Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus

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Articulus unicus. De gratiae quidditate.

Quaestio II. Utrum id quod ponit gratia in gratificato, sit creatum, vel increatum.

Secundo quaeritur, supposito quod gratia aliquid ponat circa gratificatum, utrum illud sit creatum, vel increatum.

1. Quod sit increatum, videtur per illud quod dicit Didymus in libro de Spiritu sancto¹: « Dicimus, substantiam donorum Dei esse Spiritum sanctum, nec aestimare debemus, Spiritum sanctum secundum substantiam esse divisum, quia multitudo donorum dicatur; impassibilis enim est et indivisibilis; sed iuxta differentes intellectus multis donorum vocabulis nuncupatur ». Si igitur Spiritus sanctus est donum increatum, restat, quod gratia gratum faciens dicit quid increatum.

Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per effectus sive actus gratiae, quos dicitur habere in gratificato, qui ex diversis auctoritatibus novem esse colliguntur. Gratiae enim est recreare, gratiae est animam reformare, vivificare, illuminare, assimilare, unire, stabilire, acceptabilem Deo reddere et affectum sursum ducere et elevare².

2. Ex primo actu arguitur sic. « Eodem recreat Deus, quo creat, et aequalis virtutis, ut dicit Augustinus³, est recreare et creare »: si igitur Deus se ipso creat, non per aliquid creatum; ergo se ipso recreat et reformat, non per aliquid creatum. Sed illud quo recreat, est gratia: ergo etc.

3. Ex secundo actu arguitur sic. Paris virtutis est reformare mentem quantum ad affectum et quantum ad intellectum; sed « mens immediate a prima veritate formatur » quantum ad intellectum, ut dicit Augustinus⁴: ergo et immediate quantum ad affectum a prima bonitate formatur. Sed animam formare quantum ad affectum est ipsius gratiae: ergo gratia non est aliud quam bonitas summa.

4. Ex tertio actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Si vivificare animam est actus gratiae gratum facientis; et Deus animam vivificat se ipso, non per medium creatum: ergo gratia non est aliud quam Deus. Minor probatur per Augustinum⁵, qui dicit, quod « sicut corpus vivit anima, ita anima vivit Deo »; sed anima se ipsa vivificat corpus: ergo Deus se ipso vivificat spiritum.

5. Ex quarto actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Si sol per sui praesentiam esset praesens oculo, non esset necessaria aliqua luminis influentia ad hoc, quod efficeretur oculus luminosus. Si igitur sol iustitiae Deus est praesens omni creaturae, et essentialiter est in anima uniuscuiusque; videtur, quod nulla influentia luminis sit necessaria ad illuminationem animae. Si igitur impossibile est, Deum aliquid facere frustra⁶: videtur, quod gratia illuminans animam nihil aliud sit quam divina essentia.

6. Ex quinto actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Si color esset sua similitudo, non esset necessaria novae similitudinis generatio ad hoc, quod oculus conformaretur ipsi colori, maxime si ipse color esse posset in oculo; sed in Deo propter suam⁷ simplicitatem non differt veritas et similitudo — Filius enim, qui est similitudo Patris, est eiusdem essentiae cum Patre — si ergo gratiae est Deo assimilare, et gratia est similitudo Dei, impossibile est, gratiam esse aliud a Deo.

7. Ex sexto actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Medium uniendi plus coniungitur utrique extremorum, quam extremum extremo; sed Deus est intimus animae⁸: ergo impossibile est, quod inter Deum et animam cadat aliquod medium unitivum, quod sit ab utroque extremorum diversum. Si igitur gratiae est unire animam Deo, cum gratia non sit anima, necesse est, gratiam esse Deum.

8. Ex septimo actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Impossibile est, vanitatem per vanitatem stabiliri, sed si stabilitur, stabilitur per veritatem. Si igitur omnis

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creatura vanitas est⁹, aut gratiae non est animam stabilire, aut non est aliquid creatum; sed gratiae est animam stabilire in bonum; hoc planum est: ergo gratia non est donum creatum, sed increatum.

9. Ex octavo actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Eodem ipso acceptat Deus aliquem, quo amat; sed Pater et Filius diligunt nos Spiritu sancto, sicut Sancti dicunt, et habitum fuit in primo libro¹⁰, non aliquo creato: ergo acceptat nos Spiritu sancto, non per aliquod donum creatum. Si igitur gratia est illud quo Deus animam acceptat et reputat animam gratam, videtur etc.

10. Ex nono actu vel effectu arguitur sic. Nihil potest mentem nostram supra se elevare, nisi illud quod est mente superius; sed « solus Deus maior est mente rationali¹¹ »: ergo solius Dei est ipsam supra se elevare. Sed iste actus vel effectus dicitur esse gratiae: ergo impossibile est, gratiam gratum facientem esse aliquid a Deo diversum. — His novem rationibus colligitur, quod gratia non est donum creatum, sed increatum.

Ad oppositum arguitur primo rationibus ostensivis¹², secundo rationibus inducentibus¹³ ad impossibile. Ad ostendendum autem, gratiam gratum facientem esse donum creatum, primo adducatur robur auctoritatis, et secundo violentia rationis.

1. Dicitur enim primae ad Corinthios duodecimo¹⁴: Divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem Spiritus; sed non est divisio doni increati: ergo doni creati: ergo etc. — Quodsi dicas, auctoritatem istam debere intelligi non de gratia gratum faciente, sed de gratia gratis data; obiicitur tunc per verbum Augustini ad Bonifacium¹⁵ dicentis: « Gratia meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici ». Circa igitur istud donum consistit meritum et augmentum; sed augmentum non consistit nisi circa donum creatum, meritum autem non consistit nisi circa donum gratiae gratum facientis: ergo gratia gratum faciens est quid creatum. — Quodsi dicas, augmentum illud attendi in gratia non secundum id quod est, sed secundum effectum; adducitur ad hoc auctoritas Magistri in littera¹⁶, quam sumit ex verbis Augustini, ibi: « Et si diligenter intendas, nihilominus tibi demonstratur, quae sit ipsa gratia voluntatem praeveniens et praeparans, scilicet fides cum dilectione ». Si ergo fides est donum creatum, restat, quod et ipsa gratia voluntatem praeparans donum creatum est.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ratione ostenditur, et ex omnibus istis actibus gratiae assignatis una colligitur ratio. Si enim gratiae est recreare et reformare¹⁷ et vivificare, et sic de aliis, cum omnis talis actus sit ab aliquo, sicut a principio formali — non enim est recreatio nec reformatio nec vivificatio, et sic de aliis, sine forma — necesse est, aliquod donum poni in anima, quod sit ipsius animae informativum. Sed Deus nullius¹⁸ potest esse forma perficiens, quamvis possit se habere in ratione formae exemplaris: ergo praeter donum increatum, quod Deus est, ad hoc quod anima gratificetur, necesse est ponere donum creatum. Huius autem rationis necessitas colligitur ex novem mediis, ex quibus novem possunt formari argumenta; sed tantum valet illa in unum medium colligere, quantum divisim explicare. — Sic ergo rationibus ostensivis apparet, gratiam gratum facientem esse donum creatum.

3. Item, hoc videtur rationibus ducentibus ad impossibile, quarum prima haec est: aut gratia gratum faciens ponit aliquid creatum in gratificato, cum Deus de non-grato facit gratum, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo nulla fit mutatio ex parte creaturae gratificatae: ergo fit mutatio ex parte gratificantis, quod est impossibile. — Et iterum, si nihil creatum poneret, non esset melior ille qui est Deo gratus, quam ille qui non est gratus. Si igitur hoc est impossibile ponere, quod gratus Deo non sit melior quam non-gratus; et impossibile est, quod sit melior, nisi aliquam bonitatem habeat, quam alter non habet; et hoc¹⁹ non potest esse nisi quid creatum: necesse est, quod gratia aliquid creatum ponat in gratificato. Si igitur ponit aliquid creatum, aut est donum sive aliquis habitus, aut est actus sive doni usus. Si est donum et aliquis habitus, habeo propositum, scilicet quod gratia in gratificato ponit aliquod donum creatum. Si vero est actus vel usus, ergo non plus erit²⁰ in gratificato quam in non gratificato, nisi quando operatur: ergo non erit gratia in parvulis baptizatis et in iustis dormientibus magis quam in non baptizatis et in hominibus peccatoribus. Quod si hoc est falsum et alienum a fide, necesse est, gratiam aliquod donum creatum in gratificato ponere.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur alia ratione. Tam ex fide quam ex auctoritatibus oportet supponere, quod impossibile est, aliquod meritum esse sine gratia, et hoc melius manifestabitur infra²¹. Hoc igitur supposito, quaero tunc: aut gratia est aliqua proprietas liberi arbitrii, aut omnino nominat aliam substantiam diversam. Si est aliqua proprietas liberi arbitrii, habeo propositum, videlicet, quod gratia in

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libero arbitrio est aliquod donum creatum. Si gratia non est aliqua proprietas liberi arbitrii²², sed Deus; cum liberum arbitrium exit in opus meritorium, quod est supra ipsum, in merendo potius agitur quam agat, et movetur quam moveat. Et si hoc, sicut motus sursum non attribuitur lapidi, nec est ex eo lapis laudabilis vel vituperabilis; sic opus meritorium nullo modo est libero arbitrio attribuendum; et ita nec liberum arbitrium ex illo erit aliquo praemio dignum. Quodsi hoc est impossibile et falsum, restat ergo²³, quod illud falsum est quod dicitur, gratiam non esse aliquod donum creatum.

Conclusio

Praeter donum increatum, quod comparatur ad gratiam ut principium effectivum, ponendum est donum creatum, per quod anima informetur.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hanc quaestionem sapientes opinantur contrarium sapientibus. In hac enim quaestione aliquid est, quod fides determinat, aliquid, quod ratio investigat. Fides et Scriptura determinat, quod absque gratiae dono impossibile est placere Deo²⁴; determinat etiam, quod absque dono increato, quod est Spiritus sanctus, homo non potest fieri Deo acceptus nec assumi in adoptionem filiorum Dei. Et ideo omnes recte intelligentes concedunt, in iustis esse gratiae donum, et credunt²⁵ etiam, in eis esse donum increatum, quod est Spiritus sanctus. Et hoc a fide et a Scriptura determinatur; et ideo, qui contrarium huius sentiret, esset haereticus. — Sed utrum praeter donum increatum sit in nobis ponere donum creatum, per quod simus Deo accepti, vel non; quia non expresse determinatur Scripturae auctoritate, investigatur a doctoribus rationum probabilitate. Et quoniam tam habitus quam dona quam etiam virtutes cognosci habent per proprias operationes²⁶; ideo secundum diversam comparationem actuum et effectuum gratiae ad ipsam gratiam, diversae sunt super hoc doctorum opiniones.

Sicut enim praetactum fuit in opponendo, gratiae est recreare, gratiae est reformare, vivificare, illuminare, assimilare, unire, stabilire, acceptum facere, sursum levare. Hos igitur actus quidam comparaverunt ad gratiam sicut ad principium effectivum. Et quoniam Deus sufficit ad hos actus vel effectus perficiendos in rationali creatura; et solum Deum decent pro sua dignitate, et soli Deo sunt possibiles pro sua difficultate: ideo dixerunt, quod donum creatum ponere ad hos effectus perficiendos in homine est superfluum et indecens et impossibile.

Alii vero comparaverunt effectus praedictos ad gratiam sicut ad formam. Necessarium enim est, quod vivificatio et reformatio²⁷ ab aliquo sit sicut ab efficiente, et ab aliquo sicut ab informante. Et quoniam nec est possibile nec decens, Deum esse formam perfectivam alicuius creaturae; ideo praeter donum increatum, quod comparatur ad hos actus tanquam principium effectivum, conveniens est et opportunum ponere donum creatum, per quod anima informetur.

Hanc autem positionem praeferendam credo priori, tum quia est securior, tum etiam quia rationabilior. — Securior namque est, quia consonat communitati magistrorum et verbis expositorum et pietati Sanctorum²⁸. Doctores enim Parisienses communiter hoc sentiunt et senserunt ab antiquis diebus. Verba etiam expositorum hoc praetendunt, qui gratiam in Sacramentis dari et usu virtutis augeri dicunt. Piae etiam mentes et humiles huic positioni consentiunt, pro eo quod, etsi donum gratiae non possit ita percipi a quocumque, viros tamen sanctitate praeclaros aliquando non latet divinae bonitatis influentia, quam intra semetipsos potius experiendo quam ratiocinando cognoscunt. Hoc etiam piarum mentium est, ut nihil sibi tribuant, sed totum gratiae Dei. Unde quantumcumque aliquis det gratiae Dei, a pietate non recedit, etiamsi multa tribuendo gratiae Dei aliquid subtrahat potestati naturae vel libero arbitrio. Cum vero aliquid gratiae subtrahitur, et naturae tribuitur quod est gratiae, ibi potest periculum intervenire. Et propterea, cum ista positio, quae ponit gratiam creatam et increatam, plus gratiae Dei tribuat quam alia, et maiorem ponat in natura nostra indigentiam; hinc est, quod pietati et humilitati magis est consona, et propterea est magis secura. Esto enim, quod esset falsa, quia tamen a pietate et humilitate non declinat, tenere ipsam non est nisi bonum et tutum. — Praeferenda est igitur haec opinio priori, pro eo quod est securior et magis recedit ab errore Pelagii²⁹. Quis enim secure audeat negare, in nostra gratificatione aliquod donum creatum nobis a Deo conferri? Timere enim debet unusquisque, ne forte negando donum gratiae creatae efficiatur adversarius gratiae increatae.

Praeferenda est etiam, quia rationabilior. Sicut enim in opponendo ostensum est, rationabiliter tales actus et effectus non possunt cogitari in nobis esse,

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quin sint ab aliquo sicut efficiente, et ab aliquo sicut informante. Quomodo enim actus verus reformationis³⁰ et vivificationis erit in anima, nisi sit aliqua forma complens, a qua anima informetur? Et ideo secundum hanc positionem comparatur ipsa gratia creata influentiae luminis, et principium eius comparatur soli. Unde et Scriptura³¹ vocat Deum sive Christum solem iustitiae, quia, sicut ab isto sole materiali influit lumen corporale in aera, per quod aer formaliter illuminatur; sic a sole spirituali, qui Deus est, influit lumen spirituale in animam, a quo anima formaliter illuminatur et reformatur et gratificatur et vivificatur. Unde inter omnia corporalia maxime assimilatur gratiae Dei luminis influentia. Sicut enim haec est quaedam influentia, quae assimilat corpora ipsum suscipientia ipsi fonti luminis quantum ad proprietatem; sic gratia est spiritualis influentia, quae³² mentes rationales fonti lucis assimilat et conformat. Haec autem influentia recte dicitur gratia, tum quia datur ex mera liberalitate, nulla naturae cogente necessitate — non enim oritur ex principiis subiecti, nec a Deo exit de necessitate, sed sua mera benignitate — tum etiam, quia gratum facit — dum enim hominem Deo conformat et assimilat, reddit ipsum Deo amicum et facit Deo esse placitum et acceptum — tum etiam, quia facit, hominem gratis facere ea quae facit. Affectus enim hominis recurvus est et mercenarius, quantum est de se³³; unde si quid facit, intendendo proprium commodum facit; sed cum divina gratia supervenit, sic hominem totum gratum facit, ut sive ad utilitatem proximi sive ad honorem Dei velit totum gratis impendere. — Et sic patet, quod talis influentia valde rationabiliter gratia nuncupatur. Hanc igitur positionem sustinendo tanquam securiorem et rationabiliorem, ad obiecta in contrarium facile est respondere.

1. Illud enim quod dicit Didymus, substantiam donorum Dei esse Spiritum sanctum, et si quae aliae auctoritates inveniuntur, intelligendae sunt per causam et appropriationem, quia Spiritus sanctus est donum, in quo omnia alia dona donantur, et qui est fons omnium donorum³⁴; non autem excluditur donum creatum per illud verbum. Sicut enim, cum quis tenet equum per frenum, dicitur tenere equum, nec sic excluditur tentio freni, quia tenendo frenum tenet equum: sic, cum Spiritus sanctus dicitur substantia donorum, non excluditur donum creatum, immo includitur. Non enim ob aliud dicitur nobis dari Spiritus sanctus nisi ex eo, quod sic est in nobis a Deo, ut habeatur a nobis. Tunc autem habetur a nobis, quando habitum habemus, quo possimus eo frui; et hoc est donum gratiae creatum. Et sic patet responsio ad illam auctoritatem et ad consimiles.

2—10. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de actu sive effectu recreationis, quod est a solo Deo; dicendum, quod verum est, quod est a solo Deo sicut a principio effectivo; nihilominus tamen, quia recreatio est rei iam existentis, per aliquam dispositionem natae³⁵ reformari — idem enim est recreatio et reformatio — et propterea non tantum respicit principium effectivum, sed etiam principium informativum. Non sic est de creatione, quae simpliciter est de non-ente, in qua simpliciter est productio rei, non secundum qualitatem alteratio. — Per hanc viam responderi potest ad omnes rationes sequentes. Omnes enim procedunt, secundum quod actus illi comparantur ad gratiam, sicut ad principium effectivum. Hoc autem modo non sunt a gratia creata, sicut prius dictum est; et istud melius patet, si quis diligenter pertractare voluerit; praetermittitur tamen ad praesens causa vitandae prolixitatis.

7. Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de unione, dicendum, quod gratia non unit quantum ad esse primum, quantum ad quod Deus est cuilibet creaturae intimus essentialiter, potentialiter et praesentialiter; sed gratia est medium uniendi quantum ad cognitionem et amorem, quantum ad quem modum multum distat Deus a peccatoribus³⁶.

Scholion

I. Solutio huius quaestionis improbat errorem Petri Lombardi, iam I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. refutatum et ibi in scholio breviter indicatum. Sed eadem militat etiam contra fundamentalem errorem Lutheri, qui docuit, homines formaliter iustificari sive iustos esse sola imputatione iustitiae Christi, seclusa interiore gratia et caritate. Haec doctrina condemnata est ut haeretica a Concilio Tridentino (Sess. VI. can. 10. 11. 12.); e contrario (ibid. cap. 7.) ut catholica doctrina proposita est, quod iustificatio « non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et iustificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum ». Enumeratis huius iustificationis causis, scilicet finali, efficiente, meritoria, instrumentali, additur: « Demum unica formalis causa est iustitia Dei, non qua ipse iustus est, sed qua nos iustos facit ». Docetur etiam, hoc fieri per caritatem Dei, diffusam in cordibus eorum qui iustificantur, atque ipsis inhaerentem. — Hinc sententia, quam S. Bonav. tantum ut « securiorem et rationabiliorem » profitetur, post Tridentinum tanquam certissima tenenda est; quae etiam fuit communissima inter Scholasticos, licet Durand. (I. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. 2.) quaedam singularia de necessitate gratiae habitualis, ut homo Deo reddatur gratus, in medium ferat, et Scot. (I. Sent. d. 17. q. 3. n. 21. seqq.) arguat contra varia argumenta rationis pro habitu creato caritatis ab aliis allata.

II. Principium illud in corp. positum, quod a pietate non recedatur, etiamsi quis, multa tribuendo gratiae Dei, aliquid subtrahat libero arbitrio, discrete intelligendum est, scil. ut tamen non negetur naturalis potestas liberi arbitrii, sive reducatur in negotio salutis ad rem « de solo titulo, immo titulum sine re » (cfr. Trid. Sess. VI. can. 5.), ut ab haereticis plurimis saeculi 16. et 17. factum est.

III. In solut. ad 1. doctrina, quae Patribus Graecis familiaris est, quod scil. substantia donorum sit Spiritus S., explicatur in hoc sensu, ut intelligenda sit per causam et appropriationem, quia scil. est gratiae causa efficiens et exemplaris (cfr. I. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. 2. 3.). Quod autem in adoptione divina praeter donum creatum, quo ut forma inhaerente anima Deo conformatur et assimilatur, etiam donum increatum per quandam communicationem et inhabitationem Spiritus S. datur, communiter cum nostro Doctore docetur. Hinc consortium naturae divinae, de quo toties loquitur s. Scriptura (cfr. in primis II. Petr. 1. 2. seqq.), quasi duo elementa comprehendit, de quorum relatione ad invicem et effectibus non omnes theologi idem sentiunt. Conveniunt autem in duobus, scilicet quod inhabitatio Spiritus S. non sit ad modum formae inhaerentis, et quod eadem sit gratiae creatae, quae animae per modum qualitatis inhaeret, (saltem) causa efficiens et exemplaris. Quod autem inhabitatio ista insuper fastigium quoddam perfectionis et sanctificationis et mirabilem quandam unionem cum ipsa persona inhabitante importet, cum Patribus Graecis non pauci nec exigui theologi docent, licet non eodem modo loquendi utantur. Ad rem faciunt verba Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 3. ad 2.): « Gratia creata est perfectio esse animae secundi tanquam disponens; sed perfectio sicut complens est finis, scilicet divina bonitas »; quod ibi et in a. 2. magis explicatur. In eodem sensu S. Bonav. (infra q. 3. in corpore et hic ad 1.) loqui videtur.

IV. De hac quaest. specialiter tractant tantum Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 2; S. Thom., Quaest. disput. de Caritate a. 1, et S. II. II. q. 23. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 2.

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English Translation

Article (unique). On the quiddity of grace.

Question II. Whether what grace places in the justified is created or uncreated.

Secondly it is asked, granted that grace places something about the justified, whether that thing is created or uncreated.

1. That it is uncreated seems [to follow] from what Didymus says in his book On the Holy Spirit¹: « We say that the substance of God's gifts is the Holy Spirit, nor ought we to suppose that the Holy Spirit is divided according to substance, because a multitude of gifts is spoken of; for he is impassible and indivisible; but according to differing understandings he is named with many names of gifts ». If therefore the Holy Spirit is an uncreated gift, it remains that grace-making-acceptable signifies something uncreated.

Likewise, this same thing is shown through the effects or acts of grace which it is said to have in the justified, which are gathered from various authorities to be nine. For it belongs to grace to recreate, to grace it belongs to reform, vivify, illuminate, assimilate, unite, stabilize, render acceptable to God the soul, and to lead the affection upward and to elevate it².

2. From the first act it is argued thus. « By the same [power] by which God creates He recreates, and to recreate and to create are of equal power, as Augustine says³ »: if therefore God creates by Himself, not through anything created; then He recreates and reforms by Himself, not through anything created. But that by which He recreates is grace: therefore etc.

3. From the second act it is argued thus. It is of equal power to reform the mind as to affection and as to intellect; but « the mind is immediately formed by the first truth » as to intellect, as Augustine says⁴: therefore it is also immediately formed by the first goodness as to affection. But to form the soul as to affection belongs to grace itself: therefore grace is nothing other than the highest goodness.

4. From the third act or effect it is argued thus. If to vivify the soul is an act of grace-making-acceptable; and God vivifies the soul by Himself, not through a created medium: then grace is nothing other than God. The minor is proved through Augustine⁵, who says that « as the body lives by the soul, so the soul lives by God »; but the soul vivifies the body by itself: therefore God vivifies the spirit by Himself.

5. From the fourth act or effect it is argued thus. If the sun were present to the eye by its presence, no influx of light would be necessary for the eye to be made luminous. If therefore the sun of justice, God, is present to every creature, and is essentially in the soul of each one; it seems that no influx of light is necessary for the illumination of the soul. If therefore it is impossible that God should do anything in vain⁶: it seems that the grace illuminating the soul is nothing other than the divine essence.

6. From the fifth act or effect it is argued thus. If color were its own likeness, no generation of a new likeness would be necessary for the eye to be conformed to the color itself, especially if the color itself could be in the eye; but in God, on account of His⁷ simplicity, truth and likeness do not differ — for the Son, who is the likeness of the Father, is of the same essence with the Father — if therefore it belongs to grace to assimilate to God, and grace is the likeness of God, it is impossible that grace be anything other than God.

7. From the sixth act or effect it is argued thus. The medium of uniting is more joined to each of the extremes than the extreme is to the extreme; but God is most inward to the soul⁸: therefore it is impossible that between God and the soul there should fall any uniting medium which is distinct from each of the extremes. If therefore it belongs to grace to unite the soul to God, since grace is not the soul, it is necessary that grace be God.

8. From the seventh act or effect it is argued thus. It is impossible that vanity be stabilized through vanity, but if it is stabilized, it is stabilized through truth. If therefore every

creature is vanity⁹, either it does not belong to grace to stabilize the soul, or it is not anything created; but it belongs to grace to stabilize the soul in good; this is plain: therefore grace is not a created gift, but an uncreated one.

9. From the eighth act or effect it is argued thus. By the same [Spirit] by which He loves, God accepts someone; but the Father and the Son love us by the Holy Spirit, as the Saints say, and as was held in the first book¹⁰, not by anything created: therefore He accepts us by the Holy Spirit, not through any created gift. If therefore grace is that by which God accepts the soul and reckons the soul pleasing, it seems etc.

10. From the ninth act or effect it is argued thus. Nothing can elevate our mind above itself except that which is superior to the mind; but « God alone is greater than the rational mind¹¹ »: therefore it belongs to God alone to elevate it above itself. But this act or effect is said to belong to grace: therefore it is impossible that grace-making-acceptable be anything distinct from God. — By these nine reasons it is gathered that grace is not a created gift, but an uncreated one.

On the contrary, it is argued first by demonstrative¹² reasons, secondly by reasons leading¹³ to the impossible. And to show that grace-making-acceptable is a created gift, let the force of authority be adduced first, and secondly the violence of reason.

1. For it is said in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the twelfth [chapter]¹⁴: There are divisions of graces, but the same Spirit; but there is no division of an uncreated gift: therefore [it is a division] of a created gift: therefore etc. — But if you say that this authority must be understood not of grace-making-acceptable, but of grace-freely-given; it is then objected through the word of Augustine to Boniface¹⁵, saying: « Grace merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected ». Therefore about this gift there consists merit and increase; but increase consists only about a created gift, and merit consists only about the gift of grace-making-acceptable: therefore grace-making-acceptable is something created. — But if you say that that increase is regarded in grace not according to what it is, but according to its effect; there is adduced for this the authority of the Master in the text¹⁶, which he takes from the words of Augustine, there: « And if you attend diligently, it is nonetheless shown to you what is that grace preventing and preparing the will, namely faith with love ». If therefore faith is a created gift, it remains that grace itself, preparing the will, is a created gift.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by reason, and from all these acts of grace assigned, one reason is gathered. For if it belongs to grace to recreate and to reform¹⁷ and to vivify, and so of the others, since every such act is from something as from a formal principle — for there is no recreation nor reformation nor vivification, and so of the others, without a form — it is necessary that some gift be placed in the soul which is informative of the soul itself. But God can be the perfecting form of nothing¹⁸, although He can stand in the character of an exemplary form: therefore besides the uncreated gift, which is God, in order that the soul be made gracious, it is necessary to posit a created gift. Now the necessity of this reason is gathered from the nine media, from which nine arguments can be formed; but it is worth as much to gather them into one medium as to set them out separately. — Thus therefore by demonstrative reasons it appears that grace-making-acceptable is a created gift.

3. Likewise, this is seen by reasons leading to the impossible, of which the first is this: either grace-making-acceptable places something created in the justified, when God makes the non-pleasing pleasing, or nothing. If nothing: then no change occurs on the part of the justified creature: then change occurs on the part of the one justifying, which is impossible. — And again, if it placed nothing created, he who is pleasing to God would not be better than he who is not pleasing. If therefore it is impossible to hold that one pleasing to God is not better than one not pleasing; and it is impossible that he be better unless he has some goodness which the other does not have; and this¹⁹ cannot be except something created: it is necessary that grace place something created in the justified. If therefore it places something created, either it is a gift or some habit, or it is an act or the use of a gift. If it is a gift and some habit, I have my point, namely that grace places in the justified some created gift. But if it is an act or use, then it will be²⁰ no more in the justified than in the non-justified, except when he is operating: therefore grace would not be in baptized infants and in the sleeping just any more than in the non-baptized and in sinful men. And if this is false and foreign to the faith, it is necessary that grace place some created gift in the justified.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by another reason. Both from faith and from authorities it is necessary to suppose that it is impossible that any merit exist without grace, and this will be better manifested below²¹. This therefore being supposed, I then ask: either grace is some property of free choice, or it altogether names another distinct substance. If it is some property of free choice, I have my point, namely that grace in

free choice is some created gift. If grace is not some property of free choice²², but God; since free choice goes forth into a meritorious work, which is above it, in meriting it is acted upon rather than acts, and is moved rather than moves. And if this is so, just as upward motion is not attributed to a stone, nor is the stone praiseworthy or blameworthy from it; so the meritorious work is in no way to be attributed to free choice; and thus neither will free choice from it be worthy of any reward. But if this is impossible and false, it remains therefore²³ that what is said is false, namely that grace is not some created gift.

Conclusion

Besides the uncreated gift, which is compared to grace as the effective principle, there must be posited a created gift, by which the soul is informed.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this question the wise hold the contrary of the wise. For in this question there is something which faith determines, something which reason investigates. Faith and Scripture determine that without the gift of grace it is impossible to please God²⁴; they determine also that without the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit, man cannot be made acceptable to God nor be taken up into the adoption of the sons of God. And therefore all who understand rightly grant that there is in the just the gift of grace, and they believe²⁵ also that there is in them the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit. And this is determined by faith and by Scripture; and therefore one who held the contrary of this would be a heretic. — But whether besides the uncreated gift there is to be posited in us a created gift, by which we are acceptable to God, or not; because it is not expressly determined by the authority of Scripture, it is investigated by the doctors with the probability of reasons. And since habits as well as gifts as well as virtues are known through their proper operations²⁶; therefore according to the diverse comparison of the acts and effects of grace to grace itself, the opinions of the doctors on this matter are diverse.

For just as was touched upon in the objecting, it belongs to grace to recreate, to grace it belongs to reform, vivify, illuminate, assimilate, unite, stabilize, make acceptable, raise upward. These acts, therefore, some have compared to grace as to an effective principle. And since God suffices for perfecting these acts or effects in the rational creature; and they befit God alone by reason of their dignity, and are possible to God alone by reason of their difficulty: therefore they said that to posit a created gift for perfecting these effects in man is superfluous and unfitting and impossible.

Others, however, compared the aforesaid effects to grace as to a form. For it is necessary that vivification and reformation²⁷ be from something as from an efficient cause, and from something as from that which informs. And since it is neither possible nor fitting that God be the perfective form of any creature; therefore besides the uncreated gift, which is compared to these acts as the effective principle, it is fitting and opportune to posit a created gift, by which the soul is informed.

Now I believe this position is to be preferred to the prior, both because it is safer, and also because it is more reasonable. — For it is safer, because it accords with the common opinion of the masters and the words of the expositors and the piety of the Saints²⁸. For the Parisian doctors commonly hold this and have held it from ancient days. The words of the expositors also point to this, who say that grace is given in the Sacraments and increased by the exercise of virtue. Pious and humble minds also consent to this position, for the reason that, although the gift of grace cannot be so perceived by just anyone, yet from men distinguished by holiness the influence of the divine goodness is sometimes not hidden, which they know by experiencing it within themselves rather than by reasoning. This too belongs to pious minds, that they attribute nothing to themselves, but all to the grace of God. Hence however much one ascribes to the grace of God, he does not depart from piety, even if by ascribing much to the grace of God he subtracts something from the power of nature or from free choice. But when something is subtracted from grace, and what belongs to grace is attributed to nature, there danger can intervene. And therefore, since this position, which posits grace created and uncreated, ascribes more to the grace of God than the other, and posits a greater need in our nature; hence it is that it is more consonant with piety and humility, and therefore is more secure. For granted that it were false, yet because it does not turn aside from piety and humility, to hold it is nothing but good and safe. — This opinion therefore is to be preferred to the prior, for the reason that it is safer and recedes further from the error of Pelagius²⁹. For who would safely dare to deny that in our justification some created gift is conferred on us by God? For each one ought to fear, lest perhaps by denying the gift of created grace he be made an adversary of uncreated grace.

It is to be preferred also because it is more reasonable. For just as was shown in the objecting, reasonably such acts and effects cannot be thought to be in us

unless they are from something as from an efficient cause, and from something as from that which informs. For how will the true act of reformation³⁰ and of vivification be in the soul, unless there be some completing form by which the soul is informed? And therefore according to this position the created grace itself is compared to the influx of light, and its principle is compared to the sun. Hence Scripture³¹ also calls God or Christ the sun of justice, because, just as from that material sun corporeal light flows into the air, by which the air is formally illuminated; so from the spiritual sun, who is God, spiritual light flows into the soul, by which the soul is formally illuminated and reformed and made gracious and vivified. Hence among all corporeal things the influx of light is most assimilated to the grace of God. For just as this is a certain influx which assimilates the bodies receiving it to the very source of light as to its property; so grace is a spiritual influx which³² assimilates and conforms rational minds to the source of light. Now this influx is rightly called grace, both because it is given out of mere liberality, with no necessity compelling nature — for it does not arise from the principles of the subject, nor does it go forth from God of necessity, but by His mere benignity — and also because it makes gracious — for while it conforms and assimilates man to God, it renders him a friend of God and makes him pleasing and acceptable to God — and also because it makes man do gratis the things he does. For man's affection is curved-in-on-itself and mercenary, so far as it is of itself³³; hence if he does anything, he does it intending his own advantage; but when divine grace supervenes, it so makes the whole man gracious that, whether for the advantage of his neighbor or for the honor of God, he wills to spend the whole gratuitously. — And thus it is clear that such an influx is very reasonably named grace. Holding therefore this position as the safer and the more reasonable, it is easy to respond to the objections to the contrary.

1. For that which Didymus says, that the substance of God's gifts is the Holy Spirit, and whatever other authorities are found, are to be understood by cause and appropriation, because the Holy Spirit is the gift in which all the other gifts are given, and who is the fount of all gifts³⁴; but a created gift is not excluded by that word. For just as, when someone holds a horse by the bridle, he is said to hold the horse, nor is the holding of the bridle thereby excluded, because by holding the bridle he holds the horse: so, when the Holy Spirit is said to be the substance of the gifts, a created gift is not excluded, but rather included. For the Holy Spirit is said to be given to us for no other reason than because He is so in us from God, that He may be had by us. But He is then had by us when we have a habit by which we can enjoy Him; and this is the created gift of grace. And thus the response to that authority and to similar ones is clear.

2—10. But as to that which is objected concerning the act or effect of recreation, that it is from God alone; it must be said that it is true that it is from God alone as from the effective principle; nonetheless, however, because recreation is of a thing already existing, [it is] to be reformed through some disposition apt³⁵ to it — for recreation and reformation are the same — and therefore it regards not only the effective principle, but also the informative principle. It is not so with creation, which is simply from non-being, in which there is simply the production of a thing, not alteration according to quality. — By this way a response can be made to all the following reasons. For all proceed according as those acts are compared to grace as to an effective principle. But in this mode they are not from created grace, as was said before; and this is better seen if one is willing to treat it diligently; it is nonetheless passed over for the present for the sake of avoiding prolixity.

7. But as to that which is objected concerning union, it must be said that grace does not unite as to the first being, as to which God is most inward to every creature essentially, potentially and presentially; but grace is the medium of uniting as to cognition and love, in which mode God is far distant from sinners³⁶.

Scholion

I. The solution of this question refutes the error of Peter Lombard, already refuted in I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 1, and there briefly indicated in the scholion. But the same militates also against the fundamental error of Luther, who taught that men are formally justified or are just by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, with interior grace and charity set aside. This doctrine was condemned as heretical by the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. 10, 11, 12); on the contrary (ibid. ch. 7) the catholic doctrine was proposed, that justification « is not the sole remission of sins, but also the justification and renovation of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts ». Having enumerated the causes of this justification, namely the final, efficient, meritorious, instrumental, it is added: « Finally the sole formal cause is the justice of God, not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just ». It is also taught that this comes about through the charity of God, poured out in the hearts of those who are justified, and inhering in them. — Hence the opinion which St. Bonaventure professes only as « safer and more reasonable » is, after Trent, to be held as most certain; which was also most common among the Scholastics, although Durandus (I Sent. d. 17, q. 1, 2) brings forward certain singular points concerning the necessity of habitual grace for man to be rendered gracious to God, and Scotus (I Sent. d. 17, q. 3, n. 21 seqq.) argues against various arguments of reason for a created habit of charity brought forward by others.

II. That principle posited in the body, that one is not to recede from piety even if one, by ascribing much to the grace of God, subtracts something from free choice, is to be understood discreetly, namely so that the natural power of free choice is nevertheless not denied, nor reduced in the matter of salvation to a thing « of title alone, indeed a title without the thing » (cfr. Trent, Sess. VI, can. 5), as was done by very many heretics of the 16th and 17th centuries.

III. In the solution to 1, the doctrine which is familiar to the Greek Fathers, namely that the substance of the gifts is the Holy Spirit, is explained in this sense, that it is to be understood by cause and appropriation, because, namely, He is the efficient and exemplary cause of grace (cfr. I Sent. d. 18, q. 1, 2, 3). But that in divine adoption, besides the created gift, by which as by an inhering form the soul is conformed and assimilated to God, the uncreated gift also is given through a certain communication and indwelling of the Holy Spirit, is commonly taught together with our Doctor. Hence the fellowship of the divine nature, of which sacred Scripture so often speaks (cfr. especially II Pet. 1, 2 seqq.), comprehends, as it were, two elements, concerning whose relation to one another and effects not all theologians think the same. They agree, however, in two things, namely that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is not after the mode of an inhering form, and that of the created grace which inheres in the soul after the mode of a quality, the same [Spirit] is (at least) the efficient and exemplary cause. But that this indwelling moreover imports a certain pinnacle of perfection and sanctification and a certain marvelous union with the indwelling Person itself, not a few nor insignificant theologians teach, together with the Greek Fathers, although they do not use the same manner of speaking. To the point are the words of Alexander of Hales (S. p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 3, ad 2): « Created grace is the perfection of the second being of the soul, as disposing; but perfection as completing is the end, namely the divine goodness »; which is more explained there and in a. 2. In the same sense St. Bonaventure (below q. 3 in the body, and here ad 1) seems to speak.

IV. On this question specifically there treat only Alexander of Hales, S. p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 2; St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae de Caritate a. 1, and S. II-II, q. 23, a. 2; Peter a Tarantasia, here, the single question, a. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

Num. 9: Et paulo ante diximus, substantiam bonorum Dei Spiritum sanctum esse, cum posuimus exemplum: Dabit Pater Spiritum sanctum petentibus se (Luc. 11, 13.), et: Dabit Pater bona petentibus se (Matth. 7, 11.). Nec existimare debemus, Spiritum sanctum secundum substantias [alias: substantiam] esse divisum, quia multitudo bonorum dicatur; impassibilis enim et indivisibilis atque immutabilis est; sed iuxta differentes efficientias et intellectus multis bonorum vocabulis nuncupatur (ed. Migne, Patrol. Graec. tom. 39.). — Pro Didymus edd. et plures codd. hic et in solut. falso Damascenus. In textu pro impassibilis Vat. impartibilis.
No. 9: « And a little before we said that the substance of God's goods is the Holy Spirit, when we set down the example: The Father will give the Holy Spirit to those who ask Him (Luke 11:13), and: The Father will give good things to those who ask Him (Matt. 7:11). Nor ought we to suppose that the Holy Spirit is divided according to substances [al. substance], because a multitude of goods is spoken of; for he is impassible and indivisible and immutable; but according to differing efficacies and understandings he is named with many names of goods » (Migne ed., Patrol. Graec. vol. 39). — For Didymus the editions and several codices, here and in the solution, falsely [read] Damascenus. In the text, for impassibilis the Vatican [edition reads] impartibilis.
Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 6, ubi et auctoritates, ex quibus isti novem effectus gratiae collecti sunt, afferuntur. Pro reformare edd. et plurimi codd. sibi non constantes informare.
Cfr. Alexander of Hales, S. p. III, q. 61, m. 6, where also the authorities are adduced from which these nine effects of grace are collected. For reformare the editions and very many codices, inconsistent with themselves, [read] informare.
Serm. 177. c. 5. n. 5. (alias de Verb. Apost. 10.): « Noli te extollere super Deum [putando, te temetipsum posse salvare]; subde te Deo, adora, prosternere, confitere illi qui fecit te: quia nemo recreat, nisi qui creat; nemo reficit, nisi qui fecit ». Et in Ioan. Evang. (14, 12.) tract. 72. n. 3: « Intelligat qui potest, iudicet qui potest, utrum maius sit iustos creare, quam impios iustificare. Certe enim, si aequalis est utrumque potentiae, hoc maioris est misericordiae ». In libro de Natura et gratia, c. 34, n. 39: Ipse [Deus] est autem creator eius, qui salvator eius. — Circa finem arg. pro quo recreat codd. F T Y ee et alii quod recreat, ed. I per quod recreat.
Serm. 177, c. 5, n. 5 (al. de Verb. Apost. 10): « Do not exalt yourself above God [thinking that you yourself can save yourself]; submit yourself to God, adore, prostrate yourself, confess to Him who made you: for no one recreates except Him who creates; no one remakes except Him who made ». And in On the Gospel of John (14:12) tract. 72, n. 3: « Let him understand who can, let him judge who can, whether it is greater to create the just than to justify the impious. For certainly, if both are of equal power, this is of greater mercy ». In the book On Nature and Grace, c. 34, n. 39: « He [God] who is its savior is also its creator ». — Near the end of the argument, for quo recreat codd. F T Y ee and others [read] quod recreat, ed. I per quod recreat.
Vide supra pag. 43, nota 5. — Paulo superius pro reformare Vat. et pauci codd. formare.
See above p. 43, note 5. — A little above, for reformare the Vatican [edition] and a few codices [read] formare.
In Ioan. Evang. tract. 19. n. 12, tract. 23. n. 7, tract. 47. n. 8; Serm. 62. c. 1. n. 2. (alias de Verb. Domini, 6.) 63. (alias 13.) c. 4. n. 3, 161. (alias de Verb. Apost. 18.) c. 6. n. 6, 180. (alias 28.) c. 7. n. 8, 273. (alias de Divers. 101.) c. 1. n. 1; XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2.
On the Gospel of John, tract. 19, n. 12; tract. 23, n. 7; tract. 47, n. 8; Serm. 62, c. 1, n. 2 (al. de Verb. Domini 6), 63 (al. 13), c. 4, n. 3; 161 (al. de Verb. Apost. 18), c. 6, n. 6; 180 (al. 28), c. 7, n. 8; 273 (al. de Divers. 101), c. 1, n. 1; de Civitate Dei XIII, c. 2.
Cfr. supra pag. 44, nota 5. — In maiori pro per sui praesentiam edd., excepta 1, per sui essentiam. In secunda conclus. pro Si ergo impossibile cod. T Sed quia impossibile.
Cfr. above p. 44, note 5. — In the major, for per sui praesentiam the editions, except the first, [read] per sui essentiam. In the second conclusion, for Si ergo impossibile cod. T [reads] Sed quia impossibile.
Cod. L summam.
Cod. L [reads] summam.
Cfr. supra pag. 226, nota 7.
Cfr. above p. 226, note 7.
Rom. 8, 20: Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est etc. — In seqq. respicitur illud Hebr. 13, 9: Optimum est enim gratia stabilire cor.
Rom. 8:20: For the creature was made subject to vanity etc. — In what follows, reference is made to that of Heb. 13:9: For it is best to stabilize the heart with grace.
Dist. 10. dub. 3.
Dist. 10, dub. 3 [I Sent.].
Sicut dicit Augustinus; vide supra pag. 45, nota 5.
As Augustine says; see above p. 45, note 5.
Vers. 4.
[Marker anchored at ostensivis — cross-reference note; cfr. p. 45 note context.]
Codd. Y Z et ed. I ducentibus, cod. bb deducentibus.
Codd. Y Z and ed. I [read] ducentibus, cod. bb deducentibus.
Epist. 189. (alias 205.) n. 2. sententialiter; at verbotenus Epist. 186. (alias 106.) Alipii et Augustini ad Paulinum, c. 3. n. 10. Vocula et, quae in verbis allatis habetur post mereatur, abest a Vat. et edd. 3, 4 nec non a textu originali.
Epist. 189 (al. 205) n. 2, as to sense; but verbatim Epist. 186 (al. 106) of Alypius and Augustine to Paulinus, c. 3, n. 10. The little word et, which in the words cited stands after mereatur, is absent from the Vatican [ed.] and edd. 3, 4, as also from the original text. [This Quaracchi note is keyed to the I Cor. 12 / Boniface citation cluster.]
Hic c. 3. et est secundum August., Epist. 186. c. 3. n. 9. seq.
Here, c. 3; and it is according to Augustine, Epist. 186, c. 3, n. 9 seq.
Edd. et codd. sibi non constantes reformare et informare.
The editions and codices, inconsistent with themselves, [read] reformare and informare.
Edd. nullo modo.
The editions [read] nullo modo.
Cod. cc et ed. 1 haec.
Cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] haec.
Edd., excepta 1, ponit. Pro gratificato cod. aa bis substituit gratificando.
The editions, except the first, [read] ponit. For gratificato cod. aa twice substitutes gratificando.
Dist. 28. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 29. a. 1. q. 2.
Dist. 28, a. 2, q. 3, and d. 29, a. 1, q. 2 [II Sent.].
Pro liberi arbitrii codd. K V Y bb cc (T a prima manu) non est liberum arbitrium. Subinde post Deus cod. Y interserit tunc; in cod. Z vero legitur ergo liberum arbitrium dum exit etc. In cod. T ab altera manu deleta est vox Deus.
For liberi arbitrii codd. K V Y bb cc (T by a first hand) [read] non est liberum arbitrium. Then after Deus cod. Y inserts tunc; in cod. Z indeed there is read ergo liberum arbitrium dum exit etc. In cod. T the word Deus has been deleted by a second hand.
Cod. bb etiam, cod. aa sic: restat, quod illud etiam falsum etc.
Cod. bb [reads] etiam, cod. aa thus: restat, quod illud etiam falsum etc.
De hac et seq. prop. cfr. infra d. 29. a. I. q. 1.
On this and the following proposition cfr. below d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 [II Sent.].
Sic non pauci codd., inter quos F I K L O aa ee; alii vel credunt, vel cum ed. I. ut credant, Vat. ita ut credant.
So read not a few codices, among which F I K L O aa ee; others read either credunt, or with ed. I ut credant, the Vatican [ed.] ita ut credant.
Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 2. dicit, habitum [sub quo continetur virtus] definiri operationibus et iis quorum habitus sit.
Aristotle, Ethics IV, c. 2, says that a habit [under which virtue is contained] is defined by operations and by those things of which it is the habit.
Vat. animam informare.
The Vatican [edition reads] animam informare.
Vat. informatio.
The Vatican [edition reads] informatio.
Cod. B fidelium.
Cod. B [reads] fidelium.
Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et infra d. XXVII. per totam.
Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 3, and below d. XXVII throughout.
Vat. informationis. Paulo inferius pro informetur codd. H I reformetur.
The Vatican [edition reads] informationis. A little below, for informetur codd. H I [read] reformetur.
Mal. 4, 2: Et orietur vobis timentibus nomen meum sol iustitiae. — Paulo inferius Vat. bis influitur pro influit.
Mal. 4:2: And for you who fear my name the sun of justice shall arise. — A little below the Vatican [ed.] twice [reads] influitur for influit.
Ita codd. C F L aa; Vat. transponit quae post gratia; non pauci codd. perperam bis exhibent quae, et post gratia et ante mentes.
So read codd. C F L aa; the Vatican [ed.] transposes quae after gratia; not a few codices wrongly exhibit quae twice, both after gratia and before mentes.
Cfr. Bernard., Epist. 11. n. 5. seqq., ex qua iam supra pag. 124, nota 3. aliqua attulimus. — Subinde pro unde si quid Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 unde quod.
Cfr. Bernard, Epist. 11, n. 5 seqq., from which we already adduced something above on p. 124, note 3. — Then for unde si quid the Vatican [ed.] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] unde quod.
Vat. adiicit facit. Cod. aa legit velit se totum impendere.
The Vatican [ed.] adds facit. Cod. aa reads velit se totum impendere. [Marker anchored at the fons omnium donorum clause.]
Vide I. Sent. d. 18. q. I. — Mox pro Sicut enim Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 Sic etiam. Paulo inferius pro sic, cum cod. aa sic et cum.
See I Sent. d. 18, q. 1. — Soon, for Sicut enim the Vatican [ed.] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] Sic etiam. A little below, for sic, cum cod. aa [reads] sic et cum. [Quaracchi note keyed to the recreatio/dispositio cluster.]
Cfr. Bernard., Epist. 11. n. 8. seqq., ex qua iam supra pag. 124, nota 3. aliqua attulimus. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Paulo ante pro quantum ad quem modum Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et quantum ad hunc modum, et aliquanto superius pro quantum ad quod Deus, post quae verba cod. M repetit esse, eadem substituit quo Deus.
Cfr. Bernard, Epist. 11, n. 8 seqq. — Cfr. I Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 1 seq. — A little before, for quantum ad quem modum the Vatican [ed.] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] et quantum ad hunc modum, and somewhat above, for quantum ad quod Deus, after which words cod. M repeats esse, and substitutes the same with quo Deus.

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