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Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus
p. 929

Quaestio II. Utrum bona opera aliquid addant supra intentionem quantum ad quantitatem dati.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum bona opera addant supra bonam intentionem quantum ad quantitatem dati. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Secundae ad Corinthios nono1: Qui parce seminat parce et metet; et qui seminat in benedictionibus de benedictionibus et metet. Si igitur seminatio illa, de qua loquitur Apostolus, est in eleemosynae datione; videtur, quod magnitudo dati faciat ad excellentiam gloriae.

2. Item, Tobiae quarto2: Si multum tibi fuerit, abundanter tribue: si ergo ista exhortatio non est inutilis, videtur, quod abundantia dati faciat ad incrementum meriti.

3. Item, quamvis Deus ex aequali bonitate conferat bona maiora et minora, tamen ille cui maiora contulit, tenetur ad maiorem gratiarum actionem: ergo pari ratione, si ex aequali caritate detur maius munus et minus munus, conveniens est, Deum pro maiori munere maiorem reddere retributionem.

4. Item, si non magis meretur qui plus tribuit, quam ille qui minus, ergo non plus meretur qui relinquit omnia pro Deo et dat pauperibus3 quam ille qui dat unum solidum: igitur omnes sunt stulti qui sequuntur divinum consilium. Quodsi impium est dicere, divinum consilium esse indiscretum; videtur, quod quantitas dati faciat ad amplificandum meritum.

Sed contra: 1. Marci duodecimo4: Amen dico vobis: quoniam haec plus omnibus misit in gazophylacium; loquitur de vidua: ergo si Christus plus appretiabatur datum illius viduae, quod fuit valde parvum, sicut in textu innuitur, quam magna dona aliorum; videtur, quod Deus appretietur opera solum secundum quantitatem bonae intentionis, et nullo modo secundum quantitatem muneris exterioris.

2. Item, Glossa super illum locum5: « Non offerentium substantiam considerat Deus, sed conscientiam; nec perpendit, quantum offeras, sed ex quanto »: si ergo merita tantum valent, quantum Deus illa ponderat; videtur, quod quantitas dati meritum intentionis bonae non augeat.

3. Item, super illud secundae ad Corinthios octavo6: Et qui multum habuit non abundavit; ibi Glossa: « Ubi aequa est voluntas, aequalem habebit mercedem »: ergo sive aliquis det magnum, sive parvum, dum tamen ex aequali caritate; videtur, quod eis retribuatur aequaliter.

4. Item, si quantitas dati aliquid addit, aut addit ad meritum respectu praemii substantialis, aut respectu praemii accidentalis. Non respectu praemii substantialis, quia illud respicit caritatis radicem et quantitatem gratiae. Non respectu accidentalis, quia praemium accidentale debetur operibus excellentibus et privilegiatis7; non enim meretur aliquis aureolam ex hoc, quod dat magnam eleemosynam. Videtur igitur, quod quantitas dati ad bonae intentionis meritum nihil omnino addat.

Conclusio.

Quantitas dati in bonis operibus addit ad praemium essentiale, non autem directe, sed dispositive.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod de quantitate dati est loqui dupliciter: aut comparando datum ad datum solum; aut comparando haec ad invicem et ad dantis facultatem. p. 930 — Primo modo loquendo, maior quantitas dati aliquid addit ad bonitatem intentionis, non, inquam, respectu praemii essentialis directe, sed quia aliquo modo disponit hominem ad proficiendum in bono8 et ad recedendum a malo. Qui enim maius munus tribuit, ut sibi faciat amicum de mammona iniquitatis, magis recipientem obligat ad orandum pro se, et quodam modo in obligando illum obligat Deum; et ideo plus se disponit ad gratiam, quam ille qui dat minus munus. Similiter plus se disponit ad recedendum a malo, quia in hoc, quod facit maiorem eleemosynam, absolvi meretur a maiori poena, secundum quod dicitur Lucae undecimo9: Date eleemosynam, et omnia munda sunt vobis; et Tobiae duodecimo: Eleemosyna a morte liberat; et propterea, Danielis quarto: Redime peccata tua eleemosynis.

Similiter, si comparemus quantitates datorum in comparatione ad facultatem dantium, maior quantitas non addit quantum ad meritum praemii substantialis directe, sed quodam modo dispositive. Qui enim, pensatis suis viribus, plus dat, quam alter, suis viribus pensatis, magis ad donum gratiae se disponit, magis etiam a peccato recedit. Et sic, generaliter loquendo, quantitas dati, praesupposita aequalitate bonae intentionis sive voluntatis, quantum ad praemium essentiale non addit directe et proprie, sed quodam modo dispositive: vel quia disponendo ad caritatem disponit ad maiorem gloriam, vel quia eripiendo a malo, celerius facit hominem pertingere ad coronam.

Et hoc quidem non habet instantiam, quando est excessus quantitatis dati et in comparatione ad datum et in comparatione ad facultatem dantis. Quando vero ex una parte datum unum excedit aliud in se, et econtra exceditur ab aliquo in comparatione ad facultatem dantis, per quem modum dixit Dominus10 quod vidua plus miserat in gazophylacium quam omnes divites, quia totum victum suum posuerat; tunc se habent sicut excedentia et excessa. Secundum enim diversas conditiones unum datum plus promovet quam reliquum. Maior enim quantitas dati plus valet ad evadendam poenam, quia, sicut dicitur decimo tertio Proverbiorum11: Redemptio animae viri sunt propriae divitiae. Maior vero quantitas dati secundum facultatem dantis plus valet ad acquirendam gratiam, pro eo quod talis magis se disponit ad perfectionem beatitudinis, scilicet paupertatis. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod quantitas dati aliquid auget ad meritum bonae intentionis, scilicet dispositive.

Ad argumenta in contrarium: Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod vidua illa plus dedit; dici potest, quod ibi loquitur Dominus de quantitate dati per comparationem ad facultatem dantis, quia illa totum dederat, quod patet per sequentem litteram. Praeterea, Deus, qui scrutatur corda12, vidit, quod vidua illa ex meliori voluntate oblationem suam dabat; et ideo magis donum eius appretiabatur ratione voluntatis eius melioris. Cum autem quaerimus nunc, utrum quantitas dati aliquid addat ad bonitatem intentionis; hoc quaerimus, praesupposita aequalitate bonae voluntatis; aliter enim nulla esset quaestio, quia planum est, quod plus valet magnitudo bonae voluntatis cum parvo dono, quam parvitas bonae voluntatis cum magno.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa, quod Deus non considerat quantum, sed ex quanto; dicendum, quod verum est principaliter, scilicet quantum ad retributionem praemii substantialis; non negat tamen Glossa, quin quantitas dati aliquo modo disponat de congruo ad maiorem gloriam, vel ad gloriam celerius habendam.

Ad 3, 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de alia Glossa, quod aequalis voluntas aequalem habet mercedem; iam patet responsio. Non enim fit maior retributio, voluntate remanente in sua aequalitate, sed quia quantitas dati disponit ad habendum meliorem13 voluntatem et puriorem; hinc est, quod aliquo modo facit ad augmentum gloriae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, quod aliquo modo facit ad praemium substantiale, licet non principaliter et per se, sed mediante gratia et caritate, ad quam disponit. Verumtamen illud quod obiicit de praemio accidentali, non cogit, pro eo quod meritum accidentale non tantum est aureola, sed etiam gaudium de aliquo bono creato, sive sit alicuius praerogativae et excellentiae, sive non. Et hoc melius manifestabitur in sequenti problemate14.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether good works add anything beyond intention as regards the quantity of what is given.

Secondly it is asked whether good works add, beyond good intention, anything as regards the quantity of what is given. And that they do seems to be the case.

1. Second to the Corinthians, chapter nine1: He who sows sparingly shall also reap sparingly; and he who sows in blessings shall also reap of blessings. If, therefore, that sowing of which the Apostle speaks lies in the giving of alms, it seems that the greatness of the gift contributes to the excellence of glory.

2. Likewise, Tobit four2: If thou have much, give abundantly: if then this exhortation is not useless, it seems that the abundance of the gift contributes to the increase of merit.

3. Likewise, although God from equal goodness confers greater and lesser goods, nevertheless he to whom he has conferred greater things is bound to greater thanksgiving: therefore by parity of reasoning, if from equal charity a greater gift and a lesser gift be given, it is fitting that God render a greater recompense for the greater gift.

4. Likewise, if he who gives more does not merit more than he who gives less, then he who leaves all things for God and gives to the poor3 does not merit more than he who gives a single shilling: therefore all are fools who follow the divine counsel. But if it is impious to say that the divine counsel is undiscerning, it seems that the quantity of what is given contributes to the amplifying of merit.

On the contrary: 1. Mark twelve4: Amen I say to you, that this woman hath cast in more than all into the treasury; he speaks of the widow: therefore if Christ valued more highly the gift of that widow, which was very small, as is intimated in the text, than the great gifts of others, it seems that God values works only according to the quantity of good intention, and in no way according to the quantity of the exterior offering.

2. Likewise, the Gloss upon that passage5: « God does not consider the substance of those who offer, but the conscience; nor does he weigh how much you offer, but out of how much »: if therefore merits are worth only as much as God weighs them, it seems that the quantity of what is given does not increase the merit of good intention.

3. Likewise, upon that text of the second to the Corinthians, chapter eight6: And he that had much had nothing over; there the Gloss: « Where the will is equal, it shall have an equal reward »: therefore whether one give much or little, provided it be from equal charity, it seems that they are recompensed equally.

4. Likewise, if the quantity of what is given adds anything, it either adds to merit in respect of the substantial reward, or in respect of the accidental reward. Not in respect of the substantial reward, because that regards the root of charity and the quantity of grace. Not in respect of the accidental, because the accidental reward is owed to excellent and privileged works7; for no one merits the aureole from this, that he gives a great alms. It seems, therefore, that the quantity of what is given adds nothing whatever to the merit of good intention.

Conclusion.

The quantity of what is given in good works adds to the essential reward, yet not directly, but dispositively.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that there is a twofold way of speaking about the quantity of what is given: either by comparing the gift to the gift alone; or by comparing these to one another and to the means of the giver. — Speaking in the first way, a greater quantity of the gift adds something to the goodness of intention — not, I say, in respect of the essential reward directly, but because it in some way disposes a man to advance in good8 and to withdraw from evil. For he who gives a greater gift, that he may make himself a friend of the mammon of iniquity, more obliges the recipient to pray for him, and in a certain way, in obliging him, obliges God; and therefore he more disposes himself to grace than he who gives a lesser gift. Likewise he disposes himself more to withdraw from evil, because in this, that he makes a greater alms, he merits to be absolved from a greater punishment, according to what is said in Luke eleven9: Give alms, and all things are clean unto you; and Tobit twelve: Alms delivereth from death; and therefore, Daniel four: Redeem thou thy sins with alms.

Likewise, if we compare the quantities of gifts in comparison to the means of the givers, a greater quantity does not add as regards the merit of the substantial reward directly, but in a certain way dispositively. For he who, his own resources being weighed, gives more than another, his resources being weighed, disposes himself more to the gift of grace, and also withdraws more from sin. And thus, speaking generally, the quantity of what is given, granted equality of good intention or will, as regards the essential reward does not add directly and properly, but in a certain way dispositively: either because, by disposing to charity, it disposes to greater glory, or because, by snatching from evil, it makes a man reach the crown more quickly.

And this indeed admits of no exception, when there is an excess of the quantity given both in comparison to the gift and in comparison to the means of the giver. But when on one side one gift exceeds another in itself, and conversely is exceeded by some other in comparison to the means of the giver — in which manner the Lord said10 that the widow had cast more into the treasury than all the rich, because she had put in her whole living — then they stand as exceeding and exceeded. For according to diverse conditions one gift advances more than the other. For a greater quantity of the gift is worth more for escaping punishment, because, as is said in the thirteenth chapter of Proverbs11: The ransom of a man's life are his own riches. But a greater quantity of the gift according to the means of the giver is worth more for acquiring grace, inasmuch as such a one disposes himself more to the perfection of beatitude, namely of poverty. — The arguments are therefore to be granted which show that the quantity of what is given increases something for the merit of good intention, namely dispositively.

To the arguments to the contrary: To 1. As to that which is first objected to the contrary, that that widow gave more — it can be said that there the Lord speaks of the quantity of the gift by comparison to the means of the giver, because she had given the whole, as is clear from the following text. Moreover, God, who searcheth the hearts12, saw that that widow gave her offering from a better will; and therefore her gift was valued more by reason of her better will. But when we now ask whether the quantity of what is given adds anything to the goodness of intention, we ask this presupposing equality of good will; for otherwise there would be no question, since it is plain that the greatness of a good will with a small gift is worth more than the smallness of a good will with a great one.

To 2. As to that which is objected from the Gloss, that God does not consider how much, but out of how much — it must be said that this is true principally, namely as regards the recompense of the substantial reward; yet the Gloss does not deny that the quantity of what is given in some way disposes by congruity to greater glory, or to glory more quickly obtained.

To 3, 4. As to that which is objected from the other Gloss, that an equal will has an equal reward — the response is already clear. For no greater recompense is made while the will remains in its equality, but because the quantity of what is given disposes one to have a better13 and purer will; hence it is that it in some way contributes to the increase of glory. — And by this is clear the response to that which was asked last, namely that it in some way contributes to the substantial reward, though not principally and of itself, but by the mediation of grace and charity, to which it disposes. Nevertheless that which it objects concerning the accidental reward does not compel, inasmuch as accidental merit is not only the aureole, but also joy concerning some created good, whether it be of some prerogative and excellence or not. And this will be better made manifest in the following problem14.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 6.
    Verse 6. [2 Cor. 9:6]
  2. Vers. 9.
    Verse 9. [Tob. 4:9]
  3. Respicitur illud Matth. 19, 21: Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende quae habes, et da pauperibus etc., nec non ibid. v. 27: Ecce nos reliquimus omnia etc. — Pro unum solidum (Italice soldo, Gallice sou) codd. et edd. 1, 2 corrupte unum solum, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 unum solum obolum (obolus erat moneta minutior, cfr. Du Cange.).
    Reference is made to that text of Matthew 19:21: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, etc., and also ibid. v. 27: Behold we have left all things, etc. — For unum solidum (in Italian soldo, in French sou) the codices and editions 1, 2 corruptly read unum solum; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads unum solum obolum (the obol was a smaller coin, cf. Du Cange).
  4. Vers. 43. Cfr. verba Bedae, supra pag. 906, nota 6 allata.
    Verse 43. Cf. the words of Bede, adduced above on page 906, note 6.
  5. Scil. Marc. 12, 43. — Glossa, quae est Bedae, in hunc loc., habetur apud Lyranum. — Pro super illum locum cod. X super illud Lucae 12. de vidua paupere, cod. bb super illud Lucae, nonnulli alii codd., vocem Lucae male interpretantes, super illud locum; Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 super eundem locum.
    Namely Mark 12:43. — The Gloss, which is Bede's, on this passage, is found in Lyra. — For super illum locum (upon that passage) codex X reads super illud Lucae 12. de vidua paupere (upon that of Luke 12, on the poor widow), codex bb super illud Lucae (upon that of Luke), several other codices, misinterpreting the word Lucae, super illud locum; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 super eundem locum (upon the same passage).
  6. Vers. 15. — Verba Glossae, quae est ordinaria et secundum August., Enarrat. in Ps. 125. n. 11, a Strabo et Lyrano sic redduntur: Sic qui multum dat dives, et qui parum pauper, si aequa sit utriusque voluntas, aequalem habent mercedem. — In fine arg. pro eis Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 habet ei.
    Verse 15. — The words of the Gloss, which is the ordinary Gloss and follows Augustine, Commentary on the Psalms 125, n. 11, are rendered thus by Strabo and Lyra: Thus the rich man who gives much, and the poor man who gives little, if the will of each be equal, have an equal reward. — At the end of the argument, for eis (to them) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 has ei (to him).
  7. Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Pro excellentibus edd., excepta 1, excellentioribus.
    Cf. the preceding question. — For excellentibus (excellent) the editions, except the first, read excellentioribus (more excellent).
  8. Ut docet Apostolus, II. Cor. 9, 7. seq. dicens: Hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus. Potens est autem Deus... ut in omnibus... abundetis in omne opus bonum. — Deinde alluditur ad illud Luc. 16, 9: Facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis.
    As the Apostle teaches, 2 Cor. 9:7ff., saying: For God loveth a cheerful giver. And God is able... that... you may abound to every good work. — Then allusion is made to that of Luke 16:9: Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.
  9. Vers. 41. — Seq. Script. locus est Tob. 12, 9, tertius Dan. 4, 24. — Pro Similiter plus se cod. T igitur plus se. Paulo inferius edd. 3, 4 et Vat. omittunt propterea, pro quo plures codd. et ed. 1, 2 praeterea.
    Verse 41. — The following scriptural passage is Tob. 12:9, the third Dan. 4:24. — For Similiter plus se codex T reads igitur plus se. A little below, editions 3, 4 and the Vatican omit propterea, for which several codices and editions 1, 2 read praeterea.
  10. Marc. 12, 43. seq., Luc. 21, 3. seq. — Mox pro Secundum enim cod. Y Propter.
    Mark 12:43ff., Luke 21:3ff. — Presently, for Secundum enim codex Y reads Propter.
  11. Vers. 8: Redemptio animae viri divitiae suae.
    Verse 8: The ransom of a man's life are his own riches.
  12. Rom. 8, 27; I. Paral. 28, 9; cfr. Ps. 7, 10. et Ier. 17, 10. — Paulo inferius pro et ideo magis donum eius codd. V W et ideo maius donum (cod. V donum suum).
    Rom. 8:27; 1 Paral. 28:9; cf. Ps. 7:10 and Jer. 17:10. — A little below, for et ideo magis donum eius codices V W read et ideo maius donum (codex V donum suum).
  13. Cod. ee maiorem.
    Codex ee reads maiorem (greater).
  14. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion on the preceding question.
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