Dist. 7, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 7
Quaestio III. Utrum haec sit concedenda: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei.
Tertio quaeritur de hac: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei, utrum sit concedenda. Et quod sic, videtur.
(Fundamenta.)
1. Ad Romanos primo1: Qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute; sed hoc dicitur aut de filio hominis, aut de Filio Dei; sed non de Filio Dei: ergo de filio hominis.
2. Item, in Glossa2: «Praedestinatus est Iesus, ut qui futurus erat in carne filius David, esset in virtute Filius Dei»; sed Iesus nominat illum hominem: ergo homo ille est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei.
3. Item, quanto maior est gratia, tanto maior secundum illam debet attendi praedestinatio; sed gratia unionis, per quam homo ille factus est Dei Filius, maxima fuit3, quae simul in se continuit gratiam et gloriam: si ergo homo praevisus est Filius Dei esse per gratiam illam, videtur, quod praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei.
4. Item, praedestinatio non attribuitur Filio Dei propter antecessionem, quae quidem non convenit Filio Dei, secundum quod Deus4; sed talis antecessio bene competit homini, secundum quod homo: ergo recte videtur, quod competat sibi praedestinatio. Ergo si non tantum datur illi homini gratia, per quam sit beatus, sed etiam, per quam sit Filius Dei; videtur, quod haec sit concedenda: homo est praedestinatus, ut sit Filius Dei.
Sed contra: (Ad oppositum.)
1. Si homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, et Filius Dei est homo5, ergo Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei; sed haec est falsa: ergo et illa, ex qua sequitur. Sequitur autem ex hac: homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei: ergo etc.
2. Item, praedestinatio non est nisi personae: ergo si homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, aliqua persona est praedestinata esse Filius Dei; aut igitur persona creata, aut persona increata; sed non persona creata, quia talem non est reperire in Christo: ergo persona increata. Sed personae increatae non convenit praedestinari6: ergo videtur, quod non debeat recipi praedictus sermo, iste scilicet: homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei.
3. Item, quicumque praedestinatur, antecedit illud, ad quod praedestinatur, tempore, aut natura; sed homo nec tempore nec natura antecedit Filium Dei: ergo videtur, quod sermo praedictus non debeat concedi.
4. Item, cum dicitur: homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, aut hoc intelligitur, secundum quod homo, aut secundum quod Deus; non secundum quod Deus, hoc constat: ergo intelligitur, secundum quod homo. Sed quicumque est hunc praedestinatus, ab aeterno fuit praedestinatus: ergo secundum quod homo, fuit ab aeterno praedestinatus esse Filius Dei. Sed iste terminus homo supponit verbo de praeterito7: ergo supponit pro praeterito: ergo si aliquis ab aeterno fuit praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, ab aeterno aliquis fuit homo; sed hoc est falsum: ergo et primum.
Conclusio
(Conclusio.) Ab omnibus recipitur locutio: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista locutio distingui habet per eum modum, per quem distincta fuit prius8 posita, ex eo videlicet, quod hoc participium praedestinatus potest dicere antecessionem respectu subiecti, vel respectu praedicati, vel respectu totius copulati. (Distinctio.) Si dicat antecessionem respectu subiecti, vera est locutio, et est sensus: homo, antequam esset homo9, praevisus est esse Filius Dei. (Conclusio 1.) — Si autem notet antecessionem respectu praedicati, falsa est locutio. Est enim sensus: homo praevisus est esse Filius Dei, antequam Filius Dei esset. (Conclusio 2.) — Si autem notet antecessionem respectu totius copulati, vera est. Est enim sensus: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei, id est praedestinatum est, ut homo sit Filius Dei. Et iste sensus ab omnibus opinionibus recipitur10; et ideo secundum communem locutionem concedi potest praedictus sermo. (Conclusio generalis.) — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.
Ad argumenta pro parte negativa: (Solutio oppositorum.)
Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quodsi homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, quod tunc Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia, sicut praedictum est1b, quantum ad vocabulum praedestinandi non est communicatio idiomatum, immo est sophisma secundum accidens in praedicto processu. Non enim sequitur: divina praevisio praecedit Christum, secundum quod est filius Virginis, ergo secundum quod est Filius Dei.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedestinatio est respectu personae; dicendum, quod si est ratione personae2b, non est ratione personalitatis, sed alicuius naturae. (Notandum.) Et ideo non oportet ad hoc, quod sermo habeat veritatem, praedestinationem antecedere personam simpliciter, sed sufficit, si antecedat eam ratione alicuius naturae. Et ideo, cum dicitur: homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, non intelligitur, quod illa persona sit praedestinata nisi ratione humanae naturae. — Cum vero dicitur, quod persona aeterna non est praedestinata; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod est aeterna; potest tamen ei convenire ratione naturae temporaliter assumtae3b.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedestinatus antecedit illud, ad quod praedestinatur; dicendum, quod verum est; et illud non habet instantiam, quando praedestinatio accipitur proprie respectu gratiae et gloriae; in proposito autem nomen praedestinationis extenditur ad standum pro praevisione ratione determinationis adiunctae, secundum quod (Notandum.) in praecedenti problemate visum est. — Posset tamen dici, quod praedictum verbum intelligendum est, quando vocabulum praedestinationis dicit antecessionem non solum respectu subiecti, sed etiam respectu praedicati; sic autem non est in proposito. (Alia solutio.) Oportet etiam intelligere de re, ad quam quis praedestinatur non simpliciter4b, sed in comparatione ad ipsum quod praedestinatur. Non enim oportet, quod ille qui praedestinatur, sit ante gratiam vel gloriam simpliciter, sed solum secundum quod est in eo; et sic non habet instantiam in proposito. Nam si Filius Dei praecedat hominem, tamen non prius inest homini, quam homo sit; immo per naturam prius est humanitas, quam uniretur personae Verbi.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum homo sit praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, aut secundum quod est Deus, aut secundum quod est homo; dico, quod secundum quod homo; et sic fuit ab aeterno. (Notandum.) Nec valet: ergo supponit pro praeterito. Hoc enim intelligitur de verbo praeteriti temporis, quod non habet vim ampliandi ad futurum. In his enim, quae habent vim ampliandi ad futura, pro eo quod claudunt in se actum de futuro, praedicta regula non habet locum5b. Et sic est in proposito, quia praedestinatio connotat praescientiam alicuius futuri; et ideo non oportet, istum terminum homo respectu talis praedicati supponere pro praeteritis. — Alia est etiam ratio, quare ampliat ad omne tempus: quia (Alia ratio.) praedestinatio non ponit rem suam in praedestinato, sed in praedestinante, sicut laus non in laudato, sed in laudante. Et ideo, sicut laus non tantum est de praesenti, sed etiam de praeterito et futuro; ita et praedestinatio praeterita potest esse de eo quod est futurum. Et ista clarescunt melius per ea quae in primo libro6b dicta sunt.
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Question III. Whether this is to be conceded: man is predestined to be the Son of God.
Thirdly it is asked concerning this: man is predestined to be the Son of God, whether it is to be conceded. And that it is so seems to be the case.
(Foundations.)
1. Romans 11: Who was predestined the Son of God in power; but this is said either of the son of man, or of the Son of God; but not of the Son of God: therefore of the son of man.
2. Likewise, in the Gloss2: «Jesus was predestined, that he who was to be in the flesh the son of David, might be in power the Son of God»; but "Jesus" names that man: therefore that man is predestined to be the Son of God.
3. Likewise, the greater the grace, the greater the predestination that ought to be reckoned according to it; but the grace of the union, through which that man was made the Son of God, was the greatest3, which contained in itself at once grace and glory: if therefore the man was foreseen to be the Son of God through that grace, it seems that he was predestined to be the Son of God.
4. Likewise, predestination is not attributed to the Son of God on account of antecedence, which indeed does not befit the Son of God, insofar as he is God4; but such antecedence does well befit the man, insofar as he is man: therefore it rightly seems that predestination befits him. Therefore if not only is grace given to that man, by which he is blessed, but also that by which he is the Son of God; it seems that this is to be conceded: man is predestined, that he may be the Son of God.
On the contrary: (To the opposite.)
1. If man is predestined to be the Son of God, and the Son of God is man5, therefore the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God; but this is false: therefore also that from which it follows. But it follows from this: man is predestined to be the Son of God: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, predestination is only of a person: therefore if man is predestined to be the Son of God, some person is predestined to be the Son of God; either therefore a created person, or an uncreated person; but not a created person, because such a one is not to be found in Christ: therefore an uncreated person. But to be predestined does not befit an uncreated person6: therefore it seems that the aforesaid statement ought not to be received, namely this: man is predestined to be the Son of God.
3. Likewise, whoever is predestined precedes that to which he is predestined, in time or in nature; but man precedes the Son of God neither in time nor in nature: therefore it seems that the aforesaid statement ought not to be conceded.
4. Likewise, when it is said: man is predestined to be the Son of God, either this is understood insofar as he is man, or insofar as he is God; not insofar as he is God, this is established: therefore it is understood insofar as he is man. But whoever is predestined to this, was predestined from eternity: therefore insofar as he is man, he was from eternity predestined to be the Son of God. But this term "man" supposits for the verb in the past7: therefore it supposits for the past: therefore if anyone was from eternity predestined to be the Son of God, from eternity someone was a man; but this is false: therefore also the first.
Conclusion
(Conclusion.) The locution "man is predestined to be the Son of God" is received by all.
I respond: It must be said that this locution has to be distinguished by the same mode by which the one set down earlier8 was distinguished, namely from the fact that this participle "predestined" can express antecedence with respect to the subject, or with respect to the predicate, or with respect to the whole copulated whole. (Distinction.) If it expresses antecedence with respect to the subject, the locution is true, and the sense is: man, before he was man9, was foreseen to be the Son of God. (Conclusion 1.) — But if it notes antecedence with respect to the predicate, the locution is false. For the sense is: man was foreseen to be the Son of God, before the Son of God existed. (Conclusion 2.) — But if it notes antecedence with respect to the whole copulated whole, it is true. For the sense is: man is predestined to be the Son of God, that is, it is predestined that man be the Son of God. And this sense is received by all opinions10; and therefore according to common usage the aforesaid statement can be conceded. (General conclusion.) — And the reasons which show this are to be conceded.
To the arguments on the negative side: (Solution of the opposing arguments.)
To 1. As to that which is first objected to the contrary, that if man is predestined to be the Son of God, then the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God; it must be said that it does not follow, because, as has been said1b, with respect to the word "predestining" there is no communication of idioms, rather there is a sophism of accident in the aforesaid process. For it does not follow: the divine foreknowledge precedes Christ, insofar as he is the son of the Virgin, therefore insofar as he is the Son of God.
To 2. As to that which is objected, that predestination is with respect to a person; it must be said that if it is by reason of the person2b, it is not by reason of the personality, but of some nature. (Note.) And therefore it is not necessary, in order that the statement have truth, that predestination precede the person absolutely, but it suffices if it precede it by reason of some nature. And therefore, when it is said: man is predestined to be the Son of God, it is not understood that that person is predestined except by reason of the human nature. — But when it is said that the eternal person is not predestined; it must be said that this is true, insofar as it is eternal; yet it can befit it by reason of the nature temporally assumed3b.
To 3. As to that which is objected, that the predestined precedes that to which it is predestined; it must be said that this is true; and that has no force against the case, when predestination is taken properly with respect to grace and glory; but in the present case the name of predestination is extended to stand for foreknowledge by reason of an adjoined determination, according as (Note.) was seen in the preceding problem. — Yet it could be said that the aforesaid statement is to be understood, when the word "predestination" expresses antecedence not only with respect to the subject, but also with respect to the predicate; but it is not so in the present case. (Another solution.) It is also necessary to understand concerning the thing to which one is predestined not absolutely4b, but in comparison to the very thing which is predestined. For it is not necessary that he who is predestined be before grace or glory absolutely, but only insofar as it is in him; and thus it has no force against the case. For if the Son of God precedes the man, nevertheless he is not present in the man before the man exists; rather by nature the humanity is prior to its being united to the person of the Word.
To 4. As to that which is objected, whether man is predestined to be the Son of God, either insofar as he is God, or insofar as he is man; I say that it is insofar as he is man; and thus it was from eternity. (Note.) Nor does it hold: therefore it supposits for the past. For this is understood of a verb of past tense, which does not have the power of amplifying to the future. For in those things which have the power of amplifying to future things, because they enclose in themselves an act concerning the future, the aforesaid rule does not hold5b. And so it is in the present case, because predestination connotes the foreknowledge of something future; and therefore it is not necessary that this term "man," with respect to such a predicate, supposit for past things. — There is also another reason why it amplifies to every time: because (Another reason.) predestination does not place its reality in the predestined, but in the one predestining, just as praise is not in the one praised, but in the one praising. And therefore, just as praise is not only of the present, but also of the past and future; so too past predestination can be of that which is future. And these things become clearer through what was said in the first book6b.
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- Vers. 4. — Paulo inferius post sed non de Filio Dei cod. O adiicit ut patet in Glossa ibidem, quae Glossa affertur in arg. seq.Verse 4. — A little below, after but not of the Son of God, codex O adds as is clear in the Gloss there, which Gloss is adduced in the following argument.
- Glossa (in Rom. 1, 4.) hic allata est ordinaria et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum; sumta est ex August., de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 15. n. 31, ubi pro in carne legitur secundum carnem. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine.The Gloss (on Rom. 1:4) here adduced is the ordinary one and is found in Strabo and Lyra; it is taken from Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints c. 15, n. 31, where for in the flesh is read according to the flesh. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2, at the end.
- Ut ait August., cuius dictum habes supra pag. 29, nota 1. Maior efficitur ex definitione praedestinationis, supra pag. 179, nota 5 allata.As Augustine says, whose statement you have above on page 29, note 1. The "greater" is made out from the definition of predestination, adduced above on page 179, note 5.
- Vide supra q. 1. seq. — Paulo inferius pro quod competat plurimi codd. (quorum tamen aliqui a secunda antiqui amanuensis manu emendati sunt) et edd. 1, 2 perperam quod non competat.See above, the following q. 1. — A little below, for that it befits very many codices (some of which, however, have been corrected by the second hand of an old scribe) and editions 1, 2 wrongly [read] that it does not befit.
- In edd. desiderantur verba et Filius Dei est homo.In the editions the words and the Son of God is man are wanting.
- Cod. U praedestinatio.Codex U [reads] predestination.
- Scil. illi: fuit praedestinatus. De hoc modo loquendi cfr. infra d. 11. a. 2. q. 2. arg. ult. — Pro supponit cod. T supponitur. Vat. post supponit inserit pro.Namely for it: was predestined. On this manner of speaking cf. below d. 11, a. 2, q. 2, last argument. — For supposits codex T [reads] is supposited. The Vatican edition after supposits inserts for.
- In quaest. praeced.In the preceding question.
- Id est, antequam esset productus.That is, before he was produced.
- De quo vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. seqq.Concerning which see here the text of the Master, c. 1 and following.
- Supra q. 1. ad 2. — De sophismate secundum accidens vide supra pag. 179, nota 1.Above, q. 1, to the second. — On the sophism of accident see above on page 179, note 1.
- Edd. quod etsi sit ratione personae, non tamen est etc.The editions [read] that although it is by reason of the person, nevertheless it is not etc.
- Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. X. c. 1. in fine et c. 3.Cf. below the text of the Master, d. 10, c. 1, at the end, and c. 3.
- Verba non simpliciter, quae ab edd. et plurimis codd. absunt, restituimus ex codd. A (K a secunda manu) U Z bb; cod. F insufficienter non habet nisi simpliciter. Aliquanto inferius pro Nam si edd. substituerunt Nam etsi.The words not absolutely, which are absent from the editions and most codices, we have restored from codices A (K by a second hand) U Z bb; codex F insufficiently has only absolutely. A little below, for For if the editions have substituted For although.
- Ampliatio est extensio termini communis, v. gr. hominis, a minore suppositione ad maiorem. Efficitur etiam adhibito verbo, ut in hac propositione: homo praedestinatur i. e. homo, qui erat, qui est, et qui futurus est, praedestinatur. — Paulo superius pro ad futurum codd. K N X ad futura.Amplification is the extension of a common term, e.g. "man," from a lesser supposition to a greater. It is also effected by employing a verb, as in this proposition: "man is predestined," i.e. the man who was, who is, and who will be, is predestined. — A little above, for to the future codices K N X [read] to future things.
- Dist. 40. — De eo quod laus non sit in laudato, cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 5, ubi agens de honore (τιμή) dicit: «Magis enim in iis qui honorem exhibent, quam qui eo afficiuntur, consistit». Vide etiam tom. II. pag. 631, nota 3. — Vide scholion ad 1. q. huius art.Distinction 40. — On the point that praise is not in the one praised, cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, c. 5, where, treating of honor (τιμή), he says: «For it consists more in those who show honor than in those who are affected by it». See also vol. II, page 631, note 3. — See the scholion to question 1 of this article.