Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 23
Quaestio II. Utrum, si primi parentes stetissent in statu innocentiae, aliquando decipi potuissent.
Secundo quaeritur de cognitione primorum parentum quantum ad defectum. Et hoc est quaerere, utrum, si stetissent in statu innocentiae, aliquando decipi potuissent. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Genesis tertio1: Dixit mulier: Serpens seduxit me; sed constat, quod mulier non consensit, nisi quia aestimavit, esse verum quod serpens dixit; sed ante consensum non peccavit: ergo antequam peccaret, decepta fuit.
2. Item, Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram, et habetur supra, distinctione vigesima secunda2: « Credidit Adam, utrumque fieri posse, ut et uxori morem gereret et per poenitentiam veniam haberet »; sed constat, quod illud fuit falsum; et hoc credidit, antequam peccaret, quia aliter non peccasset: ergo etc.
3. Item, Magister supra, distinctione vigesima prima3, loquens de muliere et serpente dicit, quod « mulier non horruit serpentem, quia, cum noverit esse creatum, etiam officium loquendi a Deo accepisse putavit »: sed constat, hoc falsum fuisse, quod putavit: ergo etc.
4. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Si Adam stetisset, dormivisset utique et habuisset alias operationes naturales: ergo cum somnium sit ex naturali motu fumositatum et phantasmatum circa organum phantasiae4, Adam somniasset. Sed in somnio similitudo rei accipitur pro veritate, et ubicumque hoc est, ibi est deceptio: ergo etc.
5. Item, naturale est, quod quidquid videtur, videtur sub angulo, et quanto a remotiori aliquid videtur, tanto minorem generat speciem et videtur sub angulo acutiori5: ergo ita parvus videretur sol ipsi Adae, sicut et nobis: ergo sicut decipitur sensus noster in iudicando de quantitate solis, ita videtur, quod deciperetur sensus Adae.
6. Item, ponatur, quod aliquis homo peccasset, Adam ignorante, et assereret ei falsum; aut Adam sciret, ipsum dicere falsum, aut non. Si sic: tunc sciret occulta cordis alterius; pono enim, quod ipse loquatur ei de secretis cordis sui, quae nosse in alio est proprium solius Dei6. Si nesciret esse falsum, ergo nesciret, ipsum esse mendacem: ergo crederet, ipsum esse veracem, aut male iudicaret de ipso. Sed si crederet, ipsum esse veracem, crederet, ipsum dicere verum: ergo necessario deciperetur.
Sed contra: 1. Augustinus7: « Vera pro falsis approbare non est natura hominis instituti, sed poena damnati »; sed cum quis decipitur, approbat verum pro falso, vel e converso: ergo nunquam hoc fuisset in homine, si perstitisset in statu innocentiae.
2. Item, Augustinus in Enchiridio, decimo nono capitulo8: « Ipse per se ipsum error aut magnum in re magna, aut parvum in re parva, tamen semper est malum »; et ubicumque est deceptio, ibi est error aliquis, vel magnus, vel parvus: ergo non potest esse in aliquo, quin in eo sit malum. Sed in Adam in statu innocentiae nec erat malum culpae nec malum poenae: ergo etc.
p. 540 3. Item, Augustinus in Enchiridio, capitulo decimo septimo9: « Hic homines fallunt atque falluntur miserioresque sunt, cum mentiendo fallunt, quam cum mentientibus credendo falluntur »: ergo videtur, quod utrobique sit miseria, licet maior in fallendo: ergo si in statu innocentiae non erat miseria, videtur etc.
4. Item, in statu innocentiae nihil homo pateretur vel ageret contra naturam; sed deceptio est contra appetitum naturae rationalis; unde Augustinus in Enchiridio1: « Usque tantum rationalis creatura refugit falsitatem et, quantum potest, devitat errorem, ut falli noluerit etiam quicumque amat fallere ». Adam igitur hoc naturaliter recusabat: ergo in statu innocentiae decipi non poterat.
5. Item, in Adam omnes vires inferiores subiectae erant voluntati, alioquin rectus ordo non servaretur in homine in statu innocentiae: ergo si homo nolebat decipi nec assentire falso, videtur, quod nunquam in ratione eius fuisset deceptio vel ad falsum inclinatio, quamdiu permansisset in statu illo primo.
6. Item, maioris indignitatis est falli in animo quam pati in corpore — unde decuit Christum assumere passionem in corpore, non deceptionem in mente — sed si Adam stetisset, nulla fuisset corporalis passio: ergo nulla fuisset in eo deceptio.
Conclusio.
Si Adam stetisset, nulla fuisset in eo deceptio nec ab intrinseco nec ab extrinseco, quamvis in eo potuerit esse aliqua nescientia.
Respondeo: Ad praedictam quaestionem de facili posset responderi et rationes etiam dissolvi quadam facili distinctione. Posset enim sic dici, quod deceptio quaedam est circa scibilia, quaedam vero circa opinabilia. Scibilia autem dico illa quae certa ratione comprehendi possunt, sicut sunt illa, de quibus sunt scientiae liberales. Opinabilia vero voco illa quae non habent cognosci nisi per quandam coniecturam, sicut secreta alienae conscientiae et futura contingentia, quae fiunt casu et fortuna, vel voluntate libera. — In primis autem Adam falli non poterat, quia omnium cognitionem habebat. In secundis vero dupliciter contingit aliquem falli: aut ita quod adhaeret firma credulitate, aut quod adhaeret qualicumque aestimatione. Et prima deceptio vocatur error proprie. Et haec in primo homine stante non fuisset. Secunda vero potest dici opinio, in qua est acceptio unius partis sine pleno assensu credulitatis, et haec potest dici quaedam aestimatio falsa. Et haec fuisset in Adam absque culpa et poena, maxime cum ex hac aestimatione nec incideret in peccatum nec incurreret damnum. — Et secundum hanc distinctionem dissolvi possunt rationes ad utramque partem inductae. Nam rationes ostendentes, quod in Adam potuit esse deceptio, fere omnes procedunt de deceptione, secundum quod dicitur qualiscumque aestimatio. — Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt, secundum quod deceptio dicit firmam credulitatem, ut non solum quis decipiatur putando, falsum esse verum, sed etiam approbando, falsum esse verum, vel e converso; et talis est deceptio, quae est error.
Sed licet hoc quod nunc dictum est, satis probabile videatur, non tamen plene satisfacit rationi nec concordat verbis Augustini. Ait enim Augustinus in Enchiridio, capitulo decimo septimo9: « Cum nihil aliud sit errare quam verum putare quod falsum est, falsumve quod verum est, vel certum habere pro incerto, incertumve pro certo, sive falsum sit sive verum; idque tam sit in animo deforme atque indecens, quam pulcrum atque decorum esse sentimus vel in loquendo, vel in assentiendo est, est; non, non: profecto et ob hoc ipsum vita ista misera est, qua vivimus, quod ei nonnunquam, ut non amittatur, error est necessarius ». Ex hoc verbo colligitur, quod Augustinus vocat errorem generaliter omnem deceptionem; et illum dicit indecorum et indecentem, et ad vitam miseram pertinere. Et in libro de Utilitate credendi expresse dicit, « quod nullus error absque vitio potest esse ».
Ideo dicendum est, quod etsi in statu innocentiae fuisset in homine alicuius nescientiae imperfectio, sicut ostensum fuit supra, distinctione proxima praecedenti7; non tamen in eo fuisset deceptio. Deceptio enim ultra nescientiam addit iudicii obliquationem; haec non fuisset in Adam in statu innocentiae, sicut nec fuisset in eo passio corporalis.
Et hoc potest intelligi sic. Sicut enim dupliciter contingit aliquem pati: aut passione intrinseca, aut ab extrinseco illata, sic contingit aliquem dupliciter decipi: aut quod ipse se ipsum paralogizet, aut quod paralogizetur ab alio; neutrum autem horum in Adam fuisset. Sicut enim nulla fuisset in eo passio intrinseca, quia virtus animae regitiva perfecte suo corpori praesidebat et ipsum conservare poterat8; p. 541 sic nulla fuisset deceptio veniens ab intrinseco, quia iudicium rationis omnibus potentiis sensitivis praesidebat; nec ipsae in contrarium rationi movebantur, sed potius ab ea sufficienter dirigebantur. — Quemadmodum etiam pati non poterat passione illata, sive quia nullus in tempore illo esset, qui inferret, sive quia, si adesset, divina virtus eum protegeret, sicut supra1 determinatum est; sic etiam in statu illo nemo esset, qui hominem circumveniret aut paralogizaret — nam unusquisque loqueretur veritatem cum proximo suo2 — aut si esset, divinae inspirationis revelatio sive per se, sive per Angelum succurreret, ne falleretur, sicut virtus succurrebat, ne laederetur. — Et sic Adam stante, nulla fuisset in eo deceptio, nec ab intrinseco nec ab extrinseco. — Unde rationes, quae hoc probant, concedendae sunt.
1. 2. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de seductione mulieris et etiam viri, dupliciter potest responderi. Uno modo sic, quod illa seductio fuit falsa credulitas, et si3 praecesserit peccatum inobedientiae et ambitionis, secuta fuit peccatum praesumtionis, merito cuius excaecatus est oculus rationis, ut falsum aestimaret esse verum. Statim enim mulier, audita prolatione serpentis, de se ipsa praesumsit, et similiter vir, audita suggestione mulieris; et ideo mulier existimavit per comestionem assequi posse excellentiam, et vir de transgressione mandati invenire veniam4.
Aliter potest dici, quod duplex est iudicium. Quoddam est speculationis; et illud non est pars liberi arbitrii, nec in eo consistit peccatum; et huius iudicii error post peccatum est, non ante. Est etiam aliud iudicium in agendis, et in his quae spectant ad veritatem vitae; et illud iudicium est liberi arbitrii, et hoc nunquam est sine voluntate. Et huius iudicii error bene potest esse culpa5 vel praesumtionis, vel infidelitatis, vel alicuius alterius. Et haec fuit deceptio, qua mulier primo decepta fuit, et ipse Adam; et in ista deceptione non permansit in statu innocentiae, immo cecidit. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duas auctoritates primo inductas.
3. Ad illud quod tertio obiicitur de auctoritate Magistri, quod mulier putavit, serpentem habere usum loquendi; dicendum, quod aut intelligit, quod talis putatio fuit in muliere post peccatum, aut si ante fuit, non putavit, quod hoc officium haberet determinate virtute6 sibi naturaliter data, sed aliqua latente virtute, permittente divina providentia, quae omnes res gubernabat et regebat, sicut creaverat. Nec mirum, si non expavit, quia nondum erat in ipsa muliere passio timoris; unde mulier aspiciendo serpentem falsum pro vero non approbavit, sed aliquam ibi virtutem latentem ignoravit.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de somnio, dicendum, quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset somnium ex perpessione phantasiarum ad modum parturientis, sicut dicitur Ecclesiastici trigesimo quarto7. Hoc enim venit, quia vires inferiores non sunt subiectae rationi, et corpus non obedit spiritui; sed si fuisset, hoc esset, quia ab Altissimo mitteretur aliqua visitatio, in qua homo non deciperetur, immo potius illustraretur. — Praeterea, esto quod esset ibi somnium, non sequitur, quod esset propter hoc ibi deceptio. Deceptio enim respicit rationis usum; in somniis8 autem rationis usus non esset, aut si esset, purgaret potius deceptionem phantasiae, quam ei consentiret; potius enim diceret ratio in somniis homini somnianti: tu somnias, quam diceret: quod vides est veritas.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de visu, dicendum, quod nulla esset deceptio, quia bene nosset9 Adam, quod res a remotiori apparet esse minor; et ideo non iudicaret secundum apparentiam oculi tantum, sed pensata distantia medii; et ideo non falleretur, sed haberet iudicium rectum.
6. Ad ultimum iam patet responsio ex praedictis, quia vel Adam manifesto signo deprehenderet, istum peccasse — quod satis videtur probabile, cum magna valde transmutatio facta fuerit in natura Adae per commissionem culpae — et tunc non crederet ei nec discrederet, nisi quatenus alias videret sibi credendum fore. Aut si non deprehenderet eum peccatorem; ubi sua non sufficeret cautela, succurreret divinae providentiae cura diligentissima, quae nec permisisset, eum laedi, nec permisisset falli, si voluisset eius imperiis obtemperanter subiici.
I. Argumenta, responsio et solutio oppositorum, paucis exceptis, conveniunt cum textu Alexandri Hal., S. p. II. q. 92. m. 2. a. 4. — Quod stante innocentia tantum nescientia quaedam, non autem proprie deceptio in protoparentibus esse potuerit, communiter tenetur. — Circa terminum potuerit eadem distinctio, quae quoad immortalitatem corporis in Adam supra d. 19. a. 2. q. 1. facta est, etiam hoc loco adhibetur a Petr. a Tar. his verbis: « Aut haec determinatio in statu innocentiae determinat hoc verbum potuerit, et tunc verum est; aut hoc verbum falli, et tunc duplex est opinio. Quidam concedunt, quod falli potuit, sed non errare, quia potuit putare falsum levi quadam suspicione, sed non firma credulitate falsa pro veris approbare, quod est errare... Alii dicunt melius, quod non poterat falli nec errare, quia nec a se ipso paralogizari poterat nec ab alio; quod contingebat partim ex lumine integro existente naturalis intelligentiae, partim ex cura providentiae divinae circa ipsum » etc. Consentit secundae opinioni S. Thomas cum aliis communiter.
II. S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. 1. q. 94. a. 4; de Verit. q. 18. a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4.
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Question II. Whether, if the first parents had stood in the state of innocence, they could ever have been deceived.
Secondly, it is asked about the knowledge of the first parents with respect to defect. And this is to ask whether, if they had stood in the state of innocence, they could ever have been deceived. And that they could, it seems.
1. Genesis 31: The woman said: The serpent seduced me; but it is established that the woman did not consent except because she judged that what the serpent said was true; but before consent she did not sin: therefore before she sinned, she was deceived.
2. Likewise, Augustine On Genesis according to the Letter, and it is found above, in the twenty-second distinction2: "Adam believed that both could come about, namely that he might both comply with his wife and obtain pardon through penance"; but it is established that this was false; and he believed this before he sinned, for otherwise he would not have sinned: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the Master above, in the twenty-first distinction3, speaking of the woman and the serpent, says that "the woman did not shudder at the serpent, because, since she knew it to be a creature, she also supposed that it had received the office of speaking from God": but it is established that what she supposed was false: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, this seems to follow by reason. If Adam had stood, he would surely have slept and had other natural operations: therefore, since a dream arises from the natural motion of vapors and phantasms about the organ of imagination4, Adam would have dreamed. But in a dream the likeness of a thing is taken for the truth, and wherever this is, there is deception: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, it is natural that whatever is seen, is seen under an angle, and the farther off something is seen, the smaller the appearance it generates and the more acute the angle under which it is seen5: therefore the sun would appear as small to Adam himself as it does to us: therefore, just as our sense is deceived in judging about the size of the sun, so it seems that Adam's sense would have been deceived.
6. Likewise, suppose that some man had sinned, Adam not knowing it, and asserted something false to him; either Adam would know that he was speaking falsely, or not. If so: then he would know the hidden things of another's heart; for I suppose that the man speaks to him about the secrets of his own heart, which to know in another is proper to God alone6. If he did not know it to be false, then he would not know him to be a liar: therefore he would believe him to be truthful, or would judge ill of him. But if he believed him to be truthful, he would believe him to be speaking the truth: therefore he would necessarily be deceived.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine7: "To approve the true for the false is not the nature of man as instituted, but the penalty of the damned"; but when someone is deceived, he approves the true for the false, or vice versa: therefore this would never have been in man, if he had persisted in the state of innocence.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter nineteen8: "Error in itself, whether great in a great matter or small in a small matter, is nevertheless always an evil"; and wherever there is deception, there is some error, either great or small: therefore it cannot be in anyone without there being evil in him. But in Adam in the state of innocence there was neither the evil of fault nor the evil of penalty: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter seventeen9: "Here men deceive and are deceived, and they are more wretched when they deceive by lying than when they are deceived by believing liars": therefore it seems that on both sides there is misery, though greater in deceiving: therefore if in the state of innocence there was no misery, it seems etc.
4. Likewise, in the state of innocence man would suffer or do nothing contrary to nature; but deception is contrary to the appetite of rational nature; whence Augustine in the Enchiridion1: "To such a degree does the rational creature shun falsity and, as far as it can, avoid error, that even whoever loves to deceive is unwilling to be deceived." Adam therefore naturally refused this: therefore in the state of innocence he could not be deceived.
5. Likewise, in Adam all the lower powers were subject to the will, otherwise right order would not be preserved in man in the state of innocence: therefore if man did not wish to be deceived nor to assent to the false, it seems that there would never have been in his reason any deception or inclination to the false, as long as he remained in that first state.
6. Likewise, it is of greater unworthiness to be deceived in mind than to suffer in body — whence it was fitting for Christ to assume suffering in body, not deception in mind — but if Adam had stood, there would have been no bodily suffering: therefore there would have been no deception in him.
Conclusion.
If Adam had stood, there would have been no deception in him, neither from within nor from without, although there could have been in him some nescience.
I respond: To the aforesaid question one could easily reply, and the arguments could also be resolved by a certain easy distinction. For one could say thus, that one kind of deception is about knowable things, another about opinable things. Now I call "knowable" those things which can be comprehended by certain reasoning, such as are those which are the objects of the liberal sciences. But I call "opinable" those things which can be known only through a certain conjecture, such as the secrets of another's conscience and future contingents, which come about by chance and fortune, or by free will. — In the first, however, Adam could not be deceived, because he had knowledge of all of them. But in the second, it happens in two ways that someone is deceived: either such that he clings to it with firm belief, or such that he clings to it by some kind of estimation. And the first deception is properly called error. And this would not have been in the first man while standing. But the second can be called opinion, in which there is the acceptance of one part without full assent of belief, and this can be called a certain false estimation. And this would have been in Adam without fault and penalty, especially since from this estimation he would neither fall into sin nor incur loss. — And according to this distinction the arguments adduced for both sides can be resolved. For the arguments showing that deception could be in Adam nearly all proceed concerning deception insofar as it is called any kind of estimation. — But the arguments to the opposite proceed insofar as deception means firm belief, such that not only is someone deceived in supposing the false to be true, but also in approving the false to be true, or vice versa; and such is the deception which is error.
But although what has now been said seems probable enough, it nevertheless does not fully satisfy reason nor accord with the words of Augustine. For Augustine says in the Enchiridion, chapter seventeen9: "Since to err is nothing other than to suppose true what is false, or false what is true, or to hold certain for uncertain, or uncertain for certain, whether it be false or true; and since this is as deformed and unseemly in the mind as it is beautiful and becoming, as we perceive, whether in speaking or in assenting, that yea be yea, nay be nay: assuredly for this very reason this life which we live is wretched, because for it now and then, lest it be lost, error is necessary." From this saying it is gathered that Augustine generally calls error every deception; and he calls it unseemly and unbecoming, and pertaining to the wretched life. And in the book On the Usefulness of Believing he expressly says, "that no error can be without vice."
Therefore it must be said that, even though in the state of innocence there would have been in man the imperfection of some nescience, as was shown above, in the immediately preceding distinction7; nevertheless there would not have been deception in him. For deception adds, beyond nescience, a distortion of judgment; this would not have been in Adam in the state of innocence, just as neither would there have been in him bodily suffering.
And this can be understood thus. For just as it happens in two ways that someone suffers: either by intrinsic suffering, or by suffering inflicted from without, so it happens in two ways that someone is deceived: either that he himself misreasons within himself, or that he is misled by another; and neither of these would have been in Adam. For just as there would have been in him no intrinsic suffering, because the ruling power of the soul perfectly presided over his body and could preserve it8; so there would have been no deception coming from within, because the judgment of reason presided over all the sensitive powers; nor were these moved contrary to reason, but rather were sufficiently directed by it. — Just as also he could not suffer by inflicted suffering, either because no one in that time was there to inflict it, or because, if one were present, the divine power would protect him, as was determined above1; so also in that state there would be no one to circumvent man or to mislead him — for each one would speak the truth with his neighbor2 — or if there were one, the revelation of divine inspiration, whether of itself or through an Angel, would come to his aid, lest he be deceived, just as virtue came to his aid, lest he be harmed. — And thus, Adam standing, there would have been in him no deception, neither from within nor from without. — Whence the arguments which prove this are to be conceded.
1, 2. But to that which is objected concerning the seduction of the woman and also of the man, it can be replied in two ways. In one way thus, that that seduction was a false belief, and even if3 the sin of disobedience and ambition preceded, the sin of presumption followed, by whose merit the eye of reason was blinded, so that he judged the false to be true. For immediately the woman, having heard the serpent's utterance, presumed concerning herself, and likewise the man, having heard the woman's suggestion; and therefore the woman supposed that through eating she could attain excellence, and the man supposed that he could find pardon for transgressing the commandment4.
In another way it can be said that judgment is twofold. One is of speculation; and that is not a part of free will, nor does sin consist in it; and the error of this judgment is after sin, not before. There is also another judgment in things to be done, and in those things which pertain to the truth of life; and that judgment is of free will, and this is never without the will. And the error of this judgment can well be a fault5, either of presumption, or of infidelity, or of something else. And this was the deception by which the woman was first deceived, and Adam himself; and in this deception he did not remain in the state of innocence, but rather fell. And by this the reply to the two authorities first adduced is clear.
3. To that which is objected thirdly concerning the authority of the Master, that the woman supposed the serpent to have the use of speech; it must be said that either he means that such supposing was in the woman after sin, or, if it was before, she did not suppose that it had this office determinately by a power naturally given to it6, but by some latent power, divine providence permitting, which governed and ruled all things, as it had created them. Nor is it a wonder if she was not frightened, because there was not yet in the woman the passion of fear; whence the woman, looking at the serpent, did not approve the false for the true, but was ignorant of some latent power there.
4. To that which is objected concerning the dream, it must be said that in the state of innocence there would not have been a dream from the suffering of phantasms after the manner of one in labor, as is said in Ecclesiasticus 347. For this comes about because the lower powers are not subject to reason, and the body does not obey the spirit; but if there had been one, it would be because some visitation would be sent from the Most High, in which man would not be deceived, but rather illumined. — Moreover, granting that there were a dream there, it does not follow that on this account there would be deception there. For deception regards the use of reason; but in dreams8 the use of reason would not exist, or if it did exist, it would rather purge the deception of phantasy than consent to it; for reason would rather say in dreams to the dreaming man: you are dreaming, than say: what you see is the truth.
5. To that which is objected concerning sight, it must be said that there would be no deception, because Adam would well know9 that a thing appears smaller from a distance; and therefore he would not judge according to the appearance of the eye alone, but having weighed the distance of the medium; and therefore he would not be deceived, but would have right judgment.
6. To the last, the reply is already clear from the foregoing, because either Adam would detect by a manifest sign that this man had sinned — which seems probable enough, since a very great transformation was made in Adam's nature by the commission of fault — and then he would neither believe him nor disbelieve him, except insofar as he should otherwise see that he ought to be believed. Or if he did not detect him to be a sinner; where his own caution would not suffice, the most diligent care of divine providence would come to his aid, which would neither have permitted him to be harmed, nor permitted him to be deceived, if he had been willing to be obediently subject to its commands.
I. The arguments, response, and solution of the opposites, with few exceptions, agree with the text of Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 92. m. 2. a. 4. — That while innocence stood there could have been in the protoparents only a certain nescience, but not properly deception, is commonly held. — Concerning the term could have, the same distinction which was made regarding the immortality of the body in Adam above in d. 19. a. 2. q. 1. is applied also in this place by Peter of Tarentaise in these words: "Either this determination in the state of innocence determines the word could have, and then it is true; or it determines the word be deceived, and then opinion is twofold. Some concede that he could be deceived, but not err, because he could suppose the false with some slight suspicion, but not approve the false for the true with firm belief, which is to err... Others say better, that he could neither be deceived nor err, because he could be misled neither by himself nor by another; which came about partly from the intact light of natural intelligence existing in him, partly from the care of divine providence about him" etc. S. Thomas, with others commonly, agrees with the second opinion.
II. S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 3; S. 1. q. 94. a. 4; de Verit. q. 18. a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 4. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2. a. 4.
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- Vers. 13. — Paulo superius pro decipi potuissent codd. et primae edd. decipi possent, incongrue.Verse 13. — A little above, for decipi potuissent the codices and the first editions read decipi possent, incongruously.
- Cap. 4. lit. Magistri.Chapter 4 of the text of the Master.
- Cap. 4.Chapter 4.
- Cfr. Aristot., de Somniis, c. 3.Cf. Aristotle, On Dreams, c. 3.
- Cfr. Avicenna, de Anima sive sexti Naturalium, p. III. c. 5. seqq.Cf. Avicenna, On the Soul, or the Sixth Book of the Natural [Sciences], part III, c. 5 and following.
- Sicut dictum est supra d. 8. p. II. q. 6. — Mox sola Vat. omittit falsum, ergo nesciret ipsum esse.As was said above, d. 8. p. II. q. 6. — Just after, the Vatican edition alone omits falsum, ergo nesciret ipsum esse ("false, therefore he would not know him to be").
- Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 32.Book III, On Free Choice, c. 18, n. 32.
- Num. 6. — Circa finem arg. pro nec erat plures codd. cum edd. substituunt nec est, aliqui nec fuit.Number 6. — Near the end of the argument, for nec erat several codices with the editions substitute nec est, some nec fuit.
- Num. 5.Number 5. ---