Bonaventure

Quaestio III. Utrum intentio absque bonis operibus sufficiat ad merendum vitam aeternam.

Tertio quaeritur de bonitate operum quantum ad necessitatem, utrum videlicet intentio absque bonis operibus sufficiat ad merendum vitam aeternam.

Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Bernardus de Libero Arbitrio¹: « Intentio sufficit ad meritum, bona actio requiritur ad exemplum »: ergo videtur, quod quantum ad meritum vitae aeternae non sit necessaria bonitas actionis exterioris.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi: Dixi, confitebor; Glossa²: « Votum pro operatione iudicatur »: ergo tantum valet bene velle, quantum velle et operari: ergo etc.

3. Item, Gregorius in quadam Homilia³: « Non est vacua manus a munere, cum arca cordis repleta fuerit bona voluntate »: ergo plenitudo intentionis et voluntatis aequivalet plenitudini operationis: igitur sine illa potest sufficere ad salutem.

4. Item, mereri vitam aeternam est in potestate nostra; sed opera exteriora non sunt in potestate nostra: ergo videtur, quod opera exteriora non sint necessaria ad merendum vitam aeternam: igitur ad meritum vitae aeternae videtur sufficere intentio sola⁴.

5. Item, intentio et voluntas non pendent ex opere⁵: ergo opere non existente, potest esse bonitas tam in voluntate quam in intentione; sed qui habet bonam voluntatem et intentionem est iustus, et omnis talis habet quod sufficit ei ad vitam aeternam: igitur ad meritum vitae aeternae videtur intentio sufficere absque exteriori operatione.

Sed contra: 1. Matthaei vigesimo quinto⁶: Esurivi, et non dedistis mihi manducare; ita Dominus dicet reprobis, et propter hoc feret sententiam damnationis contra eos: si ergo propter defectum bonorum operum quis damnatur, exercitium bonorum operum est ad salutem necessarium: ergo intentio sine operibus non sufficit ad meritum.

2. Item, in Canonicae Iacobi secundo⁷: Fides sine operibus mortua est; sed non est efficacior ad merendum intentio quam fides: ergo si fides non sufficit ad meritum sine operibus, pari ratione nec intentio.

3. Item, Gregorius in quadam Homilia⁸: « Amor Dei nunquam est otiosus; operatur enim magna, si est; si autem operari negligit, amor non est »: ergo si opera non adsunt, non adest veritas amoris. Sed nihil est meritorium vitae aeternae absque vero amore caritatis: ergo circumscriptis operibus, intentio non sufficit ad meritum.

4. Item, Philosophus⁹ dicit, quod ad virtutem p. 925 tria requiruntur, videlicet « scire et velle et impermutabiliter operari »: ergo si non est operatio, non est salva virtutis ratio. Sed ubi non salvatur virtutis ratio, nec poterit salvari sufficientia meriti: ergo videtur, quod absque operatione vitam aeternam non condigne sufficienter meremur.

5. Item, si sola intentio vel voluntas interior sufficeret ad meritum; sed habenti gratiam facillimum est velle bonum: ergo facillimum esset mereri vitam aeternam; cuius contrarium dicit Dominus Matthaei septimo¹⁰, cum dicit, quod arcta est via, quae ducit ad vitam.

Conclusio.

Ad meritum vitae aeternae in eo qui habet facultatem bene operandi, non sufficit bonitas intentionis absque bonitate operis exterioris.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum intentio et voluntas interior sufficit ad meritum absque opere exteriori; distinguendum est. Aut enim ille qui habet intentionem, habet facultatem bene operandi, aut non. Si non habet facultatem; cum nemo obligetur ad impossibile, si bonam habet voluntatem et directam intentionem, tunc sola plenitudo voluntatis internae sufficit ei ad meritum vitae aeternae absque exteriori operatione¹¹. Si autem adsit facultas, et se offert opportunitas; intentio non potest ad meritum sufficere absque opere.

Ratio autem huius est divini mandati obligatio et virtutis perfectio et voluntatis plenitudo. Divini mandati obligatio facit, ut intentio sine operibus non sufficiat, cum se offert opportunitas et facultas. Mandata enim Dei non solum obligant ad volendum, sed etiam ad faciendum; et ideo qui non implet divina mandata, cum possit, potius meretur iram, quam mereatur gloriam¹². — Virtutis etiam perfectio est ratio, quare non sufficit sola intentio, quoniam « virtus est ultimum potentiae¹³ », et ideo elevat potentiam ad aliquod magnum et arduum. Potentiae autem animae non habent suam utilitatem sive perfectionem completam, nisi exeant in opera sibi debita, quando adest facultas et opportunitas. Et ideo illa intentio, qua quis vult et intendit bonum, et tamen non facit, cum possit, non est intentio virtuosa, ac per hoc nec meritoria. — Voluntatis etiam plenitudo ratio est, quare non sufficit sola intentio: quoniam plena voluntas ponit effectum, si adsit facultas; alioquin non dicitur homo plene aliquid velle, si non facit, cum possit facere; sed semiplene et pigre vult, sicut piger, qui vult et non vult¹⁴. Et propterea dicit Gregorius, quod « nemo debet sibi blandiri de bona voluntate, immo de dilectione Conditoris lingua, mens et manus debet requiri », et, sicut hortatur nos beatus Ioannes primae Canonicae tertio, diligere debemus non solum verbo et lingua, sed opere et veritate. — Quoniam igitur, cum adest facultas et se offert opportunitas, absque operibus exterioribus¹⁵ nec est mandatorum Dei impletio, nec virtutis perfectio, nec voluntatis plenitudo; et absque his non est sufficientia meriti: hinc est, quod ad meritum vitae aeternae non sufficit bonitas intentionis absque bonitate operis exterioris. Et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt¹⁶.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Bernardo, quod bona intentio sufficit ad meritum; dicendum, quod loquitur de intentione illorum operum, quae non sunt in praecepto, non ratione aliorum¹⁷, quae in praecepto sunt. — Vel dicendum, quod loquitur in eo casu, quando scilicet non adest facultas bene operandi exterius.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas pro facto reputatur; dicendum, quod verum est, quando non se offert bene operandi opportunitas et facultas.

3. Ad illud vero Gregorii, quod non est vacua manus a munere etc.; dicendum, quod facienda est vis in hoc quod dicit: « cum arca cordis repleta fuerit bona voluntate »; nunquam enim, sicut dictum est prius, plene bonam voluntatem habet qui potest facere bonum illud, cuius habet voluntatem, et ad fructum non pervenit¹⁸.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod opera non sunt in potestate nostra; dicendum, quod hoc solum concludit, quod in eo casu sufficit intentio, quando deest facultas ad perficiendum operationem bonam¹⁹. p. 926 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bona voluntas non pendet ex opere; dicendum, quod verum est; attamen, cum adest facultas, plena voluntas necessario ponit bonum opus, ita quod, si bonum opus non ponitur, aut nunquam voluntas fuit plena, aut desinit esse plena. Quod ergo sine operibus non sufficiat, hoc non est, quia plenitudo bonae voluntatis ex operibus pendeat, sed quia bona voluntas, si plena est, necessario in bona opera redundat, offerente se facultate et opportunitate.

Question III. Whether intention without good works suffices to merit eternal life.

Thirdly inquiry is made about the goodness of works as to necessity, namely whether intention without good works suffices to merit eternal life.

And that it does so, seems [the case].

1. Bernard, On Free Choice¹: "Intention suffices for merit, a good action is required for example": therefore it seems that, as regards the merit of eternal life, the goodness of the exterior action is not necessary.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm: I said, I will confess; the Gloss²: "The vow is judged in place of the work": therefore to will well is worth as much as to will and to work: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Gregory in a certain Homily³: "The hand is not empty of a gift, when the ark of the heart has been filled with good will": therefore the fullness of intention and of will is equivalent to the fullness of operation: therefore without that [operation] it can suffice for salvation.

4. Likewise, to merit eternal life is in our power; but exterior works are not in our power: therefore it seems that exterior works are not necessary for meriting eternal life: therefore for the merit of eternal life intention alone seems to suffice⁴.

5. Likewise, intention and will do not depend on the work⁵: therefore, the work not existing, there can be goodness both in the will and in the intention; but he who has a good will and intention is just, and every such person has what suffices him for eternal life: therefore for the merit of eternal life intention seems to suffice without exterior operation.

On the contrary: 1. Matthew, chapter twenty-five⁶: I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat; thus the Lord will say to the reprobate, and on account of this he will bring the sentence of damnation against them: if therefore a person is damned on account of the lack of good works, the exercise of good works is necessary for salvation: therefore intention without works does not suffice for merit.

2. Likewise, in the Canonical [Epistle] of James, chapter two⁷: Faith without works is dead; but intention is not more efficacious for meriting than faith: therefore if faith does not suffice for merit without works, by parity of reasoning neither does intention.

3. Likewise, Gregory in a certain Homily⁸: "The love of God is never idle; for it works great things, if it is present; but if it neglects to work, love is not present": therefore if works are not present, the truth of love is not present. But nothing is meritorious of eternal life without the true love of charity: therefore, works being removed, intention does not suffice for merit.

4. Likewise, the Philosopher⁹ says that for virtue three things are required, namely "to know and to will and to work unchangeably": therefore if there is no operation, the account of virtue is not preserved. But where the account of virtue is not preserved, neither will the sufficiency of merit be able to be preserved: therefore it seems that without operation we do not condignly and sufficiently merit eternal life.

5. Likewise, if intention alone or the interior will were to suffice for merit; but for one having grace it is most easy to will the good: therefore it would be most easy to merit eternal life; the contrary of which the Lord says in Matthew, chapter seven¹⁰, when he says that narrow is the way that leads to life.

Conclusion.

For the merit of eternal life in him who has the faculty of acting well, the goodness of intention does not suffice without the goodness of the exterior work.

I respond: It must be said that, when it is asked whether intention and the interior will suffice for merit without the exterior work, a distinction must be made. For either he who has the intention has the faculty of acting well, or not. If he does not have the faculty: since no one is obligated to the impossible, if he has a good will and a direct intention, then the fullness of the internal will alone suffices him for the merit of eternal life without exterior operation¹¹. But if the faculty be present, and the opportunity offers itself, intention cannot suffice for merit without the work.

Now the reason for this is the obligation of the divine command, and the perfection of virtue, and the fullness of the will. The obligation of the divine command brings it about that intention without works does not suffice, when the opportunity and faculty offer themselves. For the commands of God oblige not only to willing, but also to doing; and therefore he who does not fulfill the divine commands, when he can, rather merits wrath than merits glory¹². — The perfection of virtue too is the reason why intention alone does not suffice, since "virtue is the utmost of a power¹³," and therefore it elevates the power to something great and arduous. But the powers of the soul do not have their utility or complete perfection unless they go forth into the works due to them, when the faculty and opportunity are present. And therefore that intention, by which one wills and intends the good, and yet does not do it, though he can, is not a virtuous intention, and through this not meritorious either. — The fullness of the will too is the reason why intention alone does not suffice: since a full will posits the effect, if the faculty be present; otherwise a man is not said to will something fully, if he does not do it, though he can do it; but he wills half-fully and lazily, like the sluggard, who wills and wills not¹⁴. And therefore Gregory says that "no one ought to flatter himself about a good will; rather, for the love of the Creator, tongue, mind, and hand must be required," and, as blessed John exhorts us in the first Canonical [Epistle], chapter three, we ought to love not only in word and tongue, but in deed and in truth. — Since therefore, when the faculty is present and the opportunity offers itself, without exterior works¹⁵ there is neither the fulfillment of God's commands, nor the perfection of virtue, nor the fullness of the will; and without these there is no sufficiency of merit: hence it is that for the merit of eternal life the goodness of intention does not suffice without the goodness of the exterior work. And the reasons which show this are to be conceded¹⁶.

To the arguments for the affirmative part:

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, from Bernard, that good intention suffices for merit; it must be said that he speaks of the intention of those works which are not under precept, not by reason of the others¹⁷ which are under precept. — Or it must be said that he speaks in that case when, namely, the faculty of acting well exteriorly is not present.

2. To that which is objected, that the will is reckoned for the deed; it must be said that this is true when the opportunity and faculty of acting well do not offer themselves.

3. But to that [text] of Gregory, that the hand is not empty of a gift etc.; it must be said that force is to be made on this, that he says: "when the ark of the heart has been filled with good will"; for never, as was said before, does he fully have a good will who can do that good of which he has the will, and does not arrive at the fruit¹⁸.

4. To that which is objected, that works are not in our power; it must be said that this concludes only that, in that case, intention suffices when the faculty for completing the good operation is lacking¹⁹.

5. To that which is objected, that a good will does not depend on the work; it must be said that it is true; nevertheless, when the faculty is present, a full will necessarily posits the good work, so that, if the good work is not posited, either the will was never full, or it ceases to be full. Therefore that it does not suffice without works—this is not because the fullness of the good will depends on works, but because a good will, if it is full, necessarily overflows into good works, the faculty and opportunity offering themselves.