. — But neither does this manner of speaking satisfy. For although the continuum is divisible to infinity, nevertheless there is never any continuum so great that, if it be diminished by a diminution however small, and then consequently there be made a removal of a part as small as before, and so proceeding consequently, [it can fail] at some time to be wholly consumed — as is clear, if from a mountain there were taken away something as small as a single atom — therefore if evil takes away something of that aptitude, since there are not there infinitely many such [parts]11, at some time it will be totally consumed. If you say that this would be true if in the following sin as much were taken away as in the first; but now it is not

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so, because ever less and less is taken away, and thus it is never finished — for if someone in diminishing should take the thousandth part of the diminishable, and then the thousandth part of the remainder, and so proceeding never totally take [it] away12 — if, I say, you speak in this manner, you do not satisfy, on account of this, that a greater guilt takes away more of the good; and a greater guilt can follow upon a lesser preceding guilt, and so proceeding consequently: therefore a greater and greater removal can always be made, and thus necessarily at some time the consuming of that whole good will be able to come about.

And therefore some said otherwise, (opinion 3) namely that the fact that that aptitude is always diminished and never finished comes from this, that it is durable and continuable to infinity, although it be finite in act. Hence (example) just as the water which is in a gushing spring is finite in act; yet it can never be so drained that it does not always remain, on account of this, that there is in it the power of continually flowing in: so also in the case at hand they say it stands, that that aptitude for the good has its origin from the freedom of the will; and however much the will renders itself unfit in act, yet because it always remains free, it can always make itself fit for the good. And therefore, just as if someone were to withdraw the rays from the illuminating sun, the sun could continually restore its rays, although they have13 finitude in act; so also in the case at hand they say it stands. And therefore, since sin cannot destroy the will itself, which is the root and principle of that aptitude, and the will can always continue that aptitude; the evil of guilt can never totally consume it, although in some manner it can diminish [it]. — But neither does this manner of speaking satisfy. For if the aptitude were not finished on account of this, that it is continually restored; then two unsuitable [consequences] would follow, of which one would be that the aptitude would be diminished only for a time, just as neither [is] the water of the spring; the other would be that a man could rise again from sin by himself, if the will could without grace restore that aptitude and by restoring continue [it].

And therefore there is a fourth manner of speaking, (opinion 4) namely that the aptitude can always be diminished and never totally consumed, and this because it is capable of being drawn away from rectitude to infinity. For just as a curved line can be drawn away from rectitude infinitely, (example) that is, never so drawn away that it could not [be drawn] still more; so since evil corrupts the aptitude by drawing it away from rectitude, on account of this, that evil itself or malice is a crookedness, and intensity in evil is by withdrawal from the good; that aptitude is never so diminished that it could not still be diminished more, because it is never so drawn away that it could not be drawn away more, and never so curved that it could not be curved more; and therefore it can always be diminished by evil and never totally taken away. — But this manner of speaking, among the others foregoing, (is more approved) seems to be more reasonable, on account of this, that it is founded upon the manner of taking-away of evil itself. For it corrupts, as has been said, by drawing-away from the good, as Augustine says, and as the Master relates at the end of the distinction in the text14.

For the fuller understanding therefore of this manner (it is confirmed) it must be noted that guilt corrupts and diminishes that aptitude in the way that it is opposed to it. (To be noted.) But it is not opposed to that aptitude according to that which it is, as was said above15, or insofar as it is founded in nature, but according to that to which it is, that is, insofar as it is ordered to grace; and therefore it never corrupts it nor diminishes it in such a way that it takes away any part of it according to that which it is, but because it disorders [it] from that to which it is; and through this it so diminishes that it leaves [it remaining]; and therefore it so corrupts that it never totally takes [it] away. Hence, as the Master says16, that concupiscence is by the exercise of charity continually diminished and never finished, because charity is not opposed to concupiscence itself according to its root and according to that in which it is rooted, but according to that to which it inclines; so it is to be understood in the case at hand. — And this is better made manifest (example) if an example be taken in [its] terms. For that aptitude which we say is diminished is nothing other than the fitness of the soul for receiving grace and for cooperating with grace already received. In this therefore guilt is said to diminish that aptitude, in that it renders the soul less fit for both. For when a man sins, he offends God, (it is confirmed) and from this he is made unworthy and unfit for receiving the grace of God. In this also, that he sins, he is rendered prone to evil, and in this he is made unfit for the works of the virtues17. — But it is plain that no one is ever so unworthy of the grace of God that he could not still be more unworthy, because he never offends so much18 that he could not still offend; he is never so unworthy that, as long as he is in the state of the way, he is not capable of grace; and thus he is never on that side made unfit in the highest [degree] for the reception of grace. — Likewise on the side of proneness no one is so prone that he could not still be made more prone, on account

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of this, that the will is always free; and therefore proneness in the will can never become necessity; and thus a man can always be made more and more prone and more unfit for cooperating with grace. And through this on neither side is he totally rendered unfit.

(Conclusion.) — And so it is clear that that aptitude can by guilt always be diminished and never totally taken away. And the reason for this is that it is diminished not by the removal of some part, but by drawing-away, not according to that which it is, but according to that to which it is. For in this manner19 it is opposed to that aptitude, and therefore in this manner is it diminished by it. — The reasons therefore which show this are to be granted. To the reasons for the opposite the response is sufficiently plain.

Solution of the opposing [arguments].

1. 2. 3. For what is objected first and secondly and thirdly is solved by this, that those three reasons proceed from a wrong understanding of diminution. For they argue as if the aptitude were diminished according to that which it is, and some aliquot part of it were taken away20; but it is not so, but by drawing-away, as has been said. And therefore it can never be rendered unfit by so many sins that it could not [be rendered unfit] still more by more, nor even by so great a sin that it could not [be] by a greater. (To be noted.) And therefore Dionysius says21 that « evil is infinite »; not because there is some highest evil, than which nothing could be worse; but because there is no evil so great that it could not still be worse. And therefore by however great an evil the aptitude is never taken away according to the whole; for although it be finite, nevertheless the manner of taking it away extends itself unto infinity, not by actual infinity, but by potential [infinity], by which namely we say that the curved can recede from the straight to infinity.

4. But to that which is objected, that grace totally takes away concupiscence; it must be said that (To be noted.) there is a certain grace which is opposed to concupiscence itself according to that which it is; and a certain [grace] which is opposed to it only according to that to which it is. And the first is a certain grace freely given, and it can totally take away concupiscence, when it heals and reintegrates the vitiated nature. But the other is the grace that makes [one] pleasing; and of this Augustine says22 that although it diminishes concupiscence, yet it never finishes it; and to this grace guilt is likened with respect to the aptitude, not to the other. For as has been said, it is not opposed to that aptitude according to itself or according to that in which it is, but according to that to which it is.

5. To that which is objected, that glory renders [one] incapable of evil; it must be said that punishment also renders [one] incapable of the good; but yet in different ways, because glory renders [one] incapable of evil in this, that in it23 the root of evil is taken away, namely concupiscence itself, and the fullness of the good is given. But eternal damnation renders [one] incapable of the good not because there is there the fullness of all evil, nor even because the natural fitness for the good is taken away, but because the space of meriting is taken away, and God no longer offers grace helping toward the good24. (To be noted.) And therefore that incapacity is not said [to be] through a privation of the aptitude of every kind, but rather on account of the impediments to doing well. Hence if some damned [person] were led back to the state of the way, no aptitude being conferred on him, he would anew have the aptitude for the reception of grace. And therefore, although the ordering of the aptitude be impeded, nevertheless the aptitude is never totally taken away. — But let it be, (Otherwise.) that it were granted that it be taken away in hell, still it would not follow that it be totally taken away by sin. For no guilt puts a man outside the state of the way; and therefore neither does it take away from man the aptitude for the reception of grace.

Scholion

I. Other commentators inquire concerning the same matter under the title, whether evil can corrupt the whole good of human nature, which they understand of the natural fitness or inclination toward the good, not of the nature itself or of the will; whence Richard of Mediavilla well expresses this precisely in the very title, by inquiring whether the natural fitness in the soul can be totally taken away by sin. In agreement all the ancients respond that this fitness can always be diminished, yet not utterly taken away. — But concerning the manner in which this diminution comes about, many opinions have arisen. Besides the four related here, Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 4. a. 2.) recounts three others, of which he prefers to the rest the one which holds that the aforesaid fitness is not diminished according to essence, which is finite, but according to efficacy, which is in a certain manner infinite, inasmuch as from it acts and dispositions can be generated without end. — St. Thomas in the Summa (1. II. q. 85. a. 2.) agrees with St. Bonaventure first in this, that this diminution should be understood not on the side of the root or according to that which it is, but on the side of the terminus or according to that to which it is or according to the ordering toward the end. Secondly they also agree in this, that the same does not come about by subtraction. — But how then does this diminution come about? St. Bonaventure wishes it to come about « by drawing-away from the good » or by the obliquing and incurving of rectitude in the ordering toward the act, which is explained by the example of a line which can be curved to infinity. St. Thomas uses almost the same words in the Commentary, II. Sent. d. 24. a. 5. and d. 25. a. 5. But in the Summa (loc. cit.) he says that this diminution comes about through sin « inasmuch as an impediment is placed to reaching the terminus ». That this last opinion is truer, with many others of the later [authors], says William of Ware (in the Commentary here) and he expounds it of impediments coming from without, such as are evil dispositions and malignant habits. A little otherwise and more to the mind of St. Bonaventure [is] Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. But cfr. also what St. Bonaventure says, here ad 3. and above a. 1. q. 1. schol.

II. Besides the places cited in the preceding scholion and here: Scotus, Reportata here, sole q. n. 3. and following. — St. Thomas, Summa contra gentiles III. c. 12; de Malo, q. 2, a. 12. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5; Summa p. 1. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2. a. 3. — Durandus, II. Sent. d. 24. q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 12. n. 4, ubi textus originalis in fine addit necesse est.
    Chapter 12. n. 4, where the original text adds at the end necesse est ("it is necessary").
  2. Cap. 3. — Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 5. ait: Malum etiam … se ipsum perdit [ἀπόλλυσι], et si integrum sit, intolerabile evadit.
    Chapter 3. — Aristotle, IV. Ethics c. 5. says: Evil also … destroys itself [ἀπόλλυσι], and if it were entire, it becomes intolerable.
  3. Ut ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 1.
    As was shown above a. 1. q. 1.
  4. August., I. Retract. c. 19. n. 7: De quocumque pessimo in hac vita constituto non est utique desperandum, nec pro illo imprudenter oratur, de quo non desperatur.
    Augustine, I. Retractations c. 19. n. 7: Concerning anyone whatsoever, however wicked, established in this life, one is by no means to despair, nor is prayer made imprudently for him of whom one does not despair.
  5. Vide August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 14, et Enchirid. c. 105. n. 28. Sententia haec habetur etiam supra lit. Magistri, d. XXV. c. 4.
    See Augustine, III. On Free Will c. 5. n. 14, and Enchiridion c. 105. n. 28. This opinion is had also above in the text of the Master, d. XXV. c. 4.
  6. Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 37. seq. (c. 4.), ubi inter alia: Omne autem corpus finitum consumitur a corpore finito.
    Cfr. Aristotle, I. Physics text 37. and following (c. 4.), where among other things: But every finite body is consumed by a finite body.
  7. Vat. adimat, ed. 3 adimit.
    The Vatican [edition] [reads] adimat, ed. 3 adimit.
  8. Cod. bb auferat, Vat. potest auferre.
    Cod. bb [reads] auferat, the Vatican [edition] potest auferre.
  9. Vide hic fundam. 1. et 2. — Mox pro consentiunt in hoc omnes codd. X Z sentiunt omnes, ed. 1 sentiunt hoc omnes, ed. 2 et plures codd., ut F K T, sentiunt in hoc omnes.
    See here fundamenta 1 and 2. — Soon, for consentiunt in hoc omnes the codd. X Z [read] sentiunt omnes, ed. 1 sentiunt hoc omnes, ed. 2 and several codices, as F K T, sentiunt in hoc omnes.
  10. Edd., excepta 1, et nonnulli codd. adiiciunt est. Mox post nunquam Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 addit tamen. — De divisibilitate quantitatis cfr. supra pag. 732, nota 2.
    The editions, except the first, and several codices add est. Soon, after nunquam the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 adds tamen. — On the divisibility of quantity cfr. above p. 732, note 2.
  11. Cod. T. sit ibi infinitas tanta.
    Cod. T. [reads] sit ibi infinitas tanta ("there be there so great an infinity").
  12. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 59. (c. 6.): In magnitudine enim finita, si accipiens quis determinatam, assumat eadem ratione, non eandem aliquam totius magnitudinem ratione accipiens, non pertransibit finitum.
    Aristotle, III. Physics text 59 (c. 6.): For in a finite magnitude, if one taking a determinate [part] should assume by the same ratio — not taking by [the same] ratio some same [part] of the whole magnitude — he will not pass through the finite.
  13. Edd., excepta 1, habeat.
    The editions, except the first, [read] habeat.
  14. Hic c. 5, ubi etiam verba Augustini exhibentur. — Paulo superius cod. M probabilis, cod. H nobis probabilior pro rationabilis.
    Here c. 5, where also the words of Augustine are exhibited. — A little above, cod. M [reads] probabilis, cod. H nobis probabilior for rationabilis.
  15. Art. 1. q. 1. — Mox pro ordinatur ad gratiam non pauci codd., ut C F K L O R S (T a prima manu) W bb etc., cum edd. 2, 3, 4 ordinatur a gratia.
    Article 1. q. 1. — Soon, for ordinatur ad gratiam ("is ordered to grace") not a few codices, as C F K L O R S (T by the first hand) W bb etc., with edd. 2, 3, 4 [read] ordinatur a gratia ("is ordered [away] from grace").
  16. Supra d. XXX. c. 9. et d. XXXII. c. 1. — Postea pro non opponitur codd. C K S falso omnino opponitur, cod. O omnino non opponitur, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 nunquam opponitur.
    Above d. XXX. c. 9. and d. XXXII. c. 1. — Afterward, for non opponitur the codd. C K S wrongly [read] omnino opponitur, cod. O omnino non opponitur, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 nunquam opponitur.
  17. Hugo a S. Vict., Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 14: Quanto quis magis diligit iniustitiam, tanto magis privatur iustitia, non amittendo iustitiam, quam non habet, sed habilitatem recuperandi eam, quae utique bonum est.
    Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 14: The more one loves injustice, the more he is deprived of justice — not by losing justice, which he does not have, but the aptitude for recovering it, which is assuredly a good.
  18. Cod. cc et ed. 1 subiiciunt Deum. Mox Vat. verbo offendere praemittit magis.
    Cod. cc and ed. 1 subjoin Deum ("God"). Soon the Vatican [edition] prefixes magis ("more") to the word offendere.
  19. Vat. addit culpa.
    The Vatican [edition] adds culpa ("guilt").
  20. Id est, quae aliquoties replicata mensurat totum.
    That is, [a part] which, repeated several times, measures the whole.
  21. De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 32. Cfr. supra pag. 638, nota 3. — Aliquanto inferius pro quantumcumque codd. F K et ed. 1 quodcumque.
    On the Divine Names c. 4. § 32. Cfr. above p. 638, note 3. — Somewhat lower, for quantumcumque the codd. F K and ed. 1 [read] quodcumque.
  22. Serm. 151. (alias 45. de Tempore) c. 5. n. 3. et l. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 25. n. 28. (quae duo testimonia a Magistro in littera allata sunt supra d. XXX. c. 9. et d. XXXII. 49. seq. c. 1.). Cfr. etiam VI. Contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 16. n.
    Sermon 151. (otherwise 45. de Tempore) c. 5. n. 3. and the book On Marriage and Concupiscence c. 25. n. 28. (which two testimonies were adduced by the Master in the text above d. XXX. c. 9. and d. XXXII. 49. and following c. 1.). Cfr. also VI. Against Julian the Pelagian c. 16. n.
  23. Edd. praeter 1 cum non paucis codd. in eo, cod. cc et ed. 1: et hoc, quia in ea.
    The editions except the first, with not a few codices, [read] in eo; cod. cc and ed. 1: et hoc, quia in ea.
  24. Vide supra d. 7. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
    See above, d. 7, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
← Dist. 35, Art. 2, Q. 2Dist. 35, Dubia→