Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 8
QUAESTIO V.
Utrum daemones possint malas affectiones incendere.
Quinto quaeritur, utrum daemones possint malas affectiones incendere. Et quod sic, videtur.
Argg. pro affirmativa.
1. Oseae septimo1: Omnes adulterantes sicut clibanus succensus a coquente; et Glossa exponit, quod «clibanus est fornicator, et coquens, diabolus»: ergo etc.
2. Item, Beda super Actuum quinto2 dicit, quod «diabolus fraudulenta et callida deceptione animam in affectum malitiae trahit»; sed hoc nihil aliud est quam pravam affectionem incendere: ergo etc.
3. Item, diabolus potest carnem nostram commovere, sicut dicitur Iob nono3. Super illud: Terra tradita est in manu impii, exponit Gregorius, id est «caro in manu diaboli». Si ergo carne commota excitatur stimulus concupiscentiae, qui est in nobis tanquam igniculus pravae affectionis, videtur, quod diabolus possit in nobis incendere affectionem concupiscentiae.
4. Item, ignem incendere non est aliud quam igni pabulum ministrare; sed malae imaginationes et exteriores opportunitates et occasiones sunt fomenta concupiscentiae: ergo videtur, quod diabolus hunc ignem concupiscentiae possit in nobis accendere.
5. Item, calidum potest calefacere, ergo inflammatum potest inflammare; sed diabolus totus est inflammatus, immo in eo sunt flammae et incentiva vitiorum, sicut dicitur Iacobi tertio4 et Beda dicit et Magister in littera: ergo diabolus potest nos ad malum inflammare, ergo et incendere.
Ad oppositum.
1. Imago maxime perficitur in affectione et voluntate5: ergo si diabolus non habet posse super animam, in quantum est Dei imago, ergo non videtur, quod possit affectionem nostram incendere.
2. Item, libertas arbitrii maxime consistit in affectu sive in voluntate6; sed liberum arbitrium est illud, super quod minime potest diabolus: ergo videtur, quod minime possit in nostrum affectum: ergo si non potest intellectui cogitationem immittere, ergo multo minus affectionem incendere.
3. Item, cogitatus praeambulus est ad affectionem; sed quod non potest in dispositionem, non potest in complementum: ergo si diabolus non potest immittere cogitatum7, non potest incendere affectum.
4. Item, si posset malas affectiones incendere: cum huiusmodi affectiones semper sint culpabiles, continue posset nos facere peccare, quod nefas est dicere.
Quaestio incidens.
Est igitur quaestio, quae differentia sit inter incendere et immittere; et pro quanto diabolus magis dicitur incensor quam immissor, cum e contrario videatur, cum multo plus sit affici quam cogitare.
CONCLUSIO. Daemon potest nos ad malas cogitationes et affectiones excitare, non autem eas ut principaliter agens in nobis efficere.
Respondeo: Ad quaestionem incidentem. Dicendum, quod incendere est actus translatus a corporalibus ad spiritualia. In corporalibus autem incendere est non ignem generare, sed potius igni pabulum ministrare, vel applicando ignem combustibili, vel combustibile igni. Sic et in spiritualibus. Ignis autem iste concupiscentia est sive libido perversa; pabulum istius ignis sunt cogitationes et affectiones carnales et terrenae et delectationes foedae; et ita incendere in spiritualibus non tantummodo accipitur respectu affectionum, immo etiam cogitationum; et respectu utrarumque non dicit actum sicut principaliter agentis, sed solum sicut excitantis et subministrantis. — Conclusio. Quoniam igitur diabolus potest nos ad malas cogitationes et affectiones excitare, licet non possit eas in nobis sua potestate efficere; ideo recte et proprie a Sanctis et a doctoribus sacrae Scripturae incensor dicitur, non immissor. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.
Solutio oppositorum.
1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod diabolus non potest super imaginem nec super liberum arbitrium; dicendum, quod non potest sicut agens et movens principale, potest tamen sicut suggerens et inducens. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus8: «Violentiam alicui inferre non possunt; in nobis enim est suscipere eorum immissiones».
3. Ad illud, quod non potest in cogitationem; dicendum, quod, sicut non potest cogitationem formare, sic nec affectionem principaliter causare vel movere; sicut autem potest affectionem incendere, sic etiam cogitationem.
4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod tunc posset nos facere peccare; dicendum, quod verum est, si potentia incendendi importaret necessitatem, vel praecipuam et effectivam potestatem respectu affectionis pravae; sed, sicut praedictum est, non dicit causam efficientem, sed disponentem; quae quidem dispositio efficaciam non habet, nisi nos demus ei vigorem ex nostra negligentia, vel consensu9.
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Question V.
Whether the demons can kindle evil affections.
Fifth, it is asked whether the demons can kindle evil affections. And that they can, it seems.
Arguments for the affirmative.
1. Hosea chapter seven1: All who commit adultery are like an oven heated by the baker; and the Gloss expounds that «the oven is the fornicator, and the baker, the devil»: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, Bede on Acts chapter five2 says that «the devil, by fraudulent and crafty deception, draws the soul into the affection of malice»; but this is nothing other than to kindle a depraved affection: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, the devil can move our flesh, as is said in Job chapter nine3. On that text: The earth is given into the hand of the wicked one, Gregory expounds, that is, «the flesh into the hand of the devil». If, then, when the flesh is moved the goad of concupiscence is stirred up, which is in us as a little spark of depraved affection, it seems that the devil can kindle in us the affection of concupiscence.
4. Likewise, to kindle a fire is nothing other than to supply fuel to a fire; but evil imaginations and external opportunities and occasions are the kindling of concupiscence: therefore it seems that the devil can ignite in us this fire of concupiscence.
5. Likewise, what is hot can heat, therefore what is inflamed can inflame; but the devil is wholly inflamed — nay, in him there are flames and incitements of vices, as is said in James chapter three4 and Bede says, and the Master in the littera: therefore the devil can inflame us to evil, therefore also kindle [it].
On the contrary.
1. The image is most fully perfected in affection and will5: therefore if the devil has no power over the soul insofar as it is the image of God, therefore it does not seem that he can kindle our affection.
2. Likewise, the liberty of choice consists chiefly in the affect or will6; but free choice is that over which the devil has the least power: therefore it seems that he has the least power over our affect: therefore if he cannot implant a thought into the intellect, much less can he kindle an affection.
3. Likewise, thought is the preamble to affection; but what cannot reach the disposition cannot reach the completion: therefore if the devil cannot implant a thought7, he cannot kindle the affect.
4. Likewise, if he could kindle evil affections — since affections of this sort are always culpable, he could continually make us sin, which is wicked to say.
Incidental question.
There is therefore a question what difference there is between kindling and implanting; and for what reason the devil is rather called kindler than implanter, since on the contrary it would seem otherwise, because to be affected is far more than to think.
Conclusion. A demon can stir us to evil thoughts and affections, but cannot bring them about in us as one acting principally.
I respond: To the incidental question. It must be said that kindling is an act transferred from corporeal things to spiritual. In corporeal things kindling is not to generate fire, but rather to supply fuel to fire, either by applying fire to fuel, or fuel to fire. So also in spiritual things. This fire is concupiscence or perverse desire; the fuel of this fire is carnal and earthly thoughts and affections and shameful delights; and so kindling in spiritual things is taken not only with respect to affections, but also with respect to thoughts; and with respect to both it does not denote an act of one principally acting, but only of one stirring up and supplying. — Conclusion. Since therefore the devil can stir us to evil thoughts and affections, although he cannot bring them about in us by his own power; therefore he is rightly and properly called by the saints and doctors of sacred Scripture kindler, not implanter. — And the reasons for this are to be granted.
Solution of the opposed arguments.
1. 2. To that which is objected, that the devil has no power over the image nor over free choice; it must be said that he has no power as principal agent and mover, but he has power as one suggesting and inducing. And this is what Damascene says8: «They cannot bring violence upon anyone; for it is in us to receive their implantations».
3. To that which says he cannot reach thought; it must be said that, just as he cannot form a thought, so neither can he principally cause or move an affection; but just as he can kindle an affection, so also a thought.
4. To that which is finally objected, that then he could make us sin; it must be said that this would be true, if the power of kindling imported necessity, or chief and effective power with respect to a depraved affection; but, as has been said, it does not denote an efficient cause, but a disposing one; which disposition has no efficacy unless we ourselves give vigor to it by our negligence, or by our consent9.
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- Cfr. Isidor., III. de Summo Bono sive Sent. c. 19. n. 5. — In fine solutionis plures codd. ut F U W imaginationibus pro imaginibus.Cf. Isidore, de Summo Bono sive Sententiae III, c. 19, n. 5. — At the end of the solution very many codices, such as F U W, read imaginationibus (imaginations) for imaginibus (images).
- Vers. 4. — Glossam, quae sumta est ex Hieronymo, vide apud Lyranum in hunc locum. — Paulo superius multi codd. imprimere pro incendere; sed pag. 224 omnes habent incendere.Verse 4. — For the Gloss, which is taken from Jerome, see Lyra on this passage. — A little above, many codices read imprimere (to impress) for incendere (to kindle); but at p. 224 all have incendere.
- Vers. 24. — Gregor., IX. Moral. c. 28. n. 44: Quid namque terrae nomine, nisi caro exprimitur? Quis appellatione impii nisi diabolus designatur?Verse 24. — Gregory, Moralia IX, c. 28, n. 44: For what is expressed by the name "earth" if not the flesh? Who is designated by the name "wicked one" if not the devil?
- Vers. 6: Lingua... inflammat rotam nativitatis nostrae, inflammata a gehenna. — De Magistro vide hic in lit. c. 4, ubi et verba Bedae habentur. — Paulo superius Vat. immo et pro immo.Verse 6: The tongue... setteth on fire the wheel of our nativity, being set on fire by hell. — On the Master see here in the littera c. 4, where the words of Bede are also given. — A little above, the Vatican edition reads immo et (nay, also) for immo (nay).
- Aliqui codd. cum edd. 1, 2 imagines.Some codices with editions 1 and 2 read imagines (images).
- Cfr. infra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.Cf. below at d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
- Vide infra d. 28. p. 1. q. 6. — Paulo inferius multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 minus bene cognitionem pro cogitationem; Vat. cognitionem vel cogitationem. Cfr. quaest. praec.See below at d. 28, p. 1, q. 6. — A little below, many codices with editions 1, 2, 3 read, less well, cognitionem (cognition) for cogitationem (thought); the Vatican edition has cognitionem vel cogitationem. Cf. the preceding quaestio.
- Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 4. — Cod. U quod dicit Gregorius: Debilis est hostis etc. et Damascenus. De verbo Gregorii vide supra pag. 170, nota 2.John Damascene, de Fide Orthodoxa II, c. 4. — Codex U reads which Gregory says: The enemy is weak, etc., and Damascene. On the saying of Gregory see above p. 170, note 2.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding quaestio (i.e., q. 4 above). ---