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Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 4

Textus Latinus
p. 132

QUAESTIO II. Utrum Angeli creati sint in gratia.

Supposito, quod Angeli non sint creati in gloria, quaeritur, utrum sint creati in gratia. Et videtur, quod sic:

1. Per Augustinum de Civitate duodecimo1: «Creavit Deus Angelos, simul in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam».

p. 1332. Item, super illud Oseae tertio2: «Dilexerunt vinacia uvarum», Glossa Hieronymi: «Per vinacia intelliguntur daemones, qui creati sunt in magna pinguedine Spiritus sancti, sed per superbiam arefacti de caelo ceciderunt»; constat, quod pinguedo Spiritus sancti est gratia Spiritus sancti.

3. Item, Damascenus3 expressius: «Per verbum Dei creati sunt omnes Angeli, et a Spiritu sancto per sanctificationem perfecti»: si ergo sanctificatio perfecta non est nisi per gratiam gratum facientem, et ipse loquitur de omnibus: ergo etc.

4. Item, ratione videtur, quia Deus, cum sit liberalissimus, promptus est gratiam dare omnibus paratis recipere. Unde et Anselmus4: «Ideo homo non habet gratiam, non quia Deus non dat, sed quia ipse non recipit»; sed nulla melior praeparatio ad gratiam quam pura innocentia et voluntas recta: ergo si haec erant in Angelis a sui origine et creatione, per consequens et gratia.

5. Item, fecit Deus creaturam rationalem ad inhabitandum in ea, et hoc, quia ipse Deus vult in ea habitare; unde Proverbiorum octavo5: Deliciae meae esse cum filiis hominum; ergo quod non inhabitet, venit ex aliqua prava dispositione ex parte mentis: cum ergo in Angelis nulla prava esset dispositio ex parte mentis, immo omnimoda idoneitas ad gratiam, videtur etc.

6. Item, pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum; sed ipse fecit Angelos in statu, in quo statim poterant demereri: ergo in statu, in quo poterant mereri. Sed non contingit mereri sine gratia gratum faciente: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram6: «Per caelum intelligitur angelica natura informis»; sed non fuit informis per defectum formae naturalis: ergo informis fuit per defectum formae superadditae naturae. Sed haec est gratia: ergo etc.

2. Item, Gregorius trigesimo secundo Moralium7, tractans illud verbum Ezechielis vigesimo octavo: Aurum opus decoris tui, et foramina tua in die, qua conditus es, praeparata sunt: «Huius lapidis in die conditionis suae foramina praeparata sunt, qui videlicet capax caritatis conditus fuit, qua si repleri voluisset, stantibus Angelis, tanquam in ornamento regis positis lapidibus, inhaerere potuisset. Habuit ergo iste lapis foramina, sed per superbiae vitium caritatis auro non sunt repleta». Ecce, expresse, quod non habuit caritatem.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia gratia in Angelo nullum habet retardativum8: ergo si haberet gratiam unientem Deo, totaliter Angelus ferretur in Deum: ergo nunquam peccasset. Sed peccavit: ergo nunquam caritatem vel gratiam habuit.

4. Item, sicut se habet culpa ad damnationem aeternam, ita gratia ad gloriam; sed statim ut habuerunt culpam, fuerunt damnati aeternaliter et obstinati: ergo statim ut habuerunt gratiam, fuerunt confirmati: ergo nunquam ruissent, si gratiam habuissent.

Conclusio. Probabilius videtur, Angelos non habuisse gratiam sanctificantem a primo instanti suae creationis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod haec quaestio facti est; et quia non invenimus aliam rationem quam congruitatis, probabiliter utrumque possumus opinari, sicut et alii ante nos.

Fuerunt enim aliqui9 dicentes, quod Angeli omnes creati sunt in gratuitis gratum facientibus. — Et ratio, quae movit eos, fuit haec, ex parte Dei scilicet perfecta liberalitas, et ex parte creatorum idoneitas. Quia enim ab instanti creationis erant vasa et receptacula munda, et Deus est promptus suam gratiam impartiri, nisi habeat obstaculum ex parte suscipientis; non dimisit Deus illa ad momentum vacua, sed statim ut condidit, gratia illustravit. Et talia debuerunt de manu Dei exire receptacula, ut statim essent prompta in bonum usum. Unde sicut probabiliter coniiciunt aliqui, quod Deus fecerit arbores plenas fructibus et alia10 in statu nobilissimo et perfectissimo; sic etiam naturam Angeli ornaverit gratia a sui conditione, quae in primo usu bono sive victoria erat perpetuanda, et in prima deordinatione perpetualiter amittenda. — Haec est una positio, et satis videtur consona auctoritatibus Sanctorum, ut patet inspicienti.

Fuerunt etiam alii, qui dixerunt, Angelos non habuisse gratiam gratum facientem ab instanti creationis, sed post. — Et ratio, quae eos movit, est dispositio naturae angelicae, quae fertur in id quod app. 134petit sine retardatione. Unde sicut ex conversione ad malum ita profunde conversi sunt, ut non possent redire, sic, immo multo magis, ex conversione ad bonum sive ex habilitate ita bono totaliter adhaesissent, si gratiam habuissent, quod nunquam lapsi essent11. Unde non videtur aliquo modo probabile, quod lucifer habuerit gratiam; et si ipse non habuit, cum inter ceteros esset excelsus, a maiori arguitur, nec alios habuisse a sui origine. Hanc positionem videtur acceptare Magister12, hanc positionem communiter tenent doctores; et ita huic tanquam probabiliori et communiori concordandum est.

1. 2. 3. Ad auctoritates in contrarium adductas respondendum est per distinctionem gratiae. Uno enim modo gratia dicitur communiter, prout comprehendit quidquid naturalibus est superadditum, naturalibus, inquam, quae sunt de generali rei constitutione13; sicut dicitur gratia habere bonum ingenium, bene legere, bene cantare et huiusmodi. Alio modo dicitur, quod superadditum est libero arbitrio ad rectitudinem faciens et disponens, sicut dicimus virtutes naturales14, sicut innocentia, mititas, pietas. Tertio modo, quod est superadditum tanquam rectificans et complens et elevans, et haec dicitur gratia gratum faciens, quia facit hominem acceptabilem Deo, et ideo acceptabilem, quia conformem15. — Quando igitur dicitur, quod Angelis data sunt gratuita, aut non intelligitur de gratuitis tertio modo dictis, sed primo vel secundo, quia multa dona gratuita habuerunt; aut si intelligitur de gratuitis proprie dictis, non intelligitur ab instanti creationis; sed sicut intelligitur peccatum diaboli fuisse ab initio, quia statim post initium et post primum motum deliberativum cecidit16, ita intelligendum est de gratia Angelorum. Aut si intelligitur de gratuitis proprie dictis et ab instanti creationis, hoc non intelligitur formaliter sive essentialiter, sed dispositive; unde dicitur aliquis creatus in aliquo, quia in proxima dispositione ad illud. Et ita per hanc triplicem viam ad auctoritates inductas et multas alias, quae possent induci, potest breviter responderi.

4. 5. Ad rationes autem sumtas a Dei liberalitate, dicendum, quod liberalitas est salvo ordine sapientiae et iustitiae. Quamvis enim ab instanti creationis cuiuslibet hominis posset eum17 beatificare, tamen longo tempore tardat; similiter, quamvis posset cuilibet parvulo gratiam dare sine baptismate, sicut cum baptismate, tamen non dat. Et ratio huius est, quia gloria est bonum laudabile; ideo non dat nisi per meritum laudabile; et ideo convenit eam dari, praecedenti aliquo merito congrui18. Similiter, quando confert gratiam, si confert adulto, cum gratia faciat habentem dignum gloria, non confert nisi ad motum liberi arbitrii, si habet usum; si vero non habet, ad motum fidei alienae, sive ad meritum Christi19; ideo secundum ordinem sapientiae non statim debuit dare, sed exspectare motum liberi arbitrii, quod et fecit; unde ad se conversis sine mora dedit gratiam. — Patet igitur responsio ad illud quod obiicit de liberalitate et habilitate20, quia non tantum exigit munditiam ut dispositionem, sed motum liberi arbitrii in adulto; parvulo vero potest alienum meritum suffragari, sicut et demeritum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de statu, quod in malo erat21; dicendum, quod falsum est. Quamvis enim non posset mereri ex his quae acceperat, tamen, quia Dominus ita promptus erat dare, sicut ipse accipere, nullum habebat obstaculum in merendo, sicut nec in demerendo. Et hoc patet: sicut enim facile fuit diabolo averti, ita facile bonis Angelis converti; et sicut aversio fuit demeritoria, ita conversio facta est meritoria, statim apposita gratia. Unde sicut aliquis indirecte22 dicitur habere aliquid, quod statim habet, dum indiget et petit, quamvis non penes se habeat; sic etiam indirecte potuerunt dici Angeli gratiam habuisse. Quodsi habuissent maiorem facilitatem ad malum sive inclinationem, et divinum adiutorium in opportunitate deesset, recte obiiceret.

Scholion

I. Agitur hic de gratia sanctificante, non de gratia actuali, ut patet ex corp. et solut. ad 1. 2. 3, ubi notatu dignum est id quod dicitur de triplici distinctione gratiae. Quaestio principalis est de tempore, quando Angeli gratiam sanctificantem a Deo acceperint. De hoc S. Thom. in Comment. (hic q. unica a. 3.) dicit: «Circa hoc est duplex opinio: quidam enim dicunt, non in gratia, sed in naturalibus tantum creati sunt; et haec opinio est communior. Alii vero dicunt, Angelos in gratia p. 135creatos esse. Harum autem opinionum quae verior sit, non potest efficaci ratione deprehendi». De hac autem secunda sententia dicit: «Quae opinio mihi magis placet, absque alterius partis praeiudicio». Sed Sum. theol. (1. q. 62. a. 3.) de eadem secunda sententia dicit, quod «hoc probabilius videtur tenendum»; quae sententia nunc fere communiter recipitur. Eandem opinionem, quae fuit Praepositivi, etiam S. Bonav. iudicat esse «satis consonam Sanctorum auctoritatibus»; attamen primam esse «probabiliorem et communiorem», quam tenuerunt Hugo a S. Victore et Petrus Lombardus. Haec autem sententia praecipue fundata est in duobus principiis, scil. quod Angeli per motum liberum voluntatis, gratia supernaturali adiuti, dispositi sint ad susceptionem gratiae sanctificantis (cfr. infra d. 5. a. 3. q. 1.); et quod in primo instanti creationis Angelus non potuerit esse «in actu electionis» (supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.). Primum illud principium conceditur etiam a S. Thoma; secundum vero non. — Idem problema redit in quaestione, utrum primus homo conditus fuerit in gratia sanctificante, infra d. 29. a. 2. q. 2. Notum est, Concil. Trident. hanc controversiam Scholasticorum quoad primum hominem noluisse decidere; unde consulto dixit (Sess. 5. can. 1.): «Sanctitatem et iustitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat» (loco conditus erat). Notandum autem, omnes antiquos Scholasticos in hac re non firmiter asserendo, sed secundum maiorem probabilitatem suam opinionem proferre. Sententiam S. Bonaventurae praeferunt Alex. Hal., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R. et Henr. Gand.; in sententiam S. Thomae magis inclinant B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Durand., Dionys. Carth. aliique; Scot. utramque censet esse probabilem.

II. Cum hac quaestione connectitur alia, utrum scil. non tantum boni Angeli, sed etiam mali gratiam sanctificantem acceperint; de quo solummodo in hypothesi, quae statuit, eos in primo instanti creationis non habuisse gratiam sanctificantem, dubium oriri potest. Et propter argumenta, quae in favorem huius opinionis afferuntur, ii qui dictae sententiae favent, cum S. Bonaventura (hic et infra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1.), Alexandro Hal., Richard. a Med., Aegidio R. et Henr. Gand. opinantur, probabilius esse, luciferum nunquam gratiam sanctificantem habuisse, sed tantum gratias actuales, quae ad conversionem in Deum requiruntur (d. 28. a. 2. q. 1.). Verba autem apud Ioan. 8, 44, quod diabolus in veritate non stetit, ab iisdem exponuntur de rectitudine naturali cum donis actualis gratiae. Sed alterius sententiae patroni cum S. Thoma, Scoto et sententia nunc communiter recepta contendunt, etiam malos angelos habuisse gratiam sanctificantem vel in primo instanti, vel saltem ante lapsum. Hoc expressis verbis docet Catechismus Romanus, p. I. c. 2. q. 17.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 19. m. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 3; S. 1. q. 62. a. 3. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 3. a. 12; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 8. q. 10. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

English Translation
p. 132

QUESTION II. Whether the Angels were created in grace.

Supposing that the Angels were not created in glory, it is asked whether they were created in grace. And it seems [that they were]:

1. Through Augustine, On the City of God, book 121: «God created the Angels, founding nature in them and bestowing grace at the same time».

p. 1332. Likewise, on that [text of] Hosea 32: «They loved the grape-skins of clusters», the Gloss of Jerome: «By grape-skins are understood the demons, who were created in the great richness of the Holy Spirit, but, dried up through pride, fell from heaven»; it is established that the richness of the Holy Spirit is the grace of the Holy Spirit.

3. Likewise, Damascene3 more expressly: «Through the Word of God all the Angels were created, and perfected by the Holy Spirit through sanctification»: if therefore perfect sanctification is only through sanctifying grace, and he speaks of all [the Angels]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it seems by reason, because God, since he is most liberal, is prompt to give grace to all who are ready to receive [it]. Whence also Anselm4: «Man does not have grace, not because God does not give [it], but because he himself does not receive [it]»; but there is no better preparation for grace than pure innocence and a right will: therefore if these were in the Angels from their origin and creation, consequently grace [was] also.

5. Likewise, God made the rational creature for dwelling in it, and this because God himself wills to dwell in it; whence Proverbs 85: My delights [are] to be with the sons of men; therefore that he does not dwell [in it] comes from some depraved disposition on the part of the mind: since therefore in the Angels there was no depraved disposition on the part of the mind, but rather every fitness for grace, it seems etc.

6. Likewise, God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn; but he made the Angels in a state in which they could at once demerit: therefore in a state in which they could merit. But it does not happen [that one] merits without sanctifying grace: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis6: «By heaven is understood the unformed angelic nature»; but it was not unformed through a lack of natural form: therefore it was unformed through a lack of a form superadded to nature. But this is grace: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory, Morals book 327, treating that word of Ezekiel 28: Gold [was] the work of your beauty, and your perforations were prepared in the day in which you were created: «The perforations of this stone were prepared in the day of its creation, [the stone] which, namely, was created capable of charity, with which, had it willed to be filled, it could, while the Angels stood, have adhered [to God] like stones set in a king's ornament. This stone therefore had perforations, but through the vice of pride they were not filled with the gold of charity». Behold, expressly, that it did not have charity.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason, because grace in an Angel has nothing retardant8: therefore if it had grace uniting [it] to God, the Angel would be borne wholly into God: therefore it would never have sinned. But it did sin: therefore it never had charity or grace.

4. Likewise, just as fault stands to eternal damnation, so grace [stands] to glory; but as soon as they had fault, they were damned eternally and obstinate: therefore as soon as they had grace, they were confirmed: therefore they would never have fallen, if they had had grace.

Conclusion. It seems more probable that the Angels did not have sanctifying grace from the first instant of their creation.

I respond: It must be said that this question is one of fact; and since we find no other reason than [that] of fittingness, we can probably hold either [view], as others before us [did].

For there were some9 saying that all the Angels were created in the gratuitous [gifts] that make [one] pleasing [to God]. — And the reason that moved them was this: namely, on God's part, perfect liberality, and on the part of the created [beings], fitness. For since from the instant of creation they were clean vessels and receptacles, and God is prompt to impart his grace unless he have an obstacle on the part of the recipient; God did not leave them empty for a moment, but as soon as he created [them], he made [them] resplendent with grace. And such receptacles had to come forth from God's hand, so as to be at once ready for good use. Whence, just as some probably conjecture that God made trees full of fruits and other things10 in the noblest and most perfect state; so also he adorned the Angel's nature with grace from its very condition, [a grace] which in the first good use or victory was to be perpetuated, and in the first disordering perpetually lost. — This is one position, and it seems sufficiently consonant with the authorities of the Saints, as is evident to one who inspects [them].

There were also others, who said that the Angels did not have sanctifying grace from the instant of creation, but afterward. — And the reason that moved them is the disposition of the angelic nature, which is borne toward what it p. 134seeks without retardation. Whence, just as from the conversion to evil they were so deeply turned that they could not return, so, indeed much more, from the conversion to good, or from [their] aptitude, they would have adhered wholly to the good, if they had had grace, so that they would never have fallen11. Whence it does not seem in any way probable that lucifer had grace; and if he did not have [it], since among the rest he was lofty, it is argued from the greater [case] that the others too did not have [it] from their origin. This position the Master12 seems to accept, this position the doctors commonly hold; and so one must concur with this as the more probable and more common.

1. 2. 3. To the authorities adduced to the contrary, the answer must be given by a distinction of grace. For in one way grace is said commonly, insofar as it comprehends whatever is superadded to the natural [endowments] — the natural [endowments], I say, that are of the general constitution of the thing13; as one is said by a grace to have a good native talent, to read well, to sing well, and the like. In another way it is said [of] what is superadded to free choice, making and disposing [it] toward rectitude, as we call [them] natural virtues14, such as innocence, mildness, piety. In a third way, [of] what is superadded as rectifying and completing and elevating, and this is called sanctifying grace, because it makes man acceptable to God, and acceptable for this [reason], because conformed15. — When therefore it is said that gratuitous [gifts] were given to the Angels, either it is not understood of gratuitous [gifts] said in the third way, but in the first or second, since they had many gratuitous gifts; or, if it is understood of gratuitous [gifts] properly so called, it is not understood from the instant of creation; but just as the sin of the devil is understood to have been from the beginning, since at once after the beginning and after the first deliberative motion he fell16, so it must be understood of the grace of the Angels. Or if it is understood of gratuitous [gifts] properly so called and from the instant of creation, this is not understood formally or essentially, but dispositively; whence someone is said to be created in something, because in proximate disposition to it. And so by this threefold way one can briefly respond to the authorities adduced and to many others that could be adduced.

4. 5. To the reasons drawn from God's liberality, it must be said that liberality is [exercised] with the order of wisdom and justice preserved. For although from the instant of the creation of any man he could beatify him17, yet he delays for a long time; similarly, although he could give grace to any little child without baptism, as with baptism, yet he does not give [it]. And the reason of this is that glory is a praiseworthy good; therefore he does not give [it] except through praiseworthy merit; and therefore it is fitting that it be given when some merit of congruity precedes18. Similarly, when he confers grace, if he confers [it] on an adult, since grace makes the one having [it] worthy of glory, he does not confer [it] except at a motion of free choice, if [the adult] has the use [of it]; but if he does not have [it], at a motion of another's faith, or at the merit of Christ19; therefore according to the order of wisdom he ought not to give [it] at once, but to await a motion of free choice, which he did; whence to those turned to him he gave grace without delay. — The answer, then, is evident to that which is objected concerning liberality and aptitude20, because he requires not only cleanness as a disposition, but a motion of free choice in an adult; but for a little child another's merit can avail, as also [another's] demerit.

6. To that which is objected lastly concerning the state, that he was in evil21; it must be said that it is false. For although he could not merit from those [things] which he had received, nevertheless, since the Lord was as prompt to give as he himself [was] to receive, he had no obstacle in meriting, just as [none] in demeriting. And this is evident: for just as it was easy for the devil to turn away, so [it was] easy for the good Angels to turn [to God]; and just as the aversion was demeritorious, so the conversion became meritorious, grace being at once applied. Whence, just as someone is said indirectly22 to have something which he at once has, while he needs and asks [for it], although he does not have [it] in his own possession; so also the Angels could indirectly be said to have had grace. But if they had had a greater facility toward evil or [a greater] inclination, and the divine help in the [needed] opportunity were lacking, [the objection] would rightly object.

Scholion

I. It is treated here of sanctifying grace, not of actual grace, as is evident from the body and from the solution to 1, 2, 3, where what is said about the threefold distinction of grace is worthy of note. The principal question is of time: when the Angels received sanctifying grace from God. On this, St. Thomas in the Commentary (here q. unica, a. 3) says: «Concerning this there is a twofold opinion: for some say [they were] created not in grace, but in the natural [endowments] only; and this opinion is more common. But others say that the Angels were p. 135created in grace. But which of these opinions is the truer cannot be ascertained by efficacious reason». And of this second opinion he says: «This opinion pleases me more, without prejudice to the other part». But the Summa theologiae (1, q. 62, a. 3) says of the same second opinion that «this seems the more probable [view] to be held»; which opinion is now received almost commonly. The same opinion, which was Praepositivus's, St. Bonaventure too judges to be «sufficiently consonant with the authorities of the Saints»; yet [he judges] the first to be «more probable and more common», which Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard held. But this opinion is founded chiefly on two principles, namely, that the Angels, by a free motion of the will, aided by supernatural grace, were disposed to the reception of sanctifying grace (cf. below, d. 5, a. 3, q. 1); and that in the first instant of creation the Angel could not be «in the act of election» (above, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2). That first principle is conceded also by St. Thomas; the second, however, not. — The same problem returns in the question whether the first man was created in sanctifying grace, below, d. 29, a. 2, q. 2. It is known that the Council of Trent did not wish to decide this controversy of the Scholastics regarding the first man; whence it deliberately said (Sess. 5, can. 1): «the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted» (in place of was created). But it is to be noted that all the ancient Scholastics in this matter put forward their opinion not by firmly asserting, but according to greater probability. The opinion of St. Bonaventure is preferred by Alex. Hal., Richard of Mediavilla, Aegidius Romanus, and Henry of Ghent; toward the opinion of St. Thomas incline more B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Durandus, Dionysius Carthusianus, and others; Scotus judges each to be probable.

II. With this question is connected another, namely, whether not only the good Angels, but also the evil [ones] received sanctifying grace; concerning which a doubt can arise only on the hypothesis that posits that they did not have sanctifying grace in the first instant of creation. And on account of the arguments brought forward in favor of this opinion, those who favor the said view, with St. Bonaventure (here and below, d. 6, a. 1, q. 1), Alexander Hal., Richard of Mediavilla, Aegidius Romanus, and Henry of Ghent, are of the opinion that it is more probable that lucifer never had sanctifying grace, but only actual graces, which are required for conversion to God (d. 28, a. 2, q. 1). But the words at John 8:44, that the devil did not stand in the truth, are by the same [authors] expounded of natural rectitude with the gifts of actual grace. But the patrons of the other view, with St. Thomas, Scotus, and the view now commonly received, contend that the evil angels too had sanctifying grace either in the first instant or at least before the fall. This the Roman Catechism teaches in express words, p. I, c. 2, q. 17.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II, q. 19, m. 2. — Scotus, in each Scriptum, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 3; S. 1, q. 62, a. 3. — B. Albert, II Sent. d. 3, a. 12; S. p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 8, q. 10. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 2.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 9. n. 2.
    C. 9, n. 2.
  2. Vers. 1. Vulgata: Et diligunt vinacia uvarum. — In Glossa Hieronymi, quae habetur apud Lyranum, in fine substituitur de caelo sunt proiecti pro de caelo ceciderunt; codd. autem non pauci per superabundantiam pro per superbiam.
    Verse 1. The Vulgate: And they love the grape-skins of clusters. — In the Gloss of Jerome, which is found in Lyranus, at the end de caelo sunt proiecti is substituted for de caelo ceciderunt; and not a few codices [read] per superabundantiam for per superbiam.
  3. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 3.
    On the Orthodox Faith book II, c. 3.
  4. De Casu diaboli, c. 3. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 720, nota 6.
    On the Fall of the Devil, c. 3. Cf. vol. I, p. 720, note 6.
  5. Vers. 31. — Paulo superius plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 et hoc quidem pro et hoc quia; forsan legendum: et hoc quidem quia.
    Verse 31. — A little above, very many codices with ed. 1 [read] et hoc quidem for et hoc quia; perhaps it should be read: et hoc quidem quia.
  6. Libr. I. c. 1. n. 3, c. 3. n. 7, c. 4. n. 9. et c. 9. n. 17.
    Book I, c. 1, n. 3; c. 3, n. 7; c. 4, n. 9; and c. 9, n. 17.
  7. Cap. 23. n. 48. — Ezech. 28, 13. — In fine textus Gregorii plures codd. cum ed. 1 sed propter pro sed per. Dein post expresse codd. 1 T U adnectunt dicit.
    C. 23, n. 48. — Ezek. 28:13. — At the end of the text of Gregory, several codices with ed. 1 [read] sed propter for sed per. Then, after expresse, codices 1 T U attach dicit.
  8. Ita codd. F T V aa bb etc.; Vat. nullam habet retardationem. Cfr. infra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. circa finem.
    Thus codices F T V aa bb etc.; the Vatican edition [reads] nullam habet retardationem. Cf. below, d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, near the end.
  9. Inter quos fuit Praepositivus, qui tamen in sua Summa contrariam opinionem vocat communem magistrorum. — Circa initium responsionis non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt quia; cod. bb (a 2. manu) particulam quia interserit post Dicendum quod; cod. cc vero cum ed. 1 post congruitatis subiungit unde.
    Among whom was Praepositivus, who nevertheless in his Summa calls the contrary opinion the common [opinion] of the masters. — Near the beginning of the response, not a few codices with editions 1, 2 omit quia; codex bb (by a second hand) inserts the particle quia after Dicendum quod; but codex cc with ed. 1, after congruitatis, subjoins unde.
  10. Codd. W bb animalia pro alia. Paulo inferius Vat. cum nonnullis mss. sine victoria, cod. cc et ed. 1 sine mora pro sive victoria, quod cod. W (bb primitus) omittit.
    Codices W bb [read] animalia for alia. A little below, the Vatican edition with several mss. [reads] sine victoria, codex cc and ed. 1 sine mora, for sive victoria, which codex W (bb originally) omits.
  11. Cfr. infra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo inferius ed. 1 cum nonnullis mss. habuit gratiam pro habuerit gratiam, dein cum cod. cc excellens pro excelsus.
    Cf. below, d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — A little below, ed. 1 with several mss. [reads] habuit gratiam for habuerit gratiam, then with codex cc excellens for excelsus.
  12. Dist. III. c. 4. et in hac dist. — Plures codd. accipere pro acceptare, et in fine responsionis Vat. concordant pro concordandum est.
    Dist. III, c. 4, and in this distinction. — Several codices [read] accipere for acceptare, and at the end of the response the Vatican edition [reads] concordant for concordandum est.
  13. Vat.: quae sunt de essentiali rei constitutione, sicut dicitur ex gratia etc. Cod. cc et ed. 1: sicut dicimus gratiam habere etc. Paulo inferius post Alio modo dicitur codd. 1 Q repetunt gratia.
    The Vatican edition: which are of the essential constitution of the thing, as is said from grace etc. Codex cc and ed. 1: as we say to have grace etc. A little below, after Alio modo dicitur, codices 1 Q repeat gratia.
  14. Cod. L: sicut omnes virtutes naturales, scilicet innocentia etc.
    Codex L: as all the natural virtues, namely innocence etc.
  15. Cod. cc et ed. 1 quia sufficienter conformem. Mox post primum aut in cod. aa subiungitur dico quod; cod. Z substituit hoc pro aut, quod in pluribus mss. et tribus primis edd. deest.
    Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] quia sufficienter conformem. Presently, after the first aut, in codex aa is subjoined dico quod; codex Z substitutes hoc for aut, which is lacking in several mss. and in the first three editions.
  16. De quo vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.
    Concerning which see above, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.
  17. In cod. cc et ed. 1 additur ex liberalitate.
    In codex cc and ed. 1 is added ex liberalitate.
  18. Cfr. infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. et d. 29. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.
    Cf. below, d. 12, a. 1, q. 2, in the body, and d. 29, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.
  19. Vide IV. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 6. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — Codd. W bb post si vero non habet adnectunt usum.
    See IV Sent. d. 1, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 6, p. II, a. 1, q. 1. — Codices W bb, after si vero non habet, attach usum.
  20. Vat. inhabitatione.
    The Vatican edition [reads] inhabitatione.
  21. Quia scil. Angelus non posset mereri, sed tantum demereri.
    Namely, because the Angel could not merit, but only demerit.
  22. Communissima lectio codd. et omnium edd., in qua hic et paulo inferius ponitur non indirecte, est aperte falsa. Primitus fortasse legebatur non directe quidem, sed indirecte. Quam lectionem, licet sit completior, non in textum recepimus, cum non fulciatur alicuius codicis auctoritate, sed secuti sumus cod. 1, qui simpliciter ponit indirecte. Cfr. infra d. 28. dub. 3.
    The most common reading of the codices and of all editions, in which here and a little below is put non indirecte, is plainly false. Originally perhaps it was read non directe quidem, sed indirecte. Which reading, although it is more complete, we have not received into the text, since it is not supported by the authority of any codex, but we have followed codex 1, which simply puts indirecte. Cf. below, d. 28, dub. 3.
← Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 4, Art. 2, Q. 1→