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Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus
p. 926

Articulus II. De bonitate, quam opera superaddunt bonitati intentionis.

Consequenter quaeritur quantum ad secundum principale de bonitate, quam opera superaddunt bonitati intentionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum aliquid addant opera bonitatis vel meriti supra bonam intentionem ratione praerogativae dignitatis. Secundo quaeritur, utrum addant ratione quantitatis ex parte dati. Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliquid addant ratione numerositatis.

Quaestio I. Utrum opera exteriora aliquid addant supra bonam intentionem.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum opera exteriora aliquid addant supra bonam intentionem ratione suae excellentiae et dignitatis, sicut sunt opera privilegiata. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud ad Ephesios primo1: Quae sit supereminens magnitudo; Glossa: « Quoddam incrementum gloriae habebunt summi doctores ultra id quod communiter habebunt alii »; hoc autem non est nisi ratione doctrinae, quam aliis communicant: ergo etc.

2. Item, communiter in Ecclesia magis solemnizantur Martyres quam Confessores; sed constans est, quod Ecclesia Sanctis exhibuit honorem secundum meritorum suorum exigentiam: ergo maiori gloria digni sunt, qui mortem pro Christo perferunt2, quam illi qui pati solum volunt.

3. Item, Christus nobis aliquid meruit per passionem, quod ante non meruerat nobis, utpote apertionem ianuae et multorum charismatum diffusionem: si ergo caritas Christi fuit eminentissima ab instanti conceptionis et maioris fuit efficaciae cum passione quam sine; videtur ergo, quod in quolibet alio excellentia operis exterioris addat ad meritum bonae voluntatis sive intentionis.

4. Item, bonum additum bono facit magis bonum3; sed opus privilegiatum est bonum: ergo additum intentioni facit eam magis bonam. Sed quod addit ad bonitatem addit ad meritum: ergo etc.

5. Item, si opera privilegiata nihil adderent supra bonitatem intentionis, ergo qui ea faceret frustra laboraret: si ergo impium est dicere, quod qui facit opera excellentia frustra laborat; videtur, quod opus excellens addat super intentionis bonitatem.

Sed contra: 1. De beato Martino cantat Ecclesia4: « O beata anima, quam etsi gladius persecutoris non abstulit, palmam tamen martyrii non amisit »: ergo ita videtur, quod beatus Martinus habuit palmam martyrii per bonitatem intentionis, sicut si sustinuisset acerbitatem passionis; ergo non videtur, quod opus excellens aliquid addat supra bonitatem intentionis.

p. 927 2. Item, operans non placet propter operationem, sed magis operatio propter operantem, quantumcumque operatio illa sit nobilis5: ergo quantumcumque Deus approbat operantem, tantum approbat operationem: ergo non videtur, quod homo maioris praemii efficiatur apud Deum dignus propter operationem excellentem, superadditam bonitati voluntatis.

3. Item, si aliquis sustineret mortem pro mundo, potius demereretur apud Deum, quam aliquid mereretur: ergo sustinentia mortis pro Christo, si quomodo placet Deo, hoc non est ob aliud, nisi quia ordinatur ad Christum; sed illa ordinatio est mediante intentione: ergo tota bonitas operationis, quantumcumque excellentis, ex intentione habet ortum et propter illam Deo placet. Sed ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum6: igitur tantundem placet intentio perfecta et bona cum opere, quantum placet sine opere.

4. Item, si aliqua opera faciunt ad meritum, illa sunt maxime opera humilitatis et vilitatis — haec enim opera Deus maxime commendat7 — sed opera privilegiata sunt opera cuiusdam excellentiae et dignitatis: ergo videtur, quod minime inter omnia genera operum addant ad bonae intentionis meritum.

5. Item, ubi facultas deest, voluntas reputatur pro facto, sicut determinatum est supra; et hoc non est ob aliud, nisi quia alias non esset plena et perfecta voluntas: si igitur voluntas per se sola pro opere reputatur, videtur, quod in tali casu opus privilegiatum nihil addat super intentionis bonitatem et meritum.

Conclusio

Opus exterius privilegiatum ratione dignitatis suae aliquid addit supra bonitatem intentionis, licet non addat omni modo additionis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod maius bonum potest aliquid dici dupliciter: aut intensive, utpote quia plus Deo placet; aut extensive, utpote quia pluribus prodest. Et secundum hoc dupliciter potest intelligi, quod opus privilegiatum addat ad bonitatem intentionis: aut quantum ad proximorum aedificationem, aut quantum ad Dei approbationem. Et primo modo attenditur augmentum quantum ad exemplum, secundo modo quantum ad meritum8.

Si igitur loquamur de additione quantum ad exemplum; sic absque dubio opus privilegiatum addit ad bonitatem intentionis, quia bonitas intentionis non lucet exterius nisi per ostensionem bonorum operum, et maxime privilegiatorum9. — Si autem loquamur secundo modo, scilicet quantum ad additionem, quae attenditur quantum ad meritum; sic distinguendum est, quod est loqui de merito respectu praemii substantialis, et respectu praemii accidentalis. Respectu praemii accidentalis opus privilegiatum addit supra bonam intentionem et voluntatem, quia praemium accidentale, quod est aureola, non debetur voluntati secundum se, sed voluntati in opere10. Si autem loquamur de merito respectu praemii substantialis, adhuc oportet subdistinguere, quia est meritum congrui, et est meritum condigni. Quantum ad meritum congrui, absque dubio opus privilegiatum addit supra bonitatem intentionis, pro eo quod voluntas in illo opere praeparatur et disponitur ad susceptionem maioris gratiae, per quam digna est maiori retributione. Si autem loquamur de merito condigni; sic absque dubio non addit, pro eo quod quantitas meriti condigni pensatur ex quantitate radicis; et tantum11 placet Deo quis, qui habet voluntatem plenam et non potest habere opus, quantum ille qui habet voluntatem et opus, quantum ad essentialis praemii retributionem, si sunt in aequali caritate. — Et sic patet, quod opus privilegiatum ratione dignitatis suae aliquid addit supra bonitatem intentionis, licet non addat omni modo additionis12. Ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur.

Ad obiecta: Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de beato Martino, quod palmam martyrii non amisit; dicendum, quod ibi palma martyrii non accipitur pro praemio accidentali, quod est aureola, sed pro praemio substantiali, quod est aurea. Utrumque enim est martyrii palma; sed unum, scilicet aurea, respondet martyrio, quia sustinetur ex caritate; alterum vero, scilicet aureola, respondet ei, quia est specialis privilegii et praerogativae13.

p. 928 Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod operatio14 placet propter operantem; dicendum, quod verum est; attamen, dum operans bene utitur dono, per quod placet Deo, hoc ipso disponit se ad maius et aliquo dignus est, quo quidem non esset, si non ita bene uteretur. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si operatio placet Deo propter operantem, quod non magis placeat operans propter operationem quam sine; nihil enim impedit de duobus bonis, quorum unum habet bonitatem ab altero, quin ambo melius valeant, quam valeat alterum illorum per se.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mori pro mundo displicet Deo; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod tota bonitas operis privilegiati veniat ex intentione, sed quod non potest esse opus perfecte bonum absque intentione. Nihilominus tamen opera privilegiata aliquam bonitatem de natura sui habent, quae, iuncta cum bonitate intentionis, aliquam excellentiam tribuunt bene operanti, quam non tribuerent alia genera operum. Et ideo illud verbum, quo dicitur, quod ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum, non habet hic locum. Hoc enim intelligitur, quando illud, propter quod alterum participat aliquam proprietatem, est tota ratio illius participationis. Non sic autem est in proposito, ut visum est.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod opera privilegiata sunt opera excellentia, et ideo minus debent facere ad meritum; dicendum, quod opus excellens dupliciter potest dici: aut secundum vanam aestimationem, sicut aliquis reputat excellentiam vindicare se de adversariis et praedominari aliis; aut secundum veritatis dictamen; et sic sustinere ignominiosissimum genus mortis pro Christo est opus magnae excellentiae; et tale opus excellentiae non condividitur contra opus humilitatis, immo simul cum illa stat et necessario eam requirit tanquam sociam; et dum habeat in se difficultatem et dignitatem, et caritatem praeambulam et humilitatem annexam, non est mirum, si disponit ad maiorem gloriam15.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas reputatur pro facto, ubi facultas deest; dicendum, quod illud est verum quantum ad sufficientiam ad salutem et quantum ad praemium substantiale, quia nemo amittit regnum caelorum ex hoc, quod non facit quod facere non potest; non autem est verum quantum ad praemii excellentiam sive quantum ad praemium accidentale. Et hoc modo praedictum est, quod opus privilegiatum addit supra intentionis bonitatem16.

Scholion

I. Eadem quaestio, quae hic tractatur quoad opera bona, fit infra d. 42. a. 1. q. 2. quoad opera mala. In hoc autem articulo s. Doctor tria in operibus externis distinguit, scilicet operum dignitatem, dati quantitatem et operum numerositatem, et tribus distinctis quaestionibus inquirit, utrum et quid addant bonitati intentionis sive voluntatis. Tres huius articuli quaestiones et quaestionem distinctionis 42. S. Thom. (hic a. 3; S. I. II. q. 20. a. 4.) unica quaestione comprehendit, quae est: « utrum actus exterior aliquid addat de bonitate, vel malitia supra actum interiorem ». De hac autem re est in scholis controversia, quae ut intelligatur, quaedam praenotanda sunt. 1. Quaestio agitur de actu exteriore, qui secundum se sive secundum materiam vel circumstantias bonitatem vel malitiam habet, et a S. Bonav. praecipue de opere privilegiato. 2. Actus exterior et interior sub diverso respectu sibi invicem communicant suam propriam bonitatem. Si enim actus interior ordinatur ad exteriorem ut eius obiectum, tunc actus interior ab exteriore, ut intentus et volitus est (non autem ut exercitus) sumit bonitatem vel malitiam obiectivam et specificam; exterior autem, ut est exercitus, ab interiore sumit rationem tum libertatis tum moralitatis. 3. Omnes concedunt, quod per accidens actus externus plerumque addat ad moralitatem actus interioris, vel ratione aedificationis sive scandali, vel quia intensive augeat bonitatem vel malitiam voluntatis. Supposita eadem voluntatis intensione, remanet quaestio de extensiva additione, sive utrum actus externus in eodem operante habeat aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam, distinctam a bonitate vel malitia interioris actus, ita ut, utraque iuncta, actus extensive maiorem exhibeat bonitatem vel malitiam. 4. Ad hoc affirmative respondet Scotus cum suis, et prorsus negative Nominales. Etiam S. Thom. (hic a. 3.) docet: « Loquendo igitur de illa bonitate, quam voluntas actui exteriori praebet, actus exterior nihil bonitatis addit, dummodo voluntas aeque intensa sit » (cfr. S. I. II. q. 20. a. 4. et 3.). Tamen ibid. duo addit; primo dicit: « Si autem loquamur de bonitate actus, quam actus exterior secundum se habet, sic actus exterior complet interiorem in bonitate vel malitia, sicut terminus motus complet motum ». Et concludit: « Ideo actus exterior nihil adiungit ad praemium essentiale » etc. Secundo addit: « Ad praemium autem accidentale ordinatur per bonitatem, quae est ipsius actus exterioris secundum se; et ideo actus exterior adiungit aliquid ad praemium accidentale ». — S. Bonav. ab hac Angelici doctrina vix discedit, licet (hic ad 3. et infra d. 42. q. 2.) asserat, quod opus exterius aliquo modo addat interiori in ratione bonitatis et malitiae. Nam quoad praemium accidentale S. Thomas disertis verbis ipsi consentit; nec putamus, eundem dissentire quoad dispositionem, quam (secundum S. Bonaventuram) opus privilegiatum respectu praemii substantialis ex congruo habere potest. Cfr. etiam alia quaest. infra d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. — In modo loquendi cum S. Bonav. conveniunt Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., et, ut dicit Dionys. Carth., etiam Guliel. Antissiodorensis.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. et a. 1. § 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, d. 42. q. unica, et Quodl. 18. a. 3. — S. Thom., locc. citt. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 138. m. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2, d. 42. q. 1. a. 1. dub. lat. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 42. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

III. Solutio duarum sequentium quaestionum ex praedictis principiis facile intelligitur. Notandum tantum, quod in 3. quaestione respectu plurium operum praescinditur a merito interioris actus caritate informati, qui sane augmentum et ipsius gratiae habitualis et praemii substantialis importat, ut ipse s. Doctor in corp. dicit: « Maior caritas vel melior voluntas facit ad profectum meriti ». De his quaestionibus non invenimus explicite tractantes nisi Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 2. § 2; Petr. a Tar. hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. 2. et Dionys. Carth., loc. cit.; de 2. q. tantum Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2.

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English Translation

Article II. On the goodness which works superadd to the goodness of the intention.

Next there is inquiry, with respect to the second principal point, concerning the goodness which works superadd to the goodness of the intention. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether works add anything of goodness or of merit beyond a good intention by reason of the prerogative of dignity. Second it is asked whether they add by reason of quantity on the part of the gift. Third it is asked whether they add anything by reason of multiplicity.

Question I. Whether exterior works add anything beyond a good intention.

As to the first, the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether exterior works add anything beyond a good intention by reason of their own excellence and dignity, as are privileged works. And that they do, it seems.

1. Upon that text to the Ephesians, in the first chapter1: What is the surpassing magnitude; the Gloss: « A certain increment of glory the highest doctors will have, beyond what the others will have in common »; but this is only by reason of the doctrine which they communicate to others: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, in the Church the Martyrs are commonly solemnized more than the Confessors; but it is settled that the Church has shown honor to the Saints according to the requirement of their merits: therefore they are worthy of greater glory who endure death for Christ2 than those who only will to suffer.

3. Likewise, Christ merited for us something by His passion which He had not before merited for us, namely the opening of the gate and the diffusion of many graces: if therefore the charity of Christ was most eminent from the instant of His conception and was of greater efficacy with the passion than without it; it seems therefore that in any other case the excellence of the exterior work adds to the merit of the good will or intention.

4. Likewise, good added to good makes more good3; but a privileged work is good: therefore, added to the intention, it makes it more good. But what adds to goodness adds to merit: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, if privileged works added nothing beyond the goodness of the intention, then he who did them would labor in vain: if therefore it is impious to say that one who does excellent works labors in vain; it seems that an excellent work adds beyond the goodness of the intention.

On the contrary: 1. Concerning blessed Martin the Church sings4: « O blessed soul, whom, even though the sword of the persecutor did not take away, yet the palm of martyrdom did not lose »: therefore it thus seems that blessed Martin had the palm of martyrdom through the goodness of his intention, just as if he had endured the bitterness of the passion; therefore it does not seem that an excellent work adds anything beyond the goodness of the intention.

2. Likewise, the one acting does not please by reason of the action, but rather the action pleases by reason of the one acting, however noble that action may be5: therefore, however much God approves the one acting, so much does He approve the action: therefore it does not seem that a man is made worthy of greater reward before God on account of an excellent operation superadded to the goodness of the will.

3. Likewise, if someone were to undergo death for the world, he would rather earn disfavor before God than merit anything: therefore the undergoing of death for Christ, if it pleases God in any way, this is for no other reason than that it is ordered to Christ; but that ordering is by means of the intention: therefore the whole goodness of the operation, however excellent, takes its rise from the intention and pleases God on account of it. But where one thing is on account of another, in both there is only as much as in the one6: therefore a perfect and good intention with the work pleases just as much as it pleases without the work.

4. Likewise, if any works contribute to merit, they are especially the works of humility and lowliness — for these works God especially commends7 — but privileged works are works of a certain excellence and dignity: therefore it seems that, least of all among all the kinds of works, do they add to the merit of a good intention.

5. Likewise, where the capacity is lacking, the will is reckoned for the deed, as was determined above; and this is for no other reason than that otherwise the will would not be full and perfect: if therefore the will by itself alone is reckoned for the work, it seems that in such a case a privileged work adds nothing beyond the goodness and merit of the intention.

Conclusion

A privileged exterior work, by reason of its dignity, adds something beyond the goodness of the intention, although it does not add in every mode of addition.

I respond: It must be said that a greater good can be so called in two ways: either intensively, namely because it pleases God more; or extensively, namely because it profits more persons. And according to this, in two ways it can be understood that a privileged work adds to the goodness of the intention: either as to the edification of one's neighbors, or as to God's approval. And in the first way the increase is considered as to example, in the second way as to merit8.

If therefore we speak of the addition as to example; thus without doubt a privileged work adds to the goodness of the intention, because the goodness of the intention does not shine outwardly except through the showing forth of good works, and especially of privileged ones9. — But if we speak in the second way, namely as to the addition which is considered as to merit; thus a distinction must be made, for it is one thing to speak of merit with respect to substantial reward, and with respect to accidental reward. With respect to accidental reward, a privileged work adds beyond a good intention and will, because accidental reward, which is the aureole, is not owed to the will in itself, but to the will in the work10. But if we speak of merit with respect to substantial reward, it is still necessary to subdistinguish, for there is merit of congruity and there is merit of condignity. As to the merit of congruity, without doubt a privileged work adds beyond the goodness of the intention, for this reason, that the will in that work is prepared and disposed to the reception of greater grace, through which it is worthy of greater retribution. But if we speak of merit with respect to condignity; thus without doubt it does not add, for this reason, that the quantity of condign merit is weighed by the quantity of the root; and he who has a full will and cannot have the work pleases God just as much11 as he who has both the will and the work, as to the retribution of essential reward, if they are in equal charity. — And thus it is clear that a privileged work, by reason of its dignity, adds something beyond the goodness of the intention, although it does not add in every mode of addition12. Therefore the reasons which are adduced for the first part are to be granted.

To the objections: To 1. As to that which is objected concerning blessed Martin, that he did not lose the palm of martyrdom; it must be said that there the palm of martyrdom is not taken for the accidental reward, which is the aureole, but for the substantial reward, which is the golden crown (aurea). For each is a palm of martyrdom; but the one, namely the aurea, corresponds to the martyrdom because it is endured out of charity; the other, namely the aureola, corresponds to it because it is of a special privilege and prerogative13.

To 2. As to that which is objected, that the action pleases by reason of the one acting14; it must be said that it is true; yet, while the one acting uses well the gift through which he pleases God, by this very fact he disposes himself to something greater and is worthy of something of which he would not be worthy if he did not so use it well. And therefore it does not follow that, if the action pleases God by reason of the one acting, the one acting does not please more by reason of the action than without it; for nothing prevents, of two goods, of which one has its goodness from the other, that both should be worth more than either of them is worth by itself.

To 3. As to that which is objected, that to die for the world displeases God; it must be said that it is true; but yet from this it does not follow that the whole goodness of a privileged work comes from the intention, but that there cannot be a perfectly good work without intention. Nevertheless privileged works have a certain goodness of their own nature, which, joined with the goodness of the intention, confers a certain excellence on the one acting well which other kinds of works would not confer. And therefore that saying, by which it is said that where one thing is on account of another, in both there is only as much as in the one, has no place here. For this is understood when that on account of which the other participates in some property is the whole ground of that participation. But it is not so in the case at hand, as has been seen.

To 4. As to that which is objected, that privileged works are excellent works, and therefore ought to contribute less to merit; it must be said that an excellent work can be so called in two ways: either according to vain estimation, as when someone reckons it an excellence to avenge himself on his adversaries and to dominate others; or according to the dictate of truth; and thus to endure the most ignominious kind of death for Christ is a work of great excellence; and such a work of excellence is not set in opposition to a work of humility, but rather stands together with it and necessarily requires it as its companion; and since it has in itself difficulty and dignity, and charity going before and humility joined to it, it is no wonder if it disposes one to greater glory15.

To 5. As to that which is objected, that the will is reckoned for the deed where the capacity is lacking; it must be said that this is true as to sufficiency for salvation and as to substantial reward, because no one loses the kingdom of heaven from this, that he does not do what he cannot do; but it is not true as to the excellence of the reward or as to accidental reward. And in this way it has been said before that a privileged work adds beyond the goodness of the intention16.

Scholion

I. The same question which is here treated with regard to good works is treated below in d. 42, a. 1, q. 2 with regard to evil works. In this article the holy Doctor distinguishes three things in external works, namely the dignity of the works, the quantity of the gift, and the multiplicity of the works, and in three distinct questions inquires whether and what they add to the goodness of the intention or will. The three questions of this article, and the question of distinction 42, St. Thomas (here a. 3; S. I-II, q. 20, a. 4) comprehends in a single question, which is: « whether the exterior act adds anything of goodness or of malice beyond the interior act ». But concerning this matter there is in the schools a controversy, which, that it may be understood, certain things must be premised. 1. The question concerns the exterior act which in itself, or according to its matter or circumstances, has goodness or malice, and is treated by St. Bonaventure especially concerning the privileged work. 2. The exterior and interior act, under different respects, communicate to each other their own proper goodness. For if the interior act is ordered to the exterior as to its object, then the interior act takes from the exterior, as it is intended and willed (but not as it is exercised), objective and specific goodness or malice; but the exterior, as it is exercised, takes from the interior the character both of liberty and of morality. 3. All concede that per accidens the external act for the most part adds to the morality of the interior act, either by reason of edification or scandal, or because it intensively increases the goodness or malice of the will. The same intensity of will being supposed, the question remains concerning extensive addition, that is, whether the external act in the same one acting has any goodness or malice distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior act, such that, the two being joined, the act extensively exhibits a greater goodness or malice. 4. To this Scotus with his followers responds affirmatively, and the Nominalists entirely negatively. St. Thomas too (here a. 3) teaches: « Speaking therefore of that goodness which the will gives to the exterior act, the exterior act adds nothing of goodness, provided the will is equally intense » (cf. S. I-II, q. 20, a. 4 and 3). Yet in the same place he adds two things; first he says: « But if we speak of the goodness of the act which the exterior act has of itself, thus the exterior act completes the interior in goodness or malice, as the term of a motion completes the motion ». And he concludes: « Therefore the exterior act adds nothing to essential reward », etc. Secondly he adds: « But to accidental reward it is ordered by the goodness which is of the exterior act itself; and therefore the exterior act adds something to accidental reward ». — St. Bonaventure scarcely departs from this Angelic doctrine, although (here, in reply 3, and below d. 42, q. 2) he asserts that the exterior work in some way adds to the interior in respect of goodness and malice. For as to accidental reward St. Thomas in express words agrees with him; nor do we think that he dissents as to the disposition which (according to St. Bonaventure) a privileged work can have congruously with respect to substantial reward. Cf. also the other question below, d. 42, a. 1, q. 1. — In manner of speaking with St. Bonaventure agree Alexander of Hales, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Giles of Rome, and, as Dionysius the Carthusian says, also William of Auxerre.

II. Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 96, m. 3, a. 2, § 1 and a. 1, § 3. — Scotus, in both Scripts, d. 42, q. unica, and Quodl. 18, a. 3. — St. Thomas, places cited. — B. Albert, S. p. II, tr. 22, q. 138, m. 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 4. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2, d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, dub. lat. — Durandus, II Sent., d. 42, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

III. The solution of the two following questions is easily understood from the foregoing principles. It is only to be noted that in the third question, with respect to a multiplicity of works, abstraction is made from the merit of the interior act informed by charity, which indeed brings with it an increase both of habitual grace itself and of substantial reward, as the holy Doctor himself says in the body: « A greater charity or a better will contributes to the advance of merit ». Concerning these questions we have not found anyone treating explicitly except Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. a. 2, § 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 1, 2; and Dionysius the Carthusian, loc. cit.; of the 2nd question only Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 19. — Glossam exhibent Strabus et Lyranus. — Paulo superius post et dignitatis cod. cc et ed. 1 adiiciunt quantum scilicet ad meritum.
    Verse 19. — The Gloss is given by Strabo and Lyranus. — A little above, after and dignity, codex cc and ed. 1 add namely as to merit.
  2. Vat. et ed. 1 patiuntur, et dein eadem Vat. cum codd. 3, 4 omittit solum.
    The Vatican edition and ed. 1 read they suffer, and then the same Vatican edition with codices 3, 4 omits only.
  3. Cfr. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 11.) et III. Topic. c. 3.
    Cf. Aristotle, Topics II, c. 4 (c. 11) and Topics III, c. 3.
  4. Die 11. Novembr. in II. Vesp. ad Magnificat. — Cyprian., de Mortalitate, n. 17. ait: Ita et in Dei servis, apud quos confessio cogitatur et martyrium mente concipitur, animus ad bonum deditus, Deo iudice, coronatur. Aliud est martyrio animum deesse, aliud animo defuisse martyrium.
    On November 11, at the antiphon to the Magnificat in the second Vespers. — Cyprian, On Mortality, n. 17, says: So too in the servants of God, among whom confession is thought of and martyrdom is conceived in the mind, the soul devoted to the good is, God being the judge, crowned. It is one thing for the soul to be lacking to martyrdom, another for martyrdom to have been lacking to the soul.
  5. Cfr. Isai. 29, 13; Matth. 15, 8. Gratian., II. Decret. Caus. 33. q. 3. de Poenit. d. 1. c. 87. ait: Voluntas facit opus remunerabile, non opus voluntatem. — Post nobilis Vat. sic prosequitur: ergo quantumcumque sit nobilis operatio, nisi Deus approbet operantem, non approbat operationem. Pro ergo quantumcumque ed. 3 ergo quantum. In fine arg. cod. V pro voluntatis substituit intentionis.
    Cf. Isaiah 29:13; Matthew 15:8. Gratian, Decretum II, Causa 33, q. 3, de Poenitentia d. 1, c. 87, says: The will makes the work rewardable, not the work the will. — After noble the Vatican edition continues thus: therefore, however noble the operation may be, unless God approves the one acting, He does not approve the operation. For therefore however much ed. 3 reads therefore as much. At the end of the argument codex V substitutes intention for will.
  6. Vide dictum Aristot., supra pag. 639, nota 2. allatum. — Pro tantum unum plurimi codd. cum ed. 2 hic et infra in solut. dumtaxat tantum, omissa voce unum; edd. 1, 3 tantummodo unum, omisso vocabulo tantum. Mox pro tantundem cod. bb tantum.
    See the saying of Aristotle adduced above, p. 639, note 2. — For only as much as in the one very many codices with ed. 2, here and below in the solution, read merely only, omitting the word one; edd. 1, 3 read only the one, omitting the word only. Presently, for just as much codex bb reads only.
  7. Cfr. Ps. 137, 6; Eccli. 3, 21; Iac. 4, 6; I. Petr. 5, 5. — Paulo ante pro maxime opera humilitatis Vat. opera maximae humilitatis.
    Cf. Psalm 137:6; Ecclesiasticus 3:21; James 4:6; 1 Peter 5:5. — A little before, for especially the works of humility the Vatican edition reads the works of the greatest humility.
  8. Art. 1. q. 3.
    Article 1, question 3.
  9. Matth. 5, 16: Sic luceat lux vestra coram hominibus etc. — Paulo inferius pro quod est cod. T quia est.
    Matthew 5:16: So let your light shine before men, etc. — A little below, for which is codex T reads because it is.
  10. Cfr. supra pag. 924, nota 4.
    Cf. above, p. 924, note 4.
  11. Pro tantum codd. CKOS et alii quando, et deinde pro quantum iidem codd. quam (cod. V tantum quantum).
    For as much codices CKOS and others read when, and then for as the same codices read as (codex V reads as much as).
  12. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 24. p. II. dub. 1. et d. 33. a. 2. q. 3. — Alanus ab Insulis, Theolog. Regul., regul. 72, de hac re duplicem affert opinionem. Sunt, ait, qui dicunt hoc generaliter esse verum in genere bonorum, exceptis operibus privilegiatis... Alii vero sine omni exceptione concedunt, hoc esse verum in genere bonorum [scil. sola voluntate tantum mereri, quantum voluntate et opere].
    Cf. IV Sent., d. 24, p. II, dub. 1, and d. 33, a. 2, q. 3. — Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 72, brings forward on this matter a twofold opinion. There are, he says, those who say that this is generally true in the class of good works, with the exception of privileged works... But others without any exception concede that this is true in the class of good works [namely, that by the will alone one merits as much as by will and work].
  13. Vide IV. Sent. d. 33. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4.
    See IV Sent., d. 33, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4.
  14. Cod. O addit vel studium, pro quo codd. C R S (T a prima manu) W ee et alii nec non ed. 2 perperam exhibent ad studium. Circa finem solut. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 unum et deinde alterum mutavit in unus et alter, contextu repugnante. — Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 3. ad 2. et d. 30, a. 2. q. 2. ad 5.
    Codex O adds or zeal, in place of which codices C R S (T in the first hand) W ee and others, as well as ed. 2, wrongly give to zeal. Near the end of the solution the Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 changed one and then the other into one (subject) and another, against the context. — Cf. above, d. 26, q. 3, ad 2, and d. 30, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5.
  15. gloriam cod. M gratiam. Paulo superius pro dum habeat in se in codd. F bb habetur dum habet in se, in Vat. cum in se habeat.
    For glory codex M reads grace. A little above, for since it has in itself, codices F bb have while it has in itself, the Vatican edition since it has in itself (with a different construction).
  16. Cod. A supra intentionem, scilicet bonitatem, codd. V W Z et edd. 2, 3 supra intentionem voluntatis.
    Codex A reads beyond the intention, namely the goodness, codices V W Z and edd. 2, 3 beyond the intention of the will. ---
← Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 2→