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Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 6

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO VI.

Utrum daemones scrutari possint secreta conscientiae nostrae.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum daemones possint scrutari secreta nostrae conscientiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

Ad oppositum (videtur).

1. Daemonum officium est accusare, secundum quod legitur Apocalypsis duodecimo1: Proiectus est accusator fratrum etc.: ergo si in iudicio arguemur de secretissimis cogitationibus, videtur, quod hae non lateant accusatorem nostrum.

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2. Item, peccatum est character bestiae, secundum quod insinuatur Apocalypsis decimo quarto2. Sed unusquisque cognoscit proprium signaculum, ubicumque ponatur: ergo diabolus cognoscit peccatum, ubicumque sit. Sed nihil est in nobis secretius, quam sint peccata cogitationum et affectionum nostrarum: ergo si haec diabolus potest videre, secreta conscientiarum nostrarum rimari potest.

3. Item, Augustinus duodecimo super Genesim ad litteram3: «Mali angeli cogitationem noverunt, quia multa praedicunt, quae non praedicerent, si cogitationes non novissent».

4. Item, hoc videtur per rationem. Notior est operatio quam potentia, et potentia quam substantia4; quia per cognitionem operationis et potentiae pervenitur in cognitionem substantiae; sed substantia animae non potest latere diabolum: ergo nec eius operatio nec virtus: ergo si cogitatio et affectio sunt actiones animae, ergo non possunt latere daemonem.

5. Item, substantiae spirituales, sicut dicit Dionysius5, per sui naturam sunt specula; sed sic est in speculo materiali, quod quando unum obiicitur alteri, non solum repraesentat ipsum, sed etiam omne quod relucet in ipso: ergo si maioris communicationis sunt specula spiritualia, videtur, quod quando daemon intuetur et aspicit animam, non solum ipsam videat, sed omne quod est in ipsa.

6. Item, nihil potest oculus meus videre in me, quod non possit videre oculus alienus: si ergo sic est in oculo corporali respectu rei visibilis corporalis, pari ratione similiter erit in oculo spirituali respectu cognoscibilis spiritualis. Ergo si oculum meum spiritualem non latet secretum conscientiae meae, pari ratione nec oculos daemonum.

In contrarium.

Ad oppositum: 1. Tertii Regum octavo6: Tu solus nosti corda filiorum hominum: non ergo daemon vel alius.

2. Item, Ieremiae decimo septimo7: Ego Dominus, scrutans corda et renes: ergo si Dominus hoc sibi attribuit tanquam proprium, videtur, quod non communicet diabolo.

3. Item, primae ad Corinthios secundo8: Nemo scit quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui est in illo; sed daemon nec est spiritus noster nec est in nobis: ergo non novit secreta conscientiae nostrae.

4. Item, Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus9: «Internas cogitationes nostras diabolum non videre, certum est».

5. Item, ratione videtur: quia si internas cogitationes cognosceret, cognosceret et virtutes, ergo beati Iob patientiam cognovisset; quod si cognovisset, non tentasset, cum nolit superari; sed tentavit: ergo nec virtutem nec cogitationes eius cognovit10.

CONCLUSIO. Nulla creatura potest nosse conscientiae humanae secreta nisi per signa, vel per coniecturam.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod sicut Deus voluntati rationalis creaturae dedit dominium sive arbitrium, cui nulla praesidet nisi divina potentia; sic eius cognitivae dedit conscientiae secretum, cuius secreta et profunda non penetrat nisi divina sapientia. Conclusio 1. Et ideo dico, quod nulla creatura, nec humana nec angelica, potest conscientiae humanae nosse secreta, nisi per signa vel per coniecturas, vel nisi noverit Dei revelatione, aut hominis denuntiatione sive detectione11. Et quoniam pauca sunt ita secreta, quin prodeant in opera exteriora, vel appareant per signa exteriora faciei, vel per signa cordis, quod diversimode movetur secundum diversitatem affectionum; Conclusio 2. hinc est, quod multae cogitationes et affectiones nostrae deprehendi possunt a malignis spiritibus, nisi arceantur Dei virtute. Haec autem cognitio potius est coniecturae quam certae scientiae12. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod angelus malus secreta conscientiae nostrae perscrutari non potest.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Notandum. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo in contrarium de accusatoris officio, dicendum, quod non solum ipse daemon erit accusator, immo etiam cor nostrum; unde etsi de exterioribus et visibilibus accusari possumus a diabolo, de occultis et secretis non. Neutra tamen impunita relinquentur, quia non deerit accusator et testis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum est character diaboli; dicendum, quod peccatum tunc dicitur esse character, quando scribitur in fronte; hoc autem est, cum peccat sine rubore et publice, ut iam possit ei dici: Frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi, noluisti erubescere13; et tunc absque

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dubio peccatum nostrum diabolo est cognitum, quia iam non est secretum, sed manifestum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, quod cogitationes noverunt; dicendum, quod loquitur de cognitione coniecturae, non certae scientiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod notior est operatio quam substantia; dicendum, quod verum est de operatione extrinseca; de intrinseca autem non habet semper veritatem. Multae enim res sunt nobis notae, quarum virtutes et operationes nos latent. — Alia solutio. Vel dicendum, quod hoc locum habet in operatione naturali, non in operatione voluntaria. Operatio enim naturalis, secundum quod naturalis est, ita se naturaliter nata est repraesentare nec se occultare potest, sicut nec substantia; immo per ipsam manifestatur substantia, dum plus habet de ratione actualitatis, ac per hoc manifestationis et lucis. In operatione autem voluntaria secus est. Nam cum substantia se naturaliter repraesentet, sicut naturaliter est, et se occultare non possit; operatio voluntaria, sicut voluntarie exit in esse, ita et voluntarie manifestatur; et ita occultari potest, immo non manifestatur, nisi homo velit. Talia autem sunt quae latent in secreto nostrae conscientiae. Ideo quamvis diabolus possit videre animam propria virtute, non tamen potest illam14 conspicere.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod speculum repraesentat aliud speculum et quae sunt in eo contenta; dicendum, quod duplex est speculum, quoddam naturale, et quoddam voluntarium. Speculum naturale, sicut naturaliter suscipit, ita et naturaliter reddit, et ita nihil occultat; ideo speculum sibi oppositum non solum ipsum, sed etiam omne quod lucet in eo, repraesentat. Speculum autem voluntarium non est in actu manifestationis eorum quae in se continet, nisi cum hoc facit voluntas15; et tale est speculum spirituale. Ideo non est simile.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de oculo corporali, per hanc ipsam rationem iam patet responsio. Oculus enim unus corporalis videt quidquid videt alius, si obiectum sit utrique revelatum; si autem uni aperitur et alteri tegitur, unus potest videre quod non videt alius. Quia ergo nullus se sibi nec vult nec potest velare16, quia sibi semper praesens est; ideo oculum proprium, si quid in se est, non potest latere; alienum vero oculum potest subterfugere et se illi velare, quoniam non est ipsi praesens nec super eum potens: et ideo omnem oculum spiritualem potest conscientia nostra latere, excepto se et illo qui est supra se. Et ideo dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram17, quod «sicut substantiae corporales habent aliqua velamenta, quibus se alienis conspectibus occultant, sic in substantiis spiritualibus suo modo esse intelligendum est»; haec est verborum suorum sententia.

Quaestio incidens.

Et si tu quaeras, quomodo possit hoc esse vel intelligi, cum substantia spiritualis sit simplex et uniformis per totum, et ita videtur, quod qui videt modicum, nihil latet, et cum uniformis sit, non potest esse ibi aliquid occultans et aliquid occultatum; dicendum, quod obstaculum illud non habet intelligi per interpositionem alicuius naturae opacae, sicut est in visu nostro corporeo, vel obscurae, vel minus clarae; sed ibi abscondere idem est quod manifestare nolle. Et licet non sint ibi diversitates plicarum ex compositione diversarum naturarum, sunt tamen in anima gradus potentiarum et statuum, secundum quos quaedam dicuntur animae esse magis intima, utpote quae respiciunt potentias superiores et simpliciores sive puriores, secundum quas anima magis in se ipsa recolligitur, et ei quod summe unum est, unitur et simplificatur; et penes has maxime residet conscientiae secretum.

Ad litteram Magistri.

Et sic patet solutio obiectorum; ex quibus etiam manifestantur omnia quae in littera dicuntur. Hoc autem solum indiget explanatione, quod dicit Gennadius18, quod daemones per energiam operationum etc., quid ibi appellet energiam. Energia. Et dicendum, quod energia dicitur ab en, quod est in, et ergon, quod est labor, et mene, quod est defectus; unde energia quasi interior labor vel interior defectus19. Quid energumeni. Unde illi dicuntur energumeni, qui interius laborant per vexationem daemonis interius obsidentis et animam laborare facientis. Et hoc est quod Gennadius intendit dicere.

Scholion

I. Secundum titulum quaestionis tantum de daemonibus agitur, sed in responsione negative resolvitur in genere respectu cuiusvis creaturae. — Conscientia hoc loco sumitur pro potentia intellectus et voluntatis (cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1.). — Quod autem de facto Angeli nesciant secreta cordium, in dubium vocatur a Durando (hic q. 8.), et cum eodem quoad «substantiam actionis in cogitatione» convenit Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 3. q. 13.), qui tamen quoad actus directionem in finem, sive bonum sive malum, nihil determinat. Etiam Aegid. R. aliique his ex parte consentiunt. — Scot. (II. Sent. d. 9. q. 2. n. 27. seqq.; Report. ibid. q. 2. n. 3-6; IV. Sent. d. 45. q. 4.) negat, Angelos de facto ista secreta cognoscere, sed dissentit quoad assignatam rationem et asserit, ista secreta speciali providentia Dei, concursum suum denegantis, subtrahi notitiae spirituum, praesertim daemonum. Hinc loquendo de possibili et praescindendo de negatione concursus generalis, idem putat, Angelos ea secreta per se posse cognoscere, dummodo sint praesentia, non futura. — Sed S. Thom. et communior sententia convenit cum S. Bonaventura tum in conclusionibus, tum in principali ratione. — Attentione dignae sunt solutiones ad 4. et 6.

II. Praeter iam citatos: S. Thom., S. p. I. q. 57. a. 4; de Malo, q. 16. a. 8; de Verit. q. 8. a. 13. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 7. q. 2. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 9. q. 2.

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English Translation
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Question VI.

Whether the demons can scrutinize the secrets of our conscience.

Sixth and last, it is asked whether the demons can scrutinize the secrets of our conscience. And that they can, it seems.

For the affirmative.

1. The office of demons is to accuse, according to what is read in Apocalypse twelve1: The accuser of the brethren is cast forth, etc.: therefore, if in judgment we are arraigned concerning the most secret thoughts, it seems that these do not lie hidden from our accuser.

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2. Likewise, sin is the character of the beast, as is intimated in Apocalypse fourteen2. But each one recognizes his own seal, wherever it be placed: therefore the devil recognizes sin, wherever it be. But nothing is in us more secret than are the sins of our thoughts and affections: therefore if the devil can see these, he can ferret out the secrets of our consciences.

3. Likewise, Augustine in book twelve on Genesis ad litteram3: «The evil angels have known the thought, since they predict many things, which they would not predict if they had not known the thoughts».

4. Likewise, this seems by reason. Operation is more known than power, and power than substance4; because through cognition of operation and power one arrives at cognition of substance; but the substance of the soul cannot lie hidden from the devil: therefore neither its operation nor power: therefore if thought and affection are actions of the soul, therefore they cannot lie hidden from the demon.

5. Likewise, spiritual substances, as Dionysius says5, by their nature are mirrors; but it is so in a material mirror that, when one is set over against another, it represents not only itself but also everything that shines in it: therefore if spiritual mirrors are of greater communication, it seems that, when a demon gazes upon and inspects the soul, he sees not only it but everything that is in it.

6. Likewise, nothing can my eye see in me which another's eye cannot see: if therefore it is so in the corporeal eye with respect to a visible corporeal thing, by parity of reason it will be likewise in the spiritual eye with respect to a spiritual knowable. Therefore, if the secret of my conscience does not lie hidden from my own spiritual eye, by parity of reason neither from the eyes of demons.

To the contrary.

On the contrary: 1. Third Kings, chapter eight6: Thou alone knowest the hearts of the sons of men: therefore not the demon nor any other.

2. Likewise, Jeremiah seventeen7: I am the Lord, who search the heart and the reins: therefore if the Lord attributes this to himself as proper, it seems that he does not share it with the devil.

3. Likewise, First Corinthians chapter two8: No one knows the things that are of a man, except the spirit of a man that is in him; but the demon is neither our spirit nor is in us: therefore he does not know the secrets of our conscience.

4. Likewise, Augustine in the book de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus9: «That the devil does not see our internal thoughts, is certain».

5. Likewise, it seems by reason: because if he knew the internal thoughts, he would also know the virtues; therefore he would have known blessed Job's patience; and if he had known, he would not have tempted, since he does not wish to be overcome; but he tempted: therefore he knew neither his virtue nor his thoughts10.

Conclusion. No creature can know the secrets of a human conscience save by signs, or by conjecture.

I respond: For an understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, just as God gave to the will of the rational creature dominion or free choice, over which nothing presides save the divine power; so to its cognitive [faculty] he gave the secret of conscience, whose secrets and depths nothing penetrates save divine wisdom. Conclusion 1. And therefore I say that no creature, neither human nor angelic, can know the secrets of a human conscience, except by signs or by conjectures, or unless it knows by divine revelation, or by a human being's announcement or disclosure11. And since few things are so secret that they do not come forth in external works, or appear by external signs of the face, or by the signs of the heart, which is moved diversely according to the diversity of affections; Conclusion 2. hence it is that many of our thoughts and affections can be caught by the malignant spirits, unless they be hindered by the power of God. But this cognition is rather of conjecture than of certain knowledge12. — And therefore the reasons showing that an evil angel cannot scrutinize the secrets of our conscience are to be granted.

Solution of the opposed arguments.

1. Note. To that which is objected first to the contrary, about the accuser's office, it must be said that not only will the demon himself be the accuser, but also our heart; whence, although we can be accused by the devil concerning external and visible things, concerning the hidden and the secret we cannot. Yet neither will be left unpunished, since there will be no lack of accuser and witness.

2. To that which is objected, that sin is the character of the devil; it must be said that sin is then called a character when it is written on the forehead; but this is when one sins without blush and publicly, so that it can already be said to him: Thou hast the forehead of a harlot woman; thou refusedst to blush13; and then without

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doubt our sin is known to the devil, because already it is not secret but manifest.

3. To that which is objected from Augustine, that they have known thoughts; it must be said that he is speaking of cognition by conjecture, not of certain knowledge.

4. To that which is objected, that operation is more known than substance; it must be said that this is true of external operation; but it does not always hold true of internal operation. For many things are known to us whose powers and operations lie hidden from us. — Another solution. Or it must be said that this holds in natural operation, not in voluntary operation. For natural operation, insofar as it is natural, is naturally apt to represent itself and cannot conceal itself, just as neither can substance; nay, by it substance is manifested, since it has more of the character of actuality, and through this of manifestation and light. But it is otherwise in voluntary operation. For while substance naturally represents itself, just as it naturally is, and cannot conceal itself; voluntary operation, just as it voluntarily comes forth into being, so it is also voluntarily manifested; and so it can be concealed — nay, it is not manifested unless the man wills. And of such kind are the things which lie hidden in the secret of our conscience. Therefore, although the devil can see the soul by his own power, he cannot nevertheless catch sight of it14 [i.e., of voluntary operation].

5. To that which is objected, that a mirror represents another mirror and the things contained in it; it must be said that a mirror is twofold, one natural, and one voluntary. The natural mirror, just as it naturally receives, so it naturally renders, and so conceals nothing; therefore the mirror set opposite to it represents not only itself but also everything that shines in it. But the voluntary mirror is not in the act of manifesting the things which it contains in itself, unless the will makes it so15; and such is the spiritual mirror. Therefore the case is not alike.

6. To that which is objected concerning the corporeal eye, the response is now clear by this very reason. For one corporeal eye sees whatever another sees, if the object is revealed to both; but if it is opened to one and covered to the other, one can see what the other does not see. Since therefore no one can or wills to veil himself from himself16, because he is always present to himself; therefore his own eye, if anything is in him, cannot lie hidden; but another's eye he can elude and veil himself from it, since he is not present to it nor has power over it: and therefore our conscience can lie hidden from every spiritual eye, except from itself and from him who is above it. And therefore Augustine on Genesis ad litteram says17 that «just as corporeal substances have certain coverings by which they conceal themselves from alien sight, so in spiritual substances it must be understood after their own manner»; this is the sense of his words.

Incidental question.

And if you ask how this can be or be understood, since a spiritual substance is simple and uniform throughout, and so it seems that he who sees a little, nothing lies hidden, and since it is uniform, there cannot be there something concealing and something concealed; it must be said that that obstacle is not to be understood by the interposition of any opaque nature, as is the case in our corporeal sight, or obscure, or less clear; but there to hide is the same as to be unwilling to manifest. And although there are not there diversities of folds from the composition of diverse natures, there are nevertheless in the soul gradations of powers and states, according to which certain things are said to be more inward to the soul, namely those which regard the higher and simpler or purer powers, according to which the soul more recollects itself in itself, and is united and simplified to that which is supremely one; and near these chiefly resides the secret of conscience.

To the text of the Master.

And thus the solution of the objections is clear; from which also all the things said in the littera are manifested. Only this needs explanation, that Gennadius says18 that the demons [act] through the energy of operations, etc. — what he there calls energy. Energy. And it must be said that energy is named from en, which is in, and ergon, which is labor, and mene, which is defect; whence energy is as it were an interior labor or interior defect19. What are energumens. Whence those are called energumens who labor inwardly through the vexation of a demon inwardly besetting them and making the soul to labor. And this is what Gennadius means to say.

Scholion

I. According to the title only the demons are treated of, but in the response it is resolved negatively in general with respect to any creature. — Conscience is here taken for the power of intellect and will (cf. below d. 39, a. 1, q. 1). — But that the Angels do not in fact know the secrets of hearts, is called into doubt by Durandus (here q. 8), and with him as to «the substance of the action in thought» agrees Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 3, q. 13), who however as to the direction of the act toward an end, whether good or evil, determines nothing. Aegidius Romanus too and others partly consent. — Scotus (II Sent. d. 9, q. 2, n. 27ff.; Reportatio ibid. q. 2, nn. 3–6; IV Sent. d. 45, q. 4) denies that the Angels in fact know these secrets, but dissents as to the assigned reason and asserts that these secrets are withdrawn from the notice of spirits — especially of demons — by a special providence of God who denies his own concurrence. Hence, speaking concerning the possible, and prescinding from the denial of the general concurrence, the same [Scotus] thinks that Angels can know these secrets per se, provided they be present, not future. — But St. Thomas and the more common opinion agree with St. Bonaventure both in the conclusions and in the principal reason. — Worthy of attention are the solutions to [arguments] 4 and 6.

II. Besides those already cited: St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 57, a. 4; de Malo, q. 16, a. 8; de Veritate, q. 8, a. 13. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica, a. 6, quaestiunc. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, II Sent. d. 7, q. 2, a. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 4. — Biel, II Sent. d. 9, q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 10.
    Verse 10 (Apoc. 12:10).
  2. Vers. 9. et 11.
    Verses 9 and 11 (Apoc. 14:9, 11).
  3. Cap. 17. n. 34. seq. Cfr. ibid. c. 22. n. 48.
    Chapter 17, n. 34 and following. Cf. ibid., c. 22, n. 48.
  4. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text II. (c. 1.) et II. text. 33. (c. 4.).
    Cf. Aristotle, de Anima I, text. 2 (c. 1) and II, text. 33 (c. 4).
  5. Cfr. supra pag. 83, nota 1.
    Cf. above p. 83, note 1.
  6. Vers. 39: Tu nosti solus cor omnium filiorum hominum. Cfr. II. Paralip. 6, 30.
    Verse 39: Thou alone knowest the heart of all the sons of men. Cf. 2 Paralipomenon 6:30.
  7. Vers. 10.
    Verse 10 (Jer. 17:10).
  8. Vers. 11.
    Verse 11 (1 Cor. 2:11).
  9. Cap. 48: Internas animae cogitationes diabolum non videre, certi sumus.
    Chapter 48: That the devil does not see the internal thoughts of the soul, we are certain.
  10. Hoc argumentum insinuat August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 34. — Unus alterque cod. cum Vat. virtutes pro virtutem.
    This argument is suggested by Augustine, de Gen. ad litteram XII, c. 17, n. 34. — One or two codices, with the Vatican edition, read virtutes (virtues) for virtutem (virtue).
  11. In Vat. desideratur sive detectione, pro quo plures codd. cum ed. 1 perperam sive directione.
    In the Vatican edition sive detectione (or by disclosure) is wanting; in its place very many codices with edition 1 wrongly read sive directione (or by direction).
  12. Cod. I subiungit quia signa non semper sunt expressa et sunt fallibilia, quia plurium signa apta. — Cfr. August., II. Retract. c. 30.
    Codex I adds since the signs are not always express and are fallible, because the signs are apt to many things. — Cf. Augustine, Retract. II, c. 30.
  13. Ier. 3, 3. — Paulo superius post peccat cod. V bene supplet aliquis.
    Jeremiah 3:3. — A little above, after peccat (he sins), codex V well supplies aliquis (someone).
  14. Scil. operationem voluntariam. — Vat. illa i. e. quae latent in secreto conscientiae. In cod. aa additur quantum ad omnes suas potentias.
    Namely, the voluntary operation. — The Vatican edition has illa (i.e., those things which lie hidden in the secret of conscience). In codex aa is added quantum ad omnes suas potentias (as regards all its powers).
  15. Cod. aa nisi consentiat voluntas.
    Codex aa reads unless the will consents.
  16. Vat. revelare. Mox nonnulli codd. ipse praesens, plures alii ipsa praesens pro ipsi praesens.
    The Vatican edition reads revelare (to reveal) [for velare, to veil]. Shortly after, some codices have ipse praesens, many others ipsa praesens, for ipsi praesens (present to him).
  17. Libr. XII. c. 22. n. 48. — In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 sicut corporaliter substantiae corporales.
    Book XII, c. 22, n. 48. — In very many manuscripts and in edition 1: sicut corporaliter substantiae corporales (just as corporeal substances corporeally).
  18. Vide lit. Magistri, c. 4. Editores Maurini in editione Augustini ad marginem dicunt, quod mss. omittunt operationum post energiam.
    See the littera of the Master, c. 4. The Maurist editors in the Augustine edition note in the margin that the manuscripts omit operationum (of operations) after energiam.
  19. Graece ἐνέργεια, quod derivatur ex his verbis ἐν i. e. in et ἔργον i. e. opus sive labor. S. Bonav. ad explicationem verbi energumenus, cuius ultimae syllabae formam participii exprimunt, falsa etymologia illius aetatis usus, adiungit tertium, scil. μήνη i. e. luna, quae crescendo et decrescendo signum est defectus. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
    In Greek ἐνέργεια, which is derived from these words ἐν, i.e., in, and ἔργον, i.e., work or labor. St. Bonaventure, for the explanation of the word energumenus — the last syllables of which express the form of a participle — using the false etymology of his age, adds a third, namely μήνη, i.e., moon, which, by waxing and waning, is a sign of defect. Cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, in corp. ---
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