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Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 115

Quaestio II. Utrum Angelus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus propria voluntate.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Angelus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus actu propriae voluntatis. Et quod sic videtur:

1. Auctoritate canonicae Ioannis tertio1: Diabolus ab initio peccavit; sed nihil est ante initium duratione: ergo nulla creatura praecessit duratione angelicum peccatum.

2. Item, Augustinus undecimo super Genesim ad litteram2: « Non frustra putari potest, in initio temporis diabolum superbia cecidisse, nec fuisse ullum antea tempus, quo cum Angelis sanctis pacatus vixerit et beatus, sed in ipso primordio creaturae a suo Creatore apostatasse ». Si tu dicas mihi, quod hoc non dicit secundum suam opinionem, et bene, quia ibidem, ubi Augustinus ponit istam opinionem, alias etiam ponit, quas non tenet; obiicitur, quod hoc dixerit secundum suam opinionem, quia ipsius opinio fuit, quod omnia simul essent condita, et per lucem intelligit angelicam creaturam formatam, per tenebras intelligit aversam a Deo3: ergo si simul lux facta est et a tenebris divisa, simul cum rerum prima conditione fuit peccatum Angeli; et ita videtur, quod nulla fuit omnino ibi mora.

3. Item, ratione videtur: aliqua creatura corporalis est, quae simul et in eodem instanti est et operatur, sicut lux statim cum est, lucet; et Augustinus4 dicit, « quod lux et splendor sunt coaeva, et si esset lux aeterna, splendor esset aeternus »: ergo cum spiritualis natura sit magis vel aeque actualis, ut corporalis: ergo potest esse, quod in primo instanti cum est, sit in suo actu. Sed actus eius est velle: ergo statim cum est, potest velle, ita quod esse non praecedit velle tempore sive duratione, sed solum natura; sed qua ratione velle potest bonum, eadem ratione malum: ergo cum volens malum sit malus, in primo instanti potuit esse malus. Si tu dicas, quod5 potest habere operationem coaevam naturalem, sed non liberum arbitrium; contra: « liberum arbitrium est sub Deo potentissimum », sicut dicit Bernardus6, et nihil habet retardans in Angelo nec ligans, sed statim cum est, perfectum est et potest operationem illam habere.

4. Item, si oculus crearetur cum actualitate virtutis visivae et impressione speciei, simul esset et videret. Cum ergo Angelus a sui prima conditione habuerit intellectum agentem et species rerum innatas, ut post patebit7: ergo simul fuit et intellexit, pari ratione et simul fuit et voluit. Si tu dicas, quod intelligere et velle fiunt in diversis instantibus; contra: intelligere Angeli est simplex et in instanti potest esse, similiter et velle; sed nihil prohibet, duo indivisibilia esse simul: ergo nihil prohibet, quod intelligere et velle, cum sint indivisibilia, saltem ratione indivisibilis simul sint, sicut ultima duarum linearum contiguarum simul8.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per simile. Quia anima rationalis simul tempore conditur et vitiatur, nec est ibi aliqua oppositio: ergo similiter videtur, quod in Angelo esse potuerit, quod simul fieret et vitiaretur, non tamen a Deo, sicut nec originale peccatum est a Deo. Aut si non est simile, ego quaero rationem: quare anima haec duo potest habere simul, et non Angelus? Si dicas mihi, quod ab actu alieno inficitur anima, scilicet a corpore, sed Angelus a se; hoc nihil est, quia ita cito Angelus fuit cognitus a se, sicut ab alio: ergo pari ratione ita infici potuit ab actu proprio, sicut ab alieno.

Sed contra: 1. Ezechielis vigesimo octavo9: In deliciis paradisi fuisti, plenus sapientia p. 116 et perfectus decore, ergo etc.: ergo cum hoc intelligatur de diabolo, sicut exponunt Glossae, fuit ergo aliquando sine peccato.

2. Item, hoc dicit Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei, capitulo decimo quinto: « In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti, omni lapide pretioso ornatus es; ubi aliquando intelligitur fuisse sine peccato ».

3. Item, ratione videtur: omne peccatum actuale exit in esse per actum deliberationis; sed ubi deliberatio, ibi collatio et successio de necessitate: ergo si peccatum sequitur deliberationem Angeli, peccatum sequitur Angelum non tantum natura, verum etiam duratione. Si tu dicas, quod Angelus propter intellectum deiformem deliberat in instanti, et simul videt et deliberat; ostendo, quod10 non potest esse. Angelus enim ad hoc, quod appeteret, necessario tria praecognovit: et appetibile, et cui appetebat, et rationem moventem — aliqua enim ratio fuit, quae excitavit — sed ista sunt diversa, et impossibile est per naturam, aliquam potentiam simplicem simul et semel ad plura converti; propter quod etiam dicit Philosophus11, « quod intelligimus unum solum »: ergo si non simul, successive ergo cognovit.

4. Item, Angelus, quando conditus est, aut factus est cum sua operatione actuali, aut absque operatione actuali. Si absque operatione actuali: ergo post tempus peccavit necessario. Si cum sua operatione12; sed non decuit Deum concreare alicui rei nisi operationem suae naturae convenientem: cum ergo actio deformis potius sit naturae disconveniens, patet etc.

5. Item, haec duo sunt vera per se, quod nullus in illo instanti, quo peccat, potest vitare peccatum; et nullus peccat actuali peccato in eo quod vitare non potest; sed si Angelus peccavit in illo instanti, non potuit13 in illo vitare, nec in aliquo, quod esset ante illud, nec post: ergo non potuit vitare. Sed si non potuit vitare, non peccavit: ergo si peccavit in primo instanti, non peccavit.

6. Item, malum est corruptivum boni; sed nihil corrumpitur nisi quod est vel fuit: ergo in Angelo aliquid fuit, quod amisit per peccatum. Tunc ergo quaero, utrum in primo instanti peccaverit, an non. Si non, tunc habeo propositum; si sic, ergo peccavit subito. Sed cum in subita mutatione simul sit fieri et factum esse, simul erit corrumpi et corruptum esse, et ita non esse: ergo bonum in primo instanti non est. Sed non corrumperetur, nisi fuerit: ergo in eodem instanti fuit et non fuit, et ita contradictorie opposita sunt simul vera. Sed hoc est impossibile, et propter hoc vult Philosophus14, « quod inter mutationes contrarias de necessitate sit quies media »: ergo inter illius boni productionem et ademptionem fuit quies media, et ita morula. Si tu dicas — sicut dicitur de anima rationali, quia similiter potest ibi obiici — quod15 non adimit bonum, quod infuit, sed quod infuisset, si non peccasset; nunquam enim fuit iustus et bonus, sed fuisset, si non peccasset; contra hoc est Augustinus de Correptione et gratia16: « Ille in veritate non stetit, dictum est de diabolo, quia ibi fuit, sed non permansit »: ergo illa responsio nihil valet hic.

Conclusio

Morula fuit inter creationem Angeli et lapsum eius.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod antiqua positio fuit aliquorum, quod simul tempore fuit diabolus et peccavit, nec unquam fuit nisi malus; et videtur Augustinus illam approbare super Genesim ad litteram17; et ideo aliqui moderni eam tenuerunt. — Sed quoniam, sicut expresse dicit Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei18, praedicta positio accedit ad primam, quae est haeretica, et ita quasi haeresim sapit; communis opinio magistrorum Parisiensium est, quod duratione conditio Angeli praecessit lapsum; et de communi consilio magistrorum positio opposita excommunicata est ab episcopo Parisiensi19. Ideo tanquam magis veram et catholicam, et magis probabilem et communem opinionem dico illam esse tenendam, quod morula fuit inter creationem et lapsum, licet parvula. Propter quam Sancti et expositores et ipsa Scriptura loquitur de malitia diaboli, quasi semper fuisset in ea, quia illud modicum quasi pro nihilo reputatur20.

p. 117 1. Ex hoc patet responsio ad primum, quia, ut dicit Augustinus21, sensus est: diabolus ab initio peccat, id est statim post initium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, dico, quod dicit secundum alienam opinionem; quod patet, quia contrarium dicit undecimo de Civitate Dei22. — Et quod obiicitur, quod ipse posuit omnia simul facta; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad esse naturale, sed non quantum ad bene esse. Unde posuit, quod lux corporalis simul esset et divisa esset a tenebris, similiter, quod non est ordo materialium dierum; sed bene posuit ordinem spiritualium dierum secundum septemplicem conversionem intellectus angelici supra res23.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod statim fuit in actu; dicendum, quod quidam hoc negant in omni creatura; quia tamen Augustinus videtur dicere contrarium in luce et splendore, concedamus etiam in Angelo. Sed tamen non fuit statim24 in actu electionis, quia illum antecedit deliberatio et praecognitio plurium; quia, sicut dictum est in opponendo25, non possunt esse simul, non ob repugnantiam actuum vel simplicitatum, sed propter simplicitatem intellectus angelici, quia una conversione totus capitur intellectus ab uno obiecto, ita quod incompossibilis est in illo instanti conversio ad aliud obiectum.

4. 5. Et sic patet responsio ad duo sequentia. — Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de peccato animae, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia peccatum in anima non fit per actualem deliberationem, sed fit per unionem ad carnem infectam: et quoniam unio est in instanti, deliberatio et collatio non: ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

Scholion

I. Quoad hanc quaestionem inquiri potest 1. de facto, 2. de possibili, 3. de ratione huius possibilitatis sive potius impossibilitatis.

1. Loquendo de facto, communiter tenebatur sententia negativa, cum a. 1240 a Parisiensibus condemnata esset propositio, « quod malus angelus in primo instanti suae creationis fuit malus et nunquam nisi malus » (Collect. iudicior. t. I. pag. 186, et infra d. 23. in fine).

2. Si quaeritur de possibili, Scot. (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 2; Report. II. Sent. d. 4. q. unica) cum aliis censet, Angelos in primo instanti potuisse non solum mereri, sed etiam contrahere malum sive culpae sive poenae. — Sed S. Bonav. omnino hoc negat quoad culpam, et etiam, praescindendo a Christo (de quo nihil determinare vult), negat, Angelum in primo instanti potuisse mereri (III. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.), quia, ut multi dicant, « in omni creatura esse praecedit operari » (ibid. in corp.). — S. Thom. cum Ægid. R. distinguit et docet, Angelos in primo instanti mereri quidem potuisse, omnesque de facto meritos esse (S. 1. q. 63. a. 5. ad 4.), sed non potuisse peccare.

3. Quoad rationem probantem hanc impossibilitatem, et quoad numerum instantium, qui requiratur ad peccatum Angelorum, doctores valde dissentiebant. Praecipue controvertebatur de hoc, utrum creaturae produci possint in actuali operatione. — Alex. Hal., licet S. p. II. q. 98. m. 11. dubius esse videatur, tamen ubi ex professo de hac re tractat (ibid. q. 29. m. 1. a. 7. ad 1.), asserit, quod « nec in caelo nec in Angelo nec in aliqua creatura contingit illud, quod in eodem instanti, in quo primo est, habeat actum aliquem. In omni enim alio a primo prius est potentia quam actus, non solum natura, sed etiam duratione ». — Hanc rationem S. Bonav. hoc loco (ad 3.) propter auctoritatem S. Augustini aliquo modo restringit, cum quoad lucem et actus naturales Angeli rem relinquat ambiguam. Quoad deliberatos autem Angeli actus, qui sunt in genere morum (cfr. infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 1.), negativam responsionem omnino tenet. Assentiunt ipsi B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. et etiam Richard. a Med., qui tamen sententiam S. Thomae ut probabilem admittit. — Attamen S. Thom. (cui concordat Ægid. R., reiectis sex aliis opinionibus) illam rationem non approbat (in Sum. loc. cit.) aliamque ibi et in Comment. (hic q. 2.) affert, contra quam hac vice Dionys. Carth. arguit. Omnes autem illas rationes Scotus evertere nititur, ut suam affirmativam responsionem ad secundum quaesitum sustineat.

II. Praeter laudatos supra et in Schol. praeced.: B. Albert., hic a. 14; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., q. 3, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 8. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 8. q. 10.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the angel in the first instant of its creation was evil by its own will.

Secondly it is asked whether the angel in the first instant of its creation was evil by the act of its own will. And that [it was] so seems [the case]:

1. By the authority of the canonical [letter] of John, the third [chapter]1: The devil sins from the beginning; but nothing is before the beginning in duration: therefore no creature preceded the angelic sin in duration.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the eleventh [book] on Genesis according to the letter2: « It can not without reason be thought that in the beginning of time the devil fell by pride, and that there was no time before, in which he lived at peace and blessed with the holy angels, but that in the very first beginning of the creature he apostatized from his Creator ». If you say to me that he does not say this according to his own opinion, and [you say] well, because in the same place where Augustine sets down that opinion he also sets down others which he does not hold; it is objected that he said this according to his own opinion, because his opinion was that all [things] were created at once, and by light he understands the angelic creature [when] formed, by darkness he understands [it when] turned away from God3: therefore if at once light was made and divided from darkness, at once with the first making of things was the sin of the angel; and so it seems that there was no delay at all there.

3. Likewise, by reason it seems [so]: there is some corporeal creature which at once and in the same instant both is and operates, as light, as soon as it is, shines; and Augustine4 says, « that light and splendor are coeval, and if light were eternal, splendor would be eternal »: therefore since the spiritual nature is more or equally actual as the corporeal: therefore it can be that in the first instant when it is, it is in its act. But its act is to will: therefore as soon as it is, it can will, so that being does not precede willing in time or duration, but only in nature; but by whatever reason it can will good, by the same reason [it can will] evil: therefore since one willing evil is evil, in the first instant it could be evil. If you say that5 it can have a coeval natural operation, but not free choice; on the contrary: « free choice is, under God, most powerful », as Bernard says6, and it has nothing retarding in the angel nor binding, but as soon as it is, it is perfect and can have that operation.

4. Likewise, if an eye were created with the actuality of the visual power and the impression of the species, it would at once both be and see. Since therefore the angel from its first making had an agent intellect and innate species of things, as will afterwards be plain7: therefore at once it both was and understood, by parity of reason also at once it both was and willed. If you say that to understand and to will come about in diverse instants; on the contrary: the understanding of the angel is simple and can be in an instant, likewise also the willing; but nothing prohibits two indivisibles from being at once: therefore nothing prohibits understanding and willing, since they are indivisible, from being at once at least by reason of the indivisible, as the last [points] of two contiguous lines [are] at once8.

5. Likewise, this same [thing] is shown through a likeness. Because the rational soul is at the same time made and vitiated, nor is there any opposition there: therefore likewise it seems that it could be in the angel that it should at once be made and be vitiated, yet not by God, just as neither is original sin from God. Or if it is not alike, I ask the reason: why can the soul have these two at once, and not the angel? If you say to me that the soul is infected by an alien act, namely by the body, but the angel by itself; this is nothing, because the angel was just as quickly known by itself as by another: therefore by parity of reason it could just so be infected by its own act, as by an alien [one].

But on the contrary: 1. Ezekiel the twenty-eighth9: In the delights of paradise you were, full of wisdom p. 116 and perfect in beauty, therefore etc.: therefore since this is understood of the devil, as the Glosses expound, he was therefore at some time without sin.

2. Likewise, this Augustine says in the eleventh [book] of the City of God, in the fifteenth chapter: « In the delights of the paradise of God you were, adorned with every precious stone; where he is understood to have been at some time without sin ».

3. Likewise, by reason it seems [so]: every actual sin goes forth into being through an act of deliberation; but where [there is] deliberation, there [are] comparison and succession of necessity: therefore if sin follows the deliberation of the angel, sin follows the angel not only in nature, but also in duration. If you say that the angel, on account of its deiform intellect, deliberates in an instant, and at once both sees and deliberates; I show that10 this cannot be. For the angel, in order that it might desire, necessarily foreknew three [things]: both the desirable, and that for which it desired, and the moving reason — for there was some reason which roused [it] — but these are diverse, and it is impossible by nature for any simple potency to be turned to several [things] at once and at one time; on account of which the Philosopher also says11, « that we understand one only »: therefore if not at once, then it knew successively.

4. Likewise, the angel, when it was made, was either made with its actual operation, or without an actual operation. If without an actual operation: therefore after a time it sinned necessarily. If with its operation12; but it did not befit God to co-create with anything except an operation befitting its nature: since therefore a deformed action is rather unbefitting to the nature, it is plain etc.

5. Likewise, these two [things] are true per se: that no one in that instant in which he sins can avoid the sin; and no one sins with actual sin in that which he cannot avoid; but if the angel sinned in that instant, it could not13 avoid [it] in that [instant], nor in any [instant] which was before it, nor after: therefore it could not avoid [it]. But if it could not avoid [it], it did not sin: therefore if it sinned in the first instant, it did not sin.

6. Likewise, evil is corruptive of good; but nothing is corrupted except what is or was: therefore in the angel there was something which it lost through sin. Then therefore I ask whether it sinned in the first instant, or not. If not, then I have what was proposed; if so, then it sinned suddenly. But since in a sudden change to be made and to have been made are at once, to be corrupted and to have been corrupted will be at once, and so not to be: therefore the good in the first instant is not. But it would not be corrupted unless it had been: therefore in the same instant it both was and was not, and so contradictory opposites are at once true. But this is impossible, and on account of this the Philosopher holds14 « that between contrary changes there is of necessity a rest in between »: therefore between the production and the removal of that good there was a rest in between, and so a delay. If you say — as is said of the rational soul, because it can be objected there likewise — that15 it does not remove the good which was present, but [the good] which would have been present, if it had not sinned; for it was never just and good, but would have been, if it had not sinned; against this is Augustine On Rebuke and Grace16: « He stood not in the truth, it is said of the devil, because he was there, but he did not remain »: therefore that answer is worth nothing here.

Conclusion

There was a delay between the creation of the angel and its fall.

I respond: It must be said that there was an ancient position of some, that the devil at the same time was and sinned, nor was he ever [anything] but evil; and Augustine seems to approve it on Genesis according to the letter17; and therefore some moderns held it. — But since, as Augustine expressly says in the eleventh [book] of the City of God18, the aforesaid position approaches the first, which is heretical, and so as it were savors of heresy; the common opinion of the masters of Paris is that the making of the angel preceded the fall in duration; and by the common counsel of the masters the opposite position was excommunicated by the bishop of Paris19. Therefore as the more true and catholic, and the more probable and common opinion, I say that this is to be held, that there was a delay between the creation and the fall, though a very small [one]. On account of which the Saints and the expositors and Scripture itself speak of the malice of the devil as if it had always been in him, because that little [delay] is reckoned as it were for nothing20.

p. 117 1. From this is plain the response to the first, because, as Augustine says21, the sense is: the devil sins from the beginning, that is, immediately after the beginning.

2. To that which is objected concerning Augustine, I say that he speaks according to another's opinion; which is plain, because he says the contrary in the eleventh [book] of the City of God22. — And to that which is objected, that he himself posited all [things] made at once; it must be said that it is true as to natural being, but not as to well-being. Whence he posited that corporeal light was at once and was divided from darkness, likewise that there is no order of material days; but he well posited an order of spiritual days according to the sevenfold conversion of the angelic intellect upon things23.

3. To that which is objected, that it was at once in act; it must be said that some deny this in every creature; yet because Augustine seems to say the contrary regarding light and splendor, let us concede [it] also in the angel. But yet it was not at once24 in the act of election, because deliberation and the foreknowledge of several [things] precede it; because, as was said in the objecting25, they cannot be at once, not on account of a repugnance of the acts or of the simplicities, but on account of the simplicity of the angelic intellect, because by one conversion the whole intellect is taken up by one object, so that there is incompossible in that instant a conversion to another object.

4. 5. And thus is plain the response to the two following [objections]. — But to that which is objected concerning the sin of the soul, it must be said that it is not alike, because sin in the soul does not come about through an actual deliberation, but comes about through union to infected flesh: and since the union is in an instant, [but] deliberation and comparison [are] not: therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other.

Scholion

I. As to this question it can be inquired 1. concerning fact, 2. concerning possibility, 3. concerning the ground of this possibility or rather impossibility.

1. Speaking concerning fact, the negative opinion was commonly held, since in the year 1240 there was condemned by the Parisians the proposition, « that the evil angel in the first instant of its creation was evil and never [anything] but evil » (Collection of Judgments t. I, p. 186, and below d. 23 at the end).

2. If it be asked concerning possibility, Scotus (II Sent. d. 3, q. 2; Reportata II Sent. d. 4, the sole question) with others judges that the angels in the first instant could not only merit, but also contract evil whether of fault or of punishment. — But St. Bonaventure altogether denies this as to fault, and also, prescinding from Christ (about whom he wishes to determine nothing), denies that the angel in the first instant could merit (III Sent. d. 18, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to 4), because, as many say, « in every creature being precedes operating » (ibid. in the body). — St. Thomas with Giles of Rome distinguishes and teaches that the angels in the first instant could indeed merit, and that all in fact did merit (Summa I, q. 63, a. 5, in reply to 4), but could not sin.

3. As to the ground proving this impossibility, and as to the number of instants required for the sin of the angels, the doctors greatly disagreed. Chiefly it was controverted whether creatures can be produced in actual operation. — Alexander of Hales, although in the Summa p. II, q. 98, m. 11, he seems to be doubtful, yet where he treats of this matter professedly (ibid. q. 29, m. 1, a. 7, in reply to 1), asserts that « neither in heaven nor in an angel nor in any creature does that happen, that in the same instant in which it first is, it have any act. For in everything other than the first, potency is prior to act, not only in nature, but also in duration ». — This ground St. Bonaventure in this place (in reply to 3) somewhat restricts on account of the authority of St. Augustine, since as to light and the natural acts of the angel he leaves the matter ambiguous. But as to the deliberate acts of the angel, which are in the genus of morals (cf. below d. 41, a. 1, q. 1), he altogether holds the negative response. There assent to him Blessed Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, and also Richard of Mediavilla, who however admits the opinion of St. Thomas as probable. — Yet St. Thomas (with whom Giles of Rome agrees, the six other opinions being rejected) does not approve that ground (in the Summa, loc. cit.) and adduces another there and in the Commentary (here q. 2), against which this time Dionysius the Carthusian argues. But all those grounds Scotus strives to overthrow, that he may sustain his affirmative response to the second question.

II. Besides those cited above and in the preceding Scholion: Blessed Albert, here a. 14; Summa p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 8, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 8, q. 10.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Epist. 1. 3, 8: Quoniam ab initio diabolus peccat. — In minori Vat. durationis pro duratione.
    1 [John] Letter, 3:8: Because the devil sins from the beginning. — In the minor the Vatican [edition reads] durationis for duratione.
  2. Cap. 16. n. 21, in quibus verbis textus originalis ab initio pro in initio et sed ab ipso pro sed in ipso.
    Chapter 16, n. 21, in which words the original text [has] ab initio for in initio and sed ab ipso for sed in ipso.
  3. De quo vide I. Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 32. seqq.; IV. c. 22. n. 39. seqq. et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 19. seq. Cfr. infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 13. a. 1. q. 1.
    On which see I Genesis according to the letter c. 17, n. 32 ff.; IV, c. 22, n. 39 ff., and XI On the City of God, c. 19 f. Cf. below d. 12, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 13, a. 1, q. 1.
  4. Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 1: Sicut splendor, qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur, coaevus est illi, et esset coaeternus, si esset ignis aeternus. Cfr. etiam II. contra Maxim. Arian. c. 14. n. 6. et Tract. 20. in Ioan. n. 8. — Paulo inferius plurimi codd. minus congrue ergo si pro ergo cum, quorum non pauci dein verbis sit in suo actu praefigunt ita.
    Book VI On the Trinity c. 1: Just as the splendor which is begotten from fire and is diffused is coeval with it, and would be coeternal, if the fire were eternal. Cf. also II Against Maximinus the Arian c. 14, n. 6, and Tract 20 on John, n. 8. — A little below very many codices less fittingly [read] ergo si for ergo cum, not a few of which then prefix ita to the words sit in suo actu.
  5. Supple: Angelus; non cum cod. Q (a secunda manu) lux, nec cum cod. A sol.
    Supply: Angelus; not, with codex Q (by a second hand), lux, nor, with codex A, sol.
  6. Haec sententia, quae etiam ab aliis Scholasticis allegatur, collecta est ex iis, quae S. Bernardus in libro de Gratia et libero arbitrio docet de libertate a necessitate, quae competit libero arbitrio. Haec enim, qua sumus « nobilis Deo creatura » et « praestamus ceteris animantibus » (c. 3. n. 7.), « aeque et indifferenter Deo universaeque tam malae, quam bonae rationali convenit creaturae », ac « manet tam integra pro suo modo in creatura, quam in Creatore, sed in Illo potentior » (c. 1. n. 9.). In hac libertate arbitrii « potentissimum aeternae et incommutabilis Divinitatis substantiva quaedam imago impressa videtur », ratione cuius « liberum arbitrium sui omnino defectum seu diminutionem non patitur neque augmentum » (c. 9. n. 28.). Ob hanc tandem libertatem creatura rationalis « sui iuris est » (c. 11. n. 36.), et voluntas a nullo potest cogi (c. 12. n. 39.). S. August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 7. n. 9. animarum rationalium liberum arbitrium vocat potentissimum. — Mox cod. F sed nihil pro et nihil, ac dein codd. L Q operationem suam pro operationem illam.
    This opinion, which is also alleged by other Scholastics, is collected from those [things] which St. Bernard in the book On Grace and Free Choice teaches concerning the liberty from necessity which belongs to free choice. For this [liberty], by which we are « a creature noble to God » and « more excellent than the other living beings » (c. 3, n. 7), « befits the rational creature equally and indifferently with God and the whole [creation], both evil and good », and « remains as entire in its own mode in the creature as in the Creator, but in Him more powerful » (c. 1, n. 9). In this liberty of choice « a certain substantive image of the eternal and immutable Divinity seems to be impressed [as] most powerful », by reason of which « free choice suffers no defect or diminution of itself at all, nor increase » (c. 9, n. 28). On account of this liberty, finally, the rational creature « is of its own right » (c. 11, n. 36), and the will can be coerced by none (c. 12, n. 39). St. Augustine, II On the Morals of the Manichees c. 7, n. 9, calls the free choice of rational souls most powerful. — Presently codex F [reads] sed nihil for et nihil, and then codices L Q operationem suam for operationem illam.
  7. Hic a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 fuit (codd. P Q sint) in diversis instantibus pro fiunt in diversis instantibus.
    Here a. 2, q. 1. — A little below not a few codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] fuit (codices P Q sint) in diversis instantibus for fiunt in diversis instantibus.
  8. Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 21. seqq. (c. 3.) et VI. text. 1. seq. — Paulo superius codd. F Q et ed. 1 ratione indivisibilitatis pro ratione indivisibilis.
    Cf. Aristotle, V Physics text 21 ff. (c. 3) and VI, text 1 f. — A little above codices F Q and ed. 1 [read] ratione indivisibilitatis for ratione indivisibilis.
  9. Vers. 12. seq.: Plenus sapientia et perfectus decore. In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti.
    Verse 12 f.: Full of wisdom and perfect in beauty. In the delights of the paradise of God you were.
  10. Codd. P aa quod hoc.
    Codices P aa [read] quod hoc.
  11. In cod. P bene (a secunda manu) additur secundo Topicorum, c. 4. (c. 10.). Cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 2.
    In codex P, indeed (by a second hand), is added in the second [book] of the Topics, c. 4 (c. 10). Cf. above p. 79, note 2.
  12. Cod. cc et ed. 1 addunt actuali, qui etiam paulo inferius cum nonnullis aliis mss. pro concreare substituunt creare, codd. T U dare.
    Codex cc and ed. 1 add actuali, which also, a little below, with some other manuscripts, substitute creare for concreare, codices T U dare.
  13. Cod. V hic peccatum non potuit, et paulo inferius post ergo non potuit interserit peccatum. Vat. circa initium argumenti post quod nullus in illo addit primo. — Cfr. de hoc arg. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. et 18, et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 15.
    Codex V here [reads] peccatum non potuit, and a little below, after ergo non potuit, interposes peccatum. The Vatican [edition], about the beginning of the argument, after quod nullus in illo adds primo. — Cf. on this argument Augustine, III On Free Choice c. 1 and 18, and XI On the City of God, c. 15.
  14. Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 62. et 71. (c. 7. et 8.). Cfr. V. Phys. text. 12. (c. 2.) et XI. Metaph. c. 11. (X. c. 12.). — Plures codd. cum ed. 1 cadit (cod. K cadat) quies pro sit quies. Dein post productionem in cod. Y additur et corruptionem.
    Book VIII Physics text 62 and 71 (c. 7 and 8). Cf. V Physics text 12 (c. 2) and XI Metaphysics c. 11 (X, c. 12). — Several codices with ed. 1 [read] cadit (codex K cadat) quies for sit quies. Then after productionem in codex Y is added et corruptionem.
  15. Subaudi: malum.
    Understand: malum [evil].
  16. Cap. 6. n. 10. — Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. illa ratio pro illa responsio.
    Chapter 6, n. 10. — A little below some codices [read] illa ratio for illa responsio.
  17. Libr. XI. c. 19. seqq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.
    Book XI, c. 19 ff. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4.
  18. Cap. 15: Et illud, quod ab initio diabolus peccat, non ab initio, ex quo creatus est, peccare putandus est; sed ab initio peccati, quod ab ipsius superbia coeperit esse peccatum. — De prima positione, « quae est haeretica », cfr. quaest. praeced.
    Chapter 15: And that [text], that the devil sins from the beginning, is not to be thought [to mean] that he sins from the beginning from which he was created; but from the beginning of sin, because from his own pride the sin began to be. — On the first position, « which is heretical », cf. the preceding question.
  19. Vide Scholion.
    See the Scholion.
  20. Aristot., II. Rhetor. c. 3. (c. 2.): Quae vero nihil aut admodum parva sunt, pro nihilo habenda esse putamus. — Paulo superius cod. Q propter quod pro propter quam.
    Aristotle, II Rhetoric c. 3 (c. 2): But [things] which are nothing or exceedingly small we judge are to be held for nothing. — A little above codex Q [reads] propter quod for propter quam.
  21. Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 23. n. 30, de quo vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. circa finem, et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. — Vat. cum aliquibus mss. et ed. 1 peccavit pro peccat.
    Book XI Genesis according to the letter c. 23, n. 30, on which see here the text of the Master, c. 4, near the end, and XI On the City of God, c. 15. — The Vatican [edition], with some manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] peccavit for peccat.
  22. Cap. 15. Vide supra pag. 116, nota 9.
    Chapter 15. See above p. 116, note 9.
  23. Libr. IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 22. n. 39. seqq. Cfr. infra d. 13. a. 1. q. 1.
    Book IV Genesis according to the letter c. 22, n. 39 ff. Cf. below d. 13, a. 1, q. 1.
  24. Supplent codd. Z cc et ed. 1 in Angelo, sed melius subaudiretur Angelus, vel lege cum codd. A I in Angelo actus electionis. Dein post plurium codd. I L U substituunt quae pro quia.
    Codices Z cc and ed. 1 supply in Angelo, but it would be better to understand Angelus, or read, with codices A I, in Angelo actus electionis. Then after plurium codices I L U substitute quae for quia.
  25. Fundam. 3. — Mox Vat. perperam vel simplicitatem pro vel simplicitatum i. e. indivisibilium. Dein plures codd. et T W aa bb et ed. 1 qui pro quia.
    Fundamentum 3. — Presently the Vatican [edition] wrongly [reads] vel simplicitatem for vel simplicitatum, i.e. of the indivisibles. Then several codices and T W aa bb and ed. 1 [read] qui for quia. ---
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