Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 26
Articulus Unicus. De gratiae quidditate.
Quaestio I. Utrum gratia ponat aliquid circa gratificatum.1
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod gratia Dei aliquid ponat circa gratificatum.
1. Dicitur enim Ioannis primo2: De plenitudine eius accepimus gratiam pro gratia. Si igitur quod accepimus in nobis est, divina gratia in gratificatis sive acceptatis a Deo habet esse.
2. Item, primae ad Corinthios duodecimo3: Divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spiritus, dividens singulis, prout vult; hoc autem non esset, nisi donum gratiae in singulis aliquid poneret: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum de gratia gratis data; tunc arguitur a minori4, quod si gratia gratis data aliquid ponit in gratificato, multo magis gratia gratum faciens, quae maioris est efficaciae et magis reddit ipsum gratificatum Deo acceptabilem.
3. Item, gratia gratum faciente efficitur quis dignus superna beatitudine; sed omnis dignitas aliquid ponit in eo in quo est5: ergo dignitas retributionis aeternae aliquid ponit in eo qui dignus est; hoc autem non est nisi gratia: ergo etc.
4. Item, culpa, ex qua Deus hominem odit et reprobat, ponit aliquam deformitatem in eo qui reprobatur: ergo pari ratione gratia, ob quam Deus aliquem diligit et approbat, aliquid ponit in eo qui acceptatur.
5. Item, contingit, aliquem, qui non est gratus Deo, fieri gratum; sed hoc non est propter mutationem aliquam factam ex parte Dei acceptantis: ergo hoc est propter mutationem aliquam factam ex parte hominis acceptati. Sed talis mutatio nihil ab homine tollit: ergo aliquid circa hominem acceptatum ponit.
6. Item, Deus est aequus ponderator6: ergo non magis acceptat unum hominem quam alium, nisi aliquod donum et aliquod bonum sit in uno, quod non est in altero; hoc autem vocamus ipsam gratiam: ergo gratia Dei aliquid ponit circa ipsum gratificatum et acceptatum a Deo.
Sed contra: 1. Danielis primo7: Dedit Dominus gratiam Danieli in conspectu principis eunuchorum etc.; sed constat, quod tunc nihil novum collatum est Danieli ad hoc, quod acceptaretur ab illo eunuchorum principe: si ergo Deus est benignior et ad acceptandum promptior, videtur, quod nihil oporteat in homine poni ad hoc, quod acceptetur a Deo. Si igitur gratiam Dei habere non est aliud quam Deo esse acceptum, videtur etc.
2. Item, videmus experimento, quod homo homini efficitur gratus ex solo aspectu, nec aliquid dat homo homini, cum suscipit illum in gratiam suam: ergo pari ratione non oportet aliquid dari homini, ut suscipiatur in gratiam Dei.
3. Item, omnis ille est alii gratus, qui est ab eo dilectus; sed dilectio Dei non ponit circa dilectum aliquid novum, quoniam dilexit nos ante mundi constitutionem, sicut dicitur ad Ephesios primo8: dilexit etiam nos, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, sicut dicitur ad Romanos quinto: ergo pari ratione nec illa acceptatio sive gratificatio aliquid ponet circa gratificatum.
4. Item, solis precibus alicuius absque aliquo munere interveniente potest quis amicus et gratus effici alicui, cuius prius erat inimicus et odiosus. Si igitur hoc est in homine; cum Deus multo pronior sit ad miserendum quam homo, videtur, quod multo fortius hoc possit reperiri circa gratiam Dei.
5. Item, sic se habet gratia ad gratificatum, et acceptatio ad acceptatum, sicut se habet laus ad laudatum; sed laus nihil ponit circa laudatum, sed circa laudantem9: ergo nec gratia circa gratificatum, sed circa gratificantem.
6. Item, abundantioris caritatis est diligere et acceptare eum qui minus est dignus amore, sicut inimicum, quam amicum: ergo divina caritas et bonitas non solum acceptat bonos, sed etiam quantumcumque malos; non solum dignos, sed etiam quantumcumque indignos: ergo divina acceptatio sive gratificatio non videtur aliquid ponere circa ipsum acceptatum aut10 gratificatum.
Conclusio.
Gratia divina in gratificato aliquid ponit.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod gratia divina aliquid ponit circa gratificatum sive acceptatum. — Et ratio huius est ista, quia divina voluntas in acceptando non afficitur, divina veritas in approbando non fallitur, et neutra earum in gratificando mutatur. — Quia divina voluntas in acceptando non afficitur nec acceptat aliquem propter novum affectum, necesse est, quod acceptet propter aliquem effectum, et ita aliquis effectus ponitur circa eum11 qui acceptatur. — Quia veritas divina in approbando non fallitur, ideo non praefert unum alteri nec approbat magis unum quam alterum, nisi quia habet in se aliquid, quod est magis dignum approbatione divina. Neminem autem acceptat, nisi quem approbat, et ita nemo est gratus vel Deo acceptus, nisi in se habeat aliquid, per quod sit approbatione dignus. — Quia vero voluntas non mutatur in acceptando, nec veritas in approbando; cum aliquis de novo incipit approbari vel acceptari, et nulla cadit mutatio ex parte Dei acceptantis vel approbantis: necesse est, quod aliqua cadat mutatio ex parte acceptati et approbati. Sed hoc non est, quia aliquid ei aufertur: est ergo mutatio, quia aliquod donum sibi a Deo confertur. — Et sic patet, quod gratia aliquod donum ponit circa ipsum gratificatum. Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.
Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:
Ad 1, 2. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de gratia humana, de qua dicitur, quod Deus dedit gratiam Danieli etc.; dicendum, quod illud simile deficit in tribus conditionibus praeassignatis: tum quia homo in acceptando afficitur; tum quia iudicium eius frequenter decipitur; tum etiam quia, cum de non acceptante fit acceptans, in se ipso mutatur. Hoc autem in Deo non ponitur; et ideo non est simile. Et per hoc patet primum et secundum obiectum.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de dilectione, quod non ponit aliquid in dilecto; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod dilectio se extendit non solummodo ad praesens, verum etiam ad futurum12 — unde non tantum diligit nos Deus dilectione temporali, sed etiam aeterna — acceptatio vero et gratificatio solum ad praesens se extendit; et ideo effectum non solum in habitu, sed etiam in actu ponit circa ipsum acceptatum et gratificatum.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solae preces reconciliant; dicendum, quod illud locum habet, ubi reconciliatio fit per mutationem affectionis, ut cum aliquis, qui alicui prius erat iratus, per preces alicuius mitigatur. Hoc autem circa Deum non ponitur; et si aliquando in Scriptura13 dici videatur, figurative intelligendum est, videlicet per anthropopathon.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de laude, dicendum, quod sicut laus creaturae non ponit aliquid circa laudatum, sed circa laudantem; sic etiam gratia, qua unus homo alterum acceptat. Deus autem, qui non verbo eum laudat, sed approbatione, laudando aliquid ponit circa laudatum. Unde ex hoc non sequitur, quod gratia divina nihil ponat. — Posset tamen dici, quod non est simile de laude et gratia, quia laus respicit personam extrinsecam, cui laudatus ipse manifestus efficitur: sed acceptatio respicit bona intrinseca, ex quibus una persona redditur alteri accepta.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris caritatis est acceptare eum qui minus dignus est; dicendum, quod acceptatio non tantum respicit opus vel effectum sive donum largitatis, sed etiam iudicium veritatis. Qui enim alterum acceptat ipsum etiam approbat. Et quoniam divina veritas et aequitas non potest approbare nisi bonum et aequum; nullus, quamdiu manet in sua iniquitate, potest esse Deo acceptus, etsi etiam multa sibi beneficia a Deo impendantur. Et sic patet, quod ratio sua non cogit, quia sic est divinae largitatis immensitas, ut non excludatur divinae veritatis infallibilis14 aequitas.
I. Tractatum de gratia (d. 26-29.) S. Doctor incipit ab hac fundamentali quaestione, quae proprie est de gratia gratum faciente. — Quoad terminos hic et passim occurrentes praenotanda est quaedam differentia, quae est tum inter antiquos theologos et recentiores, tum inter ipsos antiquos. — Gratia sanctificans, ab antiquis dicta gratum faciens, a recentioribus theologis etiam habitualis vocatur, ut distinguatur a gratia actuali. Antiqui autem Scholastici solebant gratiam supernaturalem dividere in duo membra principalia, videlicet, in gratiam gratis datam et gratiam gratum facientem. Gratia gratis data iam a S. Thoma (S. 1. II. q. 111. a. 1.) cum recentioribus accipitur ut illud donum Dei supernaturale, quod «non datur ad hoc, ut homo ipse per eam iustificetur, sed potius, ut ad iustificationem alterius cooperetur». Divisiones huius gratiae, enumeratae ab Apostolo (I. Cor. 12, 8. seqq.), explicantur ab Alexandro Hal. (S. p. III. q. 63. m. 3.) et a S. Thoma (loc. cit. a. 4.). Etiam S. Bonav. saepe in hoc sensu intelligit gratias gratis datas, v. g. infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2, et IV. Sent. d. 7. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2, d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 5. In aliis autem locis idem etiam gratiam a nobis dictam actualem inter gratias gratis datas recenset, ut infra d. 27. dub., immo d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. explicite declarat, quod hoc nomen, praeter ea quae enumerat Apostolus I. Cor. 12, 8, indicat «quidquid illud sit, quod superadditum est naturalibus, adiuvans aliquo modo et praeparans voluntatem ad habitum, vel usum gratiae». Sequitur autem S. Bonav. in hoc modo loquendi Alexandrum Hal., qui non tantum gratias actuales, sed etiam habitus fidei et spei tunc vocat gratias gratis datas, quando non sunt coniuncta cum gratia sanctificante; in habentibus autem eandem nec nomine actualem distinguit a gratia gratum faciente. Ita enim Alex. (S. p. III. q. 61. m. 6. a. 3. ad 1.) loquitur de excitatione gratiae: «Gratia duplex est, scil. gratum faciens et gratis data, et haec non est gratum faciens, sed tamen disponens... Dicendum ergo, quod in existentibus in peccato mortali non est excitatio a gratia gratum faciente, sed a gratia disponente vel gratis data; quia habent fidem informem, quae excitat eos ad cogitandum de divino iudicio» etc. Idem (ibid. q. 63. m. 2.) dicit: «Gratia gratis data proprie dicitur donum infusum rationali naturae sine meritis... disponens ad salutem propriam, vel aedificationem alterius»; cuius definitionis singula verba ibi explicans, de verbis disponens ad salutem dicit: «Ad differentiam gratiae gratum facientis, quae non est sicut dispositio ad salutem, quasi distans, sed est dispositio salutis, quia habens illam dignus est salute aeterna; immo gratia gratum faciens est ipsa salus, ad quam disponit gratia gratis data» (cfr. etiam ibid. m. 3.). — Eodem modo loquendi utitur etiam Petr. a Tar. Scotus autem modum distinguendi a S. Thoma adhibitum approbat, dum (IV. Sent. d. 6. q. 9. n. 11.) dicit: Omne donum Dei datum homini aut est «gratum faciens, vel gratis datum, sic intelligendo hoc quod est gratum faciens vel actualiter, vel dispositive». — De acceptatione Dei, qua homo adoptatur in filium, cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1, et Breviloq. p. V. c. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3. § 1; S. Thom., de Verit. q. 27. a. 1. — De hac et seq. quaest. alii auctores unica quaest. agere solent, et plerique commentatores tantum ad I. Sent. d. 17. Sed Alex. Hal. et Petr. a Tar. specialiter disputant de hac 1. quaest.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 1. (edd. Veneta et Colon.). — Scot., in utroque Scripto, I. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1; S. I. II. q. 110. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 150; de Verit. q. 27. a. 1. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 17. a. 1; S. p. II. fr. 16. q. 98. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 1. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.
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Article (Sole). On the quiddity of grace.
Question I. Whether grace places something in the one made pleasing.1
Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is shown that the grace of God places something in the one made pleasing.
1. For it is said in John, chapter one2: Of his fullness we have all received, and grace for grace. If, therefore, what we have received is in us, the divine grace has being in those made pleasing or accepted by God.
2. Likewise, first to the Corinthians, chapter twelve3: There are divisions of graces, but the same Spirit, dividing to each one as he wills; but this would not be so, unless the gift of grace placed something in each one: therefore etc. If you say that this is said of gratuitously given grace (gratia gratis data); then it is argued from the lesser4, that if gratuitously given grace places something in the one made pleasing, much more does grace that makes pleasing (gratia gratum faciens), which is of greater efficacy and renders him more pleasing and acceptable to God.
3. Likewise, by grace that makes pleasing one is made worthy of supernal beatitude; but every worthiness places something in that in which it is5: therefore the worthiness of eternal reward places something in him who is worthy; but this is nothing other than grace: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, fault, by reason of which God hates and reprobates a man, places some deformity in him who is reprobated: therefore by parity of reasoning grace, on account of which God loves and approves someone, places something in him who is accepted.
5. Likewise, it happens that someone who is not pleasing to God is made pleasing; but this is not on account of any change made on the part of God who accepts: therefore it is on account of some change made on the part of the man who is accepted. But such a change takes nothing away from the man: therefore it places something in the man who is accepted.
6. Likewise, God is a just weigher6: therefore he does not accept one man more than another, unless some gift and some good is in the one which is not in the other; but this we call grace itself: therefore the grace of God places something in the very one made pleasing and accepted by God.
On the contrary: 1. Daniel, chapter one7: The Lord gave Daniel grace in the sight of the prince of the eunuchs etc.; but it is plain that at that time nothing new was conferred upon Daniel that he should be accepted by that prince of the eunuchs: if therefore God is more benign and more ready to accept, it seems that nothing need be placed in a man that he should be accepted by God. If, therefore, to have the grace of God is nothing other than to be acceptable to God, it seems etc.
2. Likewise, we see by experience that one man becomes pleasing to another from his mere appearance, nor does the one man give the other anything when he receives him into his favor: therefore by parity of reasoning it is not necessary that anything be given to a man that he be received into the favor of God.
3. Likewise, everyone is pleasing to another who is loved by him; but the love of God does not place anything new in the beloved, since he loved us before the foundation of the world, as is said to the Ephesians, chapter one8: he loved us also while we were yet sinners, as is said to the Romans, chapter five: therefore by parity of reasoning neither does that acceptance or making-pleasing place anything in the one made pleasing.
4. Likewise, by someone's prayers alone, without any gift intervening, one can be made a friend and pleasing to someone whose enemy and hateful he formerly was. If, therefore, this is so in man, then, since God is far more prone to mercy than man, it seems that this can far more strongly be found in the case of God's grace.
5. Likewise, grace is related to the one made pleasing, and acceptance to the one accepted, just as praise is related to the one praised; but praise places nothing in the one praised, but in the one praising9: therefore neither does grace place anything in the one made pleasing, but in the one making pleasing.
6. Likewise, it belongs to a more abundant charity to love and accept him who is less worthy of love, such as an enemy, than a friend: therefore divine charity and goodness accepts not only the good, but even the wicked, however wicked; not only the worthy, but even the unworthy, however unworthy: therefore divine acceptance or making-pleasing does not seem to place anything in the very one accepted or10 made pleasing.
Conclusion.
Divine grace places something in the one made pleasing.
I respond: It must be said that divine grace places something in the one made pleasing or accepted. — And the reason for this is this: that the divine will in accepting is not affected, the divine truth in approving is not deceived, and neither of them is changed in making pleasing. — Because the divine will in accepting is not affected, nor does it accept anyone on account of a new affection, it is necessary that it accept on account of some effect, and thus some effect is placed in him11 who is accepted. — Because the divine truth in approving is not deceived, therefore it does not prefer one to another, nor approve one more than another, except because he has in himself something which is more worthy of divine approval. But it accepts no one except whom it approves, and thus no one is pleasing or accepted by God unless he has in himself something by which he is worthy of approval. — But because the will is not changed in accepting, nor the truth in approving; when someone newly begins to be approved or accepted, and no change falls on the part of God who accepts or approves: it is necessary that some change fall on the part of the one accepted and approved. But this is not because something is taken away from him: the change is therefore because some gift is conferred upon him by God. — And thus it is plain that grace places some gift in the very one made pleasing. Hence the reasons that show this are to be granted.
To the arguments for the opposing side:
To 1 and 2. As for that which is objected to the contrary concerning human grace, of which it is said that God gave grace to Daniel etc.; it must be said that that comparison fails in the three conditions assigned beforehand: both because man in accepting is affected; and because his judgment is frequently deceived; and also because, when from a non-accepter he becomes an accepter, he is changed in himself. But this is not posited in God; and therefore it is not similar. And by this the first and second objections are answered.
To 3. As for that which is objected concerning love, that it does not place anything in the beloved; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that love extends not only to the present, but also to the future12 — whence God loves us not only with a temporal love, but also with an eternal one — whereas acceptance and making-pleasing extends only to the present; and therefore it places an effect in the one accepted and made pleasing not only in habit, but even in act.
To 4. As for that which is objected, that prayers alone reconcile; it must be said that that holds where reconciliation is brought about through a change of affection, as when someone who was previously angry at another is mollified through someone's prayers. But this is not posited in the case of God; and if at times in Scripture13 it seems to be said, it must be understood figuratively, namely by anthropopathy.
To 5. As for that which is objected concerning praise, it must be said that just as the praise of a creature places nothing in the one praised, but in the one praising; so too the grace by which one man accepts another. But God, who praises him not by word, but by approval, in praising places something in the one praised. Hence from this it does not follow that divine grace places nothing. — Yet it could be said that praise and grace are not similar, because praise regards an extrinsic person, to whom the one praised is made manifest: but acceptance regards intrinsic goods, by which one person is rendered acceptable to another.
To 6. As for that which is objected, that it belongs to a greater charity to accept him who is less worthy; it must be said that acceptance regards not only the work or effect or gift of generosity, but also the judgment of truth. For whoever accepts another also approves him. And since divine truth and equity cannot approve anything except the good and the equitable; no one, so long as he remains in his iniquity, can be pleasing to God, even though many benefits be bestowed upon him by God. And thus it is plain that his argument does not compel, because the immensity of the divine generosity is such that the infallible14 equity of the divine truth is not excluded.
I. The treatise on grace (d. 26-29) the holy Doctor begins from this fundamental question, which is properly concerning grace that makes pleasing (gratia gratum faciens). — Concerning the terms occurring here and throughout, a certain distinction must be noted, which exists both between the ancient theologians and the more recent ones, and among the ancients themselves. — Sanctifying grace, called by the ancients grace that makes pleasing, is also called habitual by more recent theologians, that it may be distinguished from actual grace. The ancient Scholastics, moreover, used to divide supernatural grace into two principal members, namely, into gratuitously given grace and grace that makes pleasing. Gratuitously given grace is already taken by St. Thomas (Summa I-II, q. 111, a. 1), along with the more recent theologians, as that supernatural gift of God which "is not given that a man himself be justified by it, but rather that he cooperate toward the justification of another." The divisions of this grace, enumerated by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:8 ff.), are explained by Alexander of Hales (Summa p. III, q. 63, m. 3) and by St. Thomas (loc. cit., a. 4). St. Bonaventure too often understands gratuitously given graces in this sense, e.g. below d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2, and IV Sent. d. 7, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 5. But in other places the same author also reckons among the gratuitously given graces the grace called by us actual, as below d. 27, dub., indeed d. 28, a. 2, q. 1, he explicitly declares that this name, besides those things which the Apostle enumerates in 1 Cor. 12:8, indicates "whatever it may be that is superadded to the natural endowments, aiding in some way and preparing the will toward the habit or use of grace." But St. Bonaventure follows in this manner of speaking Alexander of Hales, who calls not only actual graces, but also the habits of faith and hope, gratuitously given graces when these are not joined with sanctifying grace; but in those who have the same he does not distinguish it even by the name actual from grace that makes pleasing. For thus Alexander (Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 6, a. 3, ad 1) speaks of the excitation of grace: "Grace is twofold, namely that which makes pleasing and that which is gratuitously given, and this latter is not what-makes-pleasing, but is nevertheless disposing... It must therefore be said that in those existing in mortal sin there is no excitation from grace that makes pleasing, but from disposing or gratuitously given grace; for they have unformed faith, which excites them to think about the divine judgment" etc. The same author (ibid. q. 63, m. 2) says: "Gratuitously given grace is properly called a gift infused into a rational nature without merits... disposing toward one's own salvation, or the edification of another"; and explaining there the individual words of this definition, concerning the words disposing toward salvation he says: "As distinct from grace that makes pleasing, which is not like a disposition toward salvation, as it were at a distance, but is a disposition of salvation, because one who has it is worthy of eternal salvation; indeed grace that makes pleasing is salvation itself, toward which gratuitously given grace disposes" (cf. also ibid. m. 3). — Peter of Tarentaise uses the same manner of speaking. Scotus, however, approves the manner of distinguishing employed by St. Thomas, when (IV Sent. d. 6, q. 9, n. 11) he says: Every gift of God given to a man is either "what-makes-pleasing or gratuitously given, understanding in this way that it is what-makes-pleasing either actually or dispositively." — Concerning the acceptance of God, by which a man is adopted as a son, cf. below d. 29, a. 1, q. 1, and Breviloquium p. V, c. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 91, m. 1, a. 3, § 1; St. Thomas, de Veritate q. 27, a. 1. — Concerning this and the following question other authors are wont to treat in a single question, and most commentators only at I Sent. d. 17. But Alexander of Hales and Peter of Tarentaise dispute specially concerning this first question.
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1 (Venetian and Cologne editions). — Scotus, in both Writings, I Sent. d. 17, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1; Summa I-II, q. 110, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 150; de Veritate q. 27, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 17, a. 1; Summa p. II, fr. 16, q. 98, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, sole question, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, I Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, I Sent. d. 17, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, I Sent. d. 17, q. 1.
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- Pro gratia sit cod. F hic et paulo post gratia ponat.For gratia sit ["grace be"], codex F here and a little later reads gratia ponat ["grace place"].
- Vers. 16: De plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus et gratiam pro gratia.Verse 16: Of his fullness we have all received, and grace for grace. [John 1:16.]
- Vers. 4.Verse 4. [1 Cor. 12:4.]
- De hoc modo argumentandi cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.On this mode of arguing, cf. tome I, p. 835, note 5.
- August., 83 Qq. q. 31. n. 3: Gloria est frequens de aliquo fama cum laude; dignitas, alicuius honesta et cultu et honore et verecundia digna auctoritas.Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 31, n. 3: Glory is frequent report of someone together with praise; dignity is the honorable authority of someone, worthy of cultivation, honor, and reverence.
- Prov. 16, 2: Spirituum ponderator est Dominus.Prov. 16:2: The Lord is the weigher of spirits.
- Vers. 9.Verse 9. [Dan. 1:9.]
- Vers. 4: Elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 8. — In fine arg. pro ponet, quae lectio est codd. F K W bb cc et aliorum nec non ed. 1, Vat. ponit.Verse 4: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world. [Eph. 1:4.] — The following text [to the Romans] is at the cited place, v. 8 [Rom. 5:8]. — At the end of the argument, for ponet ["will place"], which is the reading of codices F K W bb cc and others as well as ed. 1, the Vatican edition reads ponit ["places"].
- Namque iuxta Aristot, I. Rhetor. c. 21. (c. 9.) «laus est oratio, quae virtutis magnitudinem explicat». II. Moral. Eudem. c. 1: «Encomium enim oratio est, facta cuiusque singularia exponens; laus vero universalia celebrans; [beati] praedicatio autem finem intendit». Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 1. arg. 1. ad opposit. addit hanc rationem: Quia indifferenter est de ente et de non-ente, ut possumus laudare Caesarem, qui non est, de sapientia, nec tamen in eo ponitur sapientia.For according to Aristotle, Rhetoric I, c. 21 (c. 9), "praise is a discourse that sets forth the magnitude of virtue." Eudemian Ethics II, c. 1: "For an encomium is a discourse setting forth the particular deeds of each; praise, however, celebrating the universal; while the proclamation [of the blessed] intends the end." Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1, arg. 1 to the opposite, adds this reason: That it [praise] regards being and non-being indifferently, so that we can praise Caesar, who does not exist, for his wisdom, and yet wisdom is not placed in him.
- Cod. F sive.Codex F reads sive ["or"].
- Codd. F Q X aa bb ee et alii in eo, Vat. verbis circa eum praemittit esse.Codices F Q X aa bb ee and others read in eo ["in him"]; the Vatican edition prefixes esse ["to be"] to the words circa eum ["around him"].
- Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 31. seq., ubi fusius agitur de dilectione Dei ad creaturam.Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 31 ff., where the love of God toward the creature is treated more fully.
- Gen. 6, 6; Exod. 4, 14. Cfr. supra pag. 288, nota 2, ubi etiam vox anthropopathon etymologice explicatur. — Post dici videatur Vat. addit irasci vel iratus.Gen. 6:6; Exod. 4:14. Cf. above p. 288, note 2, where the word anthropopathon is also explained etymologically. — After dici videatur the Vatican edition adds irasci vel iratus ["to be angry or angered"].
- Codd. A bb cc cum ed. 1 ineffabilis.Codices A bb cc, with ed. 1, read ineffabilis ["ineffable"].