Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus

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Articulus I. De bonitate, quam opera ab intentione recipiunt.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de bonitate operum quantum ad qualitatem, utrum videlicet qualitas operum qualitati intentionis generaliter correspondeat.

Secundo quaeritur quantum ad quantitatem, videlicet utrum quantum quisque intendit, tantum faciat.

Tertio quaeritur quantum ad necessitatem, utrum scilicet bona intentio absque operibus ad salutem sufficiat.

Quaestio I. Utrum qualitas operum semper respondeat qualitati intentionis.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum qualitas operum semper respondeat qualitati intentionis; et hoc est quaerere, utrum omne opus, quod fit bona intentione, sit bonum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Ambrosii, quam Magister adducit in littera¹: « Affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit »: si ergo denominatio operis est a qualitate, et intentio sive affectus opus denominat; videtur etiam, quod informet qualitate sua.

2. Item, arbor bona, quae operatur, secundum quod bona, facit semper fructum bonum; sed voluntas, quae est arbor, cum bona intentione operatur, operatur secundum quod bona: ergo videtur, quod faciat opus bonum².

3. Item, actus non est meritorius nec demeritorius, nisi quia voluntarius; et voluntas nec est bona nec est mala nisi ex intentione, sicut supra³ ostensum est: si ergo bonitas voluntatis facit bonitatem in opere, et bonitas intentionis facit bonitatem in voluntate: ergo a primo, qualitas operis causatur a qualitate intentionis.

4. Item, potentius est bonum respectu boni, quam malum respectu mali; sed qualecumque sit opus et quantumcumque sit bonum, depravari potest per malam intentionem: ergo multo fortius qualecumque sit opus et quantumcumque malum, rectificari potest ex bona intentione. Et potest huius argumenti illatio confirmari quasi a minori et a simili et per consequentiam in ipso⁵, « quia si oppositum est causa oppositi, et propositum⁴ propositi ».

5. Item, esto quod aliquis faciat opus malum bono fine, ita quod malitia sit in opere, et bonitas in intentione; aut intentio permanet bona, opere existente malo; aut intentio fit mala ex opere malo; aut intentio facit opus bonum. Si primo modo: ergo simul et semel merebitur quis et demerebitur, quod est impossibile. Si secundo modo; sed contra: opus est effectus intentionis; sed effectus non influit in causam, sed potius e converso⁶: ergo potius intentio communicat suam proprietatem operi, quam opus intentioni: ergo si intentio est bona, necesse est, opus esse bonum, quod ex ipsa procedit.

6. Item, quantumcumque opus de se sit malum; si tamen fiat ab eo qui operatur omnino praeter intentionem, sicut ab eo qui omnino caret usu rationis, non est aliquo modo culpabile⁷: ergo si privatio intentionis opus quantumcumque de se malum potest privare malitia et facere, quod non sit malum malitia moris; pari ratione videtur, quod rectificatio intentionis opus quantumcumque de se malum potest facere bonum et rectum.

Sed contra: 1. Hugo de sancto Victore⁸: « Amor transformat amantem in amatum »; hoc autem non dicitur e converso: ergo qualiscumque sit intentio, si voluntas velit malum, necesse est, eam effici malam: ergo non videtur, quod qualitas operis correspondeat qualitati intentionis.

2. Item, Philosophus⁹ dicit, quod « aliqua sunt quae mox nominata coniuncta sunt malo », et talia dicunt theologi esse mala secundum se: si igitur in talibus actibus inseparabiliter adhaeret malitia, videtur, quod huiusmodi actus non possint fieri boni ex intentione nostra.

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3. Item, aliquid est malum, quod est contra Dei mandatum; sed intentio nostra non potest divinum mandatum infringere: ergo non potest facere, quod homo faciendo contra Dei mandatum non peccet: igitur quantumcumque bonum intendat, si contra Dei mandatum faciat, non erit bonum, sed malum: ergo non est generaliter verum, quod qualitas operis a qualitate intentionis causetur.

4. Item, bonum absolutum¹⁰ praesupponit bonum¹¹ ex circumstantia; nihil enim est simpliciter et absolute bonum, nisi vestiatur debitis conditionibus et circumstantiis. Sed aliqua sunt opera, quae semper dicunt carentiam debitae circumstantiae, sicut interficere innocentem, aut dicere falsum scienter, et consimilia: ergo videtur, quod quantumcumque aliquis talia bona intentione faciat, non erunt simpliciter bona: ergo non videtur, quod qualitas operis semper respondeat qualitati intentionis.

Conclusio

Qualitas operum semper respondet qualitati intentionis, dummodo intentio bona accipitur non tantum respectu ipsius finis intenti, sed etiam respectu boni ordinis mediorum ad finem; sola autem intenti bonitas non sufficit, ut opus reddat bonum, sicut malitia reddit malum.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc ab antiquo duplex fuit opinio, sicut Magister in littera explicat.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod generaliter verum est, quod opera bona vel mala pensantur ex intentione. Alii vero dixerunt, quod opera non pensantur generaliter bona vel mala, sed solum illa quae indifferentia sunt ad hoc, quod fiant bene vel male. Illa autem opera, quae sunt mala secundum se, ex intentione pensari non possunt, quia, quacumque intentione fiant, semper mala sunt.

Quaelibet autem harum opinionum verum dicit, si recte intelligatur. Intentionis enim qualitas dupliciter potest accipi, secundum quod intentio dupliciter¹² dicitur. Uno enim modo intentio dicit voluntatem finis; alio vero modo non tantum dicit voluntatem finis, sed etiam ordinationem eius quod est ad finem ad ipsum finem, quem appetit. Et secundum hoc dupliciter potest dici intentio bona vel mala. — Uno modo dicitur intentio bona, in qua est perfecta et bona ordinatio operis ad finem intentum; et econtra dicitur mala, in qua est ordinatio indirecta¹³. Et hoc modo bonitas intentionis non tantummodo respicit bonitatem finis, sed etiam rectum ordinem eius quod est ad finem ad ipsum finem. Haec enim duo necessario requiruntur ad hoc, quod oculus sit simplex, sicut dicit Bernardus ad Eugenium¹⁴, videlicet, quod « veritas sit in electione, et caritas in intentione ». Et hoc est dicere, quod tunc est oculus mentis simplex sive intentio bona, quando hoc amat finaliter, quod est amandum, et eligit quod est eligendum. Et hoc modo qualitas operis semper respondet qualitati intentionis nec habet instantiam, immo si oculus est simplex, totum corpus est luminosum¹⁵; et si oculus est tenebrosus, hoc est intentio mala, et opus iudicatur malum.

Alio modo dicitur intentio bona, quia illud quod finaliter intendit, est bonum, et mala, quia illud quod finaliter intendit, est malum. Et hoc modo non est generaliter verum, quod qualitas operis causetur a qualitate intentionis; et hoc dico quantum ad qualitatem, quae est bonitas. Si quis enim mentitur, utpote ad liberationem innocentis, vel furatur, ut pascat pauperem, non dicitur bene facere, sicut dicit Augustinus¹⁶, et etiam Apostolus: Non sunt facienda mala, ut eveniant bona. — Quantum autem ad qualitatem malitiae, non habet instantiam; immo necessario malitia operis correspondet intentioni male intendenti. Qualecumque enim sit opus, dum faciat illud homo mala intentione, Deus, qui scrutatur corda¹⁷, malum reputat. Cum enim ad bonitatem operis necessario requiratur intentio boni finis, sola illa desistente, opus iudicatur esse malum; non tamen, illa sola assistente, iudicatur esse bonum, quia plura exiguntur ad construendum quam ad destruendum.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, et etiam ad obiecta pro magna parte. Nam obiecta, quae probant, quod veritas¹⁹ operis non correspondet bonitati intentionis, loquuntur de bonitate intentionis, prout respicit ipsum finem; et sic verum concludunt, quia ad hoc, quod opus sit bonum, non sufficit, quod homo intendat bonum, sed etiam exigitur, quod recta via tendat ad bonum. — Argumenta vero ad oppositum pro magna parte procedunt alia via, videlicet prout intentio dicitur esse bona, non solum quia intentum est bonum, sed etiam quia ordinatio est bona.

Ad 1, 2, 3. Et sic intelligitur auctoritas Ambrosii, qua dicitur: « Affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit », et ratio secunda et tertia. Nam voluntas non dicitur esse bona in se nec etiam bona arbor ex bonitate intentionis, nisi secundum quod intentio dicitur esse bona, quia bono modo ad bonum finem tendit.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mala intentio sufficit ad faciendum opus malum; dicendum, quod non sequitur ex hoc, quod similiter intentio boni sufficiat ad bonum. « Facilius¹⁸ enim est destruere quam construere ». Et quia bonum attenditur secundum constitutionem ex concursu multarum circumstantiarum, malum vero attenditur ex cuiuscumque privatione; hinc est, quod « malum est omnifariam, et bonum uno modo »; et ideo non sequitur, quod si defectus alicuius rei sufficit ad faciendum malum, quod positio eius sufficit ad faciendum bonum; plura enim exiguntur ad bonum; nec est ibi locus a simili nec a minori. Rursus, quia malum est privatio boni, in talibus non tenet consequentia in ipso, sed potius consequentia e contrario.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intentio potius debet influere in opus, quam e converso; dicendum, quod opus non facit intentionem malam aliquid influendo, sed potius deficiendo. Quia enim opus de se inordinatum est, et intentio non potest illud ordinare; hinc est, quod dum illi operi se applicat, se ipsam deordinat.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod privatio intentionis privat malitiam ab actu; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod privatio intentionis dicitur privare malitiam ab actu, non quia aliquid intentionis conferat ipsi actui, sed potius, quia trahit actum illum extra genus moris; quia non est opus morale, nisi quod fit ex intentione. Et ideo consimilis est modus arguendi in ista ratione et in praecedenti, qua arguebatur ex comparatione mali ad bonum. Non enim valet: sufficit ad destruendum: ergo sufficit ad ponendum.

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Scholion

I. Quaestio est de bonitate, quam intentio vel bona voluntas communicare possit operibus sive actibus exterioribus. De bonitate, quam voluntas ipsa habet ex fine, cfr. supra d. 38. a. I. q. I. — Duae opiniones, quas S. Bonav. ex Magistro hic refert, apta distinctione conciliantur. Nam manifestum est, quod si intentio sumitur pro motu voluntatis ordinantis opus in finem, ille motus non potest esse bonus, « nisi ordo sit rectus, nec ordo rectus, nisi extrema convenienter ordinentur » (Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1.). Alex. Hal., 96. m. 3. a. I. § 2. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 3. 4. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. I. II. q. 19. a. 7, q. 20. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 138. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

II. De seq. (2.) quaestione pauci distincte disputant, scilicet S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 19. a. 8; B. Albert., loc. cit. m. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2.

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English Translation

Article I. On the goodness which works receive from intention.

Concerning the first there are three questions.

First, it is asked concerning the goodness of works with respect to quality, namely whether the quality of works generally corresponds to the quality of intention.

Second, it is asked with respect to quantity, namely whether a man does as much as he intends.

Third, it is asked with respect to necessity, namely whether a good intention without works suffices for salvation.

Question I. Whether the quality of works always corresponds to the quality of intention.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the quality of works always corresponds to the quality of intention; and this is to ask whether every work that is done with a good intention is good. And that it is so, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Ambrose, which the Master adduces in the text¹: « Your affection imposes a name on your work »: if therefore the denomination of the work is from its quality, and the intention or affection denominates the work; it seems also that it informs it with its own quality.

2. Likewise, a good tree, which operates insofar as it is good, always makes good fruit; but the will, which is the tree, when it operates with a good intention, operates insofar as it is good: therefore it seems that it makes a good work².

3. Likewise, an act is neither meritorious nor demeritorious except because it is voluntary; and the will is neither good nor evil except from intention, as was shown above³: if therefore the goodness of the will makes goodness in the work, and the goodness of intention makes goodness in the will: therefore from the first, the quality of the work is caused by the quality of intention.

4. Likewise, the good is more powerful with respect to the good than the evil with respect to the evil; but however a work may be and however good it is, it can be depraved by an evil intention: therefore much more strongly, however a work may be and however evil it is, it can be rectified by a good intention. And the inference of this argument can be confirmed as it were from the lesser and from the like and by consequence in itself⁵, « because if the opposite is the cause of the opposite, so too is the thing proposed of what is proposed⁴ ».

5. Likewise, suppose that someone does an evil work with a good end, such that the malice is in the work and the goodness in the intention; either the intention remains good while the work is evil; or the intention becomes evil from the evil work; or the intention makes the work good. If in the first way: then a man will at one and the same time merit and demerit, which is impossible. If in the second way; but on the contrary: the work is the effect of the intention; but the effect does not flow back into the cause, but rather the reverse⁶: therefore the intention rather communicates its own property to the work than the work to the intention: therefore if the intention is good, the work which proceeds from it must be good.

6. Likewise, however much a work is in itself evil; if nevertheless it is done by one who operates wholly apart from intention, as by one who wholly lacks the use of reason, it is in no way culpable⁷: therefore if the privation of intention can deprive a work, however much in itself evil, of malice, and make it not be evil with the malice of conduct; by parity of reasoning it seems that the rectification of intention can make a work, however much in itself evil, good and right.

On the contrary: 1. Hugh of Saint Victor⁸: « Love transforms the lover into the beloved »; but this is not said in reverse: therefore whatever the intention may be, if the will wills evil, it must become evil: therefore it does not seem that the quality of the work corresponds to the quality of intention.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher⁹ says that « there are some things which, the moment they are named, are conjoined with evil », and the theologians say that such things are evil in themselves: if therefore in such acts malice inseparably adheres, it seems that acts of this kind cannot be made good by our intention.

3. Likewise, something is evil which is against God's commandment; but our intention cannot infringe the divine commandment: therefore it cannot make a man, by acting against God's commandment, not sin: therefore however good a thing he intends, if he acts against God's commandment, it will not be good but evil: therefore it is not generally true that the quality of the work is caused by the quality of intention.

4. Likewise, the absolute good¹⁰ presupposes the good¹¹ from circumstance; for nothing is simply and absolutely good unless it is clothed with the due conditions and circumstances. But there are some works which always bespeak the lack of a due circumstance, such as killing the innocent, or knowingly speaking falsehood, and the like: therefore it seems that however much someone does such things with a good intention, they will not be simply good: therefore it does not seem that the quality of the work always corresponds to the quality of intention.

Conclusio

The quality of works always corresponds to the quality of intention, provided the good intention is taken not only with respect to the end intended itself, but also with respect to the good ordering of the means to the end; but the goodness of the thing intended alone does not suffice to render the work good, as malice renders it evil.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that concerning this there was from of old a twofold opinion, as the Master explains in the text.

For some said that it is generally true that works are weighed as good or evil from intention. But others said that works are not generally weighed as good or evil, but only those which are indifferent as to whether they are done well or ill. But those works which are evil in themselves cannot be weighed from intention, because, with whatever intention they are done, they are always evil.

But each of these opinions speaks truly, if it is rightly understood. For the quality of intention can be taken in two ways, according as intention is twofold¹². For in one way intention bespeaks the will of the end; in another way it bespeaks not only the will of the end, but also the ordering of that which is toward the end to the end itself, which it desires. And according to this, intention can be called good or evil in two ways. — In one way an intention is called good, in which there is a perfect and good ordering of the work to the end intended; and on the contrary it is called evil, in which there is an indirect ordering¹³. And in this way the goodness of intention regards not only the goodness of the end, but also the right ordering of that which is toward the end to the end itself. For these two are necessarily required for the eye to be simple, as Bernard says to Eugene¹⁴, namely, that « truth be in the choice, and charity in the intention ». And this is to say that the eye of the mind is then simple, or the intention good, when it loves finally what is to be loved, and chooses what is to be chosen. And in this way the quality of the work always corresponds to the quality of intention and admits no instance against it; rather, if the eye is simple, the whole body is luminous¹⁵; and if the eye is dark, this is the evil intention, and the work is judged evil.

In another way an intention is called good because that which it finally intends is good, and evil because that which it finally intends is evil. And in this way it is not generally true that the quality of the work is caused by the quality of intention; and this I say with respect to the quality which is goodness. For if someone lies, for instance to free an innocent man, or steals to feed the poor, he is not said to do well, as Augustine says¹⁶, and also the Apostle: Evil things are not to be done, that good things may come about. — But with respect to the quality of malice, there is no instance against it; rather, the malice of the work necessarily corresponds to one intending evilly. For whatever the work may be, while a man does it with an evil intention, God, who searches hearts¹⁷, reckons it evil. For since the intention of a good end is necessarily required for the goodness of the work, when that alone is wanting, the work is judged to be evil; yet not, when that alone is present, is it judged to be good, because more is required for building up than for tearing down.

From these things appears the response to the proposed question, and also to the objections for the most part. For the objections which prove that the truth¹⁹ of the work does not correspond to the goodness of intention speak of the goodness of intention insofar as it regards the end itself; and thus they conclude truly, because for the work to be good, it does not suffice that a man intend the good, but it is also required that he tend toward the good by the right way. — But the arguments to the contrary for the most part proceed by another way, namely insofar as intention is said to be good not only because the thing intended is good, but also because the ordering is good.

To 1, 2, 3. And thus is understood the authority of Ambrose, by which it is said: « Your affection imposes a name on your work », and the second and third reasons. For the will is not said to be good in itself, nor a good tree, from the goodness of intention, except insofar as the intention is said to be good, because in a good manner it tends toward a good end.

To 4. To that which is objected, that an evil intention suffices to make a work evil; it must be said that it does not follow from this that likewise the intention of the good suffices for the good. « For it is easier to destroy than to build¹⁸ ». And because the good is attended to according to its constitution from the concurrence of many circumstances, while evil is attended to from any privation whatever; hence it is that « evil is in every way, and good in one way »; and therefore it does not follow that if the defect of some thing suffices to make evil, that the positing of it suffices to make good; for more is required for the good; nor is there place there for the like nor for the lesser. Again, since evil is the privation of good, in such cases the consequence does not hold in itself, but rather the consequence from the contrary.

To 5. To that which is objected, that the intention ought rather to influence the work than the reverse; it must be said that the work does not make the intention evil by influencing anything, but rather by being deficient. For because the work is in itself disordered, and the intention cannot order it; hence it is that, while it applies itself to that work, it disorders itself.

To 6. To that which is objected, that the privation of intention removes malice from the act; it must be said that it is not alike, in that the privation of intention is said to remove malice from the act not because it confers anything of intention upon the act itself, but rather because it draws that act outside the genus of conduct; because there is no moral work except what is done from intention. And therefore the manner of arguing is alike in this reason and in the preceding, in which it was argued from the comparison of evil to good. For it does not hold: it suffices to destroy: therefore it suffices to posit.

Scholion

I. The question is of the goodness which intention or a good will can communicate to works or external acts. Of the goodness which the will itself has from the end, cf. above d. 38, a. I, q. I. — The two opinions which St. Bonaventure reports here from the Master are reconciled by an apt distinction. For it is manifest that if intention is taken for the motion of the will ordering the work to the end, that motion cannot be good, « unless the order is right, nor the order right, unless the extremes are suitably ordered » (Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1). Alexander of Hales, 96, m. 3, a. I, § 2. — Scotus, here q. unica, n. 3, 4. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; S. I-II, q. 19, a. 7, q. 20, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, S. p. II, tr. 22, q. 138, m. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. — Richard of Middleton, here a. I, q. I. — Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. I. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

II. On the following (2nd) question few dispute distinctly, namely St. Thomas, S. I-II, q. 19, a. 8; Bl. Albert, loc. cit., m. 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2; Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

Hic, circa initium. — In ipso Ambros. testimonio plures codd. cum edd. omittunt tuus. Paulo inferius post est a qualitate cod. V supplet intentionis. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate generaliter dicit: « Qualitatem vero dico, secundum quam quales quidam esse dicuntur ». Et post pauca: Qualia vero sunt, quae secundum has [qualitates] denominative dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ab his.
Here, near the beginning. — In the testimony of Ambrose itself many codices with the editions omit tuus. A little below, after est a qualitate, codex V supplies intentionis. Aristotle, in the Categories, in the chapter on Quality, says generally: « By quality I mean that according to which certain things are said to be of such a kind ». And shortly after: Things of such a kind are those which are denominatively named according to these [qualities], or in any other way derived from them.
Hoc arg. insinuatur in lit. Magistri, circa initium. Exemplum de arbore bona respicit illud Matth. 7, 18: Sic omnis arbor bona fructus bonos facit etc.
This argument is intimated in the Master's text, near the beginning. The example of the good tree regards that of Matthew 7:18: So every good tree makes good fruits, etc.
Dist. 38. a. 1, q. I. — De maiori vide supra pag. 892, nota 2. — Versus finem arg. Vat. post a primo addit ad ultimum.
Distinction 38, a. 1, q. I. — On the major see above p. 892, note 2. — Toward the end of the argument the Vatican edition, after a primo, adds ad ultimum.
Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 18: Quis enim audeat dicere, plus valere iniustitiam ad alligandum in servitute hominem in prima suasione sibi consentientem, quam valeret iustitia ad confirmandum eum in libertate, sibi in eadem prima tentatione adhaerentem? Cfr. supra pag. 684, nota 2, ubi verba Dionysii de hac re invenies.
Anselm, Cur Deus homo I, c. 18: For who would dare to say that injustice avails more for binding into servitude a man consenting to it at the first persuasion, than justice would avail for confirming in liberty one cleaving to it at the same first temptation? Cf. above p. 684, note 2, where you will find the words of Dionysius on this matter.
Verba Aristot. vide supra pag. 763, nota 2. — De primo ex modis argumentandi hic propositis vide tom. 1. pag. 835, nota 5; de secundo supra pag. 781, nota 1; de tertio tom. 1. pag. 822, nota 1, ubi etiam quid sit consequentia e contrario exponitur, quae dictio in solut. huius obiectionis occurrit.
For the words of Aristotle see above p. 763, note 2. — On the first of the modes of arguing here proposed see vol. 1, p. 835, note 5; on the second above p. 781, note 1; on the third vol. 1, p. 822, note 1, where it is also explained what the consequence from the contrary is, which expression occurs in the solution of this objection.
Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 27. seqq. (c. 3.) et V. Metaph. text. 2. seq. (IV. c. 2.). — Aliquanto superius pro fit mala ex opere malo cod. H fit mala, opere existente malo.
Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 27 ff. (c. 3) and Metaphysics V, text 2 f. (IV, c. 2). — Somewhat above, for becomes evil from the evil work codex H reads becomes evil while the work exists as evil.
Vide supra pag. 325, nota 6. — In fine arg. cod. B verbo potest addit de se.
See above p. 325, note 6. — At the end of the argument codex B adds to the word potest the words de se.
Ipsa eius verba habentur supra pag. 1, nota 8.
His very words are found above on p. 1, note 8.
Libr. II. Ethic. c. 6. Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 32, nota 6. — In fine arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 pro nostra exhibent bona.
Book II of the Ethics, c. 6. Cf. vol. 1, p. 32, note 6. — At the end of the argument codex cc and edition 1, for nostra, read bona.
Sive integrum. — Cfr. de hoc arg. hic lit. Magistri, circa medium.
Or whole. — Cf. on this argument the Master's text here, near the middle.
Codd. L O bene supplent ex intentione.
Codices L and O well supply from intention.
De hac duplici vi vocis intentionis vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXVIII. c. 4. — Pro voluntatem finis Vat. bis exhibet bonitatem finis, et dein cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et aliquibus codd. omittit ad ipsum finem.
On this twofold force of the word intention see above the Master's text, d. XXXVIII, c. 4. — For the will of the end the Vatican edition twice reads the goodness of the end, and then with editions 2, 3, 4 and some codices omits to the end itself.
Id est non directa, ut August., Enarrat. in Ps. 67. n. 10, ubi distinguit cor directum, et non directum.
That is, not direct, as Augustine, Enarration on Psalm 67, n. 10, where he distinguishes the heart that is direct and the one that is not direct.
Sicut iam supra pag. 891, nota 4. diximus, haec Bernardi verba habentur in eius libro de Praecepto et dispens. c. 14. n. 36. — Paulo superius post quod est Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt ad finem. Paulo inferius pro quando hoc cod. Y substituit quando homo.
As we have already said above on p. 891, note 4, these words of Bernard are found in his book On Precept and Dispensation, c. 14, n. 36. — A little above, after which is, the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 omit to the end. A little below, for when this codex Y substitutes when a man.
Matth. 6, 22. 23: Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit. Si autem oculus tuus fuerit nequam, totum corpus tuum tenebrosum erit.
Matthew 6:22–23: If your eye is simple, your whole body will be bright. But if your eye is wicked, your whole body will be dark.
Eius orationem videsis hic in lit. Magistri, circa medium. — Verba Apostoli habentur Rom. 3, 8: Et non... faciamus mala, ut veniant bona. Infra cod. bb male intendentis pro male intendenti.
You may see his statement here in the Master's text, near the middle. — The words of the Apostle are found in Romans 3:8: And let us not... do evil, that good may come. Below, codex bb reads of one intending evilly for to one intending evilly.
Rom. 8, 27.
Romans 8:27.
Cfr. supra pag. 155, nota 9. et d. 38. a. I. q. I. in corp.
Cf. above p. 155, note 9, and d. 38, a. I, q. I, in the body.
Codd. F I L Y bonitas, Vat. qualitas, quae et immediate post pro bonitati substituit qualitati.
Codices F, I, L, Y read goodness, the Vatican edition quality, which also immediately after substitutes to the quality for to the goodness. ---

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