Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus

p. 117

Articulus II. De naturali cognitione Angeli.

Circa secundum principale et¹ circa Angeli naturalem cognitionem duo quaeruntur. Primum est de cognitione ipsius creaturae. Secundum de cognitione creatricis essentiae.

Quaestio I. Utrum Angelus omnia creata, quae cognoscit, cognoscat per species innatas.

Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum Angelus omnia creata, quae cognoscit, cognoscat per species innatas, an aliqua per species acquisitas. Et quod omnia creata cognoscat per species innatas:

1. Videtur sacra Scriptura velle, Ezechielis vigesimo octavo²: Tu plenus sapientia et perfectus decore — dicitur ad diabolum — sed non esset a sui origine plenus sapientia, nisi esset in eo plenitudo specierum, per quas contingit res cognoscere: ergo p. 118 cum plenitudo sufficiat unicuique, videtur, quod species innatae sufficiant Angelo ad omnia cognoscenda.

2. Item, per Augustinum, nono de Trinitate³: « Mens igitur ipsa sicut rerum corporearum notitiam per sensum corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam ». Et huius rationem aliam non assignat, nisi quia species incorporalium non potest fieri in sensu, et species acquiritur mediante sensu; sed Angelus nullum habet sensum — supponatur modo — ergo nullius notitiam acquirit suscipiendo speciem sive acquirendo speciem novam.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per auctoritatem libri de Causis⁴: « Omnis intelligentia est plena formis »; sed si species reciperet, non esset plena: ergo etc.

4. Item, talis consuevit assignari differentia inter intellectum angelicum et humanum, quod humanus propter coniunctionem cum corpore est possibilis, angelicus vero est actualis; si ergo recipere non est nisi rei existentis in potentia, secundum quod huiusmodi⁵: patet etc.

5. Item, quod ista differentia sit conveniens, videtur. Intellectus enim divinus est in omnimoda actualitate, ita quod omnino nihil potest recipere; intellectus vero humanus, quando creatur, est sicut tabula rasa⁶, et ita in omnimoda possibilitate: ergo si inter haec extrema possibile est reperire medium possibile, scilicet in quo sit possibilitas actui coniuncta, et talem non est dare nisi angelicum, ergo etc.

6. Item, triplex est esse rerum: habent enim res esse in Verbo, et in intellectu Angelico, et in mundo, secundum quod triplex esse dicit Augustinus⁷ illud esse dictum: Fiat, et fecit, et factum est. Sed esse rerum in intellectu angelico magis accedit ad esse rerum in Verbo, quam ad esse rerum in mundo: ergo cum in Verbo sint⁸ plenissime, in maiori plenitudine sunt in Angelo quam in mundo, vel in aeque magna. Sed Deus ab initio mundi indidit rebus rationes causales, secundum quas cetera fierent, et nihil diceretur novum, quia requievit Deus die septimo⁹: ergo multo fortius videtur, quod Angelo impresserit similitudines et rationes, secundum quas posset cognoscere cetera facienda: ergo sine receptione nova.

Sed contra: 1. Ad Ephesios tertio¹⁰: Ut innotescat Principalibus et Potestatibus multiformis sapientia Dei; Glossa dicit ibi, « quod Angeli multa didicerunt ab Ecclesia »: ergo multorum species receperunt et acquisierunt.

2. Item, si per species innatas omnia cognoscit, ergo a natura sua omnia scit, ergo praesentia et futura, necessaria et contingentia, naturalia et voluntaria: quod manifeste falsum est et contra Scripturas¹¹.

3. Item, si omnia cognoscit per species innatas, habet penes se ipsum rationem cognoscendi omnia: ergo ita bene cognoscit absentia sicut praesentia, ita longinqua, sicut propinqua: ergo diabolus existens in inferno scit quidquid fit in mundo, et Angelus, qui est hic, quidquid fit in Anglia; quod manifeste falsum est et contra Scripturam, quae de multiplici missione Angelorum loquitur¹².

4. Item, si omnia cognoscit per species innatas, aut non cognoscit singularia, aut habet species omnium singularium. Primum est falsum et inconveniens, quod Angelus singularia non cognoscat, cum hominibus specialibus ministret et ad specialia et singularia ministeria dirigatur. Si autem habet species omnium singularium, ergo cum possint augeri in infinitum, habebit species infinitas; aut fiet aliquando aliquod singulare, quod non poterit cognoscere¹³. Si tu dicas, quod Angelus cognoscit singularia per species universalium; contra: in specie universalium non distinguuntur¹⁴: ergo non cognoscit distincte. Praeterea, species universalis non assimilatur cuilibet singulari assimilatione perfecta: ergo perfectius cognoscit homo quam Angelus. Si tu dicas, quod Angelus appropriat illas species applicando ad singularia; contra: omnem applicationem non fortuitam praecedit cognitio: si enim non cognoscit p. 119 illum cui applicat, quomodo vult illi speciem applicare? Et iterum, quare magis illi singulari applicabit speciem hominis quam asini? Ergo ante applicationem cognoscit singulare. Praeterea, aut cognoscit post applicationem, aut non. Si non, ergo Angelus non potest tenere in memoria cognitionem alicuius singularis, quod manifeste falsum est; si sic: ergo remanet in memoria aliqua nova species, cum aliquid cognoscit¹⁵, quod prius non cognovit, et ita illa recipit aliquam speciem: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Angelus omnia cognoscere potest per species concreatas universales, per quas cognoscit etiam singularia, sed non nisi dirigendo aspectum super cognoscibile et species ad invicem componendo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnes qui aliquid intellexerunt, hoc posuerunt, quod Angelus cognoscit res creatas per species, nisi sit talis, quae essentialiter sit in Angelo. Cognoscere autem rem omnino per se ipsum, hoc est solius illius qui est actus purus et perfectissimus, et ideo idea et¹⁶ causa omnium et efficiens et exemplaris se ipso, non alio quodam. Sed tamen in modo ponendi species diversificati sunt.

Aliqui enim posuerunt, quod Angelus omnia, quae novit per species, scit per species innatas; et huius positionis tradunt modum et causam. Modus enim hic est. Quamvis in Angelo sint innatae species in numero finito, scilicet rerum, quae sunt de prima constitutione mundi; tamen, sicut Deus in prima conditione indidit rationes causales et seminales rebus ad se multiplicandas, ita tradidit¹⁷ etiam speciebus, quas impressit angelico intellectui; et ita omnia possunt sine extrinseca receptione cognoscere. — Causam autem huius assignant, quia cum receptio fiat per quandam abstractionem et proportionem, ad quae concurrunt tanquam dispositiva organum et medium et virtutes inferiores, et hoc non sit in Angelo reperire; dicunt, quod nihil ab extra potest recipere. — Sed huius positionis modus facile non est intelligere, quia difficile est videre, qua ratione species possint multiplicari. Nam species unius rei non generat speciem omnino differentis rei, nec eadem species se multiplicat in anima secundum numerum, cum in una sit anima, sicut unius obiecti una est species in uno speculo indiviso¹⁸. — Causam autem credo esse falsam, quia planum est, quod Angelus habet intellectum possibilem, cum non sit purus actus. Planum etiam est, quod habet agentem maioris virtutis, quam si esset corpori alligatus. Si ergo alligatus potest abstrahere [et] in possibili¹⁹ imprimere, quanto magis intellectus liber et separatus hoc potest?

Ideo est alia positio, quod Angelus quaedam cognoscit per species innatas, ut puta necessaria et naturalia, et quae fuerunt cum Angelo concreata; sed fortuita et voluntaria et futura contingentia intelligit per species acquisitas et receptas. Angelicus enim intellectus est possibilis respectu huiusmodi specierum; non tamen est tanta possibilitate possibilis, ut humanus, quia humanus est possibilis omnino propter nuditatem²⁰, et etiam possibilis propter coniunctionem cum phantasmatibus; angelicus vero neutro modo, sed possibilis est respectu praedictorum cognoscibilium. Cum enim non habeant causam certam²¹, solus Deus, qui se ipso cognoscit, est in actu respectu talis cognitionis, et ille qui cognoscit in Deo, vel per revelationem factam a Deo; Angelus vero, qui indiget informatione speciei per naturam, est respectu talium in potentia, non in actu. — Sed haec positio videtur in se claudere duo opposita, scilicet quod Angelus habeat species universalium et suscipiat post species singularium. Species enim singularium eiusdem speciei non differunt nisi numero, et impossibile est, accidentia eiusdem speciei diversa numero esse in eodem subiecto²²: ergo nullus intellectus potest habere plures species hominis; sed si habet unam innatam, non potest aliam eiusdem speciei recipere, sicut nec duae albedines sunt in eodem corpore. Quod si dicas, duarum albedinum similitudines esse in eodem aere et diversa lumina eiusdem naturae, ut dicit Dionysius²³, et facies duorum hominum p. 120 in eadem imagine; non est simile, quia idola et lumina in medio distinguuntur per suas origines, et diversae figurae possunt in genere figurae differre specie, aliter²⁴ sufficit species figurae cum numero, sicut possum tres species omnino similes confingere. Et sic videtur dicta positio contraria implicare. — Amplius, si « species est totum esse formale individuorum », ut dicit Boethius²⁵, nec est individuatio nisi ex coniunctione formae cum materia; si species existens in intellectu omnino abstrahit a materia, nullo modo in eodem intellectu est ponere diversas species sive formas solo numero differentes. Et sic redit idem quod prius, scilicet quod, si intellectus angelicus habet omnium universalium species innatas, nullam ulterius speciem recipit, sed sufficienter per illas omnia cognoscit.

Et ideo est tertia positio, quod Angelus omnia cognoscit per species innatas, non quia non possit recipere species; tunc enim si Deus crearet aliquid novum in specie, necesse esset Angelum ignorare, quod si falsum est, posset recipere. Et ideo haec non est ratio, sed hoc, quod Deus intellectum angelicum possibilem tot speciebus implevit, quod per illas poterat omnia cognoscere sine omni receptione nova. Et ideo dicitur intellectus angelicus esse in actu respectu rerum, non quia se ipso sit in actu, vel quia sit actus, sed per species factus est in actu.

Et modus et intellectus istius positionis est hic. Deus enim in Angelis concreavit species universales omnium fiendarum rerum, et per illas certum est, quod potest omnia universalia cognoscere; potest etiam et singularia, sed non nisi componat ad invicem, ut patet: si ego habeo penes me speciem figurae, speciem hominis, speciem coloris et temporis, et componam ad invicem; sine nova receptione speciei cognoscam individuum in propria natura. Sed quia talis compositio, nisi esset secundum certitudinem²⁶ et correspondentiam ad ipsam rem, esset fictio et deceptio; ideo Angelus huiusmodi individua et singularia non cognoscit, nisi dirigat aspectum supra ipsum cognoscibile, et secundum illud quod est in re, ipse componat species in se; et tunc habet ita claram et certam cognitionem de re, sicut si speciem statim reciperet. — Et haec positio magis placet, quia concors est rationi et philosophiae et sacrae Scripturae. Et patet responsio ad omnia obiecta, si bene intelligatur.

1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod Angeli didicerunt etc.; dicendum, quod haec positio bene ponit, Angelos multa discere, sed non propter hoc species novas recipere. Nec illud est incompossibile. Ego enim habeo speciem hominis et animalis, dum scio unam conclusionem de eis; sed per multiplicem conversionem et collationem poterit circa easdem res per easdem species nova cognitio generari secundum diversas operationes²⁷ et habitudines, et ita aliquid addiscam, sed non novam speciem recipiam. Sic et Angeli multa didicerunt tum ex propria industria, tum ex revelatione, tum ex experientia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc cognosceret contingentia et absentia; dicendum, quod sicut tactum est, ad cognitionem harum rerum particularium, et maxime contingentium, non sufficit habere species innatas²⁸, nisi aspectus angelicus convertatur; et conversio requirit rei existentiam vel in se, vel in causa; requirit etiam praesentiam, eo quod virtus angelica est finita, ideo in approximatione aliqua proportionali est, cum se convertit ad rem extra. Et ita patet, quod non propter hoc cognoscit futura, vel etiam contingentia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut non cognoscit singularia, aut habet species infinitas; dico, quod cognoscit singularia per species universalium applicando et appropriando. Unde per appropriationem proprie et distincte cognoscit, nec oportet novas species recipi, nec oportet infinitas esse, quia singularia ad numerum finitum universalium reducuntur²⁹; sed finitae species infinitis modis componi possunt. Et ideo nunquam tot singularia cognoscit Angelus, quin adhuc possit cognoscere plura sine receptione speciei novae, non tamen sine directione aspectus supra rem. Ex qua directione non recipit speciem a cognoscibili, cum sit in actu per speciem, quam habet; sed dirigendo aspectum speciem appropriat et appropriando componit, et rem singularem sub sua proprietate cognoscit et percipit, quia tota cognitio est a forma, et forma haec « species est, quae est totum esse individuorum ».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de applicatione, quod supponit³⁰ cognitionem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod praesupponit cognitionem et relinquit cognitionem, sed tamen aliam praesupponit, aliam relinquit. Angelus enim sine conversione aliqua habet cognitionem loci, et cum convertit se supra locum, cognoscit p. 121 omnes res, quae sunt in loco, applicando species universales ad singularia et componendo; et illae species sub tali applicatione et compositione remanent in angelico intellectu, et ita relinquunt cognitionem novam sine receptione speciei³¹. — Ponatur etiam, quod nullam haberet cognitionem, sed solum speciem universalis in intellectu suo; adhuc poterit applicare et appropriare non casualiter, sed certitudinaliter. Quod patet sic. Homo enim, cum nascitur, non habet cognitionem nec speciem singularium, nec communem nec propriam; sola tamen directione aspectus super res cognoscit omnia visibilia et recipit simul cognitionem certam et speciem, quia denudatus erat a forma recepti³². Quodsi haberet species, multo melius posset, dirigendo aspectum ad res mundanas, eas cognoscere, non suscipiendo species, cum iam habeat, sed ex directione, et applicare et appropriare et componere et distincte nosse³³.

Scholion

I. Verba omnia creata in titulo quaestionis restringenda sunt ad omnia creata extra ipsum Angelum. Nam Angelus cognoscit rem, «quae essentialiter» est in ipso (in corp., in princip.), i. e. se ipsum, et etiam Deum (hic q. 2. ad 4.) non per tales species, sed potius per suam essentiam. — Supponitur tanquam doctrina communis, res ab Angelo extra ipsum cognosci per species. Attamen non defuerunt qui hoc negaverint. Nam Durandus (hic q. 6.) cum pluribus Nominalibus voluit, ab eisdem haec intelligi «non per aliud repraesentativum quam per ipsammet praesentiam rerum in se vel in suis causis, vel utroque modo». Alii cum Antissiodorensi putaverunt, omnia ab eis intelligi per eorum essentiam, analogo modo ut in Deo est. — Pro confirmanda communi sententia, quod species intelligibiles tam in homine quam in Angelis ad intelligendum vel omnia vel saltem multa requirantur, serviunt quae a Seraphico dicuntur (I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.) de similitudine, ut est ratio cognoscendi etiam in Deo (aliter tamen ac in nobis); item (ibid. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1.) de quatuor requisitis ad cognitionem; item (Itiner. mentis in Deum, c. 2.) de modo, quo mundus sensibilis intrat in animam per similitudines; et praecipue (Hexaëm. Serm. 11. a med.) de generatione speciei ab obiecto, ubi admirabili doctrina declaratur, quod «omnis creatura clamat generationem aeternam, et hanc exprimunt et repraesentant duodecim generationes».

II. Principalis controversia est de difficillimo problemate, quomodo ab Angelis cognoscantur singularia extra ipsos. Petr. a Tar. quinque de hoc opiniones recenset, nihil determinans. S. Thom. reprobat plures opiniones et etiam eam, quam ponit S. Bonav.; ipse autem tenet, singularia ab Angelo cognosci per species universales ipsi connaturales, quae etiam inferiora singularia distincte repraesentent. Scot. autem, cui fere concordat Richard. a Med., singularia haec ab ipso cognosci per species a rebus acquisitas, non tamen a phantasmatibus abstractas. S. Bonav., media via incedens, hic docet, Angelum ad hoc non indigere novarum specierum acquirendarum; tamen species universales concreatas non sufficere, ut singularia cognoscantur, «nisi Angelus dirigat aspectum supra ipsum cognoscibile, et secundum illud quod est in re, ipse componat species in se». — Addit autem idem, quod Angelus, licet non indigeat novarum specierum, «tamen possit recipere species». Sed de hac potentia iterum dissensus est, ut continuo dicetur.

III. Secunda controversia, quae cum prima intime est connexa, haec est, utrum in Angelo sit suo modo intellectus agens et possibilis, de qua distinctione vide infra d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 4. — S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 96.) docet: «In substantiis separatis non est intellectus agens et possibilis, nisi forte aequivoce» (cfr. S. I. q. 54. a. 4.). Ratio est, quia secundum ipsum nullo modo Angelus accipit cognitionem a sensibilibus. Haec ratio negatur tum a Scoto, qui vult, de facto esse illam receptionem, tum a S. Bonav., qui eam receptionem aestimat esse possibilem. Hinc uterque cum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 22. m. 3, B. Alberto (S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 3. a. 1. part. 1.), Petro a Tar. aliisque multis contendit, Angelum habere suo modo intellectum agentem et possibilem, «cum non sit actus purus» (hic in corp.). Hanc potentialitatem Seraphicus intelligit tum in ordine ad actum intellectionis, tum in ordine ad species potentiae angelicae ab origine divinitus concreatas, tum in ordine ad novas species, quas possit vel naturaliter vel a Deo imprimente acquirere. — Quod autem intellectus aliquo modo sit in potentia quoad haec tria, non est alienum, ni fallimur, a sententia S. Thomae, licet aliqui eius expositores putent, species illas in eo sensu esse connaturales, quod ab ipsa Angeli natura ut principio activo quasi proprietates fluant. Alii autem S. Thomae discipuli (cfr. Gotti, de Deo Creatore, tr. 9. q. 4. § 6.) probabilius esse putant, istas species potius esse divinitus impressas iuxta indigentiam et inclinationem naturae angelicae.

IV. Tertia controversia est circa doctrinam S. Thomae (hic q. 3. a. 2; S. I. q. 55. a. 3.), quod Angeli natura superiores intelligant per universaliores et pauciores species. Scot. (hic q. 10. n. 6. seqq.) hoc negat. Sententiae negativae favent plura a S. Bonav. incidenter dicta hic et praecipue I. Sent. d. 35. q. 4. in corp. et ad 2. — Notatu dignum est quod in solut. ad 4. in fine de humano intellectu docetur, scil. hominem a nativitate non habere cognitionem nec speciem singularium, nec communem nec propriam (cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. 4. q. 4. Schol.).

V. De cognitione Angelorum quoad praesentia, praeterita et futura contingentia cfr. infra d. 7. p. II. a. 1. q. 1-3; quoad secreta cordium d. 8. p. II. q. 6; quoad fidei mysteria III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. De hac et connexis quaestionibus: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 24. m. 2. 3. — Scot., hic q. 10. 11, et d. 9. q. 2; Report. hic q. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 55. a. 1. 3, et q. 56. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 96-100; de Verit. q. 8. a. 8. 9. — B. Albert., hic q. 15. 16; S. p. II. tr. 2. q. 14. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 14. — Durand., hic q. 5. 6. 7. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Article II. On the natural cognition of the angel.

About the second principal [matter], also¹, concerning the natural cognition of the angel, two [things] are asked. The first is about the cognition of the creature itself. The second about the cognition of the creative essence.

Question I. Whether the angel knows all created things which it knows through innate species.

It is asked therefore first, whether the angel knows all created things which it knows through innate species, or some through acquired species. And that it knows all created things through innate species:

1. Sacred Scripture seems to will [it], Ezekiel the twenty-eighth²: You [were] full of wisdom and perfect in beauty — it is said to the devil — but he would not be from his origin full of wisdom, unless there were in him a fullness of species through which it happens to know things: therefore p. 118 since a fullness suffices for each [thing], it seems that innate species suffice for the angel for knowing all things.

2. Likewise, through Augustine, in the ninth [book] On the Trinity³: « The mind therefore itself, just as it gathers the notice of corporeal things through the sense of the body, so [gathers the notice] of incorporeal [things] through itself ». And he assigns no other reason for this, except that the species of incorporeal [things] cannot come to be in sense, and a species is acquired by the mediation of sense; but the angel has no sense — let it be supposed so — therefore it acquires the notice of nothing by receiving a species or by acquiring a new species.

3. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [so] through the authority of the book On Causes⁴: « Every intelligence is full of forms »; but if it received a species, it would not be full: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, such a difference has been customarily assigned between the angelic and the human intellect, that the human, on account of its conjunction with the body, is possible [potential], but the angelic is actual; if therefore to receive is only of a thing existing in potency, insofar as [it is] of this kind⁵: it is plain etc.

5. Likewise, that this difference is fitting, seems [so]. For the divine intellect is in every-mode actuality, so that it can receive nothing at all; but the human intellect, when it is created, is like a blank tablet⁶, and so in every-mode possibility: therefore if between these extremes it is possible to find a possible middle, namely [one] in which there is a possibility conjoined to act, and such [a one] is not to be given except the angelic, therefore etc.

6. Likewise, threefold is the being of things: for things have being in the Word, and in the angelic intellect, and in the world, according to which threefold being Augustine says⁷ that being [is] said: Let it be made, and He made [it], and it was made. But the being of things in the angelic intellect more closely approaches the being of things in the Word than the being of things in the world: therefore since in the Word they are⁸ most fully, in greater fullness they are in the angel than in the world, or in equally great [fullness]. But God from the beginning of the world implanted in things causal grounds, according to which the rest would come to be, and nothing would be said [to be] new, because God rested on the seventh day⁹: therefore much more strongly it seems that He impressed on the angel the likenesses and grounds according to which it could know the rest of the things to be made: therefore without a new reception.

But on the contrary: 1. To the Ephesians the third¹⁰: That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the Principalities and Powers; the Gloss says there, « that the angels learned many [things] from the Church »: therefore they received and acquired the species of many [things].

2. Likewise, if it knows all [things] through innate species, then from its nature it knows all [things], therefore present and future, necessary and contingent, natural and voluntary: which is manifestly false and against the Scriptures¹¹.

3. Likewise, if it knows all [things] through innate species, it has within itself the ground of knowing all [things]: therefore it knows absent [things] as well as present, far [things] as well as near: therefore the devil existing in hell knows whatever is done in the world, and the angel which is here [knows] whatever is done in England; which is manifestly false and against Scripture, which speaks of the manifold sending of the angels¹².

4. Likewise, if it knows all [things] through innate species, either it does not know singulars, or it has the species of all singulars. The first is false and unfitting, that the angel should not know singulars, since it ministers to particular men and is directed to particular and singular ministries. But if it has the species of all singulars, then since they can be increased to infinity, it will have infinite species; or at some time some singular will come to be which it will not be able to know¹³. If you say that the angel knows singulars through the species of universals; on the contrary: in the species of universals they are not distinguished¹⁴: therefore it does not know distinctly. Besides, the universal species is not assimilated to each singular by a perfect assimilation: therefore man knows more perfectly than the angel. If you say that the angel appropriates those species by applying [them] to singulars; on the contrary: every non-fortuitous application is preceded by cognition: for if it does not know p. 119 the one to which it applies, how does it will to apply the species to it? And again, why will it apply the species of a man rather than of an ass to that singular? Therefore before the application it knows the singular. Besides, either it knows after the application, or not. If not, then the angel cannot keep in memory the cognition of any singular, which is manifestly false; if so: then there remains in memory some new species, when it knows¹⁵ something which before it did not know, and so it receives some species: therefore etc.

Conclusion

The angel can know all [things] through concreated universal species, through which it knows also singulars, but only by directing its gaze upon the knowable and composing the species with one another.

I respond: It must be said that all who understood anything posited this, that the angel knows created things through species, unless it be such [a thing] as is essentially in the angel. But to know a thing altogether through itself, this belongs to Him alone who is pure and most perfect act, and therefore the idea and¹⁶ cause of all and the efficient and exemplary [cause] by Himself, not by some other. But yet in the mode of positing the species they have differed.

For some posited that the angel knows all [things] which it knows through species by innate species; and of this position they hand down the mode and the cause. The mode is this. Although in the angel there are innate species in finite number, namely of the things which are of the first constitution of the world; yet, just as God in the first making implanted causal and seminal grounds in things for their multiplying, so He handed [them] over¹⁷ also to the species which He impressed on the angelic intellect; and so it can know all [things] without an extrinsic reception. — But the cause of this they assign [thus], because, since reception comes about through a certain abstraction and proportion, to which there concur as dispositive the organ and the medium and the lower powers, and this is not to be found in the angel; they say that it can receive nothing from without. — But the mode of this position is not easy to understand, because it is difficult to see by what reason the species could be multiplied. For the species of one thing does not generate the species of an altogether different thing, nor does the same species multiply itself in the soul according to number, since it is in one soul, just as of one object there is one species in one undivided mirror¹⁸. — But the cause I believe to be false, because it is plain that the angel has a possible intellect, since it is not pure act. It is plain also that it has an agent [intellect] of greater power than if it were bound to a body. If therefore [the intellect] bound [to a body] can abstract [and] impress on the possible¹⁹, how much more can the free and separate intellect [do] this?

Therefore there is another position, that the angel knows some [things] through innate species, namely necessary and natural [things], and those which were concreated with the angel; but fortuitous and voluntary and future contingent [things] it understands through acquired and received species. For the angelic intellect is possible with respect to species of this kind; yet it is not possible with so great a possibility as the human, because the human is possible altogether on account of its nakedness²⁰, and also possible on account of its conjunction with phantasms; but the angelic in neither mode, but it is possible with respect to the aforesaid knowables. For since they have no certain cause²¹, God alone, who knows by Himself, is in act with respect to such cognition, and he who knows in God, or through a revelation made by God; but the angel, which needs the information of a species by nature, is with respect to such [things] in potency, not in act. — But this position seems to enclose in itself two opposites, namely that the angel has the species of universals and receives afterward the species of singulars. For the species of singulars of the same species do not differ except in number, and it is impossible that accidents of the same species, diverse in number, be in the same subject²²: therefore no intellect can have several species of a man; but if it has one innate [one], it cannot receive another of the same species, just as neither are two whitenesses in the same body. And if you say that the likenesses of two whitenesses are in the same air, and diverse lights of the same nature, as Dionysius says²³, and the faces of two men p. 120 in the same image; it is not alike, because the idola and the lights in the medium are distinguished by their origins, and diverse figures can in the genus of figure differ in species, otherwise²⁴ the species of figure with number suffices, just as I can fashion three altogether similar species. And so the said position seems to imply the contrary. — Further, if « a species is the whole formal being of individuals », as Boethius says²⁵, nor is there individuation except from the conjunction of form with matter; if a species existing in the intellect altogether abstracts from matter, in no way is it [possible] to posit in the same intellect diverse species or forms differing by number alone. And so the same returns as before, namely that, if the angelic intellect has the innate species of all universals, it receives no further species, but sufficiently through them knows all [things].

And therefore there is a third position, that the angel knows all [things] through innate species, not because it cannot receive species; for then, if God created something new in species, the angel would necessarily be ignorant [of it], which since it is false, it could receive [it]. And therefore this is not the reason, but this, that God filled the possible angelic intellect with so many species that through them it could know all [things] without any new reception. And therefore the angelic intellect is said to be in act with respect to things, not because it is in act by itself, or because it is act, but it is made in act through the species.

And the mode and understanding of this position is this. For God concreated in the angels the universal species of all things to come to be, and through them it is certain that it can know all universals; it can also [know] singulars, but only if it composes [them] with one another, as is plain: if I have within me the species of a figure, the species of a man, the species of a color and of time, and I compose [them] with one another; without a new reception of a species I shall know the individual in its proper nature. But because such a composition, unless it were according to certitude²⁶ and correspondence to the thing itself, would be a fiction and a deception; therefore the angel does not know such individuals and singulars, unless it direct its gaze upon the knowable itself, and according to that which is in the thing, it itself compose the species in itself; and then it has a cognition of the thing as clear and certain as if it received the species at once. — And this position pleases more, because it is concordant with reason and philosophy and sacred Scripture. And the response to all the objections is plain, if it be well understood.

1. To that which is objected, that the angels learned etc.; it must be said that this position well posits that the angels learn many [things], but not on account of this that they receive new species. Nor is that incompossible. For I have the species of man and of animal, while I know one conclusion about them; but through manifold conversion and collation a new cognition can be generated about the same things through the same species according to diverse operations²⁷ and relations, and so I shall learn something, but I shall not receive a new species. So also the angels learned many [things] both from their own industry, and from revelation, and from experience.

2. To that which is objected, that then it would know contingent and absent [things]; it must be said that, as was touched [on], for the cognition of these particular things, and most of all of contingent [things], it does not suffice to have innate species²⁸, unless the angelic gaze be converted; and the conversion requires the existence of the thing either in itself, or in [its] cause; it requires also presence, because the angelic power is finite, [and] therefore is in some proportional approximation, when it converts itself to a thing without. And so it is plain that not on account of this does it know future, or also contingent, [things].

3. To that which is objected, that either it does not know singulars, or it has infinite species; I say that it knows singulars through the species of universals by applying and appropriating. Whence through appropriation it knows properly and distinctly, nor is it necessary that new species be received, nor that they be infinite, because singulars are reduced to a finite number of universals²⁹; but finite species can be composed in infinite modes. And therefore the angel never knows so many singulars that it cannot still know more without the reception of a new species, yet not without the direction of the gaze upon the thing. From which direction it does not receive a species from the knowable, since it is in act through the species which it has; but by directing the gaze it appropriates the species, and by appropriating it composes [them], and knows and perceives the singular thing under its property, because the whole cognition is from form, and this form is « the species, which is the whole being of individuals ».

4. To that which is objected concerning application, that it presupposes³⁰ cognition; it must be said that it is true that it presupposes cognition and leaves cognition, but yet it presupposes one [cognition], leaves another. For the angel without any conversion has the cognition of place, and when it converts itself upon a place, it knows p. 121 all the things which are in the place, by applying universal species to singulars and composing [them]; and those species, under such application and composition, remain in the angelic intellect, and so they leave a new cognition without the reception of a species³¹. — Let it also be supposed that it had no cognition, but only the species of a universal in its intellect; still it will be able to apply and appropriate not by chance, but with certitude. Which is plain thus. For man, when he is born, does not have the cognition nor the species of singulars, neither common nor proper; yet by the mere direction of the gaze upon things he knows all visible [things] and receives at once a certain cognition and a species, because he was naked of the form of the received³². But if he had species, he could much better, by directing his gaze to mundane things, know them, not by receiving species, since he already has [them], but from the direction, and apply and appropriate and compose and know distinctly³³.

Scholion

I. The words all created [things] in the title of the question are to be restricted to all created [things] outside the angel itself. For the angel knows the thing « which essentially » is in itself (in the body [of the question], at the beginning), i.e. itself, and also God (here q. 2, in reply to 4), not through such species, but rather through its essence. — It is supposed as common doctrine that things outside itself are known by the angel through species. Yet there were not lacking those who denied this. For Durandus (here q. 6) with several Nominalists held that these are understood by them « not through any representative other than the very presence of the things in themselves or in their causes, or in both modes ». Others with [William of] Auxerre thought that all [things] are understood by them through their essence, in a mode analogous to that in God. — For confirming the common opinion, that intelligible species are required, both in man and in the angels, for understanding either all or at least many [things], there serve [the things] which are said by the Seraphic [Doctor] (I Sent. d. 35, q. 1) about likeness, as it is the ground of knowing even in God (yet otherwise than in us); likewise (ibid. d. 3, p. 1, q. 1) about the four requisites for cognition; likewise (Itinerarium of the mind into God, c. 2) about the mode in which the sensible world enters into the soul through likenesses; and especially (Hexaëmeron, Sermon 11, from the middle) about the generation of the species from the object, where with admirable doctrine it is declared that « every creature cries out the eternal generation, and these the twelve generations express and represent ».

II. The principal controversy is about the most difficult problem, how singulars outside themselves are known by the angels. Peter of Tarentaise reviews five opinions about this, determining nothing. St. Thomas reproves several opinions and also the one which St. Bonaventure posits; he himself holds that singulars are known by the angel through universal species connatural to it, which also distinctly represent the lower singulars. But Scotus, with whom Richard of Mediavilla nearly agrees, [holds] that these singulars are known by it through species acquired from things, yet not abstracted from phantasms. St. Bonaventure, proceeding by a middle way, here teaches that the angel does not for this need new species to be acquired; yet that universal concreated species do not suffice for singulars to be known, « unless the angel direct its gaze upon the knowable itself, and according to that which is in the thing, it itself compose the species in itself ». — But he adds the same, that the angel, although it does not need new species, « yet can receive species ». But about this potency there is again disagreement, as will presently be said.

III. The second controversy, which is intimately connected with the first, is this, whether in the angel there is in its own mode an agent and possible intellect, about which distinction see below d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4. — St. Thomas (Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 96) teaches: « In separate substances there is not an agent and possible intellect, except perhaps equivocally» (cf. Summa I, q. 54, a. 4). The reason is that according to him the angel in no way receives cognition from sensibles. This reason is denied both by Scotus, who holds that in fact there is that reception, and by St. Bonaventure, who esteems that reception to be possible. Hence each, with Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 22, m. 3, Blessed Albert (Summa p. II, tr. 4, q. 14, m. 3, a. 1, part 1), Peter of Tarentaise, and many others, contends that the angel has in its own mode an agent and possible intellect, « since it is not pure act » (here in the body). This potentiality the Seraphic [Doctor] understands both in the order to the act of understanding, and in the order to the species of the angelic power concreated from the origin by God, and in the order to new species, which it can acquire either naturally or by God impressing [them]. — But that the intellect is in some mode in potency as to these three [things] is not, unless we are mistaken, alien to the opinion of St. Thomas, although some of his expositors think that those species are connatural in this sense, that from the very nature of the angel as an active principle they flow as it were [its] properties. But other disciples of St. Thomas (cf. Gotti, On God the Creator, tr. 9, q. 4, § 6) think it more probable that these species are rather divinely impressed according to the indigence and inclination of the angelic nature.

IV. The third controversy is about the doctrine of St. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 2; Summa I, q. 55, a. 3), that angels superior in nature understand through more universal and fewer species. Scotus (here q. 10, n. 6 ff.) denies this. To the negative opinion there favor many [things] incidentally said by St. Bonaventure here and especially I Sent. d. 35, q. 4, in the body and in reply to 2. — Worthy of note is what is taught in the solution to 4 at the end concerning the human intellect, namely that man from birth does not have the cognition nor the species of singulars, neither common nor proper (cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. 4, q. 4, Scholion).

V. On the cognition of the angels as to present, past, and future contingent [things] cf. below d. 7, p. II, a. 1, q. 1-3; as to the secrets of hearts d. 8, p. II, q. 6; as to the mysteries of faith III Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3. On this and connected questions: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 24, m. 2, 3. — Scotus, here q. 10, 11, and d. 9, q. 2; Reportata here q. 2, 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1, 2, 3; Summa I, q. 55, a. 1, 3, and q. 56, a. 1, 2; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 96-100; On Truth q. 8, a. 8, 9. — Blessed Albert, here q. 15, 16; Summa p. II, tr. 2, q. 14, m. 3, a. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 6, q. 1, 2. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 2, a. 1, 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5, q. 14. — Durandus, here q. 5, 6, 7. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — Biel, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

Codd. aa bb id est.
Codices aa bb [read] id est.
Vers. 12.
Verse 12.
Cap. 3. n. 3. — Verba Augustini pro ratione addita sunt haec: Neque enim, ut oculus corporis videt alios oculos et se non videt, ita mens novit alias mentes et ignorat semetipsam. Per oculos enim corporis corpora videmus, quia radios, qui per eos emicant et quidquid cernimus tangunt, refringere ac retorquere in ipsos non possumus, nisi cum specula intuemur... Sed quoquo modo se habeat vis, qua per oculos cernimus; ipsam certe vim, sive sint radii sive aliud aliquid, oculis cernere non valemus, sed mente quaerimus etc.
Chapter 3, n. 3. — The words of Augustine added for the reason are these: For not, as the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself, so does the mind know other minds and not know itself. For through the eyes of the body we see bodies, because the rays which flash out through them and touch whatever we discern, we cannot refract and bend back into them, except when we look into mirrors... But however that power be by which we discern through the eyes; that power itself certainly, whether they be rays or some other thing, we cannot discern with the eyes, but we seek [it] with the mind etc.
Prop. 10. — In minori post plena cod. M repetit formis.
Proposition 10. — In the minor, after plena, codex M repeats formis.
Averroes, 1. Phys. text. 69: Quidquid recipit aliquid non recipit ipsum, secundum quod est in actu, sed secundum quod est in potentia.
Averroes, I Physics text 69: Whatever receives something does not receive it insofar as it is in act, but insofar as it is in potency.
Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 14. (c. 4.). — Aliquanto inferius nonnulli codd. tale pro talem i. e. intellectum.
Aristotle, III On the Soul text 14 (c. 4). — Somewhat below some codices [read] tale for talem, i.e. the intellect.
Libr. II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 8. n. 16-20; IV. c. 29. n. 46. et c. 31. n. 48.
Book II Genesis according to the letter c. 8, n. 16-20; IV, c. 29, n. 46, and c. 31, n. 48.
Subaudi: res. — Ed. 1 fuerint.
Understand: res [things]. — Ed. 1 [reads] fuerint.
Gen. 2,2. — Cfr. infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2, ubi sententia Augustini de rationibus causalibus sive seminalibus exponitur. — Paulo inferius plures codd. ut C H L O Y cc et ed. 1 posset cogitare pro posset cognoscere.
Genesis 2:2. — Cf. below d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, where the opinion of Augustine on the causal or seminal grounds is expounded. — A little below several codices, such as C H L O Y cc and ed. 1, [read] posset cogitare for posset cognoscere.
Vers. 10. — Glossam vide apud Lyranum, loc. cit., ubi dicitur: «Qui [Angeli] multa secreta in his didicerunt». S. Hieron. in explicatione huius versus ait: Idcirco idipsum sacramentum [incarnationis] ei [Paulo] est revelatum, ut non solum gentibus, sed et Principatibus et Potestatibus per Ecclesiam manifesta fieret multiplex sapientia Dei.
Verse 10. — See the Gloss in Lyra, loc. cit., where it is said: «Who [the angels] learned many secrets in these [things]». St. Jerome in the explication of this verse says: Therefore that same mystery [of the incarnation] was revealed to him [Paul], that not only to the gentiles, but also to the Principalities and Powers, the manifold wisdom of God might be made manifest through the Church.
Nam Scriptura cognitionem futurorum soli Deo esse proprium docet, ut patet ex Isai. 41, 23: Annuntiate, quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus, quia dii estis vos.
For Scripture teaches that the cognition of future [things] is proper to God alone, as is plain from Isaiah 41:23: Announce the [things] which are to come in the future, and we shall know that you are gods.
Cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 6.
Cf. above p. 79, note 6.
Vat. cogitare seu cognoscere; codd. et aliae edd. sunt inter se divisi; non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3 omittunt seu cognoscere, ceteri vero cum ed. 1 omittunt cogitare seu, quos sequimur.
The Vatican [edition reads] cogitare seu cognoscere; the codices and the other editions are divided among themselves; not a few codices with editions 2, 3 omit seu cognoscere, but the rest with ed. 1 omit cogitare seu, which we follow.
Supple cum codd. I T singularia, quod etiam cod. 1 post verba ergo non cognoscit repetit.
Supply, with codices I T, singularia, which codex 1 also repeats after the words ergo non cognoscit.
Plures codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue cognoscat, et paulo inferius multi codd. recepit pro recipit.
Several codices with ed. 1 incongruously [read] cognoscat, and a little below many codices recepit for recipit.
Sola Vat. et ideo idem est. Aliquanto superius cod. Z nisi sit res creata talis pro nisi sit talis.
The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] et ideo idem est. Somewhat above codex Z [reads] nisi sit res creata talis for nisi sit talis.
Plures codd. ut I K U X Y aa bene indidit. Paulo ante aliqui codd. ad se multiplicandum pro ad se multiplicandas.
Several codices, such as I K U X Y aa, well [read] indidit. A little before, some codices [read] ad se multiplicandum for ad se multiplicandas.
Cfr. August., XI. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6. et c. 7. n. 11. seqq.
Cf. Augustine, XI On the Trinity c. 3, n. 6, and c. 7, n. 11 ff.
Plures codd. ut F H K T W bb in possibili; cod. cc et ed. 1 in possibilem.
Several codices, such as F H K T W bb, [read] in possibili; codex cc and ed. 1 in possibilem.
Alluditur ad illud: Anima humana creata est sicut tabula rasa, sive, ut alii dicunt, nuda. Sub hoc respectu ait Averroes, III. de Anima, context. 4: Omne recipiens aliquid necesse est, ut sit denudatum a natura recepti.
Allusion is made to that [saying]: The human soul is created like a blank tablet, or, as others say, naked. Under this respect Averroes says, III On the Soul, context 4: Everything receiving something must be denuded of the nature of the received.
In cod. 1 additur et determinatam.
In codex 1 is added et determinatam.
Rationem adiungit cod. M quia accidens numeratur penes subiectum, in quo est, de quo vide supra pag. 106, nota 1, et tom. I. pag. 411, nota 6. pag. 665, nota 5. — Avicenna V. de Anima sive in libro sexto Naturalium, c. 5: Cum autem aliquam formam repraesentat sensus imaginationi, et imaginatio intellectui, et intellectus excipit ex illa intentionem, sed postea repraesentaverit ei aliam formam eiusdem speciei, quae non est alia nisi numero; iam non excipiet intellectus ex ea aliam formam, praeter quam acceperat, ullo modo, nisi secundum accidens, quod est illius [v. g. quod humanitas sit Socratis] proprium... Quod autem de hoc intelligitur, hoc est, quod prima forma humana, quae praecedit, ipsa prodest tantum animae ad cognoscendum formam humanam, secunda vero nihil prodest; intentio enim impressa animae est una, quae non est nisi imaginatio prima, et imaginatio secunda nihil operatur.
Codex M adds the reason, because an accident is numbered in respect of the subject in which it is, on which see above p. 106, note 1, and tom. I, p. 411, note 6, p. 665, note 5. — Avicenna V On the Soul, or in the sixth book of the Naturalia, c. 5: But when sense represents some form to the imagination, and the imagination to the intellect, and the intellect takes from it the intention, but afterward [the imagination] represents to it another form of the same species, which is not other except in number; the intellect will no longer take from it another form, besides the one it had received, in any mode, except according to an accident which is proper to it [e.g. that humanity be Socrates']... But what is understood about this is this, that the first human form, which precedes, itself profits the soul only for knowing the human form, but the second profits nothing; for the intention impressed on the soul is one, which is nothing but the first imagination, and the second imagination operates nothing.
De Div. Nom. c. 2. § 4: Etenim videmus in domo, multis unitis lampadibus ad unum aliquod lumen, unita omnium omnia lumina et unam claritatem indiscretam relucentem, et non etiam quis, ut arbitror, poterit alicuius lampadis lumen ab aliis ex omnia lumina continenti aere discernere etc.
On the Divine Names c. 2, § 4: For we see in a house, with many lamps united to some one light, the united lights of all [being] all [things], and one undivided brightness shining back, and not even anyone, as I judge, will be able to discern the light of any one lamp from the others in the air containing all the lights etc.
Scil., si non differunt specie. — Vat. cum ed. 4 praecedentia sic exhibet: quia cum idola [i. e. species sive similitudines rerum] et lumina in medio distinguantur per suas origines, diversae figurae possunt in genere figurae differre specie. Vel aliter etc.
Namely, if they do not differ in species. — The Vatican [edition] with ed. 4 exhibits the preceding thus: because, since the idola [i.e. the species or likenesses of things] and the lights in the medium are distinguished by their origins, diverse figures can in the genus of figure differ in species. Or otherwise etc.
Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. Cfr. supra pag. 108, nota 6. — De principio individuationis vide supra d. 3. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3.
Book III of the Commentary on Porphyry. Cf. above p. 108, note 6. — On the principle of individuation see above d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3.
Vox certitudo ita sumitur in Avicenna, I. Metaph. c. 6: Unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem, qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem, qua est triangulus... et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 rectitudinem. Dein plures codd. et cognitionis naturam pro et correspondentiam. — Cfr. August., II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 37. et IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 21. seq., ubi etiam seq. solutio tangitur.
The word certitudo is so taken in Avicenna, I Metaphysics c. 6: For each thing has a certitude by which it is that which it is, just as a triangle has a certitude by which it is a triangle... and this is what perhaps we call proper being. — Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] rectitudinem. Then several codices [read] et cognitionis naturam for et correspondentiam. — Cf. Augustine, II Genesis according to the letter c. 17, n. 37, and IX On the City of God, c. 21 f., where the following solution also is touched [on].
Plures codd. ut L bb cc et ed. 1 comparationes; cod. W compositiones.
Several codices, such as L bb cc and ed. 1, [read] comparationes; codex W compositiones.
Plures codd. non sufficit species innata.
Several codices [read] non sufficit species innata.
Cfr. Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 12. (II. c. 4.) et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie.
Cf. Aristotle, III Metaphysics text 12 (II, c. 4) and Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Species.
Codd. K U praesupponit.
Codices K U [read] praesupponit.
Codd. V cc et ed. 1 distinctius novae speciei.
Codices V cc and ed. 1 [read] distinctius novae speciei.
Cfr. supra pag. 119, nota 6.
Cf. above p. 119, note 6.
Cod. aa supplet posset, quod codd. Q bb (a secunda manu) interserunt post et applicare.
Codex aa supplies posset, which codices Q bb (by a second hand) interpose after et applicare. ---

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