Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus

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Articulus II.

Quaestio III. Utrum bonitas operum addat ad bonae intentionis meritum quantum ad numerositatem.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum bonitas operum addat ad bonae intentionis meritum quantum ad numerositatem; et est quaestio, utrum bonum opus, additum operi, reddat operantem dignum maiori praemio essentiali. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo per illud Zachariae quarto¹: Exaequabit gratiam gratiae: ergo ubi est aequalitas gratiae, erit aequalitas gloriae: igitur si aliqui duo ex aequali gratia inaequaliter operantur, nihilominus in mercede gloriae aequabuntur.

2. Item, super illud Iudicum secundo²: Qui longo tempore post eum vixerunt; Glossa: « Solius Dei est nosse inter seniores, quis eorum post se maiorem lucem emiserit, utrum Paulus, an Petrus, an Bartholomaeus »; sed certum est, quod Paulus plus omnibus laboravit, sicut dicit primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto: ergo magnitudo praemii non pensatur secundum multitudinem operum.

3. Item, Augustinus³: « Non multitudo operum, non diuturnitas temporum auget meritum, sed sola caritas et melior voluntas »; sed nihil hoc expressius dici potest.

4. Item, quantum homo diligit Deum, tantum diligitur a Deo⁴; et quantum diligitur a Deo, tantum remuneratur a Deo: ergo si est aequalitas in dilectione, aequalitas est in remuneratione. Sed multi sunt aequales in dilectione, qui tamen non sunt aequales in opere: ergo videtur, quod multitudo operum non faciat ad meriti substantialis praemii incrementum.

Sed contra: 1. Ad Romanos quarto⁵: Ei, ait, qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum meritum; Glossa: « Merces non dabitur secundum gratiam fidei tantum, sed secundum meritum operationis suae »: ergo videtur, quod pluribus operibus maiorem mercedem quis mereatur habere.

2. Item, super illud ad Galatas sexto⁶: Bonum autem facientes, non deficiamus; Glossa: « Quantum seminaverimus in operibus, tantum metemus in fructibus »: ergo etc.

3. Item, per unum bonum opus homo meretur vitam aeternam: ergo si aliud sequens opus est ita bonum, sicut prius, tantundem merebitur, sicut primum; aut ergo meretur illud idem, aut aliquid superadditum illi. Si aliquid superadditum illi; habeo propositum, quod multitudo operum prosit ad augmentum meriti. Si nihil; ergo videtur, quod frustra operetur: ergo stultus est qui⁷, facto uno bono, amplius facit aliud. Quodsi hoc est impium dicere, restat etc.

4. Item, peccatum non est magis efficax ad merendum poenam, quam sit bonum opus ad merendum gloriam⁸; sed peccatum sequens, additum praecedenti, si sit aequale ei, meretur duplo maiorem poenam: ergo bonum opus, additum praecedenti, meretur duplo maiorem gloriam.

5. Item, qui servit homini, quanto diutius ei servit, tanto maiorem assequitur mercedem: si ergo Deus in retribuendo et est iustior et liberalior, quam sit homo; videtur, quod quanto aliquis in pluribus ei servit et quanto plura opera pro Christo facit, tanto maiorem ab ipso recipiat retributionem.

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6. Item, iste qui multiplicat opera bona, seminat in terra bona⁹: ergo necessario oportet, quod aliquem fructum praemii ex eo accipiat, aut igitur praemium substantiale, aut accidentale, aut aureae, aut aureolae. Sed non aureolae, cum illa debeatur operibus excellentibus: ergo recipiet maius praemium substantiale sive aureae.

Est igitur quaestio, quantum prosint bona opera multiplicata et quem fructum afferunt.

Conclusio.

Multiplicatio bonorum operum non valet ad profectum in merito respectu praemii essentialis nisi disponendo et conservando, ad profectum vero in praemio accidentali potest valere tripliciter.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod proficere in merito vel ad meritum, potest esse duobus modis secundum duplicem differentiam praemii. Quoddam enim est praemium substantiale, quod quidem consistit in visione et fruitione Dei; quod ideo dicitur praemium substantiale, quia fundamentum et substantia¹⁰ totius nostrae beatitudinis est Deus, et illo perfecte habito, perfecta est in nobis beatitudo. Aliud vero est praemium accidentale, quod quidem consistit in gaudio, quod habetur de bono creato, vel de liberatione ab aliquo malo. — Accipiendo igitur meritum respectu praemii substantialis, contingit dicere, quod aliquid valet ad profectum meriti tripliciter: aut quia per illud meretur homo maiorem gloriam, et hoc modo maior caritas vel melior voluntas facit ad profectum meriti; aut quia disponit ad merendum maiorem gloriam, et talia sunt opera perfectionis¹¹, quae dicuntur facere ad meriti profectum; aut quia conservat illud, per quod meretur homo gloriam, et sic omnia bona opera proficiunt ad meritum, quia in ipsis caritas exercetur et conservatur et radicatur, ut homo finaliter perseveret in illa. Et hoc non est parvum, quia, quidquid homo faciat, non salvatur, nisi finaliter perseveret¹². Et sic patet, quod operum multiplicatio quodam modo valet ad profectum in merito respectu praemii substantialis; et hoc dico disponendo et conservando, non autem merendo maiorem gloriam ex condigno. — Similiter ad profectum maioris praemii accidentalis potest aliquid valere tripliciter: aut ratione adeptionis aureolae, et sic opera specialis excellentiae faciunt ad profectum meriti voluntatis bonae; aut ratione adeptionis alicuius delectationis internae, et sic omnia opera, quae fiunt ex gratia, quodam modo valent ad profectum praemii accidentalis, quia, secundum quod homo plura bona opera facit, secundum hoc de pluribus iucundabitur in conscientia sua; aut ratione diminutionis poenae, et sic opera difficilia et poenalia faciunt ad profectum meriti et addunt ad meritum bonae voluntatis, quia remissionem alicuius poenae meretur homo ex voluntate cum opere, quam non meretur¹³ ex sola voluntate.

Haec autem distinctio non solum valet ad terminandum quod dictum est, sed etiam ad duo praecedentia. Generaliter enim verum est, quod operum dignitas et dati quantitas et operum numerositas ad profectum meriti facit respectu praemii accidentalis, licet differenter. Verum est etiam generaliter, quod ista omnia opera non faciunt ad profectum meriti respectu praemii substantialis, nisi solum disponendo et conservando. — Unde rationes illae, quae ostendunt, quod non multiplicatur merces praemii substantialis secundum multiplicationem operum, concedendae sunt; verum enim concludunt.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ei qui operatur, merces imputatur secundum meritum; dicendum, quod textus ille, secundum quod Glossa exponit, non vult dicere, quod quantitas mercedis respondeat operi principaliter; sed hoc vult dicere, quod ubi est opportunitas operandi, non sufficit gratia fidei sine bona operatione; ubi autem opportunitas, vel facultas deest, sola gratia sufficit; unde sensus est: ei qui operatur, id est, ei qui habet tempus operandi.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa, quod quantum seminaverimus in operibus, tantum metemus in fructibus; dicendum, quod nomine fructuum intelligitur ibi gaudium, quod habebit quis de bonis operationibus¹⁴; non praemium substantiale, quod consistit in Deo. Si autem de illo, scilicet substantiali praemio intelligatur, tunc tantum et quantum non dicunt commensurationem, nec etiam dicunt dispositionem necessitatis, sed congruitatis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per sequens opus meretur homo tantundem¹⁵, quantum per primum; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non meretur aliud, sed idem ipsum, quod prius meruerat, loquendo quantum ad essentiale praemium. Et non

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sequitur, quod in vanum laboret; quia, etsi primum opus erat meritorium vitae aeternae, non tamen merebatur efficaciter, nisi caritate perseverante; et caritas non potest in homine vivere, quin exeat in bonos actus, cum potest et debet. Ideo sequens opus frustra non fit, quia, quamvis non addat ad praemii excellentiam, addit tamen ad meriti efficaciam; disponit etiam nihilominus ad profectum et facit ad incrementum meriti respectu accidentalis praemii, sicut prius ostensum est.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum additum peccato duplat meritum et supplicium, ergo et bonum additum bono; dicendum, quod non est simile, propter hoc quod, quia mala facimus, mali sumus, sed non, quia bona facimus, boni sumus; immo potius e converso bonitas operum ortum habet ex bonitate operantis¹⁶. Et hinc est, quod diversis peccatis meretur homo diversa supplicia, quamvis diversis bonis operibus mereatur homo unam gloriam, quia ratio merendi et acceptandi in pluribus bonis una est; ratio vero displicendi et demerendi est in pluribus peccatis diversa.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod apud hominem maius praemium meretur homo ex pluribus operibus; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia homo non reputat opus dignum retributione propter bonitatem operantis, sed potius operantem propter bonitatem operis. Homo enim indiget alieno servitio; Deus autem, qui bonorum nostrorum non indiget¹⁷, non operantem propter opera, sed opera propter operantem acceptat et remunerat; et ideo non est simile ex parte ista et ex illa.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod opera multiplicata non valent ad praemium accidentale, quia non assequuntur aureolam; dicendum, quod accidentale praemium in plus est quam aureola. Nomine enim aureolae non intelligimus quodcumque praemium accidentale, sed illud quod habet quandam praerogativam et dignitatem, sicut et opus, cui respondet. Nihilominus tamen gaudium de bonorum operum multiplicatione ad accidentale praemium spectat, cum sine ipso possit haberi vita aeterna; et ad hoc quidem faciunt bona opera multiplicata; faciunt etiam ad essentiale praemium aliquo modo, sicut prius ostensum est. — Ex his patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur¹⁸.

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English Translation

Article II.

Question III. Whether the goodness of works adds to the merit of a good intention by reason of number.

Thirdly it is asked whether the goodness of works adds to the merit of a good intention by reason of number; and the question is whether a good work, added to a work, renders the one acting worthy of a greater essential reward. And it seems that it does not:

1. First, by that text of Zechariah, chapter four¹: He will make grace equal to grace: therefore where there is equality of grace, there will be equality of glory: therefore if two persons, out of equal grace, act unequally, they will nonetheless be made equal in the reward of glory.

2. Likewise, on that text of Judges, chapter two²: Who lived a long time after him; the Gloss: « It belongs to God alone to know, among the elders, which of them sent forth a greater light after himself, whether Paul, or Peter, or Bartholomew »; but it is certain that Paul labored more than all, as he says in the first to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen: therefore the greatness of the reward is not weighed according to the multitude of works.

3. Likewise, Augustine³: « Not the multitude of works, not the length of time, increases merit, but charity alone and a better will »; but nothing can be said more expressly than this.

4. Likewise, as much as a man loves God, so much is he loved by God⁴; and as much as he is loved by God, so much is he rewarded by God: therefore if there is equality in love, there is equality in reward. But many are equal in love who nonetheless are not equal in work: therefore it seems that the multitude of works does not contribute to the increase of the reward of substantial merit.

On the contrary: 1. To the Romans, chapter four⁵: To him, he says, who works, the wage is not reckoned according to grace, but according to merit; the Gloss: « The wage will not be given according to the grace of faith alone, but according to the merit of one's working »: therefore it seems that by more works one merits to have a greater wage.

2. Likewise, on that text to the Galatians, chapter six⁶: But doing good, let us not fail; the Gloss: « As much as we shall have sown in works, so much shall we reap in fruits »: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by one good work a man merits eternal life: therefore if another following work is as good as the prior one, he will merit just as much as by the first; therefore either he merits that same thing, or something superadded to it. If something superadded to it; I have my point, that the multitude of works avails for the increase of merit. If nothing; then it seems that he works in vain: therefore he is foolish who⁷, having done one good thing, does another in addition. But if it is impious to say this, it remains etc.

4. Likewise, sin is not more efficacious for meriting punishment than a good work is for meriting glory⁸; but a following sin, added to a preceding one, if it is equal to it, merits twice as great a punishment: therefore a good work, added to a preceding one, merits twice as great a glory.

5. Likewise, whoever serves a man, the longer he serves him, the greater the wage he obtains: if therefore God in rewarding is both more just and more generous than a man is; it seems that the more anyone serves him in more things and the more works he does for Christ, the greater the reward he receives from him.

6. Likewise, he who multiplies good works sows in good ground⁹: therefore it is necessary that he receive some fruit of reward from it, either therefore a substantial reward, or an accidental one, or of the aurea, or of the aureole. But not of the aureole, since that is owed to excellent works: therefore he will receive a greater substantial reward, that is, of the aurea.

The question, therefore, is how much multiplied good works avail and what fruit they bring.

Conclusion.

The multiplication of good works does not avail for progress in merit with respect to the essential reward except by disposing and conserving, but it can avail in three ways for progress in the accidental reward.

I respond: For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that to progress in merit, or toward merit, can be in two ways according to the twofold difference of reward. For one reward is substantial, which indeed consists in the vision and enjoyment of God; and it is called the substantial reward because the foundation and substance¹⁰ of our whole beatitude is God, and once he is perfectly possessed, our beatitude is perfect. The other is the accidental reward, which indeed consists in the joy that is had from a created good, or from liberation from some evil. — Taking merit, therefore, with respect to the substantial reward, it can be said that something avails for the progress of merit in three ways: either because through it a man merits a greater glory, and in this way a greater charity or a better will contributes to the progress of merit; or because it disposes toward meriting a greater glory, and such are works of perfection¹¹, which are said to contribute to the progress of merit; or because it conserves that by which a man merits glory, and thus all good works are profitable toward merit, because in them charity is exercised and conserved and rooted, so that a man may finally persevere in it. And this is no small thing, because, whatever a man may do, he is not saved unless he finally perseveres¹². And thus it is clear that the multiplication of works in a certain way avails for progress in merit with respect to the substantial reward; and this I say by disposing and conserving, but not by meriting a greater glory by condign merit. — Likewise, for progress toward a greater accidental reward something can avail in three ways: either by reason of the attainment of the aureole, and thus works of special excellence contribute to the progress of the merit of the good will; or by reason of the attainment of some internal delight, and thus all works that are done from grace in a certain way avail for the progress of the accidental reward, because, according as a man does more good works, accordingly will he rejoice over more things in his conscience; or by reason of the diminution of punishment, and thus difficult and penal works contribute to the progress of merit and add to the merit of the good will, because a man merits the remission of some punishment by the will together with the work, which he does not merit¹³ by the will alone.

This distinction, moreover, avails not only for settling what has been said, but also for the two preceding questions. For it is generally true that the worthiness of works and the quantity of what is given and the number of works contribute to the progress of merit with respect to the accidental reward, though in different ways. It is also generally true that all these works do not contribute to the progress of merit with respect to the substantial reward, except only by disposing and conserving. — Hence those arguments which show that the wage of the substantial reward is not multiplied according to the multiplication of works are to be conceded; for they conclude truly.

To the arguments for the negative side:

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary, that to the one who works the wage is reckoned according to merit; it must be said that that text, according as the Gloss expounds it, does not mean that the quantity of the wage corresponds to the work principally; but it means this, that where there is opportunity for working, the grace of faith does not suffice without good working; but where opportunity or capacity is lacking, grace alone suffices; hence the sense is: to him who works, that is, to him who has time for working.

2. To that which is objected from the Gloss, that as much as we shall have sown in works, so much shall we reap in fruits; it must be said that by the name of fruits is there understood the joy that one will have from good workings¹⁴; not the substantial reward, which consists in God. But if it be understood of the latter, namely the substantial reward, then as much and how much do not signify commensuration, nor do they signify a disposition of necessity, but of congruity.

3. To that which is objected, that by a following work a man merits just as much¹⁵ as by the first; it must be said that this is true; but he does not merit something else, but that very same thing which he had merited before, speaking with respect to the essential reward. And it does not

follow that he labors in vain; because, although the first work was meritorious of eternal life, nonetheless he did not merit efficaciously except by persevering charity; and charity cannot live in a man without going forth into good acts, when he can and ought. Therefore the following work is not done in vain, because, although it does not add to the excellence of the reward, it nonetheless adds to the efficacy of the merit; it also disposes none the less toward progress and contributes to the increase of merit with respect to the accidental reward, as was shown before.

4. To that which is objected, that sin added to sin doubles the merit and the punishment, therefore also good added to good; it must be said that it is not the same, because of this, that, since we do evil, we are evil, but not, since we do good, are we good; rather, on the contrary, the goodness of works has its origin from the goodness of the one acting¹⁶. And hence it is that for different sins a man merits different punishments, although for different good works a man merits one glory, because the ground of meriting and of being accepted in many good things is one; but the ground of displeasing and of demeriting is diverse in many sins.

5. To that which is objected, that with a man a person merits a greater reward from more works; it must be said that it is not the same, because a man does not reckon a work worthy of recompense on account of the goodness of the one acting, but rather the one acting on account of the goodness of the work. For a man needs another's service; but God, who does not need our goods¹⁷, accepts and rewards not the one acting on account of the works, but the works on account of the one acting; and therefore it is not the same on this side and on that.

6. To that which is objected last, that multiplied works do not avail for the accidental reward, because they do not attain the aureole; it must be said that the accidental reward is more than the aureole. For by the name of aureole we do not understand any accidental reward whatever, but that which has a certain prerogative and dignity, just as also the work to which it corresponds. Nevertheless the joy over the multiplication of good works does pertain to the accidental reward, since without it eternal life can be had; and to this indeed multiplied good works do contribute; they contribute also to the essential reward in some way, as was shown before. — From these things the response is clear to that which was last asked¹⁸.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 7. — Paulo superius pro additum operi cod. H additum bono operi. Paulo inferius pro erit aequalitas codd. M cc et ed. 1 ibi erit aequalitas, Vat. et aequalitas.
Verse 7. — A little above, for added to a work codex H reads added to a good work. A little below, for there will be equality codices M, cc and ed. 1 read there will be equality, the Vatican edition and equality.
Vers. 7, quem codd. cum edd. 1, 2 sic reddunt: Qui longe post eum luxerunt. — Glossa, quae sumta est ex Origenis homil. I. in Iudic. n. 3, habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. Ipsa Origenis oratio haec est: Et quidem Dei est solius nosse post Iesum, quis fuerit inter seniores, qui longiorem diem fecerit, id est, qui maiorem ex se emiserit lucem, utrum Petrus, an Paulus, Bartholomaeus, an Ioannes. — Codd. et primae edd. omittunt in Glossa allata vocem maiorem. — Seq. loc. Script. est loc. cit. V. 10: Sed abundantius illis omnibus laboravi.
Verse 7, which the codices with editions 1, 2 render thus: Who shone long after him. — The Gloss, which is taken from Origen's first homily on Judges, n. 3, is found in Strabus and Lyranus. Origen's own statement is this: And indeed it belongs to God alone to know, after Jesus, who among the elders made the longer day, that is, who sent forth a greater light from himself, whether Peter, or Paul, Bartholomew, or John. — The codices and the first editions omit the word greater in the Gloss cited. — The following scriptural passage is the place cited, v. 10: But I labored more abundantly than all of them.
In cod. Q secunda antiqui amanuensis manus addidit super illud Psalmi [118, 72.]: Bonum mihi lex oris tui. In Enarrat. super hunc locum haec ipsa verba, Augustino tributa, non habentur, neque in ullo alio illius Doctoris libro ea invenimus. Sententia autem, quae istis verbis exprimitur, saepius occurrit in Augusti scriptis. Sic e. g. in V. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 54, ubi S. Doctor exponens illa verba (30, 14.): Prope est verbum hoc valde in ore tuo, et in corde tuo et in manibus tuis facere illud, ait: « Nec frustra tamen hoc [et in manibus tuis] a Septuaginta interpretibus additum existimo; nisi quia intelligi voluerunt, etiam ipsas manus, quibus significantur opera, in corde accipi debere, ubi est fides, quae per dilectionem operatur (Gal. 5, 6.). Nam si forinsecus ea quae Deus iubet, manibus fiant et in corde non fiant, nemo est tam insulsus, qui praecepta arbitretur impleri. Porro si caritas, quae plenitudo est Legis (Rom. 13, 10.), habitet in corde, etiamsi manibus corporis quisquam non possit operari, pax illi est utique cum hominibus bonae voluntatis » (Luc. 2, 14.). Et in libro ad Deogratias seu Epist. 102. (alias 49.) q. 4. n. 26. ait: « Ex qualitatibus quippe voluntatum, non ex temporum spatiis, sive recte facta sive peccata metimur ». Possunt etiam pro sententia adduci multi loci ex August. scriptis, quibus vel bona voluntas commendatur, vel docetur, opera misericordiae (eleemosynas) nihil valere coram Deo absque bona voluntate, et hanc sufficere, deficientibus etiam facultatibus exterioribus. Cfr. de hoc 1. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 23. seq.; II. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 2. n. 9; in Epist. Ioan. tr. 6. n. 2. seq., tr. 8. n. 9; Enarrat. in Ps. 36. serm. 2. n. 13. et in Ps. 125. n. 5. 11. seq. — Gul. Mara, hic quaest. ult., dictum, de quo agitur, Bernardo tribuit, sed in eius operibus etiam sententialiter tantum habetur, quod scimus.
In codex Q a second hand of an old copyist added this above that text of the Psalm [118, 72.]: The law of your mouth is good to me. In the Enarration on this passage these very words, attributed to Augustine, are not found, nor do we find them in any other book of that Doctor. The sentiment, however, which is expressed by these words, occurs rather often in Augustine's writings. Thus, for example, in the Five Questions on the Pentateuch, q. 54, where the holy Doctor, expounding those words (30, 14.): This word is very near you, in your mouth, and in your heart and in your hands to do it, says: « Nor do I think that this [and in your hands] was added in vain by the Seventy translators; but only because they wished it to be understood that even the hands themselves, by which works are signified, ought to be taken in the heart, where there is faith, which works through love (Gal. 5, 6.). For if outwardly the things which God commands are done by the hands and are not done in the heart, no one is so foolish as to judge that the precepts are fulfilled. Further, if charity, which is the fullness of the Law (Rom. 13, 10.), dwells in the heart, even if someone cannot work with the hands of the body, there is for him surely peace with men of good will » (Luke 2, 14.). And in the book to Deogratias or Epistle 102 (otherwise 49.) q. 4. n. 26. he says: « For we measure things rightly done or sins by the qualities of wills, not by the spans of time ». Many passages too can be adduced from Augustine's writings in support of the sentiment, in which either a good will is commended, or it is taught that the works of mercy (almsgivings) avail nothing before God without a good will, and that this suffices, even when external means are lacking. Cf. on this On Free Choice I, c. 12, n. 23 seq.; On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount II, c. 2, n. 9; on the Epistle of John, tr. 6, n. 2 seq., tr. 8, n. 9; Enarration on Ps. 36, serm. 2, n. 13, and on Ps. 125, n. 5, 11 seq. — William of Mara, here in the last question, attributes the saying in question to Bernard, but in his works too it is found only as to its sense, as far as we know.
Haec propositio innititur verbis Scripturae, Prov. 8, 17: Ego diligentes me diligo, et Ioan. 14, 21: Qui autem diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo, et ego diligam eum. Cfr. ibid. v. 23. — Circa finem arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt meriti.
This proposition rests on the words of Scripture, Prov. 8, 17: I love those who love me, and John 14, 21: But whoever loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him. Cf. ibid. v. 23. — Near the end of the argument codex cc and ed. 1 omit of merit.
Vers. 4. — Verba, quae hic Glossae tribuuntur, sunt in interlineari (ad hunc loc.), sed contracta sunt.
Verse 4. — The words which are here attributed to the Gloss are in the interlinear (on this passage), but they are abridged.
Vers. 9. — Glossa est ordinaria et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum.
Verse 9. — The Gloss is the ordinary one and is found in Strabus and Lyranus.
Codd. C R S (T a prima manu) Y et alii cum edd. 1, 2, 3 quia.
Codices C, R, S (T by the first hand), Y and others, with editions 1, 2, 3, read because.
Vide supra pag. 920, nota 4. — Pro non est magis efficax cod. bb est minus efficax.
See above, p. 920, note 4. — For is not more efficacious codex bb reads is less efficacious.
Respicitur Matth. 13, 23; Marc. 4, 20; Luc. 8, 15. — De aureola vide supra q. 1.
Reference is made to Matt. 13, 23; Mark 4, 20; Luke 8, 15. — On the aureole see above, q. 1.
Plures codd., ut K T Z bb ee, cum ed. 2 scientia, cod. cc et ed. 1 summa.
Several codices, such as K, T, Z, bb, ee, with ed. 2 read knowledge; codex cc and ed. 1 read the sum.
Matth. 19, 21: Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende etc. — In propos. seq. edd., excepta 1, cum aliquibus codd. inter verba et conservatur interiiciunt operatur.
Matt. 19, 21: If you wish to be perfect, go, sell etc. — In the following statement the editions, except ed. 1, with some codices insert is worked between the words and is conserved.
Ita Vat., ceterae edd. cum plurimis codd. fiat.
So the Vatican edition; the other editions with most codices read may be done.
Matth. 10, 22: Qui autem perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit.
Matt. 10, 22: But whoever shall have persevered to the end, he shall be saved.
Cod. T mereretur.
Codex T reads would merit.
Edd. praeter 1 cum nonnullis codd. operibus.
The editions except ed. 1, with some codices, read in works.
Vat. addit habere. Subinde pro per primum cod. cc et ed. 1 per praemium. Paulo inferius pro Et non sequitur cod. K (bb a secunda manu) Et ideo non sequitur. Post pauca pro vivere edd. 3, 4 et Vat. vigere.
The Vatican edition adds to have. Then for through the first codex cc and ed. 1 read through the reward. A little below, for And it does not follow codex K (bb by a second hand) reads And therefore it does not follow. After a little, for to live editions 3, 4 and the Vatican edition read to be vigorous.
Cfr. supra pag. 718, nota 9. — Mox codd. F K T et alii omittunt diversis. Paulo inferius pro ratio merendi, quam lectionem solam rectam invenimus in codd. W X bb (T a secunda manu), Vat. actio merendi, cod. Y acceptatio merendi. Subinde pro acceptandi codd. F H K V W Y bb ee accipiendi. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1.
Cf. above, p. 718, note 9. — Presently codices F, K, T and others omit different. A little below, for the ground of meriting, which reading alone we find correct in codices W, X, bb (T by a second hand), the Vatican edition reads the action of meriting, codex Y the acceptance of meriting. Then for of being accepted codices F, H, K, V, W, Y, bb, ee read of receiving. Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1.
Psalm 15, 2. — In fine arg. pro et ex illa codd. B F Y et ex parte illa.
Psalm 15, 2. — At the end of the argument, for and on that codices B, F, Y read and on that side. ---

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