Dist. 10, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 10
Articulus II. Ad quid boni Angeli mittantur.
Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet ad quid mittuntur. Et est prima quaestio, utrum mittantur ad accendendum nostrum affectum. Secundo, utrum mittantur ad illuminandum intellectum.
Quaestio I. Utrum Angeli mittantur ad inflammandum affectum.
Circa primum sic proceditur. Et quod mittantur ad inflammandum affectum, videtur.
Ad oppositum. 1. Angelus, qui missus est ad Isaiam, sicut dicit Dionysius1, dicitur esse unus de Seraphim, quia missus est ad incendendum et inflammandum: sed inflammatio respicit affectum: ergo etc.
2. Item, actus hierarchiarum, sicut vult Dionysius, de Angelica Hierarchia2, sunt « illuminare, purgare, perficere »: ergo si purgatio respicit remotionem sordium, et sordidatio respicit affectum quantum ad concupiscentiae vitium; videtur e contrario, quod Angelus mittatur ad inflammandum affectum per amorem sanctum et mundum.
3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Bonum, secundum quod bonum, est diffusivum sui3; sed Angelus beatus est perfecte bonus: ergo potest bonitatem diffundere. Sed bonum ut bonum respicit affectum: ergo videtur, quod cum affectus noster secundum susceptionem bonitatis habeat perfici et inflammari, quod ad hoc possit et debeat Angelus mitti, ut nostrum affectum inflammet et perficiat.
4. Item, nos videmus in naturalibus, quod illud quod est inflammatum, dum alteri rei inflammabili approximat, ipsam inflammat: ergo si affectus angelicus est igne divini amoris inflammatus et repletus, et in sua missione nobis approximat, ergo affectus nostros inflammat.
Ad oppositum arguitur ita: Fundamenta. 1. Secundum affectum nostrum potissime consistit arbitrii libertas; sed nihil nisi solus Deus potest super liberum arbitrium, cum sit sub Deo potentissimum4: ergo nulla creatura, quantumcumque nobilis et perfecta, potest inflammare vel perficere affectum nostrum.
2. Item, secundum affectum nostrum maxime consistit iustitia et aequitas — « iustitia enim est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata », ut dicit Anselmus5 — sed solius summae iustitiae est voluntatem nostram rectificare: ergo eius solius est affectum inflammare.
3. Item, secundum rectam inflammationem affectus consistit caritas: ergo si caritas vel est Spiritus sanctus, vel immediate a Spiritu sancto6, inflammatio affectus nostri non potest esse ab aliquo alio.
4. Item, secundum affectum nostrum maxime consistit animae nostrae deiformitas7: si ergo solius Dei est deiformem efficere, solius Dei est in affectum nostrum influere: ergo illud non spectat ad ministerium Angelorum.
Conclusio
Angeli boni affectum nostrum inflammant, non principaliter efficiendo, sed excitando et adiuvando.
Respondeo: Distinctio. Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod affectum nostrum inflammari ab aliquo dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod inflammetur ab aliquo sicut a principali agente et efficiente, aut sicut ab excitante et adiuvante. Et secundum istum duplicem modum intelligendi dupliciter intellexerunt aliqui affectum nostrum ab Angelis inflammari et perfici; sed primus intellectus est haereticus, secundus vero catholicus.
Opinio haeretica. Primum intellectum habuerunt aliqui philosophorum8. Posuerunt enim, quod intelligentia esset animae instrumentum, et quod intelligentia influeret super animam, sicut influit agens super instrumentum; unde dixerunt, quod anima triplicem habet
operationem: animalem, intellectualem et divinam. Animalem ex se ipsa, intellectualem ex influentia angelica, sed divinam ex influentia divina. — Improbatur. Sed ista positio est contra veritatem catholicam et piam. Qui enim hoc posuerunt, non intellexerunt arbitrii libertatem neque animae dignitatem neque beatitudinis sublimitatem; quae si intellexissent, sicut beatus Augustinus9, egregius doctor, posuit, animam immediate a Deo compleri et moveri et beatificari dixissent, ut beatus Augustinus. Unde beatus Augustinus ubicumque de mente loquitur, istum errorem exstirpat, ostendens, quod ita immediate anima secundum mentem unitur Deo, sicut et mens angelica.
Conclusio. Si autem intelligatur secundo modo, sic habet veritatem; et hoc modo intellexit beatus Dionysius in libro de Angelica Hierarchia, et per hunc etiam modum ab Angelo dicitur Propheta fuisse incensus.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. 2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima.
3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod bonum est diffusivum sui: dicendum, quod diffusio dupliciter potest esse a bono: aut per modum multiplicationis, sicut calor vel lumen dicitur se diffundere; aut per modum utilis operationis, per quem modum dicitur bonus homo bonitatem suam diffundere, dum ad hoc operatur et laborat, ut alii bonitatem non ab ipso, sed a Deo suscipiant. Et per hunc modum intelligenda est diffusio in bonitate vel caritate angelica.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod inflammatum coniunctum inflammabili inflammat; dicendum, quod verum est, quando illa inflammatio est per eductionem alicuius de materia; ibi enim quod est in actu potest educere aliquid, quod est in potentia. Quando vero aliquid habet inflammari per caloris infusionem, non habet veritatem, quia hoc modo non inflammatur aliquid nisi per coniunctionem sui cum principio caloris, quod calorem natum est infundere. Et per hunc modum est inflammari in spiritualibus10, ubi flamma est amor divinus, non ex ipsa anima productus, sed potius a Deo infusus; et ideo hunc calorem non potest in nobis angelicus spiritus efficere, quamquam aliquo modo ad eius susceptionem possit nos excitare.
I. Eadem principia, quae in hac et seq. quaest. applicantur quoad Angelos bonos, supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. 5. respectu daemonum posita sunt; quae ab aliis Commentatoribus Lombardi adhibentur, ut explicent actus hierarchicos, quibus Angeli superiores purgant, illuminant et perficiunt inferiores (cfr. ibi scholion n. II.). De duabus his quaestionibus alii antiqui doctores explicite non tractant praeter B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 9. q. 34. m. 4. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 5. 6; Richard. a Med., (de q. 2.) hic a. 2. q. 2; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
II. Quoad 1. quaestionem iuvat ex Petro a Tar. (loc. cit. a. 5.) haec transcribere: « Affectum nostrum incendi vel inflammari tripliciter potest intelligi: vel efficiendo, sic solus Deus potest inflammare affectum; vel movendo, sicut obiectum movet potentiam...; vel excitando, sicut qui offert speciem rei desiderabilis inflammat affectum. Hoc autem ultimo modo Angelus potest inflammare vel incendere affectum nostrum. Primo modo ignis incendit lignum; secundo modo lignum incendit ignem; tertio modo qui lignum suggerit igni accendit ». Quoad 2. quaestionem, quae est non exigui momenti, idem Petrus (a. 6.) docet, tria requiri, ut intellectus noster aliquid, maxime aliud a se, cognoscat, scil. « species, qua cognoscatur, et lumen, in quo cognoscatur, et intentio, qua convertit se intellectus super speciem. Angelus non potest in intellectu novam speciem producere, sed nec habitum novi luminis, sed nec eius intentionem quo vult convertere. Unde... illuminat tantum excitando et disponendo. Facit enim in phantasia transmutationem specierum, componendo et dividendo secundum exigentiam rei, quam vult revelare; irradiat etiam lumen intellectus agentis sui super illas, ut moveant intellectum, et sic operatur quasi lumen intellectus nostri agentis augendo, et sic plura et subtiliora videri possunt in lumine duplicato; et excitat etiam aliquo nutu intentionem animae, ut se convertat super illa phantasmata abstrahendo; et sic dicitur animam purgare, illuminare, perficere ». — Notandum, quantum urgeat S. Bonav., quod sacrarium mentis nostrae non dependeat nisi a Deo.
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Article II. To what end the good Angels are sent.
Next there is inquiry concerning the second article, namely, to what end they are sent. And the first question is whether they are sent to kindle our affection. Secondly, whether they are sent to illuminate the intellect.
Question I. Whether the Angels are sent to inflame the affection.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus. And that they are sent to inflame the affection, [thus] it seems.
To the opposite. 1. The Angel who was sent to Isaiah, as Dionysius says1, is said to be one of the Seraphim, because he was sent to set on fire and to inflame: but inflaming regards the affection: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the acts of the hierarchies, as Dionysius wishes, On the Angelic Hierarchy2, are «to illuminate, to purge, to perfect»: therefore, if purging regards the removal of filth, and defilement regards the affection as to the vice of concupiscence, it seems on the contrary that an Angel is sent to inflame the affection through holy and pure love.
3. Likewise, this seems [so] by reason. The good, insofar as [it is] good, is diffusive of itself3; but a blessed Angel is perfectly good: therefore he can diffuse goodness. But the good as good regards the affection: therefore it seems that, since our affection is to be perfected and inflamed according to the reception of goodness, an Angel can and ought to be sent for this, that he may inflame and perfect our affection.
4. Likewise, we see in natural things that that which is inflamed, when it draws near to another inflammable thing, inflames it: therefore, if the angelic affection is inflamed and filled with the fire of divine love, and in his mission draws near to us, then he inflames our affections.
To the opposite it is argued thus: The grounds. 1. The freedom of choice consists especially in our affection; but nothing except God alone has power over free choice, since it is most powerful under God4: therefore no creature, however noble and perfect, can inflame or perfect our affection.
2. Likewise, justice and equity consist especially in our affection — «for justice is rectitude of will preserved for its own sake», as Anselm says5 — but it belongs to the highest justice alone to rectify our will: therefore it belongs to it alone to inflame the affection.
3. Likewise, charity consists according to the right inflaming of the affection: therefore, if charity either is the Holy Spirit, or [is] immediately from the Holy Spirit6, the inflaming of our affection cannot be from any other.
4. Likewise, the deiformity of our soul consists especially according to our affection7: if, then, it belongs to God alone to make [a thing] deiform, it belongs to God alone to flow into our affection: therefore that does not pertain to the ministry of the Angels.
Conclusion
The good Angels inflame our affection, not by effecting [it] principally, but by stirring [it] up and helping.
I respond: A distinction. For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the inflaming of our affection by something can be understood in two ways: either thus, that it be inflamed by something as by a principal agent and efficient [cause], or as by something that stirs up and helps. And according to this twofold mode of understanding, some understood in two ways our affection to be inflamed and perfected by the Angels; but the first understanding is heretical, the second indeed catholic.
A heretical opinion. The first understanding certain philosophers held8. For they posited that the intelligence was the soul's instrument, and that the intelligence flowed into the soul as an agent flows into an instrument; whence they said that the soul has a threefold
operation: an animal, an intellectual, and a divine [operation]. The animal [operation] from itself, the intellectual from angelic influence, but the divine from divine influence. — It is disproved. But this position is against the catholic and pious truth. For those who posited this did not understand the freedom of choice, nor the dignity of the soul, nor the sublimity of beatitude; which if they had understood, they would have said — as blessed Augustine9, the excellent doctor, posited — that the soul is completed and moved and beatified immediately by God, as blessed Augustine [held]. Hence blessed Augustine, wherever he speaks of the mind, roots out that error, showing that the soul, according to the mind, is so immediately united to God, just as the angelic mind also [is].
Conclusion. But if it be understood in the second way, then it has truth; and in this way blessed Dionysius understood [it] in the book On the Angelic Hierarchy, and in this manner too the Prophet is said to have been set on fire by an Angel.
The solution of the opposing arguments. 1, 2. And by this the reply to the first two [arguments] is plain.
3. But to that which is objected — that the good is diffusive of itself — it must be said that diffusion can be from the good in two ways: either by way of multiplication, as heat or light is said to diffuse itself; or by way of useful operation, in which manner a good man is said to diffuse his goodness, while he works and labors to this end, that others may receive goodness — not from him, but from God. And in this manner is to be understood the diffusion in angelic goodness or charity.
4. To that which is objected — that the inflamed [thing], joined to an inflammable [thing], inflames [it] — it must be said that this is true when that inflaming is by the eduction of something from matter; for there what is in act can educe something which is in potency. But when something is to be inflamed by the infusion of heat, it does not hold true, because in this manner a thing is not inflamed except by the joining of itself with the principle of heat, which is fitted by nature to infuse the heat. And in this manner is the inflaming in spiritual things10, where the flame is divine love, not produced from the soul itself, but rather infused by God; and therefore this heat the angelic spirit cannot effect in us, although in some way it can stir us up to the reception of it.
I. The same principles which in this question and the following are applied with respect to the good Angels were set down above, d. 8, part II, q. 1, 5, with respect to the demons; which [principles] are employed by the other Commentators of Lombard to explain the hierarchical acts by which the higher Angels purge, illuminate, and perfect the lower (cf. the scholion there, n. II). On these two questions the other ancient doctors do not treat explicitly, except B. Albert, Summa part II, tr. 9, q. 34, m. 4, 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here, the sole question, a. 5, 6; Richard of Middleton (on q. 2), here, a. 2, q. 2; Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 1.
II. As to the first question, it is helpful to transcribe these [words] from Peter of Tarentaise (in the place cited, a. 5): «That our affection is set on fire or inflamed can be understood in three ways: either by effecting — thus God alone can inflame the affection; or by moving, as an object moves a power...; or by stirring up, as one who presents the appearance of a desirable thing inflames the affection. And in this last way an Angel can inflame or set on fire our affection. In the first way fire sets wood on fire; in the second way wood sets fire on fire; in the third way one who supplies the wood kindles the fire». As to the second question, which is of no small moment, the same Peter (a. 6) teaches that three things are required for our intellect to know something, especially something other than itself, namely «a species by which it may be known, and a light in which it may be known, and an intention by which the intellect turns itself upon the species. An Angel cannot produce a new species in the intellect, nor [produce] the habit of a new light, nor turn its intention whither he will. Hence... he illuminates only by stirring up and disposing. For he makes in the imagination a transmutation of the species, by composing and dividing according to the requirement of the thing which he wishes to reveal; he also irradiates the light of his own agent intellect upon them, that they may move the intellect, and so he operates as it were by augmenting the light of our agent intellect, and so more and subtler things can be seen in the doubled light; and he also stirs up by some prompting the intention of the soul, that it may turn itself upon those phantasms by abstracting; and so he is said to purge, illuminate, [and] perfect the soul». — It is to be noted how greatly S. Bonaventure insists that the sanctuary of our mind depends on none but God.
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- De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 13. § 2. Cfr. supra pag. 262, nota 5.[Dionysius,] On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 13, § 2. Cf. above, p. 262, note 5.
- Cap. 3. § 2. Cfr. infra q. 2. in fine.[On the Celestial Hierarchy] c. 3, § 2. Cf. below, q. 2, at the end.
- Cfr. Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 4. § 1. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 1. seq. — Quod bonum respiciat affectum, vide tom. 1. pag. 800, nota 3.Cf. Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 4, § 1, and On the Divine Names c. 4, § 1 ff. — That the good regards the affection, see volume 1, p. 800, note 3.
- Secundum Bernardum. Cfr. supra pag. 115, nota 6. — Plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 potissimum.According to Bernard. Cf. above, p. 115, note 6. — Several codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] potissimum [for potentissimum].
- Dialog. de Veritate, c. 12.[Anselm,] Dialogue on Truth, c. 12.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 1. et infra d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. — Non pauci codd. omittunt a Spiritu sancto, et dein substituunt potest pro non potest; perperam.Cf. [book] I of the Sentences, d. 17, part 1, q. 1, and below, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2. — Not a few codices omit a Spiritu sancto, and then substitute potest for non potest; wrongly.
- Vide infra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.See below, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
- Praesertim Neoplatonici, inter quos eminet Proclus. Quod Proclus diffusius docet (Element. theol. et phys. prop. 201.) brevius in libro de Causis, prop. 3. sic exhibetur: Omnis anima nobilis tres habet operationes. Nam ex operationibus eius est operatio animalis et operatio intelligibilis et operatio divina. Operatio autem divina est, quoniam ipsa praeparat naturam cum virtute, quae est in ipsa a causa prima; eius autem operatio intelligibilis est, quoniam ipsa scit res per virtutem intelligentiae, quae est in ipsa; operatio autem eius animalis est, quoniam ipsa movet primum corpus et omnia corpora naturalia; quoniam ipsa est causa motus corporum et causa operationis naturae etc. Cfr. etiam prop. 9.Especially the Neoplatonists, among whom Proclus is eminent. What Proclus teaches more at length (Elements of Theology and Physics, prop. 201) is set forth more briefly in the book On Causes, prop. 3, thus: Every noble soul has three operations. For among its operations is the animal operation and the intelligible operation and the divine operation. The divine operation is so [called] because [the soul] itself prepares nature with the power which is in it from the first cause; its intelligible operation is so [called] because it itself knows things through the power of intelligence which is in it; its animal operation is so [called] because it itself moves the first body and all natural bodies — since it is the cause of the motion of bodies and the cause of the operation of nature etc. Cf. also prop. 9.
- Cfr. supra pag. 43, nota 3. et pag. 226, nota 3.Cf. above, p. 43, note 3, and p. 226, note 3.
- Plures codd. spiritibus.Several codices [read] spiritibus (in spirits) [for spiritualibus]. ---