Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 8
QUAESTIO IV.
Utrum daemones cogitationes immittere possint.
Quarto quaeritur, utrum daemon possit cogitationes immittere. Et quod sic, videtur:
Argg. pro affirmativa.
1. Primo auctoritate veteris Testamenti, in Psalmo1: Immittit Angelus Domini in circuitu timentium eum; si bonus Angelus potest immittere, cum bonus et malus sint eiusdem naturae, patet etc.
2. Item, auctoritate Ioannis, decimo tertio2: Cum diabolus misisset in cor, ut traderet eum Judas; sed mittere in cor non est aliud quam immittere: ergo etc.
3. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus3: «Maligni spiritus in cordibus malignorum cogitationes immittere non desistunt».
4. Item, suggestio est aculeus diaboli; sed suggestio nihil aliud est quam pravae cogitationis immissio: si ergo diabolus potest mala suggerere, ergo et potest malas cogitationes immittere.
Pro parte negativa.
Contra: 1. Matthaei decimo quinto4, super illud: Nihil quod in os intrat, coinquinat hominem, dicit Glossa Bedae, quod «diabolus non est malarum cogitationum immissor».
2. Item, si potest cogitationem immittere, cum in cogitatione formetur acies intelligentiae: ergo potest mentem nostram formare; quod falsum est, cum hoc dicat Augustinus5 esse proprium veritatis primae.
3. Item, nihil nobis intimius est quam nostra cogitatio: ergo si diabolus potest cogitationes immittere6, potest ad interiora nostra spiritualia introire; sed hoc nihil aliud est quam illabi: ergo menti nostrae illabi potest, quod supra est improbatum.
4. Item, si potest cogitationes immittere, ergo potest, quando vult, malum facere cogitare; sed ipse continue nobis optat malum: ergo nunquam permitteret, nos a cogitationibus malis desistere; quod manifeste falsum est.
Quaestiones incidentes.
Est igitur quaestio, quantum posse habeat diabolus respectu cogitationum generandarum in nobis, utrum scilicet possit efficere, vel tantum offerre; si offerre, utrum necessario possit nos compellere ad hoc, quod recipiamus oblatum.
Argg. pro secunda quaestione.
Et quod sic, videtur, quia si aliquid praesentatur aspectui oculorum nostrorum, necessarium est, nos videre, et sic de aliis sensibus: ergo similiter videtur de cogitationibus. Quod si verum est, videtur, quod a malis cogitationibus non possimus evadere, et quod mala cogitare non sit reprehensibile, cum tamen Dominus reprehendat Matthaei nono: Quid cogitatis mala in cordibus vestris?
CONCLUSIO. Daemon potest animae humanae cogitationes suggerere, non ut principaliter agens, sed ut excitans.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod immissio dicit actum, cuius effectus terminatur in eo quod intus est. Hunc autem actum Distinctio. dupliciter potest dicere respectu illius effectus: aut sicut causae principaliter agentis et efficientis, aut sicut excitantis vel impellentis. Conclusio 1. Primo modo proprie accipitur; et sic competit soli Deo respectu animae; ipse enim solus est, qui per modum principalis agentis potest in eius intimis cogitationes et affectiones gignere et formare7. Conclusio 2. Alio modo accipitur large et minus proprie. Quoniam immissio de ratione sui nominis quandam virtutem et auctoritatem sufficientem respectu effectus importat; ideo, quando solummodo dicit excitationem vel impulsionem, large accipitur et minus proprie. — Conclusio 3. Et sic competit daemoni respectu animae, quoniam eius officium est sive perversum studium, eidem malas cogitationes suggerere.
Ad argg. pro utraque parte.
Et sic patet responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem. Nam rationes et auctoritates ad primam partem inductae procedunt de immissione communiter dicta; rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt de immissione proprie dicta.
Ad quaestionem incidentem.
Ad illud vero quod quaeritur ultimo, quantum posse habeant daemones respectu malarum cogitationum nostrarum; dicendum, quod phantasmata possunt offerre.
Ad quaestionem 2.
Ad illud autem quod quaeritur, utrum necessario possint compellere8; diversimode a diversis respondetur. Opinio 1. Quidam enim dicunt, quod necessario possint compellere ad cogitationes malorum9, non tamen malas. Cogitatio enim, quae est de malo, non est mala, nisi eam comitetur affectio mala, quae est in potestate nostra. — Opinio 2, probabilior. Aliis vero videtur et probabilius, quod non possunt facere, quo facto necessario cogitemus malum, nisi in casu, videlicet cum cogitatio animae non est circa utilia occupata. Cum enim evagatur et est otiosa, tunc potest ei diabolus offerre imaginem turpem et vanam. Notandum. Et ideo volenti malas cogitationes et imaginationes effugere sollicite et diligenter cavendum est, ne contingat aliquando animum a bonis et ab utilibus cogitationibus revocari10. Hoc tamen non difficile est ei qui solitus est in bonis animum exercere, cui multo facilius est et delectabilius in bonis versari cogitationibus, quam sit viris carnalibus in foedis et turpibus imaginibus.
I. Haec et seq. quaest., infra d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. quoad Angelos tractantur et a multis una quaestione absolvuntur. Solutionem S. Bonaventurae Petrus a Tar. sic clare proponit: «Immissio cogitationem dicit actum, cuius effectus intra terminatur. Potest ergo intelligi immissio ista dupliciter: vel intrinsecus imprimendo, sic non immittit; vel extrinsecus excitando, sic immittit. Nam phantasmata componit et lumine intellectus sui agentis irradiata praesentat, ad quae suscipienda anima se convertit, si vult, sicut ad cetera phantasmata; si non vult, se non convertit».
II. De hac et seq. quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 7. a. 3. 4. — Scot. (quoad principia), in utroque Scripto II. Sent. d. 11. q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 5; S. I. q. 111. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 88; de Malo, q. 16. a. 11. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 8-10; S. p. II. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 3. partic. 1-4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. quaestiunc. 3-4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 5. 6. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. dub. lat. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. in fine.
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Question IV.
Whether the demons can implant thoughts.
Fourth, it is asked whether a demon can implant thoughts. And that he can, it seems:
Arguments for the affirmative.
1. First, by the authority of the Old Testament, in the Psalm1: The Angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear him; if a good Angel can implant, since the good and the evil are of the same nature, the point is clear, etc.
2. Likewise, by the authority of John, chapter thirteen2: When the devil had now put into the heart that Judas should betray him; but to put into the heart is nothing other than to implant: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, Gregory in the Moralia3: «The malignant spirits cease not to implant thoughts in the hearts of the malignant».
4. Likewise, suggestion is the goad of the devil; but suggestion is nothing other than the implanting of a depraved thought: if therefore the devil can suggest evils, therefore he can also implant evil thoughts.
For the negative part.
On the contrary: 1. Matthew chapter fifteen4, on that text: Not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man, the Gloss of Bede says that «the devil is not the implanter of evil thoughts».
2. Likewise, if he can implant a thought, since in thought the edge of the intelligence is formed: therefore he can shape our mind; which is false, since Augustine says5 that this is proper to the first truth.
3. Likewise, nothing is more inward to us than our thought: therefore if the devil can implant thoughts6, he can enter into our inward spiritual things; but this is nothing other than to slip in [illabi]: therefore he can slip into our mind, which has been disproved above.
4. Likewise, if he can implant thoughts, therefore he can, whenever he wills, make us think evil; but he continually wishes evil for us: therefore he would never allow us to desist from evil thoughts; which is manifestly false.
Incidental questions.
There is therefore a question how much power the devil has with respect to thoughts to be generated in us, namely whether he can effect them, or only offer them; and if offer, whether he can necessarily compel us to receive what is offered.
Arguments for the second question.
And that he can, it seems: because if something is presented to the gaze of our eyes, it is necessary that we see, and likewise of the other senses: therefore it likewise seems concerning thoughts. And if this is true, it seems that we cannot escape evil thoughts, and that to think evil is not reprehensible — although the Lord reprehends in Matthew chapter nine: Why do you think evil things in your hearts?
Conclusion. A demon can suggest thoughts to the human soul, not as one acting principally, but as one stirring up.
I respond: It must be said that implantation [immissio] denotes an act whose effect is terminated in what is within. Distinction. This act, however, can be spoken of in two ways with respect to that effect: either as of a cause principally acting and effecting, or as of one stirring up or impelling. Conclusion 1. In the first way it is taken properly; and so it belongs to God alone with respect to the soul; for he alone is the one who, by the mode of a principal agent, can in its inmost parts beget and form thoughts and affections7. Conclusion 2. In the other way it is taken broadly and less properly. For implantation, by the very meaning of the name, imports a certain power and authority sufficient with respect to its effect; therefore, when it denotes only stirring up or impulse, it is taken broadly and less properly. — Conclusion 3. And in this way it belongs to the demon with respect to the soul, since his office or rather his perverse zeal is to suggest evil thoughts to it.
To the arguments on both sides.
And thus the response to the arguments on both sides is clear. For the reasons and authorities adduced for the first part proceed of implantation taken commonly; while the reasons on the opposite side proceed of implantation taken properly.
To the incidental question.
To that which is asked last, how much power the demons have with respect to our evil thoughts, it must be said that they can offer phantasms.
To question 2.
But to that which is asked, whether they can necessarily compel8, the response is given diversely by diverse [authors]. Opinion 1. For some say that they can necessarily compel us to thoughts of evil things9, yet not to evil thoughts. For a thought which is about evil is not evil unless an evil affection accompany it, which is in our power. — Opinion 2, the more probable. But to others it seems, and more probably, that they cannot bring it about that, with this done, we necessarily think evil — except in a particular case, namely when the soul's thought is not occupied about useful things. For when it wanders and is idle, then the devil can offer to it a foul and vain image. Note. And therefore, for one wishing to flee evil thoughts and imaginations, one must carefully and diligently watch lest it happen that the mind be at any time recalled from good and useful thoughts10. Yet this is not difficult for him who is accustomed to exercise his mind in good things, for whom it is much easier and more delightful to dwell upon good thoughts than it is for carnal men to dwell upon foul and shameful images.
I. This and the following question, below at d. 10, a. 2, q. 1, are treated with respect to the Angels and by many are dispatched in a single question. The solution of St. Bonaventure is clearly proposed by Petrus a Tarantasia thus: «Implantation signifies an act whose effect is terminated within. This implantation can therefore be understood in two ways: either by impressing intrinsically — in this way he does not implant; or by stirring up extrinsically — in this way he does implant. For he composes phantasms and, irradiated by the light of his own agent intellect, presents them; to receive which the soul turns itself, if it wills, just as to other phantasms; if it wills not, it does not turn itself».
II. On this and the following question: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 101, m. 7, a. 3–4. — Scotus (as regards principles), in both Scripta on II Sent. d. 11, q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 5; Summa I q. 111, a. 3; Summa contra Gentes III, c. 88; de Malo, q. 16, a. 11–12. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8–10; Summa p. II, tr. 6, q. 27, m. 3, partic. 1–4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica, a. 6, quaestiunc. 3–4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 5–6. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 3, dub. lat. 2–3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 4 at the end.
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- Psalm. 33, 8.Psalm 33:8 (Vulgate; = Ps. 34:7 in Hebrew numbering).
- Vers. 2.Verse 2.
- Libr. XIV. c. 38. n. 46: Latrones namque eius maligni sunt spiritus, qui exquirendis hominum mortibus occupantur. Qui viam sibi in adflictorum cordibus faciunt, quando inter adversa, quae exterius tolerantur, cogitationes quoque pravas immittere non desistunt.Book XIV, c. 38, n. 46: For his robbers are the malignant spirits, who are occupied in seeking out the deaths of men. They make a way for themselves in the hearts of the afflicted, when, amid the adversities which are endured externally, they also cease not to implant depraved thoughts.
- Vers. 11: Non quod intrat in os coinquinat hominem. — Verba Bedae, quae sunt in Comment. super Matth. 15, 18: Unde diabolus adiutor cogitationum malarum et incentor, non auctor esse potest.Verse 11: Not what entereth into the mouth defileth a man. — The words of Bede, which are in his Commentary on Matthew 15:18: Whence the devil can be helper and kindler of evil thoughts, but not their author.
- Libr. 83 Qq. q. 81. n. 2. et 4; ibid. q. 53. n. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 43, nota 3. — Locutio in cogitatione formatur acies intelligentiae est secundum August., XI. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6. seqq. Intelligentia hic melius sensu strictiore sumitur, scil. pro suprema animae facultate; de quo vide librum de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. II. seq.Augustine, Book of 83 Questions q. 81, nn. 2 and 4; ibid. q. 53, n. 2. Cf. above p. 43, note 3. — The phrase in thought the edge of the intelligence is formed is according to Augustine, de Trinitate XI, c. 3, n. 6ff. Intelligence here is better taken in a stricter sense, namely for the supreme faculty of the soul; on which see the book de Spiritu et anima (among the works of Augustine), c. II and following.
- Vat. post immittere prosequitur ergo potest, quando vult, ad interiora etc.The Vatican edition, after implant, continues therefore he can, whenever he wills, [enter] into the inward parts, etc.
- Cfr. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 118. Serm. 18. n. 4. — Paulo inferius post importat plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et ideo pro ideo.Cf. Augustine, Enarrationes in Ps. 118, Sermon 18, n. 4. — A little below, after imports, very many codices with editions 2, 3, 4 read et ideo (and therefore) for ideo (therefore).
- Fide codd. H cc et ed. 1 expunximus verba hic addita missione et, utpote quae parum pertinent ad rem, de qua agitur.On the testimony of codices H and cc and edition 1, we have expunged the words here added missione et (by implantation and), as scarcely pertaining to the matter under discussion.
- In cod. I suppletur ad cogitationes malas.In codex I there is supplied to evil thoughts.
- Vat. supplet ratio; melius suppleretur anima.The Vatican edition supplies reason; soul would be supplied better. ---