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Dist. 33, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 33

Textus Latinus
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ARTICULUS II.

De quantitate originalis peccati.

Consequenter circa secundum articulum quaeritur de quantitate originalis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur de ipso originali sub ratione quantitatis continuae1, utrum unum originale possit esse maius altero.

Secundo quaeritur quantum ad rationem quantitatis discretae, utrum videlicet sit ponere unum originale, vel plura.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum originale peccatum reperiatur in omnibus aequaliter.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum originale in omnibus reperiatur aequaliter. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Anselmus de Originali Peccato, capitulo vigesimo septimo2: « Originale peccatum in omnibus aestimo esse aequale ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Originale peccatum est carentia debitae iustitiae, sicut saepe dictum est3; sed quilibet illa iustitia originali est simpliciter nudatus et privatus: ergo si aequaliter omnes sunt privati, aequaliter originali macula sunt infecti: ergo in quibuscumque reperitur originale peccatum, aequaliter reperitur.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per causam. Originale peccatum est in nobis propter Adae inobedientiam; sed inobedientia Adae una fuit et aequaliter omnes posteros respiciebat4: ergo videtur, quod omnes aequaliter culpabiles faciebat.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per poenam. Omnes enim habentes culpam originalem aequaliter puniuntur, videlicet omnimoda carentia visionis Dei5: si igitur quantitas poenae respondet quantitati culpae, videtur, quod si est aequalitas in carentia visionis, quod sit aequalitas in corruptione originalis.

5. Item, hoc ipsum probatur per concupiscentiam annexam. Originale enim peccatum ad omne malum reddit pronum per concupiscentiam — unde dum lex prohibet concupiscentiam, prohibere dicitur omne malum6 — ergo originale peccatum unumquemque corrumpit universaliter. Sed universalem corruptionem non contingit reperire secundum maius et minus, immo in omnibus, in quibus reperitur, in termino reperitur: ergo videtur, quod originalis culpa non possit esse maior in una persona quam in alia.

6. Item, si maius est originale in uno quam in alio, aut hoc est ex actu parentis, aut ex actu prolis. Ex actu parentis esse non potest; nam, sicut

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probatum est supra7, peccatum parentis in prolem non transit. Ex actu vero prolis esse non potest, sicut planum est: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo originale in uno quam in alio reperiatur intensius.

Sed contra:

Ad oppositum.

1. Anselmus de Conceptu virginali8: « Sicut propter naturam nascitur corrupta persona, ita natura per personam efficitur magis peccatrix »; sed peccatum, quod inficit naturam, est peccatum originale: ergo videtur, quod originale peccatum in aliquo possit fieri maius et intensius.

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Nullum malum est in summo, quia nihil est summe malum9; sed originale peccatum malum est: ergo non est in summo. Sed quod est citra summum intendi potest et augeri: ergo originale peccatum intensibile est, igitur potest maius in uno quam in altero reperiri.

3. Item, originale peccatum est concupiscentia10; sed concupiscentia potest intendi, sicut et potest remitti, et aliquando intenditur, sicut patet per experimentum: ergo videtur, quod peccatum originale intendi valeat, ut sit maius in uno quam in alio, vel etiam intensius in eodem secundum status diversos.

4. Item, foeditas carnis est ratio, quare anima contrahit originale11; sed caro non est infecta in summo, et quod non est infectum in summo, dum transit per viam infectionis, potest magis et magis infici: si igitur caro nostra transit per viam infectionis, dum propagatur; videtur, quod magis et magis inficitur, ac per hoc quotidie originale peccatum augmentatur.

5. Item, omnis proprietas, quanto magis appropinquat suae causae, est intensior et fortior, et quanto magis elongatur, debilior12; sed corruptio originalis ab Adam producitur tanquam a fontali principio et radice: ergo videtur, quod quanto aliquis est Adae proximior, quod tanto originalis culpa sit in eo intensior.

6. Item, una anima meliora habet naturalia quam alia, sicut in praecedenti distinctione13 habitum est; sed tanto corruptio peior est, quanto est in meliori natura, sicut Augustinus dicit et expresse ratio manifestat, propter dignitatem eius quod corrumpitur: ergo originalis corruptio peior est in una anima quam in altera; et si hoc, videtur, quod culpa sit intensior.

Conclusio.

Originale peccatum in omnibus reperitur aequaliter.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut, si Adam stetisset, omnes aequaliter essent innocentes, ita nunc, cum Adam peccavit, omnes facti sunt aequaliter peccatores; et ita culpa originalis in omnibus reperitur aequaliter, ita quod non est maior in uno quam in altero, nec etiam intendi habet in eodem subiecto.

Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum est, quod ista tria concurrunt ad originale peccatum, scilicet debitae iustitiae carentia et concupiscentia et carnis foeditas; et primum est ipsi originali essentiale, secundum vero materiale et tertium causale, sicut supra14 explanatum fuit. Si igitur originale deberet augeri, ex aliquo istorum oporteret ipsum intendi; cum autem per nullum horum intendi habeat, in omnibus aequaliter habet reperiri. — Quantum ad carentiam namque debitae iustitiae non potest intendi. Ista enim carentia non potest esse maior in uno quam in alio nisi triplici de causa: aut quia sit obligatio fortior, aut quia sit ibi privatio maior, aut quia modus privandi sit detestabilior. Nullo istorum modorum maior habet esse carentia in uno homine quam in alio. Non est enim obligatio fortior, quia omnes aequaliter obligantur15 in Adam; nec privatio maior, quia eodem dono, scilicet originalis iustitiae, omnes per originalem culpam nudantur; nec modus privandi detestabilior, quia omnes privati sunt per unam inobedientiam Adae; et sic originale ratione carentiae debitae iustitiae non recipit magis et minus, sed in omnibus est aequaliter.

Similiter nec quantum ad concupiscentiam intendi habet. Si enim intenditur appetitus vel concupiscentia respectu alicuius delectabilis in aliquo, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut ex complexione, aut ex assuefactione, aut ex vinculi refrenantis confractione. Primo modo absque dubio concupiscentia augeri potest, sicut patet de concupiscentia carnis, quae

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magis fervet in cholericis et sanguineis quam in melancholicis; sed talis intensio nihil facit ad culpam; non enim est culpabilis, sed naturalis vel poenalis. — Similiter et secundo modo concupiscentia intendi potest16 in eodem homine, sicut patet in eo qui assuefactus est luxuriari et bona cibaria comedere, quod magis est pronus et ardentius concupiscit quam is qui talia non gustavit. Sed haec intensio non facit ad originale peccatum, sed potius ad actuale, quia non dicitur originale peccatum concupiscentia quocumque modo, sed solum prout ab origine est contracta. — Tertio modo non potest intendi, sed in omnibus habet aequaliter reperiri, pro eo quod illud retinaculum originalis iustitiae merito culpae Adae in omnibus est confractum. Et quoniam secundum istum tertium modum attenditur quantitas originalis ex parte concupiscentiae, hinc est, quod quantum ad concupiscentiam originalis culpa in omnibus, in quibus est, reperitur aequaliter.

Similiter quantum ad foeditatem, quae est in carne, non potest esse maius et minus originale; et hoc patet. Nam quod aliqua proprietas intendatur, requiritur idoneitas ad intensionem tam ex parte susceptibilis, quam ex parte proprietatis, quae intenditur, quam etiam ex parte agentis; et si aliquod horum defuerit, proprietas illa non habet intendi, sicut patet consideranti. Omnia autem haec deficiunt in proposito. Defectus enim est ex parte susceptibilis. Nam sicut speculum novum inficitur a muliere menstruata, sed postquam inveteratum est, ex aliquo aspectu non recipit novam infectionem; sic humana natura, in sui primordio17 quasi nova existens, infici habuit a corruptione personae; postmodum vero quasi inveterata, ex nova corruptione non recipit novam infectionem. — Defectus etiam est ex parte agentis, quia nullus est post primum hominem, cuius transgressio respiciat obligationem naturae, sed obligationem personae18. Hinc est, quod talis culpa non habet inficere carnem coniunctam. — Defectus etiam est ex parte proprietatis intensibilis. « Illa enim, quorum impositio est in termino, non habent recipere maius et minus », sicut vult Philosophus19. Foeditas autem carnis, secundum quod est principium contractionis originalis, ortum habet ex carentia originalis iustitiae; et quia carentia illa nuditas quaedam est, et nudo non est reperire magis nudum20, sicut originalis iustitiae nuditas non recipit magis et minus, sic nec carnis foeditas.

Et sic patet, quod ex parte foeditatis carnis originale non habet intendi vel augmentari in eodem vel in diversis, nec ex parte concupiscentiae, vel21 carentia debitae iustitiae, sicut ostensum est; nec sunt plura concurrentia ad originale. Manifestum est igitur, quod originale peccatum in omnibus, in quibus reperitur, habet esse aequaliter; et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Anselmo, quod natura per personam efficitur magis peccatrix; dicendum, quod natura dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo natura dicitur « vis insita rebus, ex similibus similia procreans22 »; alio modo dicitur natura ipsum commune. His duobus modis distinguitur natura contra personam. Et cum dicitur, quod natura corrumpit personam, accipitur natura pro vi propagativa, et corruptio personae dicitur illa quae respicit voluntatem rationalem. Cum autem dicit Anselmus, quod natura efficitur per personam magis peccatrix; accipit naturam pro communi, prout consideratur in supposito — et hoc patet per exemplum suum, quod dicit23: sicut Adam peccante, peccat homo, sic Adam magis peccante, magis peccat homo — et hoc modo natura non habet corrumpi solum per peccatum originale, sed etiam per peccatum actuale. Ex hoc igitur non sequitur, quod originale habeat esse maius et intensius.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum malum est in summo; dicendum, quod est summum simpliciter et summum in genere24; et quamvis non contingat, reperiri summum malum simpliciter, est tamen reperire malum, quod est summum in proprio genere, sicut videmus aliquem ita privatum visu, quod non potest esse magis. Sic et in proposito potest intelligi, quod originale simpliciter privat iustitiam originalem; et ideo eius infectio est in termino. — Posset tamen dici, quod etsi non esset in summo, non tamen sequitur, quod possit intendi, quia potest esse defectus ex parte susceptibilis25, vel ex parte agentis; et utrumque hic deficit, sicut supra ostensum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod concupiscentia potest crescere; dicendum, quod verum est intensive, sed non extensive. Illud tamen crementum26 nihil facit ad originale peccatum, cum non sit nisi vel ex complexione, vel ex assuefactione, sicut ostensum est.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod foeditas carnis potest esse maior; dicendum, quod etsi foeditas carnis, prout est corruptio poenalis, intendatur et crescat, sicut patet in leprosis et seminifluis et aliis foedis infirmitatibus oppressis, prout tamen ipsa est principium originalis, aequaliter habet reperiri in singulis, quia ab uno solo et primo fonte procedit.

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5. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod proprietas intensior est, cum appropinquat suae origini; dicendum, quod illud verum est de proprietate, quae quidem dicit naturam et positionem, et de illa, quae habet continuari cum sua origine, sicut est in virtute movente et luminis effusione; aliter non habet veritatem, sicut patet: nam candela inflammata ab alia ita bene inflammabit, sicut inflammabat illa. Utrumque enim deficit in proposito, tum quia illa carnis foeditas plus dicit rationem privationis quam positionis; tum etiam quia illius foeditatis transfusio est per generationem, in qua generatum primum et secundum habent eandem vim, quam habebat generans primum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una anima habet meliora naturalia quam alia; dicendum, quod etsi hoc verum sit et concedendum, tamen, quantum pertinet ad puritatem innocentiae, omnes animae aequales essent27; et quia illius privationem directe respicit originale, hinc est, quod licet alia naturalia sint excellentiora, non tamen propter hoc intenditur corruptio originalis culpae. Quando enim dicitur, quod tanto peior est corruptio, quanto melior est natura; hoc intelligitur secundum illud, secundum quod natura per vitium corrumpitur; aliter enim non habet veritatem, quia frequenter ille qui habet meliora naturalia, non habet ita gravia peccata, sicut ille qui habet minus bona, et28 in eodem genere peccati.

Scholion

I. Secundum principia in praecedentibus tractata solutio utriusque quaestionis huius articuli non habet difficultatem.

De quaest. agunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 6, m. 9. a. 1-3. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 32. q. unica n. 6. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 82. a. 4. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 32. a. 4; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 108. m. 3. q. incid. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 30. q. 1, d. 32. q. 2.

II. De seq. (2.) quaest.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 8. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 31. a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 112. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. a. 2.

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English Translation

ARTICLE II.

On the quantity of original sin.

Consequently, concerning the second article, it is asked about the quantity of original [sin]. And concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked about original [sin] itself under the character of continuous quantity1, whether one original [sin] can be greater than another.

Secondly it is asked as to the character of discrete quantity, namely whether one is to posit one original [sin], or several.

QUESTION I.

Whether original sin is found in all equally.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether original [sin] is found in all equally. And that it is, it seems:

1. Anselm, On Original Sin, chapter twenty-seventh2: « Original sin I judge to be equal in all ».

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. Original sin is the lack of due justice, as has often been said3; but anyone is simply stripped and deprived of that original justice: therefore if all are equally deprived, they are equally infected with the original stain: therefore in whomever original sin is found, it is found equally.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by its cause. Original sin is in us on account of Adam's disobedience; but Adam's disobedience was one and regarded all his posterity equally4: therefore it seems that it made all equally culpable.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by punishment. For all who have original guilt are punished equally, namely by the complete lack of the vision of God5: if therefore the quantity of punishment corresponds to the quantity of guilt, it seems that, if there is equality in the lack of vision, there is equality in the corruption of original [sin].

5. Likewise, this same thing is proved by the annexed concupiscence. For original sin renders one prone to every evil through concupiscence — whence when the law prohibits concupiscence, it is said to prohibit every evil6 — therefore original sin corrupts each one universally. But universal corruption is not found according to greater and less, but rather in all in whom it is found it is found at the limit: therefore it seems that original guilt cannot be greater in one person than in another.

6. Likewise, if original [sin] is greater in one than in another, either this is from the act of the parent, or from the act of the offspring. From the act of the parent it cannot be; for, as

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has been proved above7, the sin of the parent does not pass into the offspring. But from the act of the offspring it cannot be, as is plain: therefore it seems that in no way is original [sin] found more intensely in one than in another.

On the contrary:

To the opposite.

1. Anselm, On the Virginal Conception8: « Just as on account of nature a corrupt person is born, so nature through the person is made more sinful »; but the sin which infects nature is original sin: therefore it seems that original sin in someone can become greater and more intense.

2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason. No evil is at the highest [degree], because nothing is supremely evil9; but original sin is an evil: therefore it is not at the highest. But what is below the highest can be intensified and increased: therefore original sin is intensifiable, therefore it can be found greater in one than in another.

3. Likewise, original sin is concupiscence10; but concupiscence can be intensified, just as it can also be remitted, and is sometimes intensified, as is plain by experience: therefore it seems that original sin can be intensified, so that it is greater in one than in another, or even more intense in the same [subject] according to diverse states.

4. Likewise, the foulness of the flesh is the reason why the soul contracts original [sin]11; but the flesh is not infected at the highest [degree], and what is not infected at the highest, while it passes through the way of infection, can be infected more and more: if therefore our flesh passes through the way of infection while it is propagated, it seems that it is infected more and more, and through this original sin is daily augmented.

5. Likewise, every property, the more it approaches its cause, is the more intense and stronger, and the more it is removed [from it], the weaker12; but the corruption of original [sin] is produced from Adam as from a source-principle and root: therefore it seems that the nearer one is to Adam, the more intense original guilt is in him.

6. Likewise, one soul has better natural endowments than another, as was held in the preceding distinction13; but corruption is the worse, the more it is in a better nature, as Augustine says and reason manifestly shows, on account of the dignity of that which is corrupted: therefore the corruption of original [sin] is worse in one soul than in another; and if this is so, it seems that the guilt is more intense.

Conclusion.

Original sin is found in all equally.

I respond: It must be said that, just as, if Adam had stood, all would equally be innocent, so now, since Adam sinned, all are made equally sinners; and so original guilt is found in all equally, such that it is not greater in one than in another, nor does it even have it [in its power] to be intensified in the same subject.

For the understanding of this it is to be noted that these three things concur in original sin, namely the lack of due justice and concupiscence and the foulness of the flesh; and the first is essential to original [sin] itself, the second material and the third causal, as was explained above14. If therefore original [sin] ought to be augmented, it would have to be intensified from one of these; but since it has [it in its power] to be intensified through none of these, it has [it in its power] to be found equally in all. — As to the lack of due justice it cannot be intensified. For this lack cannot be greater in one than in another except for a threefold cause: either because there is a stronger obligation, or because there is there a greater privation, or because the mode of depriving is more detestable. By none of these modes is the lack greater in one human than in another. For there is not a stronger obligation, because all are obligated equally15 in Adam; nor a greater privation, because by the same gift, namely of original justice, all are stripped by original guilt; nor a more detestable mode of depriving, because all are deprived by the one disobedience of Adam; and so original [sin] by reason of the lack of due justice does not receive more and less, but is in all equally.

Likewise neither as to concupiscence does it have [it in its power] to be intensified. For if appetite or concupiscence with respect to some delectable [thing] is intensified in someone, this can be in three ways: either from complexion, or from habituation, or from the breaking of the restraining bond. In the first way concupiscence can undoubtedly be increased, as is plain of the concupiscence of the flesh, which

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burns more in the choleric and sanguine than in the melancholic; but such intensity does nothing toward guilt; for it is not culpable, but natural or penal. — Likewise also in the second way concupiscence can be intensified16 in the same human, as is plain in one who is habituated to being lustful and to eating good food, who is more prone and more ardently concupisces than one who has not tasted such things. But this intensity does nothing toward original sin, but rather toward actual [sin], because original sin is not called concupiscence in any mode whatever, but only insofar as it is contracted from origin. — In the third way it cannot be intensified, but has [it in its power] to be found equally in all, for the reason that that restraint of original justice is broken in all by the merit of Adam's guilt. And since according to that third mode the quantity of original [sin] is attended to on the part of concupiscence, hence it is that as to concupiscence original guilt is found equally in all in whom it is.

Likewise as to the foulness which is in the flesh, original [sin] cannot be greater and less; and this is plain. For that some property be intensified, an aptitude for intensification is required both on the part of the receivable [subject], and on the part of the property which is intensified, and also on the part of the agent; and if any of these be lacking, that property does not have [it in its power] to be intensified, as is plain to one considering. But all these are lacking in the case at hand. For there is a defect on the part of the receivable [subject]. For just as a new mirror is infected by a menstruating woman, but after it has grown old, from some aspect it does not receive a new infection; so human nature, in its origin17 existing as if new, was capable of being infected by the corruption of the person; but afterward, as if grown old, it does not receive a new infection from a new corruption. — There is also a defect on the part of the agent, because there is no one after the first human whose transgression regards the obligation of nature, but the obligation of the person18. Hence it is that such guilt does not have [it in its power] to infect the conjoined flesh. — There is also a defect on the part of the intensifiable property. « For those things whose imposition is at the limit do not have [it in their power] to receive greater and less », as the Philosopher holds19. But the foulness of the flesh, insofar as it is the principle of the contraction of original [sin], has its origin from the lack of original justice; and because that lack is a certain nakedness, and of the naked there is no finding [anything] more naked20, just as the nakedness of original justice does not receive greater and less, so neither does the foulness of the flesh.

And so it is plain that on the part of the foulness of the flesh original [sin] does not have [it in its power] to be intensified or augmented in the same or in diverse [subjects], nor on the part of concupiscence, or21 [on the part of] the lack of due justice, as has been shown; nor are there several [things] concurring in original [sin]. It is manifest therefore that original sin in all in whom it is found has [it in its power] to be equally; and the reasons showing this are to be granted.

1. To that therefore which is first objected concerning Anselm, that nature through the person is made more sinful; it must be said that nature is taken in two ways. In one way nature is called « a force implanted in things, procreating like from like22 »; in another way nature is called the common [thing] itself. By these two modes nature is distinguished against the person. And when it is said that nature corrupts the person, nature is taken for the propagative force, and the corruption of the person is called that which regards the rational will. But when Anselm says that nature is made more sinful through the person, he takes nature for the common [thing], insofar as it is considered in the supposit — and this is plain by his own example, which he gives23: just as, when Adam sins, the human sins, so, when Adam sins more, the human sins more — and in this mode nature does not have [it in its power] to be corrupted only by original sin, but also by actual sin. From this therefore it does not follow that original [sin] has [it in its power] to be greater and more intense.

2. To that which is objected, that no evil is at the highest [degree]; it must be said that there is the highest simply and the highest in a genus24; and although it does not happen that the highest evil is found simply, yet there is found an evil which is highest in its own genus, as we see someone so deprived of sight that he cannot be [deprived] more. So also in the case at hand it can be understood that original [sin] simply deprives [one of] original justice; and therefore its infection is at the limit. — Yet it could be said that even if it were not at the highest, it still does not follow that it can be intensified, because there can be a defect on the part of the receivable [subject]25, or on the part of the agent; and both are lacking here, as was shown above.

3. To that which is objected, that concupiscence can grow; it must be said that it is true intensively, but not extensively. Yet that increase26 does nothing toward original sin, since it is only either from complexion, or from habituation, as has been shown.

4. To that which is objected, that the foulness of the flesh can be greater; it must be said that even if the foulness of the flesh, insofar as it is a penal corruption, be intensified and grow, as is plain in lepers and those with a flux of seed and others oppressed by foul infirmities, yet insofar as it is itself the principle of original [sin], it has [it in its power] to be found equally in individuals, because it proceeds from one sole and first source.

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5. To that which is objected, that a property is more intense when it approaches its origin; it must be said that that is true of a property which indeed states a nature and a position, and of that which has [it in its power] to be continued with its origin, as is the case in the moving power and the effusion of light; otherwise it does not hold true, as is plain: for a candle kindled from another will kindle just as well as that one was kindling. For both [conditions] are lacking in the case at hand, both because that foulness of the flesh states the character of privation rather than of position; and also because the transfusion of that foulness is through generation, in which the first and second generated have the same force which the first generator had.

6. To that which is objected, that one soul has better natural endowments than another; it must be said that even if this be true and is to be conceded, yet, as far as pertains to the purity of innocence, all souls would be equal27; and because original [sin] directly regards the privation of that [purity], hence it is that, although other natural endowments be more excellent, yet on this account the corruption of original guilt is not intensified. For when it is said that corruption is the worse, the more the nature is better; this is understood according to that [respect] according to which the nature is corrupted by the vice; for otherwise it does not hold true, because frequently he who has better natural endowments does not have such grave sins as he who has lesser goods, even28 in the same genus of sin.

Scholion

I. According to the principles treated in what precedes, the solution of both questions of this article presents no difficulty.

On the [first] question treat: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 6, m. 9. a. 1-3. — Scotus, II. Sent. d. 32. q. unica n. 6. — St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. a. 3; Summa I. II. q. 82. a. 4. — B. Albert, II. Sent. d. 32. a. 4; Summa p. II. tr. 17. q. 108. m. 3. q. incid. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, II. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 30. q. 1, d. 32. q. 2.

II. On the following (2nd) question: Alexander of Hales, in the cited place m. 8. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3; Summa in the cited place a. 2. — B. Albert, II. Sent. d. 31. a. 3; Summa p. II. tr. 17. q. 112. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2. a. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. De divisione quantitatis in continuam et discretam cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto.
    On the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, cfr. Aristotle, Categories [On the Predicaments], the chapter on Quantity.
  2. Ubi textus originalis sic sonat: « Quod [originale peccatum] propter praedictas aestimo rationes in omnibus infantibus naturaliter propagatis esse aequale ». Similis huic sententia habetur ibid. c. 24. in fine.
    Where the original text runs thus: « That [original sin], for the aforesaid reasons, I judge to be equal in all infants naturally propagated ». A similar sentence to this is found in the same place c. 24, at the end.
  3. Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 1, d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. — De hoc arg. cfr. Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 24.
    Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 1, d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. and a. 3. q. 1. — On this argument cfr. Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin c. 24.
  4. Anselm., loc. cit. eandem rationem affert his verbis: Sicut peccatum Adae, quod est causa, cur [infantes] nascantur in illo, ad omnes pertinet aequaliter.
    Anselm, in the cited place, brings the same reason in these words: Just as the sin of Adam, which is the cause why [infants] are born in it, pertains to all equally.
  5. Anselm., loc. cit. c. 27: Et omnes, qui in illo [originali] solo moriuntur, aequaliter damnari [aestimo]. — Paulo inferius voci visionis edd. adiiciunt Dei.
    Anselm, in the cited place c. 27: And all who die in it [original sin] alone, [I judge] to be equally damned. — A little below, to the word visionis the editions add Dei.
  6. Secundum Glossam in Rom. 7, 7. supra pag. 721, nota 2. allatam. Quoad minorem subsumtam considerentur quae Gilb. Porret. in libro Sex Princip. c. ult. ait: Huiusmodi impositio [vocis] in termino facta est, ultra quem transgredi non licet, quemadmodum in superlativis; etenim albissimus et nigerrimus et huiusmodi sine amplius sunt et minus, eo quod huiusmodi impositio in termino est, ultra quem porrigi impossibile est et citra permanere. Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 9. — Pro maius et minus edd., excepta 1, cum codd. T aa bb et aliis magis et minus.
    According to the Gloss on Rom. 7, 7, adduced above p. 721, note 2. As to the minor [premise] subsumed, let one consider what Gilbert de la Porrée says in the book Six Principles, the last chapter: An imposition of this kind [of a word] is made at the limit, beyond which it is not permitted to transgress, just as in superlatives; for whitest and blackest and the like are without [a] more and [a] less, for the reason that an imposition of this kind is at the limit, beyond which it is impossible to extend and short of which to remain. Cfr. above p. 111, note 9. — For maius et minus ("greater and less") the editions, except 1, with codd. T aa bb and others [read] magis et minus ("more and less").
  7. Hic a. 1. q. 1. — Hoc arg. adducitur ab Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 24.
    Here a. 1. q. 1. — This argument is adduced by Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin c. 24.
  8. Cap. 27: Sicut persona propter naturam peccatrix nascitur, ita natura per personam magis peccatrix redditur.
    Chapter 27: Just as the person is born sinful on account of nature, so nature is rendered more sinful through the person.
  9. Cfr. infra d. 34. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 35. a. 2. q. 3.
    Cfr. below d. 34. a. 2. q. 1. and d. 35. a. 2. q. 3.
  10. Ut monstratum est supra d. 30. a. 2. q. 1.
    As was shown above d. 30. a. 2. q. 1.
  11. De quo vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1. 2.
    On which see above d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. and dub. 1. 2.
  12. Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 17.
    Cfr. the Book of Causes, proposition 17.
  13. Dub. 6. — Quoad dictum Augustini vide supra pag. 790, nota 5. — Circa finem arg. pro in una anima quam in altera (codd. T bb cc et ed. 1 alia) cod. aa in uno quam in altero.
    Dub. 6. — As to the saying of Augustine see above p. 790, note 5. — Near the end of the argument, for in una anima quam in altera ("in one soul than in another") (codd. T bb cc and ed. 1 [read] alia) cod. aa [reads] in uno quam in altero ("in one than in another").
  14. Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 1, d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1.
    Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 1, d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. and dub. 1.
  15. Cod. cc et ed. 1 obligabantur, codd. H Y aa obligabamur, alii codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 obligamur. Cum in subnexis omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 exhibeant nudantur (Vat. tantum cum edd. 3, 4 nudamur), cum cod. K posuimus obligantur.
    Cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] obligabantur, codd. H Y aa obligabamur, other codices with the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 obligamur. Since in what follows all the codices and edd. 1, 2 exhibit nudantur (the Vatican [edition] only, with edd. 3, 4, [reads] nudamur), with cod. K we have put obligantur.
  16. Cod. T addit et remitti.
    Cod. T adds et remitti.
  17. Edd., excepta 1, in statu primordiali (ed. 2 primordio).
    The editions, except 1, [read] in statu primordiali ("in the primordial state") (ed. 2 primordio).
  18. Vat. cum ed. 1 sic: respiciat nisi obligationem personae, codd. V Z et edd. 2, 3: respiciat obligationem personae.
    The Vatican [edition] with ed. 1 [reads] thus: respiciat nisi obligationem personae; codd. V Z and edd. 2, 3: respiciat obligationem personae.
  19. Intellige hic Gilbert. Porretanum, cuius verba supra attulimus pag. 787, nota 6. — Pro imposito Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 potentia.
    Understand here Gilbert de la Porrée, whose words we adduced above p. 787, note 6. — For imposito the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] potentia.
  20. Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3.
    Cfr. above p. 111, note 3.
  21. Vat. sincerius nec.
    The Vatican [edition] [reads] sincerius [for] nec.
  22. De hac definitione vide tom. 1. pag. 134, nota 10.
    On this definition see vol. 1, p. 134, note 10.
  23. De Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 23: Quia cum Adam peccavit, homo peccavit. Cfr. supra pag. 720, nota 5. Ibid. c. 27: Quia cum peccat persona quaelibet, peccat homo.
    On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin c. 23: Because when Adam sinned, the human sinned. Cfr. above p. 720, note 5. In the same place c. 27: Because when any person whatever sins, the human sins.
  24. Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.). — In fine huius propos. post esse magis codd. L O adiungunt caecus.
    Cfr. Aristotle, V. Metaphysics text 21 (IV. c. 16). — At the end of this proposition, after esse magis codd. L O add caecus ("blind").
  25. Edd., excepta 1, cum paucis codd. voci susceptibilis praefigunt sui. Paulo superius edd., excepta 1, pro possit intendi substituunt posset intendi.
    The editions, except 1, with a few codices prefix sui to the word susceptibilis. A little above, the editions, except 1, for possit intendi substitute posset intendi.
  26. Vat. incrementum.
    The Vatican [edition] [reads] incrementum.
  27. Vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.
    See above d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. and d. 32. a. 2. q. 1.
  28. Codd. aa ee omittunt et, pro quo cod. A substituit etiam, Vat. et etiam.
    Codd. aa ee omit et, for which cod. A substitutes etiam; the Vatican [edition] [reads] et etiam.
← Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 33, Art. 2, Q. 2→