Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 22

Textus Latinus

p. 523

Quaestio II. Utrum ignorantia in aliquo homine possit esse culpa.

Secundo quaeritur gratia huius¹, utrum ignorantia in aliquo homine possit esse culpa. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo quarto²: Ignorans ignorabitur; sed nullus ignoratur a Deo nisi propter culpam: ergo etc.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi³: Noluit intelligere etc., Glossa Augustini: «Ignorantia in his qui intelligere nolunt, est peccatum».

3. Item, ratione videtur. Cognoscere credenda et operanda est actus virtutis, scilicet fidei et prudentiae⁴: ergo haec ignorare est virtutibus privari; sed privationes virtutum sunt vitia et peccata: ergo aliqua ignorantia est culpa.

4. Item, non facere ea quae homo tenetur facere, est peccatum, similiter non dicere, similiter non amare ea quae homo tenetur amare, est peccatum: ergo similiter nescire quod⁵ tenetur scire est peccatum; sed multi sunt, qui ignorant ea quae tenentur scire, utpote ea, sine quibus salvari non possunt: ergo in talibus ignorantia est culpa.

5. Item, error est peccatum⁶: aut ergo ratione eius quod ponit, aut ratione eius quod privat. Non ratione eius quod ponit, quia peccatum privatio est, non positio. Si ratione eius quod privat; sed error privat scientiam, et privatio scientiae est ignorantia: ergo ignorantia est culpa.

Contra: 1. Augustinus in Enchiridio⁷ dicit, quod «inflicta est nobis ignorantia rerum agendarum et concupiscentia noxiarum»; sed nullum peccatum est nobis inflictum: ergo ignorantia non est peccatum.

2. Item, ratione videtur. In omni enim peccato est aversio a bono incommutabili et conversio ad commutabile⁸; sed in ignorantia nulla est ad bonum commutabile conversio: ergo ignorantia non est culpa.

p. 524 3. Item, nullum peccatum remanet post poenitentiam; sed ignorantia remanet in homine post poenitentiam et contritionem; ergo ignorantia non est culpa. Si tu dicas, quod remanet actu, sed transit reatu; ergo tunc videtur, quod ignorantia non esset culpa actualis, sed originalis. Sed non est originalis, quia remanet post baptismum, et hoc melius patebit infra⁹; nec actualis: ergo non est culpa.

4. Item, omne peccatum est in affectu, cum omne peccatum sit voluntarium¹⁰; sed ignorantia est in intellectu: ergo ignorantia non est peccatum.

5. Item, si ignorantia est peccatum, ergo ignorare est peccare; sed de viro ignorante verum est dicere, quod in omni instanti ignorat: ergo in omni instanti peccat: ergo tot sunt in eo peccata, quot sunt instantia. Quod si hoc est falsum et impossibile, restat, ignorantiam peccatum non esse.

Conclusio

Ignorantia rerum ad salutem necessariarum potest interdum esse peccatum, interdum non.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum privationes cognoscantur per habitus¹¹, cognitio ignorantiae pendet ex cognitione scientiae. — Attendendum autem, quod quaedam est cognitio aliquorum, quae nec est necessaria ad virtutem nec est necessaria ad salutem, sicut est artium mechanicarum et liberalium¹²; et talis cognitio nec est virtus nec de esse virtutis; et illa ignorantia, quae est huius cognitionis privatio, culpa non est, sive sit ignorantia negationis sive dispositionis, sive etiam sit voluntaria, sive non. — Alia est cognitio credibilium et operabilium, quae ad salutem necessaria est in adulto; et haec est cognitio fidei et prudentiae; et ad hanc cognitionem habendam tenemur, quia sine hac nullus potest recte vivere. — Huius autem cognitionis privatio potest dupliciter in nobis esse: aut manente tentione, aut non manente. Si manente tentione, tunc est ibi culpa, quia, cum quis tenetur ad aliquid et illud non implet, ex hoc ipso culpatur et dignus est poena. Si autem sit in nobis privatio, non manente tentione, utpote cum non potest scire, et impotentia excusat ab obligatione; sic¹³ privatio huius cognitionis culpa non est, sicut in furiosis. — Et secundum hoc ignorantia, quae dicit privationem cognitionis ad salutem necessariae, uno modo peccatum est, alio vero modo minime.

Aliter potest dici, et quasi in idem redit, quod privatio cognitionis ad salutem necessariae dupliciter potest esse: aut ita, quod est in nobis, sed non a nobis, et hoc modo culpa non est, sed magis poena, et cum non simus eius principium, in ipsa nec meremur nec demeremur; aut ita, quod est in nobis et a nobis, et sic culpa est. — Hoc autem potest esse tripliciter: vel cum in via veritatis existentes voluntarie ab ea recedimus et in erroris foveam nos praecipitamus, et haec privatio potest dici ignorantia erronea, quae est in haereticis; vel cum, ad viam veritatis valentes pertingere, cupimus in tenebris ambulare, et haec potest dici ignorantia affectata; aut quia ex quadam pigritia et negligentia non curamus veritatem addiscere, et haec dicitur ignorantia crassa et supina. — Et quaelibet istarum est culpa, licet prima maior quam secunda, et secunda quam tertia.

Et sic concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod ignorantia aliquo modo potest esse culpa.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod ignorantia est nobis inflicta; dicendum, quod prout nobis inflicta est, poena est et non culpa; prout tamen voluntas nostra aliquo modo deordinatur circa illam, sicut prius dictum est, incipit esse culpa; sicut passiones sanctis Martyribus illatae poenae erant, consideratae secundum se, comparatae tamen ad voluntatem Sanctorum libenter eas perferentem pro amore Christi, erant eis meritoriae. Utrum autem aliquo modo sit culpa, prout scilicet contracta est, videbitur infra¹⁴ cum agetur de originali peccato.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorantia non est conversio; dicendum, quod verum est, prout est pura privatio; prout tamen ipsam concomitatur aliquo modo nostra affectio, non habet veritatem; et hoc modo dicitur esse culpa, non primo.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorantia remanet post poenitentiam; dicendum, quod non remanet, prout habet rationem culpae, scilicet ratione voluntatis concomitantis, vel quodam modo eam causantis; sed si remanet, hoc est in quantum habet rationem poenae ex originali contractae. Ideo quantum ad primum, in quo habet rationem actualis, transit non solum actu, sed etiam reatu, cum quis poenitet; quantum vero ad secundum, quodam modo remanet, et ita videtur ignorantia remanere actu; et in hoc habet quandam approximationem ad peccatum originale; secundum id tamen, quod culpa est, actuale peccatum est¹⁵.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorantia est in intellectu; dicendum, quod illa ignorantia, quae p. 525opponitur cognitioni virtutis, ad quam tenemur, non tantum respicit intellectum, sed etiam affectum, sicut et virtus sibi opposita. Unde non tantum dicit scientiae carentiam, sed etiam voluntatis incuriam et negligentiam ad scientiam percipiendam.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in quolibet instanti ignorat; dicendum, quod ignorare non dicitur esse culpa nisi eatenus, qua quis tenetur scire quod ignorat. Et ideo, etsi in quolibet instanti ignoret et in quolibet teneatur, quia tamen praeceptum affirmativum non obligat pro¹⁶ semper, sed pro loco et tempore; ignorans ignorando non peccat nisi in illo instanti et tempore, in quo tenetur nosse vel addiscere quod ignorat; ideo, quamvis semper dicatur ignorare, non tamen semper dicitur peccare.

Scholion

I. Catholici auctores in hoc principio conveniunt, quod ignorantia, quatenus caret voluntario, eatenus caret culpa actuali in ignorante; unde ignorantia invincibilis (antecedens) excusat a peccato. Hoc principium negatum est a pluribus haereticis, et etiam a Iansenio quoad ignorantiam circa legem naturalem.

Duplici via, sed in eodem sensu, S. Doctor, adhibitis variis distinctionibus, quaestionem solvit. A S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 6. a. 8.), Scoto (hic q. unica) aliisque communiter distinguitur ignorantia antecedens, concomitans et consequens, et secundum has distinctiones quaestio solvitur.

Differentia tamen quaedam inter doctores antiquos fuit circa hoc, utrum ignorantia privative accepta secundum se culpa sit, quod tenet S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), an sit tantum materia culpae, sive sit culpa non nisi ratione adiuncti, quod est negligentia addiscendi, vel voluntas non addiscendi», ut vult Durand. (hic q. 3.), cui sententiae favet etiam Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) his verbis: Nec ignorantia affectata culpa est formaliter, nisi ratione commissionis voluntatis; nec etiam ignorantia crassa nisi ratione negligentiae vel omissionis ipsius voluntatis».

II. De hac quaestione praeter citatos cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 113. m. 1-8. — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. p. II. q. 76. a. 2. — S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 76. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 7.; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 89. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. et dub. lat. I.

III. De sequente quaest.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 135. m. 1-6. — Scot. apud eundem loc. cit. a. 4. — S. Thom., hic. q. 2. a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 3. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 9-11; S. loc. cit. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic. a. 2. q. 3. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 12. q. 23.

---

English Translation

Question II. Whether ignorance in some person can be a fault.

Secondly, in connection with this¹, it is asked whether ignorance in some person can be a fault. And that it can, it seems.

1. First Corinthians, chapter fourteen²: He who is ignorant shall be ignored; but no one is ignored by God except on account of a fault: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm³: He would not understand etc., the Gloss of Augustine: «Ignorance in those who refuse to understand is a sin».

3. Likewise, it seems by reason. To know what is to be believed and what is to be done is an act of virtue, namely of faith and prudence⁴: therefore to be ignorant of these is to be deprived of virtues; but the privations of virtues are vices and sins: therefore some ignorance is a fault.

4. Likewise, not to do the things which a man is bound to do is a sin, likewise not to say them, likewise not to love the things which a man is bound to love is a sin: therefore likewise not to know what⁵ one is bound to know is a sin; but there are many who are ignorant of those things which they are bound to know, namely those things without which they cannot be saved: therefore in such people ignorance is a fault.

5. Likewise, error is a sin⁶: therefore either by reason of what it posits, or by reason of what it deprives. Not by reason of what it posits, because sin is a privation, not a positing. If by reason of what it deprives; but error deprives of knowledge, and the privation of knowledge is ignorance: therefore ignorance is a fault.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the Enchiridion⁷ says that «ignorance of the things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things have been inflicted upon us»; but no sin has been inflicted upon us: therefore ignorance is not a sin.

2. Likewise, it seems by reason. For in every sin there is a turning away from the unchangeable good and a turning toward the changeable⁸; but in ignorance there is no turning toward the changeable good: therefore ignorance is not a fault.

3. Likewise, no sin remains after penance; but ignorance remains in a man after penance and contrition; therefore ignorance is not a fault. If you say that it remains in act, but passes away as to guilt; then it seems that ignorance would not be an actual fault, but an original one. But it is not original, because it remains after baptism, and this will appear better below⁹; nor is it actual: therefore it is not a fault.

4. Likewise, every sin is in the affection, since every sin is voluntary¹⁰; but ignorance is in the intellect: therefore ignorance is not a sin.

5. Likewise, if ignorance is a sin, then to be ignorant is to sin; but of an ignorant man it is true to say that at every instant he is ignorant: therefore at every instant he sins: therefore there are as many sins in him as there are instants. But if this is false and impossible, it remains that ignorance is not a sin.

Conclusion

Ignorance of things necessary for salvation can sometimes be a sin, sometimes not.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, since privations are known through the habits¹¹, the knowledge of ignorance depends upon the knowledge of the corresponding knowledge. — But it must be attended to that there is a certain knowledge of some things which is neither necessary for virtue nor necessary for salvation, as is the knowledge of the mechanical and liberal arts¹²; and such knowledge is neither a virtue nor of the being of virtue; and that ignorance which is the privation of this knowledge is not a fault, whether it be an ignorance of negation or of disposition, whether also it be voluntary or not. — There is another knowledge, of things to be believed and to be done, which is necessary for salvation in an adult; and this is the knowledge of faith and prudence; and we are bound to have this knowledge, because without it no one can live rightly. — But the privation of this knowledge can be in us in two ways: either with the obligation remaining, or with it not remaining. If with the obligation remaining, then there is a fault there, because, when someone is bound to something and does not fulfill it, by that very fact he is at fault and worthy of punishment. If, however, the privation is in us with the obligation not remaining, as when one cannot know, and incapacity excuses from obligation; then¹³ the privation of this knowledge is not a fault, as in the insane. — And accordingly ignorance, which states the privation of knowledge necessary for salvation, is in one way a sin, but in another way not at all.

It can be said otherwise, and it comes back to almost the same thing, that the privation of knowledge necessary for salvation can be in two ways: either such that it is in us, but not from us, and in this way it is not a fault, but rather a punishment, and since we are not its principle, in it we neither merit nor demerit; or such that it is in us and from us, and thus it is a fault. — But this can be in three ways: either when, existing on the way of truth, we voluntarily withdraw from it and cast ourselves into the pit of error, and this privation can be called erroneous ignorance, which is in heretics; or when, being able to attain to the way of truth, we desire to walk in darkness, and this can be called affected ignorance; or because, out of a certain laziness and negligence, we do not care to learn the truth, and this is called gross and supine ignorance. — And each of these is a fault, although the first is greater than the second, and the second than the third.

And thus the reasons showing that ignorance can in some way be a fault are to be conceded.

To the arguments to the contrary:

To 1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that ignorance is inflicted upon us; it must be said that, insofar as it is inflicted upon us, it is a punishment and not a fault; insofar, however, as our will is in some way disordered concerning it, as was said before, it begins to be a fault; just as the sufferings inflicted on the holy Martyrs were punishments, considered in themselves, yet compared to the will of the Saints willingly bearing them for the love of Christ, they were meritorious for them. But whether it is in some way a fault, insofar namely as it is contracted, will be seen below¹⁴ when original sin is treated of.

To 2. To that which is objected, that ignorance is not a turning-toward; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is a pure privation; insofar, however, as our affection in some way accompanies it, it does not hold true; and in this way it is said to be a fault, not primarily.

To 3. To that which is objected, that ignorance remains after penance; it must be said that it does not remain insofar as it has the character of a fault, namely by reason of the accompanying will, or in some way causing it; but if it remains, this is insofar as it has the character of a punishment contracted from the original. Therefore, as to the first, in which it has the character of an actual sin, it passes away not only in act but also in guilt, when one repents; but as to the second, it remains in some way, and thus ignorance seems to remain in act; and in this it has a certain approximation to original sin; yet according to that by which it is a fault, it is an actual sin¹⁵.

To 4. To that which is objected, that ignorance is in the intellect; it must be said that that ignorance which is opposed to the knowledge of virtue, to which we are bound, regards not only the intellect, but also the affection, just as the virtue opposed to it. Hence it states not only a lack of knowledge, but also a heedlessness of the will and a negligence in acquiring knowledge.

To 5. To that which is objected, that at every instant he is ignorant; it must be said that to be ignorant is not said to be a fault except insofar as one is bound to know what he is ignorant of. And therefore, even if at every instant he is ignorant and at every instant he is bound, yet because an affirmative precept does not oblige for¹⁶ all time, but for a place and a time; one who is ignorant, in being ignorant, does not sin except in that instant and time in which he is bound to know or to learn what he is ignorant of; therefore, although he is always said to be ignorant, he is not nevertheless always said to sin.

Scholion

I. Catholic authors agree on this principle, that ignorance, insofar as it lacks the voluntary, to that extent lacks actual fault in the ignorant person; hence invincible ignorance (antecedent) excuses from sin. This principle has been denied by several heretics, and also by Jansenius as regards ignorance concerning the natural law.

By a twofold way, but in the same sense, the holy Doctor, employing various distinctions, solves the question. By St. Thomas (Summa I-II, q. 6, a. 8), Scotus (here, the single question), and others, ignorance is commonly distinguished into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent, and according to these distinctions the question is solved.

There was, however, a certain difference among the ancient doctors on this point, whether ignorance taken privatively is in itself a fault, which St. Thomas holds (here, q. 2, a. 1), or whether it is only the matter of a fault, that is, whether it is a fault only by reason of something adjoined, which is the negligence of learning, or the will of not learning», as Durandus holds (here, q. 3), to which opinion Richard of Middleton also inclines (here, a. 2, q. 2) in these words: «Neither is affected ignorance a fault formally, except by reason of an act of the will; nor likewise is gross ignorance, except by reason of negligence or omission of the will itself».

II. On this question, besides those cited, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 113, m. 1-8. — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III, p. II, q. 76, a. 2. — St. Thomas, Summa I-II, q. 76, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 7; Summa p. II, tr. 14, q. 89, partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, a. 2. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 2, and the broad dubium I.

III. On the following question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., q. 135, m. 1-6. — Scotus, in the same, loc. cit., a. 4. — St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 2; Summa loc. cit., a. 3, 1. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 9-11; Summa loc. cit., partic. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 2, q. 3, 4. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 12, q. 23.

---

Apparatus Criticus

Dist. 23. a. 2. q. 2. seqq.
Distinction 23, a. 2, q. 2 and following.
Vers. 38.
Verse 38.
Psalm. 35, 4. — August., Epist. 194. (alias 105.) ad Sixtum, c. 6. n. 27. sic ait: Quia et ipsa ignorantia in eis qui intelligere noluerunt, sine dubitatione peccatum est. Cfr. etiam eius Enarrat. in Ps. 35. n. 1. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.
Psalm 35:4. — Augustine, Letter 194 (otherwise 105) to Sixtus, c. 6, n. 27, says thus: For ignorance itself too, in those who refused to understand, is without doubt a sin. Cf. also his Commentary on Psalm 35, n. 1, and here the text of the Master, c. 5.
Vide III. Sent. d. 33. q. 1. et 4.
See III Sentences, d. 33, q. 1 and 4.
Cod. T quae.
Codex T reads quae.
Cfr. infra d. 23. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.
Cf. below, d. 23, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.
Cap. 24. n. 8: Deinde iam etiam nolentibus subintravit ignorantia rerum agendarum et concupiscentia noxiarum.
Chapter 24, n. 8: Thereafter ignorance of the things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things crept in, even upon those unwilling.
Cfr. infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, et a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro in ignorantia, ut legimus fide codd. T aa cc et ed. I, Vat. ignorantia.
Cf. below, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1, and a. 3, q. 2. — Presently, for in ignorantia, as we read on the faith of codices T, aa, cc and edition I, the Vatican edition reads ignorantia.
Sicut infra probatur d. 41. a. 2. q. 1.
As is proved below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1.
Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 2. et d. 32. a. 1. q. 2.
Distinction 30, a. 2, q. 2, and d. 32, a. 1, q. 2.
Secundum Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 25. (c. 6.).
According to Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 25 (c. 6).
Quae illa aetate septem numerabantur, scil. Grammatica, Dialectica, Rhetorica, Musica, Arithmetica, Geometria, Astronomia. De artibus mechanicis cfr. S. Bonav., opuscul. de Reductione artium ad theologiam. — Codd. Y aa post sicut est supplent cognitio.
Which at that time were numbered as seven, namely Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Music, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy. On the mechanical arts cf. St. Bonaventure, the little work On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology. — Codices Y, aa, after sicut est supply cognitio.
Cod. cc et ed. I, post scire suppressa vocula et, hic ante sic eam interserunt.
Codex cc and edition I, having suppressed the little word et after scire, here insert it before sic.
Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro perferentem Vat. perferentium.
Distinction 30, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above, for perferentem the Vatican edition reads perferentium.
Cfr. infra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
Cf. below, d. 32, a. 1, q. 1 and following.
Ex cod. cc et ed. I adiecimus pro.
From codex cc and edition I we have added pro.

← Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 1 Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 3→