Dist. 22, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 22
Articulus II. De culpa primorum parentum in comparatione ad ignorantiam intellectus.
Consequenter quaeritur de peccato primorum parentum in relatione ad ignorantiam ex parte intellectus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
Primo quaeritur, utrum peccatum primorum parentum fuerit ex ignorantia.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum ignorantia aliquo modo sit culpa.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit culpae excusatio1.
Quaestio I. Utrum peccatum primorum parentum fuerit ex ignorantia.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod peccatum primorum parentum fuit ex ignorantia, ad minus peccatum mulieris.
1. Genesis tertio2: Serpens seduxit me etc.; sed ubi est seductio, ibi est scientiae privatio: ubi autem hoc est, ibi est ignorantia: ergo etc.
2. Item, qui dubitat de aliquo, de quo debet esse certus, potius dicitur illud ignorare quam scire; sed mulier de verbo Domini debuit esse certa, quod dixerat3: Quacumque die comederis, morte morieris, et de hoc dubitavit, cum dixit: Ne forte moriamur: ergo ex ignorantia peccasse videtur.
3. Item, qui credit, mortale peccatum esse veniale, ignorat veritatem iuris divini; sed Adam credidit, peccatum illud esse veniale, sicut dicit Augustinus, et Magister adducit in littera4: «Arbitratus est, illud esse veniale non mortale delictum»: ergo videtur, quod tam vir quam mulier peccaverint ex ignorantia.
4. Item, omne peccatum aut «est ex ignorantia, aut est ex infirmitate, aut est ex malitia»5. Sed peccatum primorum parentum non fuit ex malitia, quia tunc esset peccatum in Spiritum sanctum; nec ex infirmitate, quia nullam habebant pronitatem ad peccandum: ergo fuit ex ignorantia.
5. Item, si Adam et Eva credidissent Deum tam graviter offendere et tantas poenalitates incurrere, cum nullam haberent ad peccatum pronitatem, nullo modo videtur, quod culpam commisissent: si ergo culpam commiserunt, videtur, quod hoc ignoraverunt, et ita ex ignorantia peccaverunt.
Sed contra: p. 522 1. Si peccaverunt ex ignorantia, aut illa ignorantia fuit poena, aut culpa. Si culpa: ergo culpa fuit in eis ante primam culpam, quod est impossibile, cum implicentur hic duo opposita. Si poena: ergo poena fuit ante culpam6.
2. Item, si fuit ibi ignorantia, aut ergo iuris, aut facti. Non facti, quia bene sciebant, se de ligno vetito comedere. Non iuris, quia bene sciebant, se debere Deo obedire et contra eius imperium nullo modo facere. Nulla ergo videtur in eis ignorantia fuisse7.
3. Item, si fuit ibi ignorantia, aut ergo voluntaria, aut involuntaria. Si voluntaria: ergo videtur, quod iam voluntas eorum in appetendo ignorantiam esset inordinata. Si involuntaria: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo debuit eis imputari culpa. Si ergo est imputata, non videtur, quod fuisset ex aliqua ignorantia.
4. Item, si fuit ex ignorantia: aut ergo innata, aut contracta, aut inflicta, aut procurata. Non ex procurata nec contracta nec inflicta: ergo fuit ex ignorantia innata. Sed non decebat Deum facere naturam humanam cum pronitate et impotentia: ergo pari ratione non debuit eam facere cum caecitate et ignorantia: si ergo ex ignorantia peccaverunt, videtur, quod hoc possit imputari Deo.
5. Item, si aliquo modo dicitur ex ignorantia peccasse mulier, hoc est, quia a serpente seducta fuit; sed vir non fuit seductus, sicut dicit Apostolus8: ergo ex ignorantia peccatum eius non processit. Si ergo radix peccati in viro et muliere non fuit altera et altera, videtur etiam, quod nec mulier peccaverit ex ignorantia.
Conclusio
> Peccatum Evae et etiam Adae fuit ex quadam ignorantia, accepta in sensu largo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod peccatum esse ex ignorantia potest dici dupliciter, videlicet proprie et communiter: proprie, prout distinguitur peccatum ex ignorantia contra peccatum ex infirmitate et ex industria; et hoc modo ignorantia dicit privationem scientiae, quae9 non competit homini ex natura, sed merito primae culpae fuit contracta. Et hoc modo peccatum primorum parentum non potest dici ex ignorantia, nec continetur sub illa divisione, qua dicitur, quod omne peccatum aut est ex ignorantia, aut etc. Illa enim divisio peccati est secundum statum naturae lapsae. — Communiter autem dicitur peccatum esse ex ignorantia, quod committitur, aliqua nescientia existente circa peccantem, ratione cuius nec considerat gravitatem culpae nec gravitatem poenae. Et sic peccatum primorum parentum ex ignorantia dici potest fuisse, quia tam in viro quam in muliere fuit quaedam nescientia, quae non fuit poena, sed quaedam naturalis imperfectio, magis reperta in muliere quam in viro. Mulier enim ignoravit, utrum serpens sibi verum, vel falsum suggereret; ignoravit etiam severitatem divinae iustitiae. Vir autem alterum horum dicitur ignorasse, videlicet divinae iustitiae severitatem, in hoc quod aestimavit de illa transgressione cito veniam invenire: inexpertus enim erat severitatem divinae iustitiae. Uterque tamen cognoscere potuit per scientiam, quam habebat, se male facere.
Et sic large accipiendo ignorantiam dici potest, peccatum primorum parentum fuisse ex ignorantia; et magis peccatum Evae quam Adae10. Et hoc concludunt rationes ad primam partem inductae. — Proprie vero accipiendo ignorantiam, secundum quod dicit poenam, et hoc est, prout dicit nescientiam eius rei, quam homo deberet scire secundum exigentiam11; sic peccatum primorum parentum non fuit ex ignorantia, sicut ostendunt rationes adductae ad partem contrariam; et hoc patet discurrendo per singulas.
Ad argumenta pro parte contraria: 1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod ignorantia aut est poena, aut culpa; dici potest, quod ista divisio non est sufficiens, nisi accipiatur ignorantia proprie. Nam non solum homo primo institutus, sed etiam Angelus beatus aliqua ignorat, cum multa innotescant Principatibus et Potestatibus per Ecclesiam12. Unde talis ignorantia nec culpa nec poena est, quia est respectu horum quae non debet scire, quantum est de prima conditione naturae.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut fuit ignorantia iuris, aut facti; dicendum, quod non fuit ibi, proprie loquendo, ignorantia iuris quantum ad principale, sed quantum ad aliquid annexum, utpote quantum ad severitatem iudicis. Similiter non fuit ibi ignorantia facti quantum ad principale, quia bene sciebant, se gustare lignum vetitum; fuit tamen in muliere quaedam ignorantia quantum ad illud quod credebat assequi per illud, videlicet assimilationem ad Deum; et ita non fuit ibi ignorantia proprie dicta, sed communiter.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorantia aut erat voluntaria, aut involuntaria; dicendum, quod ista non est divisio per immediata, si large accipiatur ignorantia. Aliquis enim est, qui nihil13 cogitat de eo quod ignorat; et tunc nec circa illud afficitur voluntarie nec involuntarie; et sic erat de illa ignorantia Evae.
p. 523 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut erat innata, aut contracta etc.: dicendum, quod illa ignorantia dicebat quandam scientiae incompletionem et imperfectionem, quae inerat animabus primorum parentum ex defectu propriae naturae, per hoc quod animae eorum non erant in omnimoda lucis plenitudine. In tali autem statu decuit sic hominem fieri, quia, sicut infra14 patebit, prius debuit esse viator quam comprehensor. Nec tamen ex illa ignorantia dicitur homo fuisse in tenebris vel in caecitate, quia sufficiens lumen habebat ad incedendum per viam iustitiae; et ideo non est simile de pronitate. Pronitas enim non solummodo dicit imperfectionem, sed etiam quandam naturae curvationem, ac per hoc deordinationem.
5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod vir non peccavit ex ignorantia, quia non fuit seductus; dicendum, quod non solummodo mulier ignorasse dicitur propter seductionem, sed etiam quia ignoravit poenae subsequentis acerbitatem. Et licet in Adam non fuerit ignorantia illius seductionis, fuit tamen ignorantia per inexperientiam divinae ultionis; et ideo aliqua ignorantia sive nescientia fuit in Adam, licet minor quam in Eva. — Nec valet illud quod obiicitur de radice, quia ignorantia non ponitur ibi esse tanquam ex una radice, sed quia quodam modo talis nescientia occasionem praebuit ad peccandum.
I. Responsio ad hanc quaestionem eruitur ex distinctione communiter recepta, quae fit inter ignorantiam proprie dictam (quae importat privationem nec non culpam, vel saltem poenam, ac supponit, subiectum et aptum esse et teneri pro eo tempore ad sciendum), atque inter ignorantiam large acceptam, quae nihil nisi negationem alicuius scientiae importat et esse potest sine culpa et poena. Attamen nullum peccatum esse potest, nisi supposita aliqua nescientia, ut patet. De divisione peccatorum, quam habet etiam Magister (hic c. 5.), scil. in peccata ignorantiae, infirmitatis et industriae, cfr. hic dub. 2. et infra d. 43. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. et ad 4, nec non dub. 1. Et notandum, quod aliud est peccatum ex ignorantia, aliud peccatum ignorantiae. Hoc enim est culpabilis omissio debitae scientiae, illud vero est peccatum qualecumque, quod committitur ignoranter (Centiloq. p. I. sect. 25.).
II. Hanc quaestionem tangit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 1. ad 3. — De ea: Scot., hic q. unica. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2.
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Article II. On the fault of the first parents in relation to the ignorance of the intellect.
Next there is inquiry concerning the sin of the first parents in relation to ignorance on the part of the intellect. And concerning this, three things are asked.
First it is asked whether the sin of the first parents was from ignorance.
Second it is asked whether ignorance is in any way a fault.
Third it is asked whether there is an excuse for the fault1.
Question I. Whether the sin of the first parents was from ignorance.
Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the sin of the first parents was from ignorance, at least the sin of the woman.
1. Genesis third chapter2: The serpent deceived me, etc.; but where there is deception, there is privation of knowledge; and where this is, there is ignorance: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, one who doubts about something about which he ought to be certain is rather said to be ignorant of it than to know it; but the woman ought to have been certain about the word of the Lord, who had said3: On whatever day you eat, you shall die the death, and she doubted about this when she said: Lest perhaps we die: therefore she seems to have sinned from ignorance.
3. Likewise, one who believes a mortal sin to be venial is ignorant of the truth of the divine law; but Adam believed that sin to be venial, as Augustine says, and the Master adduces in the text4: «He reckoned it to be a venial, not a mortal, offense»: therefore it seems that both the man and the woman sinned from ignorance.
4. Likewise, every sin is either «from ignorance, or from infirmity, or from malice»5. But the sin of the first parents was not from malice, because then it would be a sin against the Holy Spirit; nor from infirmity, because they had no proneness to sinning: therefore it was from ignorance.
5. Likewise, if Adam and Eve had believed that they were offending God so gravely and incurring such great penalties, since they had no proneness to sin, it in no way seems that they would have committed a fault: if therefore they committed a fault, it seems that they were ignorant of this, and so sinned from ignorance.
On the contrary: 1. If they sinned from ignorance, that ignorance was either a punishment or a fault. If a fault: then there was a fault in them before the first fault, which is impossible, since two opposites are here implied. If a punishment: then a punishment was before the fault6.
2. Likewise, if there was ignorance there, then it was either of law or of fact. Not of fact, because they well knew that they were eating from the forbidden tree. Not of law, because they well knew that they ought to obey God and in no way act against His command. Therefore no ignorance seems to have been in them7.
3. Likewise, if there was ignorance there, then it was either voluntary or involuntary. If voluntary: then it seems that already their will, in desiring ignorance, was disordered. If involuntary: then it seems that in no way ought a fault to be imputed to them. If therefore it was imputed, it does not seem that it was from any ignorance.
4. Likewise, if it was from ignorance, then it was either innate, or contracted, or inflicted, or procured. Not from one procured nor contracted nor inflicted: therefore it was from innate ignorance. But it was not fitting for God to make human nature with proneness and impotence: therefore by parity of reasoning He ought not to have made it with blindness and ignorance: if therefore they sinned from ignorance, it seems that this could be imputed to God.
5. Likewise, if in any way the woman is said to have sinned from ignorance, this is because she was deceived by the serpent; but the man was not deceived, as the Apostle says8: therefore his sin did not proceed from ignorance. If therefore the root of sin in the man and in the woman was not one and another, it seems also that not even the woman sinned from ignorance.
Conclusion
> The sin of Eve and also of Adam was from a certain ignorance, taken in the broad sense.
I respond: It must be said that for a sin to be from ignorance can be said in two ways, namely properly and commonly: properly, insofar as sin from ignorance is distinguished against sin from infirmity and from deliberation; and in this way ignorance signifies a privation of knowledge which9 does not belong to man by nature, but was contracted by the merit of the first fault. And in this way the sin of the first parents cannot be said to be from ignorance, nor is it contained under that division by which it is said that every sin is either from ignorance, or etc. For that division of sin is according to the state of fallen nature. — But commonly a sin is said to be from ignorance which is committed while some not-knowing exists in the one sinning, by reason of which he considers neither the gravity of the fault nor the gravity of the punishment. And in this way the sin of the first parents can be said to have been from ignorance, because both in the man and in the woman there was a certain not-knowing, which was not a punishment, but a certain natural imperfection, more found in the woman than in the man. For the woman was ignorant whether the serpent was suggesting to her something true or false; she was also ignorant of the severity of divine justice. The man, however, is said to have been ignorant of one of these, namely of the severity of divine justice, in that he reckoned that for that transgression he would quickly find pardon: for he was inexperienced in the severity of divine justice. Yet each was able to know, by the knowledge which he had, that he was doing wrong.
And so, taking ignorance broadly, it can be said that the sin of the first parents was from ignorance; and the sin of Eve more than that of Adam10. And this is what the reasons adduced for the first part conclude. — But taking ignorance properly, insofar as it signifies a punishment, and this is, insofar as it signifies a not-knowing of that thing which a man ought to know according to requirement11; in this way the sin of the first parents was not from ignorance, as the reasons adduced for the contrary part show; and this is plain by running through them one by one.
To the arguments for the contrary part: 1. As to what is objected, that ignorance is either a punishment or a fault; it can be said that this division is not sufficient, unless ignorance is taken properly. For not only man as first instituted, but even the blessed Angel is ignorant of some things, since many things become known to the Principalities and Powers through the Church12. Hence such ignorance is neither a fault nor a punishment, because it is in respect of those things which he need not know, so far as pertains to the first condition of nature.
2. To what is objected, that it was either ignorance of law or of fact; it must be said that there was not there, properly speaking, ignorance of law as regards the principal point, but as regards something annexed, namely as regards the severity of the judge. Likewise there was not there ignorance of fact as regards the principal point, because they well knew that they were tasting the forbidden tree; yet there was in the woman a certain ignorance as regards that which she believed she would attain through it, namely likeness to God; and so there was not there ignorance properly called, but commonly.
3. To what is objected, that ignorance was either voluntary or involuntary; it must be said that this is not a division through immediates, if ignorance is taken broadly. For someone there is who thinks nothing13 about that which he is ignorant of; and then he is affected toward it neither voluntarily nor involuntarily; and so it was with that ignorance of Eve.
4. To what is objected, that it was either innate, or contracted, etc.: it must be said that that ignorance signified a certain incompleteness and imperfection of knowledge, which was in the souls of the first parents from the defect of their own nature, in that their souls were not in the entire fullness of light. But in such a state it was fitting that man should be made so, because, as will be plain below14, he had to be a wayfarer before a comprehender. Yet man is not said to have been in darkness or in blindness by that ignorance, because he had sufficient light to walk along the way of justice; and therefore it is not similar in the case of proneness. For proneness signifies not only an imperfection, but also a certain curving of nature, and through this a disorder.
5. To what is objected last, that the man did not sin from ignorance, because he was not deceived; it must be said that the woman is said to have been ignorant not only on account of the deception, but also because she was ignorant of the bitterness of the subsequent punishment. And although in Adam there was not the ignorance of that deception, yet there was ignorance through inexperience of the divine vengeance; and therefore some ignorance or not-knowing was in Adam, though less than in Eve. — Nor does what is objected about the root avail, because ignorance is not posited there as being from one root, but because in a certain way such not-knowing furnished an occasion for sinning.
I. The answer to this question is drawn from the commonly received distinction made between ignorance properly called (which implies a privation as well as a fault, or at least a punishment, and presupposes that the subject is both fit and bound, for that time, to know), and ignorance taken broadly, which implies nothing but the negation of some knowledge and can exist without fault and punishment. Nevertheless, no sin can exist except on the supposition of some not-knowing, as is plain. On the division of sins, which the Master also has (here c. 5.), namely into sins of ignorance, of infirmity, and of deliberation, cf. here dub. 2 and below d. 43, a. 3, q. 2, in the body and at the reply to 4, as well as dub. 1. And it is to be noted that a sin from ignorance is one thing, a sin of ignorance another. For the latter is a culpable omission of the knowledge owed, while the former is any sin whatever which is committed ignorantly (Centiloquium, p. I, sect. 25.).
II. This question is touched by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 104, m. 1, ad 3. — On it: Scotus, here in the single question. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here in the single question. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. 2.
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- Edd., excepta I, excusatoria.The editions, except the first, read excusatoria ["of excuse"].
- Vers. 13. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.Verse 13. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4.
- Gen. 2, 17. — Seq. textus est Gen. 3, 3.Genesis 2:17. — The following text is Genesis 3:3.
- Hic c. 4. seq., ubi et istae duae de hac re opiniones exhibentur, quae hic proponuntur.Here c. 4 ff., where also these two opinions on this matter are set forth, which are here proposed.
- Isidor., II. Sent. c. 17. n. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. in fine.Isidore, Sentences II, c. 17, n. 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, at the end.
- Quod sane iniustum esset; nam, sicut August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51. ait, «Omnis poena, si iusta est, peccati poena est.»Which would surely be unjust; for, as Augustine says, On Free Will III, c. 18, n. 51, «Every punishment, if it is just, is the punishment of a sin.»
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5.
- Epist. I. Tim. 2, 14: Et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in praevaricatione fuit. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. in fine.First Epistle to Timothy 2:14: And Adam was not deceived, but the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression. See here the text of the Master, c. 4, at the end.
- Scil. privatio.That is, the privation.
- De quo cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. 3. 4. 5.On which cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1, 3, 4, 5.
- Vat. cum ed. 4 adiungit sui status.The Vatican edition together with edition 4 adds sui status ["of his state"].
- Eph. 3, 10. — Quoad additamentum per Ecclesiam, quod abest a s. Script., consulas supra, pag. 118, nota 8, expositionem s. Hieronymi. — Pro Principatibus codd. et edd. 1, 2 Principibus.Ephesians 3:10. — As to the addition through the Church, which is absent from Holy Scripture, consult above, p. 118, note 8, the exposition of St. Jerome. — For Principalities the codices and editions 1, 2 read Princes.
- Non pauci codd., inter quos CFIKORS, male omittunt nihil.Not a few codices, among them CFIKORS, wrongly omit nihil ["nothing"].
- Dist. 23. a. 2. q. 2. seqq.Distinction 23, a. 2, q. 2 and following.