Dist. 11, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 11
QUAESTIO III.
Utrum Angelus ex damnatione custoditi incurrat aliquod detrimentum.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum ex damnatione custoditi incurrat Angelus aliquod detrimentum. Et quod sic, videtur:
Ad oppositum. 1. Tertii Regum vigesimo1: Custodi virum istum; qui si lapsus fuerit, erit anima tua pro anima illius;4 ex quo colligitur, quod Dominus eo pacto committit ad custodiendum, quod, si custoditus amittitur, de manu custodis requiratur. Si ergo homo perditur, videtur, quod Angelus ipsum custodiens incurrat salutis suae2 periculum; et hoc3 vide-
tur dicere Origenes super illud Numerorum vigesimo quinto5: Initiati sunt Beelphegor; Glossa: «Praeest Angelus bonus, qui pro delictis culpatur et pro bene gestis laudatur».
2. Item, Isaiae trigesimo tertio6: Angeli pacis amare flebunt; constat autem, quod non flebunt nisi propter miseriam et damnationem hominum: ergo si illis maxime compatiuntur, quos custodiunt, videtur, quod de damnatione illorum incurrant gemitum et planctum, et ita aliquod gaudii detrimentum.
3. Item, «si oppositum est causa oppositi, et propositum propositi7»; sed salvatio hominum custoditorum generat in Angelis custodientibus gaudium et congratulationem: ergo damnatio generabit gemitum et compassionem.
4. Item, sicut completio desiderii delectat animam, ita frustratio contristat8; sed Angelus, quia cupit, salvari eum quem custodit, gaudet, cum ille salvatur, quia desiderium eius impletur: ergo cum ex eius damnatione frustretur, videtur etc.
5. Item, poena Arii semper crescit propter multiplicationem eorum quos per errorem suum ad damnationem trahit9: ergo per oppositum ex nostra salvatione crescit Angelorum praemium nos custodientium. Si ergo nos damnamur, cum ipsi gloriari debeant in nobis sive de nobis, videtur, quod patiantur gloriae detrimentum.
6. Item, angeli mali gaudent, dum possunt hominem pertrahere ad supplicia, et hoc est, quia homines odiunt, quos exercitant et tentant: ergo si boni Angeli diligunt illos quos custodiunt, videtur, quod per oppositum doleant.
Contra: Fundamenta. 1. Bonus Angelus est beatus; sed beatus est cui ad nutum cuncta succedunt10; ei autem qui huiusmodi est, non potest aliquod accidere detrimentum: ergo videtur, quod ex damnatione eorum quos custodiunt, nullum detrimentum incurrant.
2. Item, Angelus bonus voluntatem suam divinae voluntati conformat: ergo si Deus non vult salvare nisi praedestinatos, videtur, quod nec Angelus bonus: ergo si nullus praedestinatus damnatur, nullus damnatur, quem Angelus bonus non velit damnari: ergo videtur, quod ex nullius damnatione tristetur.
3. Item, dolor et tristitia non est sine poena, et poena non est sine culpa praevia11; sed in beatis Angelis nunquam fuit culpa: ergo nec fuit nec potest esse tristitia.
4. Item, Angelus non magis meretur in ministrando bono quam malo, cum ex voluntate aequaliter bona12 ministret utrique: ergo si remuneratio pensatur secundum meritum, non minus remuneratur Angelus, cum custodit praescitum, quam cum custodit praedestinatum: ergo videtur, quod ex illius damnatione nullum incurrat Angelus detrimentum.
Quaestio incidens 1. Iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum Angelus velit illum quem custodit, salvari, cum revelatum est sibi, ipsum esse praescitum. Si non vult ipsum salvari, ergo videtur eum custodire invite; si vult, ergo videtur, quod voluntas eius voluntati divinae non conformetur nec quod etiam impleatur.
Quaest. incidens 2. Item, cum custodit praescitum, quaero: quod praemium ei ex hoc redditur? Substantiale non, constat; accidentale non, ut videtur, quia illud consistit circa salvationem eorum quos custodiunt, sicut patet in praemio aureolae, quod habent praedicantes13.
CONCLUSIO.
Angeli ex damnatione eorum quos custodiunt, nec concipiunt gemitum nec incurrunt aliquod gloriae detrimentum.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc diversimode senserunt diversi.
Opinio 1. Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod Angeli beati ex damnatione eorum quos custodiunt, etsi non incurrant detrimentum gloriae, concipiunt tamen gemitum misericordiae. Quamvis enim sint ex sublimitate gloriae immortales et impassibiles, non sunt tamen incompassibiles. Et hoc accipiunt ex quodam verbo Bernardi14, qui videtur hoc dicere; et dicunt, verbum Isaiae superius dictum sic intelligendum esse. — Improbatur. Sed tamen illud non videtur intelligibile, quomodo aliquis possit compati et non pati. Nec illud videtur probabile, quod Angeli aliqua pietate et misericordia flectantur ad reprobos, cum ipsi maxime zelent iustitiam et divinam gloriam, utpote qui iam sunt constituti in perfecto
statu iustitiae. Propter quod dicit Gregorius in quadam homilia15, quod ad reprobos non habent compassionem iustorum animae. Ait enim sic: «Iustorum animae, etsi naturae suae bonitate misericordiam habent, iam nunc, auctoris sui iustitiae coniunctae, tanta rectitudine constringuntur, ut nulla ad reprobos compassione moveantur»; loquitur de Beatis.
Opinio 2. et conclusio. Et propter hoc est alia positio, quod Angeli custodientes ex damnatione eorum quos custodiunt, nec concipiunt gemitum nec incurrunt aliquod gloriae detrimentum. Gemitum non concipiunt propter plenitudinem gaudii, quod adeo perfectum est, ut nullo modo suscipiat admixtionem contrarii. Detrimentum etiam non patiuntur propter stabilitatem boni adepti: nihil enim habent quod possint amittere, nec ex parte meriti nec ex parte praemii, cum sint in gloria et in iustitia confirmati. Et quoniam detrimentum dicit amissionem alicuius boni habiti, ideo ex nullo eventu detrimentum aliquod possunt pati. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae ad hoc inducuntur.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. 2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod Deus requiret animam custoditi de manu custodientis; dicendum, quod verum est, cum perit propter custodis negligentiam. Et quia in beatis Angelis nulla cadit negligentia, ideo de manu ipsorum nullus damnatus requiritur. Et propterea verbum Origenis, quod sequitur, si simpliciter intelligatur, est falsum. Nullo enim modo Angeli boni culpabuntur nec in iudicium adducentur; nisi forte quis dicat, hoc debere intelligi, quod adducentur in iudicium non ad suam condemnationem, sed ad manifestandum, quod reprobi ex sua sunt damnati malitia, non ex suorum custodum negligentia; vel nisi quis intelligat verbum Origenis, ut Angeli dicantur ibi praelati. — Et per hunc modum verbum Isaiae, quod subsequitur, potest intelligi vel exponi, ut Angeli pacis dicantur ibi boni praelati. Si tamen quis intelligit de Angelis beatis secundum veritatem, amaritudo fletus non indicat veritatem doloris, sed aliquam conformitatem notat in signo vel effectu exteriori; et potest illud intelligi dictum per anthropopathon, sicut dicitur Deus tactus fuisse dolore cordis intrinsecus, Genesis sexto16.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si oppositum est causa oppositi etc.; dicendum, quod ista maxima habet instantiam, ubi alterum inest per naturam sive ad modum naturae, sicut et illa, quod opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem17. Et quoniam Angelus beatus est susceptibilis gaudii, sed non tristitiae, ideo gaudere potest de salute, quamvis non tristetur ex damnatione.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod frustratio desiderii contristat; dicendum, quod tunc desiderium frustratur, quando quis aliquid appetit in omnem eventum sive absolute, et illud non evenit; quando vero appetit sub conditione, et illa conditio non stat, si illud quod appetit, non evenit, propter hoc non dicitur desiderium frustrari18. Et sic est in proposito. Nam Angelus appetit, eum quem custodit, beatificari, si ipse voluerit fideliter adhaerere Christo; et hoc nunquam fallit, quin eveniat. Et quia ille qui damnatur, recedit ab apposita conditione, ideo in desiderio Angeli nullam ponit frustrationem, dum non ad id pervenit, quod sibi Angelus appetebat.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ex nostra salvatione crescit Angelorum praemium; dicendum, quod verum est, quod crescit praemium accidentale; non tamen sequitur ex hoc, quod ex defectu salutis incurrant Angeli detrimentum vel damnum, quia detrimentum vel damnum est respectu rei iam habitae. Si autem sit respectu rei habendae, hoc solum est, quando ex impedimento aliqua remanet indigentia et imperfectio in eo qui impeditur. Hoc autem non est sic in proposito, quia, quantumcumque ille qui custoditur, damnetur, nihilominus tamen Notandum. Angelus habet suum praemium salvum et quantum ad gaudium, quod habet in Deo, et quantum ad gaudium, quod habet in se ipso sive de bono proprio — gaudebit enim de bonis operibus, quae circa illum fecit quem custodivit — et quantum etiam ad gaudium, quod habet in alio, quia cum unus cadit, alter coronam suam accipit, sicut fuit expositum in primo libro19; et ideo, si ruina angelica non reparatur ex illo quem custodit, reparabitur ex alio. Quamvis ergo propter culpam illius, ne de eo gaudeat, patiatur impedimentum, et ex tali tropo fortassis dicat Origenes, ipsum esse culpandum; nullum tamen ex hoc incurrit detrimentum.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod angelus malus gaudet de damnatione: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, sicut non est reperire malum omnino impermixtum bono, est tamen reperire bonum omnino impermixtum malo; sic reprobatio angelorum aliquo modo admittit gaudium, licet impurum, sed perfecta beatificatio nullum patitur secum tormentum vel gemitum.
Ex praedictis patent illa duo, quae ultimo quaerebantur, scilicet de voluntate et praemio An-
gelorum custodientium malos. — Ad q. incid. 1. Volunt enim, malos quos noverunt esse praescitos, voluntate absoluta damnari; quantum autem in se est, vellent salvari; et ideo non custodiunt inviti, quia, quamvis sciant, se frustra laborare ad perducendum eos ad salutem, tamen sciunt, se fructuose laborare in hoc, quod retrahunt, ne incurrant maiorem damnationem. — Circa animas 4 effectus custodiae. Quadruplex enim consuevit principalis effectus custodiae angelicae assignari circa animas. Unus est, ut proficiat anima in bonum gratiae; alius, ut non cadat in malum culpae; tertius est, si cadat, quod postmodum resurgat; quartus est, ne toties vel in tantum malum cadat, quoties vel ad quantum adversarius incitat. — Alia solutio. Posset tamen aliter dici, quod non est Angelis revelatum, qui ex eis quos custodiunt, salvari debeant, vel damnari; hoc tamen non est certum.
Ad quaest. incid. 2. De praemio vero dicendum, quod sicut duplex est finis artificis: unus in se, et alter in alio, sicut patet in rhetore20, cuius finis est loqui ornate, et hic est finis in se, et alter, alii persuadere, et hic est finis in alio; sic etiam duplex est praemium Angeli accidentale: unum, quo gaudet de bonis operibus, quae fecit; aliud, quo gaudet de salute eius, quem custodivit. Et quemadmodum artifex, si habeat finem primum et careat secundo, nihilominus perfecte dicitur habere methodum, si ex contingentibus nihil omiserit; sic Angelus, qui fideliter custodivit eum qui ex culpa sua damnatur, perfectum habet meritum et praemium, dum de bonis suis operibus gloriatur. Gaudium autem illud, quod est de multiplicatione bonorum operum, non est praemium substantiale, cum non sit de summo bono, sed accidentale; nec tamen est aureola, quia non omne praemium accidentale est aureola, sed illud solum, quod habet praeexcellentiam21.
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Question III.
Whether the Angel incurs any harm from the damnation of the one in his custody.
Third, it is asked whether the Angel incurs any harm from the damnation of the one in his custody. And that he does, it seems:
To the opposite. 1. Third [Book of] Kings, chapter twenty1: Guard this man; if he should fall, your soul will be for his soul;4 from which it is gathered that the Lord commits [the man] to be guarded on this pact, that, if the one guarded is lost, he shall be required from the hand of the guardian. If therefore a man is lost, it seems that the Angel guarding him incurs danger to his own salvation2; and this3 seems
to be what Origen says on that text of Numbers chapter twenty-five5: They were initiated to Baal-Peor; the Gloss: «A good Angel is set over [him], who is blamed for offenses and praised for things well done».
2. Likewise, Isaiah chapter thirty-three6: The Angels of peace shall weep bitterly; it is clear, however, that they weep only on account of the misery and damnation of men: therefore if they sympathize most with those whom they guard, it seems that from the damnation of those they incur groan and lamentation, and so some loss of joy.
3. Likewise, «if the opposite is the cause of the opposite, also the proposed of the proposed7»; but the salvation of men in their custody generates joy and congratulation in the guarding Angels: therefore damnation will generate groan and compassion.
4. Likewise, just as the completion of desire delights the soul, so frustration saddens it8; but the Angel, because he desires that the one he guards be saved, rejoices when he is saved, because his desire is fulfilled: therefore when from his damnation he is frustrated, it seems etc.
5. Likewise, the punishment of Arius always grows on account of the multiplication of those whom by his error he draws to damnation9: therefore on the contrary, from our salvation grows the reward of the Angels guarding us. If therefore we are damned, since they themselves ought to glory in us or about us, it seems that they suffer loss of glory.
6. Likewise, the evil angels rejoice when they can drag a man to torments, and this is because they hate men, whom they harass and tempt: therefore if the good Angels love those whom they guard, it seems that on the contrary they grieve.
On the contrary: Fundamental [arguments]. 1. The good Angel is blessed; but the blessed is he to whom all things succeed according to his nod10; and to him who is of this sort, nothing harmful can befall: therefore it seems that from the damnation of those whom they guard, they incur no harm.
2. Likewise, the good Angel conforms his will to the divine will: therefore if God does not will to save except the predestinate, it seems that neither does the good Angel: therefore if no predestinate is damned, no one is damned whom the good Angel does not will to be damned: therefore it seems that from no one's damnation is he saddened.
3. Likewise, grief and sadness are not without punishment, and punishment is not without prior fault11; but in the blessed Angels there was never fault: therefore neither was there nor can there be sadness.
4. Likewise, the Angel does not merit more in ministering to the good than to the evil, since out of equally good12 will he ministers to each: therefore if recompense is weighed according to merit, the Angel is not less recompensed when he guards a foreknown [reprobate] than when he guards a predestinate: therefore it seems that from the [reprobate's] damnation the Angel incurs no harm.
Incident question 1. Adjoining this it is asked whether the Angel wills him whom he guards to be saved, when it has been revealed to him that he is foreknown [as a reprobate]. If he does not will him to be saved, then it seems he guards him unwillingly; if he does will it, then it seems that his will is not conformed to the divine will nor even fulfilled.
Incident question 2. Likewise, when he guards a foreknown [reprobate], I ask: what reward is given to him from this? Substantial not, it is clear; accidental not, as it seems, because that consists in the salvation of those whom they guard, as is clear in the reward of the aureola which preachers have13.
Conclusion.
The Angels from the damnation of those whom they guard neither conceive a groan nor incur any loss of glory.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that on this matter different [authors] have held differently.
Opinion 1. For some have wished to say that the blessed Angels, from the damnation of those whom they guard, although they incur no loss of glory, nevertheless conceive a groan of mercy. For although by the sublimity of glory they are immortal and impassible, they are nevertheless not incompassionate. And they take this from a certain word of Bernard14, who seems to say this; and they say that the text of Isaiah quoted above is to be so understood. — It is disproved. But this does not seem intelligible, how anyone can suffer with and not suffer. Nor does it seem probable that the Angels are moved by any piety and mercy toward the reprobate, since they themselves most greatly zealously pursue justice and the divine glory, as those who are now already established in the perfect
state of justice. On account of which Gregory in a certain homily15 says that toward the reprobate the souls of the just have no compassion. For he speaks thus: «The souls of the just, although by the goodness of their nature they have mercy, even now, joined to the justice of their Author, are constrained by such rectitude that they are moved by no compassion toward the reprobate»; he is speaking of the Blessed.
Opinion 2 and the conclusion. And on account of this there is another position, that the guarding Angels, from the damnation of those whom they guard, neither conceive a groan nor incur any loss of glory. They do not conceive a groan on account of the plenitude of joy, which is so perfect that in no way does it admit the admixture of a contrary. They also do not suffer loss on account of the stability of the good they have attained: for they have nothing which they could lose, neither on the side of merit nor on the side of reward, since they are confirmed in glory and in justice. And since loss names the loss of some good [already] had, therefore from no event can they suffer any loss. — And the reasons advanced for this are to be conceded.
Solution of the opposing [arguments]. 1. 2. To what is objected, that God will require the soul of the guarded from the hand of the guardian; it must be said that this is true when [the guarded] perishes through the guardian's negligence. And because in the blessed Angels no negligence falls, therefore from their hand no damned [soul] is required. And for this reason the word of Origen which follows, if taken simply, is false. For in no way will the good Angels be blamed nor brought to judgment; unless perhaps someone should say that this is to be understood thus: that they will be brought to judgment not for their own condemnation, but to make manifest that the reprobate are damned from their own malice, not from their guardians' negligence; or unless someone understands Origen's word in such a way that Angels are there called prelates. — And by this mode the text of Isaiah which follows can be understood or expounded, so that Angels of peace are there called good prelates. If, however, someone understands [it] of the blessed Angels according to the truth, the bitterness of weeping does not indicate true grief, but notes some conformity in outward sign or effect; and that can be understood as said by anthropopathy, just as God is said to have been touched with grief of heart inwardly, Genesis chapter six16.
3. To what is objected, that if the opposite is the cause of the opposite etc.; it must be said that this maxim has an exception where the other [opposite] is present by nature or in the manner of nature, just as also the maxim that opposites are by nature [apt] to come about concerning the same [subject]17. And since the blessed Angel is susceptible of joy, but not of sadness, therefore he can rejoice over salvation, although he is not saddened by damnation.
4. To what is objected, that frustration of desire saddens; it must be said that a desire is then frustrated when someone wants something in every event or absolutely, and that does not come about; but when he wants it under a condition, and that condition does not stand, if what he wants does not come about, on this account the desire is not said to be frustrated18. And so it is in the matter at hand. For the Angel desires the one he guards to be beatified, if he himself shall faithfully wish to cleave to Christ; and this never fails to come about. And because the one who is damned departs from the appended condition, therefore in the Angel's desire he places no frustration when he does not arrive at that which the Angel desired for him.
5. To what is objected, that from our salvation the reward of the Angels grows; it must be said that it is true that the accidental reward grows; nevertheless it does not follow from this that from the failure of salvation the Angels incur harm or damage, because harm or damage is with respect to a thing already had. But if it is with respect to a thing to be had, this is only when from some impediment some need and imperfection remains in him who is impeded. But this is not so in the matter at hand, because, however much the one who is guarded be damned, nevertheless the Note. Angel has his reward intact both as to the joy which he has in God, and as to the joy which he has in himself or from his own good — for he will rejoice over the good works which he did concerning the one whom he guarded — and as to the joy which he has in another, because when one falls, another receives his crown, as was expounded in the first book19; and so, if the angelic ruin is not repaired by the one he guards, it will be repaired by another. Although therefore on account of the fault of that one, lest he rejoice over him, he suffers an impediment, and from such a figure of speech perhaps Origen says he is to be blamed; nevertheless from this he incurs no loss.
6. To what is objected, that the evil angel rejoices over damnation: therefore etc.; it must be said that the case is not similar, because, just as it is not [possible] to find evil entirely unmixed with good, but it is [possible] to find good entirely unmixed with evil; so the reprobation of the angels in some way admits joy, though impure, but perfect beatification suffers with it no torment or groan.
From what has been said there appear those two things which were last asked, namely concerning the will and reward of the Angels
guarding the evil. — To incident question 1. For they will, by an absolute will, that the evil whom they know to be foreknown [as reprobate] be damned; but as far as in themselves lies, they would wish them saved; and therefore they do not guard them unwillingly, because, although they know they labor in vain to lead them to salvation, nevertheless they know that they labor fruitfully in this, that they hold them back lest they incur greater damnation. — Four effects of custody concerning souls. For a fourfold principal effect of angelic custody is wont to be assigned concerning souls. One is that the soul should advance in the good of grace; another, that it should not fall into the evil of fault; a third, that if it fall, it should afterward rise again; a fourth, that it should not fall into evil as often or as deeply as the adversary incites. — Another solution. It could also be said otherwise, that it is not revealed to the Angels which of those whom they guard ought to be saved or damned; this however is not certain.
To incident question 2. On the reward, however, it must be said that just as the end of the craftsman is twofold: one in himself, and another in another, as is clear in the rhetorician20, whose end is to speak ornately, and this is the end in himself, and another, to persuade another, and this is the end in another; so also the accidental reward of the Angel is twofold: one by which he rejoices over the good works which he did; another, by which he rejoices over the salvation of him whom he guarded. And just as a craftsman, if he have the first end and lack the second, is nevertheless said perfectly to have his method, if he has omitted nothing of the contingencies; so the Angel who has faithfully guarded one who is damned by his own fault, has perfect merit and reward, while he glories in his own good works. But that joy which is over the multiplication of good works is not the substantial reward, since it is not of the highest good, but the accidental; nor however is it the aureola, because not every accidental reward is the aureola, but only that which has pre-excellence21.
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- Codd. W X Y bb cc et quia.Codices W, X, Y, bb, cc read et quia.
- In cod. V additur accidentale, in Vat. creatum.In codex V is added accidentale; in the Vatican edition, creatum.
- In quaest. seq.In the following question.
- Vers. 39.Verse 39.
- Vers. 3. — Origenes, hom. 20. in Num. n. 4. et hom. 13. in Luc. Cfr. Lyranus in hunc locum.Verse 3. — Origen, Homily 20 on Numbers n. 4 and Homily 13 on Luke. Cf. Lyra on this passage.
- Vers. 7.Verse 7.
- Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4: Si oppositum in opposito, et propositum in proposito erit.Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 4: If the opposite [is] in the opposite, then the proposed will be in the proposed.
- August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 3 n. 2: Frustrata quippe cupiditas, sive non perveniendo quo tendebat, sive amittendo quo pervenerat, vertitur in dolorem.Augustine, On the City of God XXI, c. 3, n. 2: For frustrated desire, whether by not arriving where it was tending, or by losing what it had reached, turns into grief.
- Libr. IV. Sent. d. 46. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 2. ad opp. haec sententia attribuitur Augustino.Book IV of the Sentences, dist. 46, a. 1, q. 1, in arg. 2 ad opp., this opinion is attributed to Augustine.
- Boeth., II. de Consol. prosa 4: Adde, quod felicissimi cuiusque delicatissimus sensus est, et nisi ad nutum cuncta suppetant, omnis adversitatis insolens, minimis quibusque prosternitur, adeo perexigua sunt quae fortunatissimis beatitudinis summam detrahunt. — Aliqui codd. ad votum, cod. A optata ad votum pro ad nutum.Boethius, On the Consolation II, prose 4: «Add that the most fortunate has the most delicate sensibility, and unless all things meet his beck, intolerant of any adversity, he is laid low by the slightest things — so very slight are the things which detract from the sum of beatitude of the most fortunate». — Some codices read ad votum, codex A optata ad votum for ad nutum.
- Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51.Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 18, n. 51.
- Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 dona.Many codices along with editions 1 and 2 read dona.
- Cfr. infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Vat. praedicatores.Cf. below, d. 40, a. 2, q. 1 and following. — The Vatican edition reads praedicatores.
- Libr. V. de Consid. c. 4 n. 7: Et primo quidem cives spiritus esse illic potentes... impassibiles... affectu benignos, religione pios etc. — Verbum Isaiae habetur hic in arg. 2. ad opp.Book V On Consideration, c. 4, n. 7: «And first indeed the citizens are spirits there, powerful... impassible... benign in affection, religious in piety» etc. — The text of Isaiah is found here in arg. 2 ad opp.
- In Evang. hom. 40. n. 7: Iustorum animae, quamvis in suae naturae bonitate misericordiam habeant, iam tunc auctoris sui etc. — Codd. T aa habeant pro habent et cod. A tunc pro nunc.On the Gospel, hom. 40, n. 7: The souls of the just, although in the goodness of their nature they have mercy, even then [joined to] their Author etc. — Codices T, aa read habeant for habent and codex A reads tunc for nunc.
- Vers. 6. — Quid sibi velit dictio per anthropopathon, a Graecis verbis ἄνθρωπος i. e. homo et πάθος i. e. passio, explicatur per notulam in cod. W ad marginem scriptam: quando passio humana attribuitur Deo.Verse 6. — What the expression per anthropopathon means — from the Greek words ἄνθρωπος i.e. man and πάθος i.e. passion — is explained by a small marginal note in codex W: when human passion is attributed to God.
- Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. et I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 3. ad 5, ut bene a secunda manu in cod. P notatur. — In fine solutionis plures codd. cum ed. 1 de damnatione.Cf. above, d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1, and I Sent. d. 17, p. II, q. 3, ad 5, as is well noted by a second hand in codex P. — At the end of the solution several codices along with ed. 1 read de damnatione.
- Vide I. Sent. d. 46. q. 1.See I Sent. d. 46, q. 1.
- Dist. 40. a. 2. q. 2. — Alluditur hic ad illud Apoc. 3, 11: Tene quod habes, ut nemo accipiat coronam tuam. — Mox plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 etsi, Vat. ideo et si pro et ideo si, quod habet cod. W.Dist. 40, a. 2, q. 2. — Allusion is made here to Apoc. 3, 11: Hold what you have, that no one take your crown. — Soon afterward most codices along with ed. 1 read etsi; the Vatican edition reads ideo et si for et ideo si, which codex W has.
- Cfr. Aristot., I. de Arte rhetorica, c. 1. seqq. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 in rhetorica.Cf. Aristotle, On the Art of Rhetoric I, c. 1 and following. — Codex cc and ed. 1 read in rhetorica.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question. ---