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Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus
p. 922

Quaestio II. Utrum quantum quis intendit, tantum faciat.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum quantum quis intendit12, tantum faciat, ut sicut opus ab intentione recipit aliquo modo qualitatem, ita etiam recipiat quantitatem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud Matthaei duodecimo6: Bonus homo de bono thesauro etc.; Glossa: «Quantum bonum intendis, tantum facis».

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione3. Omne agens per intentionem praefigit sibi finem, ad quem opus suum mensurat7: ergo si omne opus morale est ab agente per intentionem, omnis operis moralis mensuratio attenditur in comparatione eius ad finem. Sed comparatio ad finem est intentio4: ergo quantitas omnis operis moralis penes intentionem attenditur5.

3. Item, secundum quantitatem caritatis attenditur meritum exterioris operis, et secundum magnitudinem libidinis attenditur magnitudo exterioris peccati. Si ergo caritas, ut dicit Bernardus8, respicit intentionem, et similiter libido, quae dicit quietationem in bono creato; ergo videtur, quod quantitas omnis operis moralis secundum intentionem mensuretur9.

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4. Item, si aliquod opus de natura sui generis est veniale peccatum, nihilominus ille qui facit illud, mortaliter peccat, si intendit peccare mortaliter; hoc autem non esset, nisi opus reciperet quantitatem in genere moris ab intentione: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Si «quantum quis intendit, tantum facit»: ergo si Linus sive aliquis alius parvus sanctus intenderet mereri gloriam Petri, mereretur gloriam Petri, et si amplius intenderet, amplius mereretur: ergo habenti minorem caritatem redderetur maius praemium, quod est plane falsum.

2. Item, si «quantum quis intendit, tantum facit»: ergo si aliquis adulterans intendit peccare venialiter, peccat venialiter: si igitur hoc est plane falsum, manifestum est, quod quantitas operis non causatur ex quantitate intentionis.

3. Item, quanto aliquis est humilior, tanto minus boni credit se facere; sed intentio sequitur credulitatem, quia «fides dirigit intentionem»: ergo quanto quis humilior est, tanto minus bonum intendit facere. Si ergo bonitas operis mensuraretur penes quantitatem intentionis, videtur, quod quanto quis esset humilior, tanto opus eius esset minus bonum; sed hoc est plane falsum: ergo etc.

4. Item, unus simplex, cum facit parvum peccatum, credit esse gravissimum peccatum; alius impius et iniquus, cum facit maximum peccatum, credit10 valde parum peccare: si ergo opus mensuratur penes intentionem, videtur, quod iniquus et malitiosus minus peccet in enormi genere peccati, quam unus simplex in genere peccati quantumcumque levi. Si igitur hoc est plane falsum, ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, videlicet quod quantitas operis correspondeat quantitati intentionis.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Quantitas bonitatis et malitiae in opere correspondet quantitati bonitatis et malitiae in intentione, sed in bonis tunc solummodo, si quantitas intentionis attenditur respectu actus intendendi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut in praecedenti problemate duplex distinguitur qualitas intentionis, sic et in hoc intelligendum est, quod quantitas intentionis dupliciter potest intelligi, videlicet aut ratione actus intendendi, aut ratione ipsius intenti. Et secundum hoc distinguitur ista locutio dupliciter: «quantum intendis, tantum facis», quia tantum et quantum possunt esse nomina, vel adverbia11. Si tantum et quantum sint adverbia, tunc dicunt quantitatem actus intendendi; et tunc est locutio vera generaliter, sive respectu bonorum, sive respectu malorum; quia quantum actus intendendi est intensus in bonitate et malitia, tantum operatio exterior est bona vel mala. Omne enim meritum et demeritum ad actum voluntatis reducitur, licet circumstantiae exteriores aliquo modo faciant ad maiorem voluntatis depravationem. — Si autem tantum et quantum sint nomina, tunc dicunt quantitatem ex parte intenti; et sic non est generaliter verus ille sermo, quia opus exterius factum non semper commensuratur ei quod intentio intendit. Frequenter enim intendit homo facere magnum bonum, et facit parvum, quia modicam habet caritatem. Habet tamen aliquo modo veritatem in malis, videlicet intendendo, licet non diminuendo, et prout tantum et quantum dicunt quandam comparationem proportionalitatis12, non commensurationem aequalitatis. Unde qui intendit multum peccare, multum peccat, qualecumque opus faciat; non tamen qui intendit parum peccare parum peccat, maxime si opus facit, quod multum habet de deformitate.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Concedo enim, quod quantitas bonitatis et

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malitiae in opere correspondet13 quantitati bonitatis et malitiae in intentione, secundum quod quantitas intentionis attenditur quantum ad actum intendendi, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt. Concedo etiam nihilominus, quod quantitas operis non semper correspondet quantitati intentionis, secundum quod quantitas intentionis attenditur ex parte intenti14, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur.

Ad argumenta: Ad 3, 4. Ad alias tamen duas rationes, quae ultimo inducuntur, responderi potest, quod non cogunt, pro eo quod non est idem dicere de aliquo, quod credit facere magnum, vel parvum bonum sive malum, et15 quod intendit. Aliud enim est aestimatio, aliud est intentio; et quamvis opus sequatur aestimationem, non tamen sequitur intentionem. Praeterea, illae duae rationes, sicut et aliae, procedunt de quantitate intentionis a parte intenti. Quamvis enim humilis homo parum intendat facere, nihilominus tamen magnae bonitatis est eius intentio, dum ex magna virtute movetur ad illud faciendum. Similiter, cum iniquus homo intendit modicum malum facere, tamen, quia ex magna libidine facit, multum seu valde prava est eius intentio, dum nimium adhaeret bono creato; et ideo non sequitur, quod minus peccet ille qui est magis malitiosus.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether one does as much as one intends.

Secondly it is asked whether one does as much as one intends12, so that just as a work receives in some way its quality from the intention, so too it might receive its quantity. And that it is so seems to be the case.

1. Upon that text of Matthew, chapter twelve6: A good man out of a good treasure etc.; the Gloss: «As much good as you intend, that much you do».

2. Likewise, this seems so by reason3. Every agent acting through intention sets before itself an end, to which it measures its work7: therefore if every moral work proceeds from the agent through intention, the measurement of every moral work is regarded in its comparison to the end. But comparison to the end is intention4: therefore the quantity of every moral work is regarded according to the intention5.

3. Likewise, the merit of an exterior work is regarded according to the quantity of charity, and the magnitude of an exterior sin is regarded according to the magnitude of concupiscence. If therefore charity, as Bernard says8, regards the intention, and likewise concupiscence, which means a coming-to-rest in a created good; therefore it seems that the quantity of every moral work is measured according to the intention9.

4. Likewise, if some work is of the nature of its kind a venial sin, nonetheless the one who does it sins mortally, if he intends to sin mortally; but this would not be, unless the work received its quantity in the genus of morals from the intention: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. If «one does as much as one intends»: therefore if Linus or some other minor saint were to intend to merit the glory of Peter, he would merit the glory of Peter, and if he intended more, he would merit more: therefore to one having less charity a greater reward would be rendered, which is plainly false.

2. Likewise, if «one does as much as one intends»: therefore if someone committing adultery intends to sin venially, he sins venially: if therefore this is plainly false, it is manifest that the quantity of the work is not caused by the quantity of the intention.

3. Likewise, the more humble someone is, the less good he believes himself to do; but intention follows belief, since «faith directs the intention»: therefore the more humble one is, the less good he intends to do. If therefore the goodness of a work were measured according to the quantity of the intention, it seems that the more humble someone were, the less good his work would be; but this is plainly false: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a simple man, when he does a small sin, believes it to be a most grave sin; another, impious and wicked, when he does the greatest sin, believes10 himself to sin very little: if therefore a work is measured according to the intention, it seems that the wicked and malicious man would sin less in an enormous kind of sin than a simple man in a kind of sin however slight. If therefore this is plainly false, then so too is that from which it follows, namely that the quantity of the work corresponds to the quantity of the intention.

Conclusion

Conclusion. The quantity of goodness and malice in the work corresponds to the quantity of goodness and malice in the intention, but in good works only then, if the quantity of the intention is regarded with respect to the act of intending.

I respond: It must be said that, just as in the preceding problem a twofold quality of intention is distinguished, so too here it must be understood that the quantity of the intention can be understood in two ways, namely either by reason of the act of intending, or by reason of the thing intended itself. And according to this, that locution is distinguished in two ways: «as much as you intend, that much you do», because that-much and as-much can be nouns, or adverbs11. If that-much and as-much are adverbs, then they signify the quantity of the act of intending; and then the locution is true generally, whether with respect to good works or with respect to evil ones; because as much as the act of intending is intense in goodness and in malice, that much the exterior operation is good or evil. For all merit and demerit is reduced to the act of the will, although exterior circumstances in some way contribute to a greater depravation of the will. — But if that-much and as-much are nouns, then they signify the quantity on the part of the thing intended; and thus that statement is not generally true, because the exterior work done is not always commensurate with that which the intention intends. For frequently a man intends to do a great good, and does a small one, because he has little charity. It has nonetheless in some way truth in evils, namely by way of intending, though not by way of lessening, and insofar as that-much and as-much signify a certain comparison of proportionality12, not a commensuration of equality. Hence whoever intends to sin much, sins much, whatever work he may do; but not so one who intends to sin little — he does not sin little, especially if he does a work which has much of deformity.

From these things the response to the question proposed is clear. For I concede that the quantity of goodness and

malice in the work corresponds13 to the quantity of goodness and malice in the intention, according as the quantity of the intention is regarded as to the act of intending, as the reasons adduced for the first part show. I concede also nonetheless that the quantity of the work does not always correspond to the quantity of the intention, according as the quantity of the intention is regarded on the part of the thing intended14, as the reasons show which are adduced for the second part.

To the arguments: To 3, 4. To the other two reasons, however, which are adduced last, it can be replied that they are not compelling, for the reason that it is not the same thing to say of someone that he believes himself to do a great or a small good or evil, and15 what he intends. For estimation is one thing, intention another; and although the work follows the estimation, it does not however follow the intention. Moreover, those two reasons, like the others, proceed from the quantity of the intention on the part of the thing intended. For although a humble man intends to do little, nonetheless his intention is of great goodness, since he is moved to do it out of great virtue. Likewise, when a wicked man intends to do a modest evil, yet, because he does it out of great concupiscence, his intention is much, that is, very depraved, since he clings too much to a created good; and therefore it does not follow that the one who is more malicious sins less.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. X Z cc et ed. 1 intendat.
    Codices X Z cc and edition 1 read intendat (subjunctive).
  2. Edd., excepta 1, intendit. Pro ad bonum finem cod. H ad ultimum finem.
    The editions, except 1, read intendit. For ad bonum finem (to a good end) codex H reads ad ultimum finem (to a final end).
  3. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 3. (c. 1.). — De altero Aristot. testimonio, in quo pro omnifariam edd., excepta 1, et nonnulli codd. legunt omnifarie et cod. bb substituit multifarie, vide supra pag. 655, nota 3. — Paulo superius pro intentio boni Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 intentio bona, et mox pro secundum constitutionem codd. bb cc et ed. 1 secundum constructionem.
    Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 3 (c. 1). — Concerning the other testimony of Aristotle, in which for omnifariam the editions, except 1, and several codices read omnifarie and codex bb substitutes multifarie, see above p. 655, note 3. — A little above, for intentio boni the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads intentio bona, and shortly after, for secundum constitutionem codices bb cc and edition 1 read secundum constructionem.
  4. Non pauci codd., ut B D E K P Q T bb ee etc., cum edd. 2, 3, 4 potentia; perperam. In fine arg. edd., excepta 1, et pauci codd. falso commutarunt se ipsam in se ipsum.
    Not a few codices, as B D E K P Q T bb ee etc., with editions 2, 3, 4 read potentia; wrongly. At the end of the argument the editions, except 1, and a few codices falsely changed se ipsam into se ipsum.
  5. Cod. cc et ed. 1 subiiciunt ipsa privatio, cod. V pro intentionis substituit intentio.
    Codex cc and edition 1 add ipsa privatio, codex V for intentionis substitutes intentio.
  6. Vers. 35. — Glossa est interlinearis et habetur apud Lyranum; recurrit infra in argg. 1. et 2. ad oppos.
    Verse 35. — The Gloss is interlinear and is found in Lyra; it recurs below in arguments 1 and 2 ad oppositum.
  7. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 29. et 49. (c. 3. et 5.); V. Metaph. text. 2. (IV. c. 2.).
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, texts 29 and 49 (c. 3 and 5); Metaphysics V, text 2 (IV, c. 2).
  8. Ipsa Bernardi verba vide supra pag. 891, nota 4. De definitione libidinis cfr. supra pag. 734, nota 9. — De maiori vide supra d. 29. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. et verba Bedae, supra pag. 906, nota 6. allata.
    For Bernard's own words see above p. 891, note 4. On the definition of concupiscence cf. above p. 734, note 9. — On the major premiss see above d. 29, a. 3, q. 2, in the body, and the words of Bede adduced above p. 906, note 6.
  9. Ut dicit Magister infra in lit. d. XLI. c. 1. Cfr. ibid. dub. 1. — Post pauca pro mensuraretur in Vat. et edd. 3, 4 exhibetur mensuratur, in codd. Y bb mensuretur.
    As the Master says below in the text, d. 41, c. 1. Cf. ibid. dubium 1. — A little after, for mensuraretur the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 give mensuratur, in codices Y bb mensuretur.
  10. Vat. et edd. 3, 4 subiungunt se.
    The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add se.
  11. Secundum B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 41. a. 3, etiam Antissiodorensis hac distinctione usus est ad solvendam quaestionem, de qua hic agitur. Ait enim Albertus loc. cit.: Antissiodorensis distinguit hic dicendo... possunt sumi nominaliter et adverbialiter. Si nominaliter, tunc sunt in activo casu, et est sensus: quantam rem intendis, tantam facis; et tunc in bonis non tenet, quia bonum causatur ex una tota et sola causa et non a sola intentione; in malis autem comparatione habita ad peius, tenet ex parte reatus, licet non teneat ex parte conversionis ad bonum commutabile...: sed descendendo respectu minus mali non tenet, quia non sequitur, si intendis fornicando peccare venialiter, quod pecces venialiter. Si autem sumitur adverbialiter, tunc possunt notare intentionem in genere et similitudinem, vel in specie in aequalitate. Primo modo vera est: quantum intendis, tantum facis, i. e. si multum, multum; si secundo modo, falsa est, quia non ad aequalitatem intentionis semper commensuratur opus. — Paulo superius pro locutio dupliciter multi codd. et ed. 1 locutio duplex.
    According to B. Albert, II Sent. d. 41, a. 3, William of Auxerre too used this distinction for solving the question here treated. For Albert says, loc. cit.: William of Auxerre distinguishes here, saying... they can be taken as nouns and as adverbs. If as nouns, then they are in the active case, and the sense is: whatever thing you intend, that thing you do; and then it does not hold in good works, because the good is caused by one whole and sole cause and not by intention alone; but in evils, comparison being made to the worse, it holds on the side of guilt, although it does not hold on the side of conversion to a changeable good...: but descending with respect to the lesser evil it does not hold, because it does not follow, if you intend in fornicating to sin venially, that you sin venially. But if it is taken as an adverb, then they can denote the intention in genus and likeness, or in species in equality. In the first way it is true: as much as you intend, that much you do, i.e. if much, much; if in the second way, it is false, because the work is not always commensurate to the equality of the intention. — A little above, for locutio dupliciter many codices and edition 1 read locutio duplex.
  12. Edd., excepta 1, proportionis. Subinde post non Vat. inserit tamen.
    The editions, except 1, read proportionis. Then after non the Vatican edition inserts tamen.
  13. Codd. bb cc et ed. 1 correspondeant, ceterae edd. correspondeat.
    Codices bb cc and edition 1 read correspondeant, the other editions correspondeat.
  14. In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 deest et. Circa finem solut. Vat. omisit verba multum seu.
    In the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 et is lacking. Near the end of the solution the Vatican edition omitted the words multum seu.
  15. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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